Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

Sources are reporting that the new American ambassador to Damascus will be Robert Ford, former ambassador to Algeria and current deputy ambassador to Iraq.

It’s funny: I was having tea with an NPR journalist yesterday afternoon and we were remarking on the fact that we still have no inkling of what the Obama Administration’s Syria policy is. For all we know, there is no policy… especially if they can’t decide whether or not to appoint an ambassador to Syria. Well, maybe I was wrong.

In other news, there seems to have been some confusion regarding the identity of one Ali Tajeddine who was a victim on the tragic Ethiopian Airlines crash last week. Some have suggested that this was the wealthy Shiite businessman by the same name whose purchases of land north of the Litani caused some controversy back in 2007. Here’s an excerpt from a piece by Nick Blanford in the Christian Science Monitor from back then:

For the past year, Ali Tajiddine, a Shiite businessman who traded diamonds in West Africa before branching into property development and construction, has been snapping up vast tracts of land in the district from impoverished Christian and Druze property holders.

…

Walid Jumblatt, leader of Lebanon’s Druze and arch foe of Hizbullah, says that the land is being purchased with Iranian funds delivered to Hizbullah and disbursed by Tajiddine. Tajiddine’s connections to Hizbullah are widely known locally in south Lebanon. One of his relatives was arrested in Antwerp, Belgium, in May 2003 in a case involving diamonds from West Africa and suspected money laundering on behalf of Hizbullah.

(For more conspiracy theories involving real estate, Jumblatt, and Hizbullah, see here.)

Anyway, the point of bringing all of this up is to say that the Ali Tajeddine killed on the Ethiopian Airlines crash was not the same Ali Tajeddine who was buying up land. According to the Lebanese National News Agency, the crash victim was born on March 4, 1979, which would have made him almost 31 years old. A journalist friend of mine who has interviewed the businessman Ali Tajeddine tells me that he is definitely older than 31, so it’s not the same guy.

Those rushing to interpret the crash as a big blow to Hizbullah financing should take this into consideration. (Although the Hassan Tajeddine who was killed was in fact the Hassan Tajeddine).

Click image to download IFES report on electoral systems (highly useful).

A friend of mine recently drew my attention to the fact that the ministerial statement (al-bayan al-wizari) of Saad al-Hariri’s government contains a surprising clause: a commitment to begin developing a new electoral law for the 2013 parliamentary elections within the next eighteen months (see article no. 20) It’s not clear to me how binding this commitment is or whether Parliament can really pressure the cabinet in any way if they don’t deliver a new draft law by June of 2011, but there is officially supposed to be a re-visitation of the issue of electoral reform.

Unfortunately, there is very little understanding of what kinds of electoral systems exist, what kinds of outcomes different systems tend to produce, and what kinds of measures are necessary to implement them.

This doesn’t mean that there is a lack of rhetoric on the issue. Take, for example, Christian parties like the Lebanese Forces, the Kata’eb, and (some elements within) the Free Patriotic Movement. These groups tend to support the idea of small (even single-seat) districts where candidates are elected on a majoritarian basis (as they are, for example, in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.K. House of Commons). Parties like AMAL and Hezbollah, on the other hand, have called for a single national district with candidates elected according to proportional representation (as is found, among other places, in Israel.)

These two systems are diametrically opposed. They represent two extreme poles on a wide spectrum of electoral systems. One would think that, given the differences in the two models and the forms of government that they engender, a public debate might have emerged by now, exposing the merits and drawbacks of both sides. Of course, no such debate has really emerged, and the reason for this, I believe, is that most people (including politicians) don’t really get electoral systems. Until quite recently, neither did I, and I’m still figuring them out.

But guess what? It’s your lucky day. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) has graciously allowed me to publish a report that explains, in a clear and concise manner, some of the basic principles of different electoral systems and their implications for Lebanon. I’ve seen no better short presentation of these issues that is specifically geared to the Lebanese context, so I highly urge you to download it (it’s in PDF), read it carefully, and come back and tell us all which system you’d like to see instituted.

Update: This report by Matt Nash is highly worth reading. It breaks down the numbers behind the proposal to lower the voting age to 18. If you’re curious about how many of the 18-21 year-olds belong to which sect, this report provides the figures presented by Rabi` al-Habr’s company (Statistics International).

(The scene: A Beirut cafe)

Abu Michel: Did you hear that they’re trying to lower the voting age to 18?

Abu Samir: Of course. What a ridiculous idea.

Abu Michel: What do 18 year-olds know about anything?

Abu Samir: When I was 18, I was still a child.

Abu Michel: And the 18 year-olds these days? They’re even more immature, with their video games and their internets.

Abu Samir: Well, I’m glad that Hakim has been very clear on this point. He will not accept lowering the voting age unless they also allow Lebanese emigrants abroad to vote absentee.

Abu Michel: What do you mean “Hakim has been very clear”? El-General has been even clearer!

Abu Samir: So we see eye-to-eye…

Abu Michel: Absolutely.

Abu Samir: I have soooo many relatives living outside Lebanon. If they could vote, the entire picture would change.

Abu Michel: I have so many as well. Dozens!

Abu Samir: Hundreds!

Abu Michel: Thousands!

Abu Samir: Fourteen million! That’s the number of Lebanese living in the diaspora.

Abu Michel: I heard it was more like twenty million!

Abu Samir: Whatever the number is, it’s a lot ya zalameh. And they’re mostly Christian. Why do you think the Berris and Hariris and Jumblatts don’t want to let them vote?

Abu Michel: Absolutely. Look at Carlos Slim. Richest man in the world. Lebanese.

Abu Samir: (smiling) Not just Lebanese. Maronite.

Abu Michel: (smiling) Naturally. And I’m sure that Mr. Slim would love to vote in the municipal elections here in Lebanon. But noooooo, what do Berri and Hariri say?

Abu Samir: (sarcastic voice) “He’s been away too long… he’s never been to Lebanon… his father left when he was 14… he doesn’t even speak Arabic…” Give me a break! Once a Lebanese, always a Lebanese!

Abu Michel: Exactly! He has a right to vote in his ancestral municipality, even if he’s never stepped foot in it!

Abu Samir: Hell, I’ve never even been to my municipality either! We were registered erroneously in Akkar two generations ago and we’ve never been able to change it!

Abu Michel: Me too! I’ve never been to West Bekaa, but do you think that’s going to prevent me from impacting the lives of the poor schmucks who do live out there?

Abu Samir: Exactly! And so if it’s good enough for us, why shouldn’t it be good enough for Carlos Slim?

Abu Michel: And Shakira!

Abu Samir: Yasmine Bleeth!

Abu Michel: Salma Hayek!

Abu Samir: Keanu Reeves!

Abu Michel: Tiffany!

Abu Samir: And that hot chick who plays the Czech student in American Pie!

Abu Michel: You see? There are so many expatriate Christians… I mean, umm, Lebanese… who should not be deprived of their right to vote.

Abu Samir: I couldn’t agree more. Plus, if we let them vote in our elections, maybe they’ll finally start taking an interest in Lebanese affairs.

Abu Michel: Good point. If there’s one thing that Lebanon needs, it’s foreigners taking an interest in Lebanese affairs.

Abu Samir: Pass the sugar.

**

Thanks are due to the talented Maya Zankoul for the illustrations. To see previous collaborations between QN and Maya, click here.

While I was in Beirut last week, I stopped by the final lecture of The Beirut Exchange (a two-week program organized by Mideastwire twice a year, in which college and masters students get to meet various political bigwigs and study Arabic).

If you’re at all interested in Middle East politics, and Lebanon in particular, I’d consider checking this out. This year’s program included sit-downs with President Suleiman, Michel Aoun, Walid Jumblatt, Nawwaf Mousawi, Hassan Fadlallah, Nicholas Blanford, Paul Salem, Rami Khoury, and many other luminaries of the Beirut political scene. Nick Noe, who runs the program, tells me that they’re also considering setting up a separate branch in Syria in the near future, and perhaps farther afield as well.

Here’s a story about the program in as-Safir and here’s the advertisement for the June program (pdf).

Here are two parking stories, both of which I encountered today within a few hours of each other.

**

While getting my head shaved at my favorite barber, H., this evening in Beirut, I learned that he had just been in a fight with the owner of the shop next door. The fight began as an argument over a parking spot, but soon escalated into a brawl. The local neighborhood boys quickly came out of the woodwork, hustling to H’s defense, but by then he had already gotten the better of his adversary and sent him packing.

As I sat in the chair, my head covered in shaving foam, H. received one phone call after another from people who had heard about the fight and were trying to mediate between the two men. My barber, who is typically a very mild-mannered man, spent half an hour shouting into the telephone, vowing to bring the world down upon the guy’s head if he dared to say a word about parking ever again. There were threats veiled and direct, and mentions of aquaintances with itchy trigger-fingers.

As he fumed and spouted, the phone tucked into the crook of his shoulder, H continued shaving. His hands remained as steady as ever and the straight blade didn’t so much as tremble as he scraped it over my scalp. I sat still and sipped my coffee.

**

Earlier in the day, my grandmother told me that she’d gotten a call from a police officer a few months back. My aunt was visiting at the time, and she answered the phone. Here’s the conversation, as my grandmother told it:

Aunt: Allo?

Officer: Marhaba.

Aunt: Marhabtein.

Officer: May I please speak with Umm Ibrahim?  

Aunt: Who’s speaking?

Officer: I’m calling from Maghfar Hbeish.

Aunt: I’m her daughter. Can I help you?

Officer: Yes, it seems your mother hasn’t paid a parking ticket in Hamra for six months.

Aunt: That’s impossible. She never travels to Hamra.

Officer: Well, we have a record here of a ticket for a car registered in her name. The license plate is 1234567.

Aunt: Oh, I see. There’s been a mistake. She sold that car five years ago. The current owner is responsible, not my mother.

Officer: Well, I’m afraid she’ll have to come down to the station to clear it up.

Aunt: What? She’s an old woman! And she lives in the mountains! She can’t come all the way down to the police station in Beirut.

Officer: She’s an old woman? What year was she born?

Aunt: 1932.

Officer: 1932?! Let me speak to her.

Aunt: Hold on. Mama! Come speak to the police.

(My grandmother shuffles to the phone)

Grandmother: Hello?

Officer: What are you still doing driving at your age?

Grandmother: Well, I…

Officer: Stop driving! You’re too old!

Grandmother: Ok, I’ll stop. But what about the ticket?

Officer: Don’t worry about it. I’m tearing it up, and I’m going to write down that the owner of the car is dead.

Grandmother: Thanks, ya habibi. I appreciate it.

Officer: Wa law, ya Sittna? Have a nice day.

Grandmother: Thanks. Goodbye.

How much of the current fight about administrative appointments is about sectarian politics, and how much of it is just about politics?

When one hears reports about how so-and-so is demanding that such-and-such position is given to this or that sect, it’s tempting to get up on the soapbox and proclaim that confessionalism is rearing its ugly head again. In a non-confessional system — so the secular activist’s complaint goes — there would be no impediments to finding “the right person for the job.”

In my view, this way of looking at the issue is problematic. At any given time there are probably several people, from several different sects, who could fill an administrative position and do a very good job. The problem, in most cases, is not that the ideal candidate is prevented from getting the job because of his/her sect, but because they are not part of the relevant patronage network.

Take, for example, the current quarrel about the directorship of General Security. Supposedly, Aoun wants the position to go to “a Maronite” and Berri wants it to go to “a Shiite”. But surely it’s not as simple as that. Aoun wants the position to go to a Maronite who is loyal to the FPM, and Berri wants a Shiite loyal to AMAL. I would venture to say that Aoun would rather have a Shiite loyal to the FPM in the spot rather than a Maronite loyal to AMAL.

In other words, the real obstacle to getting qualified people in the right jobs is cronyism, not confessionalism. If we got rid of the system of confessional quotas in administrative appointments, it would not suddenly throw open the gates to a legion of qualified bureaucrats who had been prevented from getting the right jobs because they came from the wrong sect.

The real role that confessionalism plays in all of this is that of a smokescreen. By pretending that they are the defenders of Maronite and Shiite interests,  Aoun and Berri provide sectarian cover for their mundane political squabbles, just as Hariri does for the Sunnis, and Jumblatt does for the Druzes, etc.

I think that this has broader implications for the anti-confessionalism debate in parliament as well. Simply put, it’s not enough to just advocate for the abolishment of confessionalism. You have to identify what kind of a system you want to replace it with, and how you are going to counter-act the effects of patronage, cronyism, corruption, etc.

The only issue of real import in Lebanon these days — as far as political reform is concerned — is Nabih Berri’s controversial call to establish a committee to explore the ways and means to abolish political sectarianism.

Yes, you heard me right. Berri has called a meeting. A brown bag lunch. A coffee hour. And everybody — from Samir Geagea to Michel Aoun to Saad al-Hariri — has thrown a huge hissy fit.

Let’s pause for a moment and appreciate the irony of this situation. Abolishing political sectarianism — which is ostensibly a core component of Free Patriotic Movement and March 14 values — has now become the issue over which the likes of Aoun, Geagea, and Hariri find common ground to rail against.

Their excuse? It’s too much, too soon. “We have to eliminate sectarianism in our hearts before we eliminate it in our institutions,” says Patriarch Sfeir. Fair enough. But what harm will be done by establishing a commission and starting a national conversation? How else do these politicians propose to eliminate sectarianism in the hearts of the Lebanese? They can barely keep the electricity on 18 hours a day.

Most questionable, to my mind, are the “shoot the messenger” articles that one reads in the press by liberal-minded civil society types. The argument runs as follows: Abolishing sectarianism is important and necessary, but not if Nabih Berri is proposing it:

“Who is [Berri] fooling? The primary benefactors of the abolition of political sectarianism would be the Shia, demographically the largest community in Lebanon, who overwhelmingly side with Hezbollah and Amal. Despite the urgency of eliminating sectarianism from both Lebanese society and the country’s official texts, it would be hard to accept that the largest community, the one controlled by the Hezbollah-led opposition and its arsenal, would be then able to control the country, its institutions and decisions, including UN Security Council resolutions 1559 and 1701.”

This strikes me as nothing but cynical fear-mongering. Let’s assume that Hanin Ghaddar is right, and that the primary benefactors would indeed be “the Shia”. What does that have to do with Nabih Berri “fooling” anyone? Would she be less perturbed if a Christian was calling for the commission? Let’s say Ziad Baroud or President Suleiman proposed the commission (as they actually have done on the record) would that mean that “the Shia” would not be the primary benefactors of abolishing sectarianism? Why is it ok if Baroud proposes it, but not if Berri does? She goes on:

“Berri’s timing is also questionable. He decided to launch his campaign, despite objections from other political leaders, right before preparations for the national dialogue, in which Lebanese leaders are to sit down to discuss Hezbollah’s arms and the national defense strategy. As more March 14 Christians raise the call to disarm Hezbollah, and despite the consensus on the ministerial statement, Berri – and by extension Hezbollah – thought it might be a good idea to warn the Christians with the anti-sectarian mantra, as it threatens them directly.”

Really? No one in Lebanon is under any illusion that any national dialogue talks are going to “disarm Hezbollah”. It’s not even on the table. There is absolutely no political willpower or military firepower to even make it worth raising. So why would Berri have to threaten “the Christians” with de-confessionalism? Which Christians? Does she think that Hezbollah is worried about the Lebanese Forces? And Aoun is Hezbollah’s ally, so why would Berri be trying to scare the FPM?

I interpret Berri’s call for deconfessionalism in a different way. The Speaker understands just as well as anyone that the process of abolishing the current system is going to be long and drawn out. It will involve several steps and will take years. Some of these steps will include the creation of a senate, the redistibution of powers between the different branches of government, administrative decentralization, electoral reform, etc. We’ve discussed these issues on this blog ad infinitum.

However, one of the most important elements of this process is going to have to be the eventual disarmament of Hezbollah. None of the other parties are going to accept a non-confessional system that allows one party to maintain a militia that is stronger than the Lebanese Army. And guess what? AMAL won’t either. This is the subtext of Berri’s strategy, in my opinion. By championing deconfessionalism, he is hitting two birds with one stone. Abolishing the current system would give his coreligionists a fair share in the government of their country, to be sure, but it would also clip the wings of his party’s biggest competitor.

Is Nabih Berri one of the most corrupt sectarian leaders in Lebanon? Yes. Is it farcical for him to be proposing abolishing sectarianism? Yes. Does he have ulterior motives? Probably. But who cares? Civil society should be calling his bluff (if that’s what it is), and trying to make the most out of an opportunity that may not come along again for years. That’s how political reform is achieved, like it or not.

Rather than getting on a high horse, Lebanese civil society should be getting into the trenches.

I know you’re all probably bored stiff with the discussion about US military funding to the Lebanese Army, but I couldn’t pass this one up.

The following commentary was sent to me by a former official who has intimate firsthand knowledge of US-Lebanese military affairs. It is published here at QN with their permission.

**

I’ve been reading the discussion on your blog regarding US assistance to the LAF. As one of the only people from the Pentagon or State Department intimately involved in designing and operationalizing this effort who has left government, I would like to share some thoughts on this program.

I was one of the point people for countless briefings on this effort both within the Executive branch and before Congress. The initial security assistance package delivered after the war (primarily spare parts and ammunition) was for strengthening Lebanese sovereignty, as were all other elements of our effort to build the LAF. This was the key argument made for the assistance; not diminishing Hizballah’s operating space.

One criticism made in the discussion is that the U.S. should be building the LAF to fight the IDF. I’m perplexed as to why the U.S. should do so. Lebanon’s challenge, which it has faced from time immemorial, is the destabilizing impact of various domestic groups (many, if not all, fostered by external actors). Only when the Lebanese government can exert its sovereignty throughout Lebanese territory will Lebanon have a chance at achieving stability. Doing so will diminish the ability of outside parties to meddle in Lebanese affairs. This is what the aid program is intended to accomplish.

Building the LAF (or any partner state military, for that matter) does not mean nor should it ever mean “total, unrestricted support,” as some have asserted. This argument illustrates a shortsighted understanding of how to build a military. The LAF’s two biggest needs when the U.S. began the program to rapidly train and equip it were. . .mobility and ammunition. Yes, not very enticing, but these requirements were painfully clear to anyone who examined the LAF. In 2005, LAF troops did not have the ability to move deftly around the country. They averaged 3-5 bullets per soldier, per year (including training). In building the LAF, the U.S. has focused on addressing its urgent needs first. For this, the U.S. should be applauded. Furthermore, despite a painfully slow and outdated security assistance program, substantial aid has been delivered to Lebanon since 2006, yet another example of how high this effort has been on Washington’s priority list. One critical aspect of the U.S. program to rapidly build the LAF is its strategic-level focus. The establishment of the Joint Military Committee (JMC), a senior-level annual defense dialogue that the Pentagon leadership holds only with close allies, is one important example. This forum helps ensure both parties are on the same page, and it serves as an important avenue in facilitating discussion on issues like defense strategy.

A modernized, strengthened LAF would involve quite a few of the elements that Emile raises (which are, one should note, found in many of today’s militaries, not simply in Hizballah). However, the notion that Hizballah will support such an effort seems rather farcical. At the end of the day, a stronger, more willing LAF is inevitably a competitor to Hizballah, not a compatriot.

The notion that the U.S. and Lebanon have vastly differing visions of how to best rapidly build the LAF is actually rather inaccurate. Since this effort began, a sustained dialogue at various levels has enabled the parties to come to a similar understanding of the LAF’s needs, and how the U.S. would fulfill them. It is rare that one hears requests for F-16s or the like from LAF members. In fact, the Lebanese government’s decision to accept MiGs from Russia was rued throughout the LAF and by many political figures as well; at all levels, they understood that these planes were not helpful in fulfilling the LAF’s mandate.

Finally, I do believe this talk of LAF complaints is a bit overplayed. All militaries want security assistance in-country yesterday. A bit of frustration is inevitable, as we see in other cases (e.g., Iraq; Afghanistan; Pakistan). That said, the U.S. could have launched its effort to build the LAF earlier than it did; the first tranche of tangible assistance didn’t come through until the second half of 2006. Our system is what it is; the Founding Fathers designed it to impede, rather than to foster, action. So be it. Turn to the Iranians if one would prefer greater speed.

I should add that those interested in examining the current effort would do well to study the 1982-1984 period. That represented the first time the U.S. tried to rapidly build the LAF (under a program known as the Lebanese Army Modernization Program—LAMP), and it suffered from a host of problems. The U.S. has learned much since the LAMP transpired, including the significance of context, continuous reassessment, and appropriate distribution of materiel.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Well, Air France lost my luggage. My video monitor on the plane was busted, so I ended up reading Geoff Dyer’s new novel Jeff in Venice, Death in Varanasi in one sitting. It’s so hot here that my annual ritual of going skiing and swimming in one day is not going to be an option. The traffic is bad and is bound to get worse when it starts pouring this week.

But I’m not complaining. Do you know why?

Nicholas Noe sent me this commentary to publish at QN; it’s a response to the debate about U.S. military funding for the Lebanese Army that we’ve hosted here over the past week. In other news, check out a preview of Jesse Aizenstat’s book on surfing in southern Lebanon. Also, the new Arab Reform Bulletin is out.

I’m off to beloved Beirut this afternoon, for a week. I will try to post between bites.

*

(Commentary for Qifa Nabki by Nicholas Noe, editor-in-chief of Mideastwire.com)

In July 2008, David Schenker posted a piece on Harvard’s MESH website that said: “The debate regarding U.S. support for the LAF has been fuelled by a contentious and factually inaccurate op-ed in the New York Times written by Nicholas Noe in mid-June. [As a result of] his article, “A Fair Fight for the Lebanese Army… No doubt, the Times received a flood of critical letters… Not surprisingly, it did not run any. Nevertheless, I still think it’s worth debunking some of the more egregious inaccuracies and bad thinking in Noe’s piece.”

At the time I declined to respond on MESH because of two unpleasant experiences with the editors who, on one occasion, had insisted on censoring certain criticism about the way that they “moderated” and restricted comment and, on another occasion, demonstrated that they only “vetted” charges which agreed with their right of center gravity (allowing statements about people having “gone native” and the like – quite apart from charges of “egregious inaccuracies”).

One year and half on from that episode – which, it should be said, was followed by more responsible and helpful criticism from Emile Hokayem and Andrew Exum – Schenker seems to have finally come clean, acknowledging frankly in Forbes.com what I and countless others had long argued: essentially, that the US refuses to alter Israel’s QME vis-à-vis Lebanon – and, therefore, ultimately refuses a credible exploration of how such an alteration, along with others steps, might underpin a peaceful strategy of integrating Hizbullah under the authority of a truly democratic state in Lebanon. (For those interested in the subject, I would suggest reading the 2009 enacted legislation that finally enshrines Israel’s QME into law).

“While U.S. taxpayer generosity, currently slated at over $100 million this year, will enhance LAF domestic counterterrorism capabilities,” Schenker wrote recently, “it is not meant–and will never be meant–to help Lebanon deter or defend against Israeli strikes.”

In July 2008, however, Schenker wrote on MESH: “Washington has fully backed the LAF…contrary to Noe’s assertion.”

“This and subsequent assistance,” he continued, “has not been subject to Israeli veto, but rather is based on a careful assessment of LAF operational requirements carried out by the United States and France.”

Well we now know what most of us, especially here in Lebanon, knew then – but this time with important, frank statements by a man who was an integral part of the Bush administration’s disastrous Lebanon policy: Since the inauguration of the Cedar Revolution in early 2005, US officials constantly and very publicly ratcheted up their rhetoric over the “unqualified” support – the total, unrestricted support for a robust LAF. But at the same time, “careful assessments” were not determining the quality and level of support – a desire to not disrupt Israel’s QME was.

At some point, the whole LAF-Bush Administration episode may stand as a classic exercise in how not to go about credible public diplomacy (as the rise and fall of the Cedar revolution should also stand as a test case of how not to go about a colour revolution).

Indeed, as the deputy chief of mission (DCM) in Beirut, William Grant, put it in an interview in pro-U.S. An-Nahar daily in August 2008, “There is nothing until now that the Lebanese Army requested and the Americans failed to provide. The army realizes that it can ask for whatever it wants and we did not offer it a limited list to choose from . . . there are no U.S. restrictions on what the army requests.” Later, in the same interview, Grant went a step further, explaining that, “We always hear complaints from the Lebanese people that the United States helps the Lebanese Army but it does not provide it with necessary weapons and equipment. This is totally not true.”

Beyond the clarity which he now brings to the discussion over the real limits of US support for the LAF, Schenker also raises a number of other points in his recent piece – some of which dovetail with Emile and Andrew’s thinking – which should also be taken to task by serious observers, scholars and partisans hoping to peacefully deal with Lebanon (and the region’s) problems:

First - “Lebanon received nearly $500 million worth of military material from Washington.” Actually, according to the Congressional Research service, by early 2009, only about $60 million had been delivered – kept in bay at that point to see how the June elections turned out, among other factors.

Second – “Washington has never been under any illusions regarding the political will of Lebanese politicians to employ the LAF in controversial missions, like securing the border with Syria or disarming Hezbollah, or the LAF’s ability to take on such missions. The aid program was not designed to accomplish these highly ambitious goals in the near term.”

This is not true – and Schenker knows it given his role in the Rumsfeld Pentagon. In fact, Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt told the Chicago Tribune in March 2006, after confirming an ongoing review: “We’re looking for stability. . . . An unstable Lebanon is a danger to itself, to its immediate neighbors and the region. This is part of our overall strategy.” He then asked, “The larger question is: Who is their enemy? Are they looking at Israel? Al-Qaeda? Syria? . . . In our minds, this is the army that sooner or later will have to stand up to the armed branch of Hezbollah.”

Shortly thereafter, amid ongoing hostilities during the July War (which, as we now know, we vigorously encouraged by the Bush administration as a means of destroying Hezbollah), one State Department spokesperson made the quid pro quo clear, on the record: if the LAF hoped for equipment, even spare parts, it would have to first focus on “using its military to keep Hizbullah in check,” he said. The point was underscored by U.S. officials later interviewed by International Crisis Group who “implied” that “the LAF must be trained and equipped to meet Hizbollah’s, not Israel’s, challenge.” Ironically, as Schenker also no doubt knows, the title for the original US assistance to the LAF in 2006-2007 was actually called “Restricting Hezbollah’s Operational Space.”

Of course, all of the US emphasis on building up the LAF to confront Hezbollah had real ramifications in the event that finally put an end to the whole adventure – May 2008 – when US officials realized that their effort to goad the army (and March 14) – to dangle the carrots of money and hardware – into a confrontation with Hezbollah was going to have disasterous effects. Schenker adds the “near term,” above, perhaps to hedge a bit, but he knows that the aid program was designed originally for a primary mission: having the LAF help, sooner better than later, in the mission of going after Hezbollah.

Third - “Consider that Syria, which devotes an estimated $6 billion per year to military expenditures, could not prevent Israel from destroying its nuclear facility in 2007–or from buzzing the presidential palace with its F-16s in 2006.” This is true, of course – but the argument implies that the LAF could never be reasonably built into a credible deterrent – which is wrong.

Emile has a helpful point on this score: “In the best of all worlds, we would have a serious defence review that would conclude that we need a military fashioned à la Hezbollah – special forces, light infantry, officers and NCOs that have a sense of initiative, good communication, anti-tank weaponry, good intelligence and reconnaissance assets, some helicopters, coastal radars, even air defence at some point – but hopefully without the thousands of rockets and missiles that Hezbollah deploys. Such a force would do a far better job at protecting Lebanon at a much cheaper cost, and the QME would not be an insurmountable problem.”

It may, as Aram at CSIS pointed out in 2009, cost $1 billion… but a credible deterrent can be built – all the more so since Hizbullah, as a model, is actually already serving as a key side in a (somewhat) credible (though awful and unsustainable) “balance of terror.” Allow the Lebanese state to buy SAM’s to protect population centers, allow it to create a national army along the lines of an asymmetrical conflict and allow an Arab state effort to gather funds for doing so (Aram and I both have proposals along the lines of a Paris-type conference).

Emile’s “best of all worlds” could go forward if the US got behind the vision instead of obstructing it – indeed, Hezbollah would be enormously hard pressed to resist such an effort, as well as the necessary follow through which would focus on ending the Shebaa issue and moving ahead with democratic reforms of the power structure. Of course, the LAF needs to be reformed in all this – but it can only happen in the context of a credible plan to bolster its capabilities to do what national armies should do instead of unelected militias – defend the whole, the entire country, from all threats, foreign and domestic.

The two approaches can and should proceed hand in hand with the ultimate aim of putting enough domestic political pressure on Hizbullah that it integrates fully under the authority of the state. The Obama administration, though, needs to decide: either stop the obstructions or vigorously assist in creating a real, democratic state in Lebanon that can finally protect all of its people. The time for a decision, sadly, seems to be running out.