I don’t see why your reading (which is very intelligent) is incompatible with the terms “majority” and “minority”.

- They brushed over the heterogeneity of each coalition (and its lack of program, and its cross-communal shortcomings),

Coalitions can be heterogeneous and still structured according to the logic of majority/minority. Other countries that have a more entrenched bipartisan system or a more stable tradition of coalition government still exhibit strong heterogeneity in these groupings. The Democratic party in the U.S. has various caucuses and coalitions within it. The Israeli ruling coalition is composed of parties with different ideologies. Etc.

- They concealed the fact that the power structure in Lebanon lay in the hand of 4 dominant networks (Mustaqbal, Amal, Hezbollah, PSP) aka the quadripartite oligarchy and its informal arrangements.

Concealed from who? I think that this is well-established, and nobody is fooled.

- They gave the impression that the Lebanese system was somewhat bipartisan even though it is actually extremely fragmented and hijacked by the will of a limited number of political players (one neutralised the Constitutional Court, the other neutralised the Parliament, together they neutralised the government and created an informal institution, the Dialogue Table…)

Again, is it any surprise to anyone that the system is fragmented? I know that it seems like half the articles written about Lebanon in the mainstream press make reference to the “rivalry between the two opposing sides”, but surely the other half of the articles make reference to “Lebanon’s fragmented political culture.”

- They facilitated the reading of the elections in terms of “winner” and “looser” even though the quadripartite oligarchy chose not to wage any battle within its ranks (so all its four members are actually winners).

How is this the fault of the terms “majority” and “minority”?

- They raised expectations by giving the impression that one coalition could govern without the other.

This may be true.

These labels more than contribute to some kind of understanding of the political dynamic… they actually determine our reading of the situation.

“I honestly cannot tell the difference between the Kataeb, the LF, the NB, the NLP and the FPM in terms of economical, educational and institutional outlook.”

Agreed.

Technically, an opposition is a political group that is outside government. This hasn’t been the case for Amal since the 1980s or Hezbollah since 2005 or FMP since 2008.

The FPM did not join the government after the 2005 elections, so how could they have been anything but an opposition?

As for Hizb/AMAL, when they resigned from the government in late 2006, they essentially joined the opposition. Even if Saniora didn’t accept their resignations, the whole point of the walk-out was to empty the existing government of constitutional legitimacy (based on a very particular reading of the Preamble, clause j) and to bring it down.

It wasn’t just a “rift”! It was a frontal assault on the politics of the March 14 alliance.

“I hope all this isn’t coming across as word play.”

It is, kind of.

I mean, at the end of the day, we can chase our tails about how to define this or that as long as we want. What matters, surely, is the extent to which a label contributes to our understanding of the political dynamic.

And I believe that “majority” and “minority” were actually very productive labels for a while. The two coalitions held up remarkably well for a four-year period, coordinating their policies and stances in a manner that was quite surprising, given what you would expect about “weak internal forces” etc.

The argument you presented in your reply isn’t exactly the one I’m trying to make.
I’m not a consensualist by the way. I would have liked to live in a bipartisan political system in which u can choose between two political programs. But as a Lebanese, I’m never given a choice between two programs (even if the two cross-communal coalitions pretend otherwise… hence raised expectations). As you know, the political scene is extremely fragmented and sometimes programs and outlooks are much more similar across the coalition divide than within it. For example, the convergence between christian parties is striking. I honestly cannot tell the difference between the Kataeb, the LF, the NB, the NLP and the FPM in terms of economical, educational and institutional outlook. That’s why when it was time to vote, the only debate was geopolitical! On the other hand, I see no such convergence within the different elements of the Lebanon First parliamentary bloc.

I don’t believe Lebanon – political system and society – is that screwed up (though both are quite dysfunctional). I think it is extraordinarily complex. And any analysis of it should reflect that complexity.

Labels such as “Opposition”, “Loyalist”, “Majority” and “Minority” do not reflect this complexity but reduce it to one element that is extremely misleading.

Technically, an opposition is a political group that is outside government. This hasn’t been the case for Amal since the 1980s or Hezbollah since 2005 or FMP since 2008. In the 1990s Jumblatt started using the label opposition while still in government. But that doesn’t change the fact that these parties are actually governmental parties, and some will probably remain so even if they were not participating in government (ex: Michel Murr, Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt). This is the Lebanese reality.

I wouldn’t say that from late 2006 until mid-2008, “there was a clear opposition that was attempting to bring down the government”. How much does this translate or explain the actual power struggles? I don’t believe it does.
What happened in 2006 was more like a rift within the governing coalition (structured around the quadripartite oligarchy) joined by several other political groups (some qualify as parliamentarian opposition, while others were not even in parliament…). No political actor knew how to deal with this rift. If Siniora had accepted the resignation of the Amal and Hezbollah ministers (who were loyal to the President), then we could have been able to speak in term of government vs opposition. But he never did! And he actually couldn’t because the resigning parties are part of the ruling oligarchy.
As for the “loyalist” label, everyone is a loyalist inasmuch as they are loyal to one of the power centers, the question is to which one: to the Prime Minister? to the President? to the Speaker? to a Za’im? Calling a coalition that has different allegiances “loyalist” is obviously misleading.
I hope all this isn’t coming across as word play.

As for “majority” and “minority”, this is suited in truly parliamentarian countries that have a bipartisan system. This is not the case of Lebanon. Not only are we not bipartisan but the power center is certainly not the parliament. What meaning do these labels mean when you have at least 5 different parties (patronage networks) under each label and that the ties and commonalities within each camp are extremely weak?! If it is used to show that one is larger than the other, then why not oppose the larger and the smaller coalition? If it is meant to imply that one coalition can rule without the other than it is a deceptive categorisation because of the power structure and the informal power sharing arrangements (ex: Amal and Mustaqbal public administrations, Jumblatistan, Hezbollah-land…).
“Majority” and “minority” simply do not reflect the actual power structure that still relies on the quadripartite oligarchy that is gradually integrating new members (notably the FPM and the Lebanese Forces).

I don’t believe one can analyse the Lebanese political game in terms of “majority”/”minority”, “opposition”/”loyalist”, “pro-west”/”pro-syrian”. These labels are extremely misleading. You cannot ignore the label because it is in public use, but I believe one should always stress that the label does not describe the object it refers to (just like commercial labels).

What’s wrong with “majority” and “minority”? Clearly, it is no longer a useful category, given that March 14 is disintegrating, as a coalition. But between 2005 and the first half of 2009, there was a clear parliamentary majority and minority. Right?

Same goes for “opposition” and “loyalist”. They represent political projects. From late 2006 until mid-2008, there was a very clear opposition that was attempting to bring down the government, which was composed of loyalist parties. What’s wrong with this label?

As for pro-West/anti-Syrian, etc. I agree this is problematic, but when I use these terms it is almost always in the context of an article in the mainstream media, with an audience that may not even know where Lebanon is. So we resort to such labels.

As for consensualism: I’ve made my argument on this score several times, and published an opinion piece in The National on it a few weeks ago. Didn’t we discuss it then?

To me, all of the qualifications that you’ve added are both obstacles to a non-consensual system as well as being partly engendered by the consensual system.

Your argument seems to be: look at how screwed up Lebanon is. Given the heterogeneity present in both coalitions, and given the facts of Hezbollah’s weapons and the patronage networks of various parties, the best system we can hope for is a consensual one.

I disagree, and I’ve explained why several times on this blog.

Any political coalition is going to have a certain degree of heterogeneity in it. Look at the most recent health care vote in the U.S. congress. The Democrats had 40 votes to spare in the House, and the bill passed by only two votes.

Why don’t we pick one specific issue that you think needs to be analyzed further, vis-a-vis the cabinet formation process, and discuss it.

The “Opposition” is part of the government, one wonder to whom the “Loyalist” are loyal, the “Minority” and the “Majority” are actually a coalition of a great number of parties, networks, blocs who sometimes are hostile to each other and have good ties with parties or networks from the other side. The “pro-West” is actually “anti-syrian” and some are actually distrustful of the west and belong to regional patronage networks… the same could be said about the “pro-Syrian”. Their value is more polemical than anything and it serves to mobilise the target group and comfort foreign sponsors.

Traditionally, the Lebanese have used the terms “Opposition” and “Loyalist” (which were only relevant under Khoury, Chamoun and Helou), the other appellations are new and were originally devised to fit geopolitical considerations.

Regarding cabinet formation, you say “there’s not so much left to say”, I’m not so sure about that. I think these four months are full with elements that can be informatively analysed. And you did add “the rules regarding cabinet formation should be very clear“. Well, they obviously are not… or else you wouldn’t have put a “should”. As for the time limit, well, that calls for institutional changes. So I’m curious to know how you would clarify them?

You say “consensual government is a boneheaded idea“. But all our governments have been consensual. Even if the “March XIV” coalition had decided and was able to form a so-called majority government (which is impossible considering the power structure in Lebanon most notably because of Hezbollah’s weapons and Amal’s control on large chunks of the administration and the speakership, and all that with the full support the two parties enjoy from most Shiite-Lebanese), you would have had a coalition government in which parties have conflicting agendas. Here are a couple of examples:
- the PSP said it would oppose privation
- the LF is very carefully working on a patronage network and blocking other christian forces from doing the same. And it is backed by the Maronite Patriarch and the Future Movement.
- the Lebanon First parliamentary bloc cannot agree on any policy except one (the economical policy because they have no say in it), because of its heterogeneity. It includes islamists, liberals, traditionalists, people with “former” connections to the Syrian intelligence, people with differing geopolitical outlooks, wealthy and semi-autonomous clients.
So even an improbable so called “majority coalition”, it would still be a precarious consensual formation abiding by consensual rules.

The interior ministry is no joke; it’s one of the most important of them all. And it’s sort of amazing that we have an activist minister in there. I think he can scarcely believe it himself sometimes.

Is it just me not being attentive enough? or has he been powerless while the cabinet formation goes on?