Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah will be interviewed this evening on al-Manar at 21:30 PM Beirut time (14:30 PM EST, 18:30 GMT). I expect it to be an important exchange, and the choice of an interview format (rather than a formal address) may suggest that Nasrallah is aiming to defuse tensions resulting from all the “Hizbullah-killed-Hariri” rumors in the Lebanese press.

For English-speakers, you’ll be able to follow the highlights on Naharnet and NOW Lebanon. Arabic speakers can probably find a live streaming feed of the interview somewhere online, and I’ll be sure to put the full transcript up as soon as it is available.

Nasrallah interview

9:38 – Nasrallah confirms that around 12 people from Hizbullah (or close to the party) have been questioned by the Special Tribunal.

9:42 – Nasrallah says that he will adhere to safeguarding the secrecy of the proceedings, in compliance with the wishes of the investigators themselves.

9:44 – Those questioned have been questioned in their capacity as witnesses and not as accused.

9:46 – There are some who are accusing Hizbullah and its [state] supporters of being responsible for the crime. And some are saying that only certain individuals from within Hizbullah are responsible. The first article that accused the party was in Le Figaro, back in August of 2006, after the July War.

9:49 – Nasrallah goes through all the major news reports, articles, etc. that pinned the crime on Hizbullah, up to the report in Le Monde in February 2010. Nasrallah: “I consider this to be a political accusation.”

9:53 – The first to accuse Hizbullah were Israeli leaders.

9:58 – They accuse us of terrorism, of drug-trafficking, of money laundering, all in order to distort our image. This latest campaign is no different.

10:04 – Either the officials are just speculating about the proceedings, or the investigation itself is leaking information. Otherwise, it seems that there are self-proclaimed prophets these days who know which way things are going to proceed.

10:07 – The whole history of this tribunal is full of leaks. It is composed of so many different parties from different countries; so it is natural that leaks occur.

10:08 – The goal may be to distort Hizbullah’s image, to pressure Hizbullah, perhaps even to strike a deal with Hizbullah. I don’t know. But these are all just fantasies.

10:14 – The accusation against Syria of being involved in the murder was a political accusation that has been used since 2005 against Syria and its allies in Lebanon. This political accusation led to the death of Syrian workers in Lebanon and many other problems.

10:17 – There are several problems with this investivating commission. (#1) An investigating commission is supposed to embrace secrecy, particularly the secrecy of witnesses. It did not do this. There have constantly been leaks to the press and to political salons.

10:19 – (#2) An investigation is supposed to consider all possible hypotheses. They did not do this. They only considered one hypothesis: Syria and the Lebanese generals. They did not consider that al-Qaeda or Israel or anyone else might be behind it. If I’m going to objective, I would say that they should consider everyone, even Hizbullah, which they did not do at the beginning.

10:21 – And this continues to the present. The “4 Generals” hypothesis is finished. The “Syrian” hypothesis is finished. So now they are considering Hizbullah.

10:22 – (#3) This investigating commission has depended on false witnesses for four years. Who supported them? Who gave them passports, money, and told them what to say? And why haven’t they brought them in and prosecuted them?

10:24 – (#4) They put people in prison with no evidence.

10:27 – All of these problems lead one to feel that this investigation and the Tribunal are not to be trusted.

10:28 – We are trying to be productive. We don’t want to close doors. There are ways in which the Tribunal can renew people’s confidence in it. Here are some suggestions: (a) prosecute the false witnesses, to send the message that there will be no more false witnesses from now on; (b) prosecute those who are supporting and standing behind the false witnesses; (c) prosecute every instance of a leak;  (d) working on every hypothesis about who might have been responsible for the crime; (e) provide justice for those who were accused and imprisoned. They can’t simply wash their hands of those officers who were imprisoned and accused of being involved.

10:32 – So, we would like for the Tribunal to be considered objective, but there are things that it needs to do.

10:33 – What is our position on the Tribunal? We, like all Lebanese, want to know the truth. We considered the killing of the Martyr Rafiq al-Hariri to be a very dangerous event for Lebanon and for the region. So we were very concerned and we want to know the truth.

10:34 – We will cooperate with the Tribunal so as to prevent the investigation from taking false courses.

10:36 – Our decision is to cooperate. We have no problem with the investigation commission to meet with our members at all.

10:37 – However, if the investigation is trying to drive towards the same conclusions that appeared in Le Figaro, as-Siyasa, Le Monde, etc. I reserve the right to take a different decision. If they continue to protect false witnesses, I will take a different decision.

10:38 – So, for the present time, we will happily cooperate. But we want to see the course of this investigation.

[I'm going to stop live-blogging here, as the interview has shifted to other topics. I will post a full transcript later.]

I recommend this piece by David Lesch, a Syria specialist and confidante of President Bashar al-Assad, for Foreign Policy’s Mideast channel.

Lesch makes a similar point to the one I made on this blog a few weeks ago, only to earn the ridicule of many of my Syria Comment buddies (!) Here are the crucial paragraphs, from Lesch:

“Bashar has repeated to me on a number of occasions how he would like to position his country as a regional facilitator, engendered by its unique ability to play both sides of the fence. Syria has displayed the potentiality of this role by helping to bring stability to Lebanon, trying to reconcile Hamas with the Palestinian Authority, and mediating with Teheran on occasion. And some officials in Washington were beginning to realize and appreciate this.

Then Bashar goes and hugs Ahmadinejad and proclaims solidarity with Iran. What I have found more often than not in Washington is an institutionalized enmity toward and frustration with Syria. Washington tends to hold a grudge-big time. There are many who are still viscerally angry at Syria for its role in facilitating Iraqi insurgents across the border. So, embarrassing the Obama administration at this particular moment was unwise. On the other hand, Syria cannot play the role of regional facilitator unless it cultivates its diverse connections. Policy: understandable; timing: awful…

There are those who say that the US may have overplayed its hand with Syria too soon. Syria also has to be careful not to overplay its hand. Maybe Bashar feels the Obama administration is too disorganized and weak right now to worry about making positive impressions, but this might not always be the case, especially if the US president’s perceived standing improves due to the passage of the time-consuming health care legislation. Bashar worked hard to finally be taken seriously in Washington and in the region, but straddling the fence can be dangerous too if you don’t know when to-or can’t-get off of it when the time is right.

A few notes:

1. Defense strategy: Mara Karlin, the former Pentagon Levant director, has an interesting piece about U.S. military assistance to Lebanon, in The Daily Star:

A Lebanese soldier's yearly ration of bullets. Seriously.

“One year ago, my first effort after leaving the US Defense Department was to publish a piece in a major Israeli newspaper explaining why Israel should support a strong Lebanese military. As one of the architects of the United States’ program to re-build the Lebanese Armed Forces, a concept Israel has resisted, I thought it vital that the Israeli public understand how important this effort was for regional security.

“I now realize that I was wrong, not in terms of substance, but in my audience. Instead, I should have written a piece for the Lebanese media explaining why Lebanon should support the effort.

“After a host of meetings I held in Beirut this month, it is painfully clear to me that the American program to train and equip Lebanon’s armed forces is misunderstood. Its purpose, substance, and pace were criticized by nearly every political or military leader with whom I met while on my trip…”

(Keep reading)

2. Hezbollah and the STL: There is a great deal of speculation about what Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah is going to say in an interview tomorrow night with respect to the rumors regarding the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and its questioning of Hezbollah members.

A source tells al-Akhbar that Nasrallah intends to send the message that any attempt to accuse the party will lead to a “political May 7″, referring to the events of May 7 2008, when Hezbollah forces took over Beirut and forced the Saniora government to rescind an order to dismantle the party’s private communication network:

ويوضح المرجع المذكور «أن الرسالة الفعلية التي يريد السيد نصر الله إبلاغها الجميع في لبنان والعالم هي أن التورط في مسألة اتهام الحزب سيقود حتماً إلى 7 أيار سياسي». ولفت إلى أن نصر الله الذي قال قبل أيام إنه «سيقول المناسب من الكلام في هذه المرحلة» يعطي إشارة إلى أن لديه الكثير من الأوراق في جعبته، وهو يحاول تنبيه الآخرين إلى خطورة ما يقدمون عليه. لكن المرجع نفى علمه بما إذا كان نصر الله سيكشف عن خفايا بعض الاتصالات التي جرت بشأن هذا الموضوع مع حزب الله من قبل جهات محلية وخارجية».

(Keep reading)

3. Arab Democracy: The 2009-2010 Arab Democracy Index has been published. Lebanon now ranks fourth out of the ten countries surveyed, and made the biggest leap forward between 2008 and 2009, in terms of democractic reforms adopted. I’ve posted the recommendations below, but you can download the entire report here (PDF).

1- Reform the election system by adopting an election law based on proportional representation and not the sectarian register. The new law should reduce the voting age, adopt a quota for women at least in the nomination process, and give the Election Commission (which oversees elections) administrative and financial independence as well as judicial authority. The Commission should not be affiliated with the Ministry of Interior; it should organize and oversee elections independently.

2- Implement the Municipal Law, passed in 1977, with amendments to provide direct election by the people of chairperson and vice-chairperson, to shorten the terms of the municipal councils, and to remove obstacles that hinder their performance. This should be accompanied by ratification of the Administrative Decentralization Law to ensure administrative and financial independence for municipalities and curb central surveillance, in order to activate local participation. A comprehensive development process is also required, which should limit the influence of politicians in local development.

3- Adopt a law to protect individuals who uncover corruption, and create a monitoring institution, such as an ombudsman, to promote administrative reform and combat corruption in public institutions.

4- Finalize the process of transferring jurisdiction over prisons from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Justice; prosecute and punish in accordance with the Lebanese Penal Law those who commit torture in Lebanese prisons; and release detainees arrested without judicial warrant.

5- End prior censorship of publication and free publications and periodicals from the obligation to obtain a license.

6- Amend the Constitutional Council Law to give the Council authority to interpret the constitution, and not merely to monitor the constitutionality of laws and to settle parliamentary contestations. Appeals to the Constitutional Council must be facilitated, and its independence, initiative, and ability to review laws must be supported. The right to review laws – which Article 19 now limits to the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, ten members of Parliament, and the heads of the recognized sects in Lebanon – should also be reconsidered. Under the present system, a political accord can lead to agreement on unconstitutional laws when the required majority to contest them is not available. Another very important recommendation here is to amend the selection process for members of the Constitutional Council, increasing its independence and immunizing it from political intervention and political attractions.

7- Confirm the independence of the judiciary and strictly enforce guarantees fully protecting judges from intervention from any source. This should involve comprehensive reform to enhance the status of the judiciary as an authority parallel to the executive and legislative authorities, as well as constitutional and legal amendments to protect the judiciary and judges from interference in their judgments and from external pressure. This can be achieved by changing the mechanism for the appointment of members of the Higher Council of Justice and by giving it authority to appoint and move judges from one place to another.

8- Enact an amendment to the Citizenship Law to entitle Lebanese women, like men, to pass Lebanese citizenship to their offspring, regardless of the spouse’s citizenship.

9- Establish a social security network with the power to draft a law for pensions, social security, and care for the elderly through serious, active dialogue among relevant parties (the state, laborers, and employers.)

10- Adopt an economic and financial plan to encourage productive sectors in industry, agriculture, and handicrafts in order to reduce unemployment and achieve comprehensive development in the country.

11- Special interest should be paid to education, especially the issue of school drop-out, and increased government expenditure on education.

Check out this story by Jean Aziz in al-Akhbar. What I’m wondering is where the TV station got the information about the route that the “secret informant” traveled after the interview with the STL investigators, among other things. I’ve posted an English translation of part of the article below, courtesy of Mideastwire. (I’ll fill in the blanks on my own later and edit the translation…)

“A secret “witness” in Downtown Beirut”

By Jean Aziz | March 25, 2010

“In theory, the news broadcast by a television station yesterday about one of the individuals being questioned by the investigators of the International Tribunal, seems normal. However, the details carry question marks, and doubts. The news says that the international investigators have carried out an investigation, last Tuesday the 23rd, with an unidentified individual. They brought him handcuffed from one of the capital’s streets to their offices at the “Dubai Islam” building in Downtown Beirut. Interestingly enough, the concerned individual was brought in at exactly 11am to the building disguised behind fake mustaches and eyeglasses.

“Around 100 minutes later, the same individual emerged with his face uncovered, [and got in] a Japanese type cab that was waiting for him. The “witness” rode the car from Downtown Beirut to the Charles Helou bus station. There, he exited the car and rode in one of the buses heading to the north. However, as he arrived to the Naher el-Mot area, he left the bus again, crossed the highway, and took for the third time another cab that was waiting for him at the opposite side of the highway and that drove him to the Saint Simon area in the Ramlet al-Bayda in Beirut. There, he left the car and disappeared in one of the tin huts that are randomly built there…[ellipses as published]

“… This incident is linked by concerned parties to the proven matter concerning the summonses being sent from the International Tribunal to the Prosecutor-General’s Office and including names of some members that were said to be close to Hezbollah. One official certifies this matter and stresses that the response to the demand to question these [Hezbollah members] was negative with a clear rejection on the part of those “wanted” [members regarding] any appearance in front of the international investigators. The same official goes on to certify that there are negotiations going on now around finding a settlement to this issue…

“The two previous episodes are being connected with the same concerned parties to what is being said about a tendency to revive the scenario of the Der Spiegel accusation. The mentioned scenario has reached several websites that stated that the source [of the scenario] consists of sources knowledgeable of the Hague’s work… The mentioned action aims, according to the analyses of the same concerned parties, to achieving a political goal revolving around two levels: the minimal level is a mere confusing of the Lebanese domestic situation… As for the upper level, the bet is to stir Sunni-Shi’i strife… In any case, the concerned parties show extreme interest with these readings, that almost reached the level of concern to the extent that some have started to talk about two hot parentheses that might be opened in Beirut in the upcoming few weeks…”

That’s right, folks. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has dispatched a team of 3D filmmakers to Lebanon to shoot a sequel to Avatar set in downtown Beirut. Or something like that.

There have been several notable items in the press over the past week about Hezbollah. Rather than spending an hour trying to figure out how to coax them all into a single exquisite narrative, I’m going to just dump them in your lap.

Investigators from the STL are in town, questioning various people about the Hariri case. Some of these people include members of Hezbollah, and the party has reportedly welcomed the investigators with open arms, endless cups of tea, and an assortment of Hezbollah-themed memorabilia (pens, hats, notepads, etc.)

You will recall the article in Der Spiegel last year arguing that the Hariri assassination was carried out by Hezbollah. Today, Wi’am Wahhab suggests that the STL is getting ready to accuse slain Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyyeh. Wahhab is not a very credible source, and it may just be that he’s not prepared to give up the limelight (after calling on President Suleiman to resign last week, which put him on the front page of every newspaper in Lebanon).

Finally, Nicholas Noe and Azmi Bishara each published an interesting opinion piece about Hezbollah last week. I highly recommend you read both of them as the differences in their analyses are symptomatic of how divided the commentariat is on the issue of the balance of power between Hezbollah and Israel. To be fair, Nick’s analysis is really focused on Hezbollah’s own assessment of this balance of power while Bishara tries to adopt a macro picture, but the articles are worth being read together.

In a speech given at AIPAC on Monday night, Benjamin Netanyahu declared to a roaring crowd: “The Jewish people were building Jerusalem 3,000 years, and the Jewish people are building Jerusalem today. Jerusalem is not a settlement; It’s our capital.”

The game of chicken continues. As Netanyahu continues to pursue a hard line on the settlements issue, embarassing high-ranking U.S. officials like Vice President Biden and Secretary of State Clinton, the UK expels an Israeli diplomat in London.

Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen took the highly unusual step of weighing in on the political dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict (after some prompting by CENTCOM commander General Petraeus), arguing that the conflict had a direct impact on America’s status in the region.

As someone put it recently, there is no bigger lobby in Congress than the U.S. military, and if the military decides that a particular policy is becoming a liability for national security, it could provide the White House with some much-needed political cover to put pressure on the Israelis.

As for the narrower question of who actually was building in Jerusalem 3,000 years ago and why this is so utterly beside the point, you could do far worse than to read Bernard Avishai and Juan Cole.

Joshua Landis sent me a 1945 recording of the famous American jazz musician, Slim Gaillard, singing a tune entitled “Yep-Roc Heresay”, the lyrics of which are almost entirely in Arabic. Take a listen below and see if you can make out what he’s saying.

That’s right, he’s singing about food: yabra (i.e. stuffed graped leaves), harisseh (a semolina dessert), kibbeh bi-siniyyeh (a dish of meat and bulgur), lahm mishweh (grilled meat), etc.

A great tune. So what’s the back-story? I’ve been able to dig up various bits and pieces, but perhaps one of the readers can help out. The Wikipedia page on Gaillard suggests that he was reading from an Arabic menu, while this page claims that it was an Armenian menu, and that the song was actually “banned on at least two Los Angeles radio stations for its suspicious lyric references to drugs and crime…” (!)

The song has since become something of a standard, as evidenced by this rendition by what looks like some kind of wedding band. (I don’t think I’ve ever seen anything so hysterical. Who knew that Levantine cooking lent itself so well to vocalese?)

One other question I had about this song was its title: Yep-Roc Heresay. After puzzling over it for a moment, I realized that it was a botched transliteration of the first two words of the song: “Yabra… Harisseh…” I can’t really tell if Gaillard’s own pronunciation is wrong or whether some record company executive couldn’t figure out what he was saying.

What’s interesting about this little error is that it has taken on a life of its own. There is a record company based in North Carolina called Yep-Roc Records, whose owners named it after the Slim Gaillard tune. I intend to send them a link to this post, suggesting that they rename their company “Yabra Harisseh Records” for the sake of authenticity.

In the meantime, I’ve come across another tune (“Arabian Boogie”) where Slim sings in Arabic; you can listen to it below.

The National Democratic Institute has released its report on the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 2009. (Download a PDF in English or Arabic.) See if you can spot this blog in the footnotes.

The EU Observation Mission released its report (pdf) back in October; the Carter Center has yet to publish a final report.

It now occurs to me that we here at Qifa Nabki never released an unofficial election report of our own, despite our role as amateur “observers”. If you are a new reader of this blog, here’s a link to some of the better posts and discussions on the subject.

As many of you know, the Lebanese-Mexican tycoon Carlos Slim Helou was in Lebanon last week meeting with political and business leaders and discussing various projects of interest. Slim, who recently regained his title as the World’s Richest Man, was given a medal by Lebanon’s President Michel Suleiman, and fêted in the Lebanese press for demonstrating the inherent superiority of Phoenician DNA in producing successful traders.

Lucky for you, we’ve teamed up again with the wonderful Maya Zankoul to bring you an inside peek at Slim’s meetings with Lebanon’s leaders.

Click the image below to see the entire comic strip.

Click the image to see the rest of the illustrations!

Thanks to the wonderfully talented Maya Zankoul for the illustrations. For previous collaborations between Qifa Nabki and Maya, click here.

A couple of days ago, I sat in on a lecture about Nasser’s foreign policy in the 1950′s-60′s, and the importance of regional axes in the Cold War world. It left me wondering about the extent to which we still live in such a world today, at least as far as Middle East politics are concerned.

This question would have been easier to answer a few years ago, when the region was conveniently divided into “moderates” and “radicals” (or the camps of “resistance” and “surrender”, depending on your perspective.) These days, however, as I noted in a Year in Review piece back in 2009, the divisions are not so straightforward.

Rob Malley and Peter Harling concur. In an excellent op-ed for the Washington Post, they argue that international relations in the Middle East today reflect a far messier reality, one that is full of opportunities for engagement by a superpower that tragically can’t seem to read the writing on the wall. Check out the whole article, but here are some suggestive bits:

Changes over the past few years have blurred the region’s purported lines. Qatar brokered the inter-Lebanese accord in May 2008, while Turkey started to mediate Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Neither country “belongs” to one axis or the other; both have earned reputations for talking to all sides. While Saudi Arabia had long echoed U.S. skepticism and overall objectives regarding Syria, engagement between the two has resumed. Riyadh and Damascus reached common ground in implicitly rebuking any Iranian role in Yemen, much to Tehran’s irritation, and in quietly opposing Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who enjoys U.S. support. The Saudis also renewed contact with the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas after a period of estrangement.

From Syria, too, come interesting signals. Uncomfortable with what had turned into a monogamous affair with Iran, Damascus began courting Qatar, France and, most prominently, Turkey. Deep strategic ties notwithstanding, Damascus and Tehran are waging a discreet proxy war in Iraq, backing different allies and combating different foes. Damascus broke a historic taboo in dispatching an ambassador to Beirut. In Lebanon itself, segments of the two political camps — until recently split in ways that mirrored the militants-vs.-moderates divide — are signaling a desire to reshape the political landscape.

…

Today, the relevant competition in the Middle East is not between a pro-Iranian and a pro-American axis but between two homegrown visions. One, backed by Iran, emphasizes resistance to Israel and the West, speaks to the region’s thirst for dignity and prioritizes military cooperation. The other, symbolized by Turkey, highlights diplomacy, stresses engagement with all parties and values economic integration. Both outlooks are championed by non-Arab emerging regional powers and resonate with an Arab street as incensed by Israel as it is weary of its own leaders.

These developments, Malley and Harling argue, are remarkable, and yet have largely gone unnoticed by the Obama Administration, which is still stuck in the rigid “moderates-versus-militants” paradigm of its predecessor. The Leveretts make a similar plea for more engagement with Iran and Syria by the White House, while plenty of others believe that the engagement policy has proven to be a complete failure (see here and here).

Meanwhile, the issue of regional axes has recently come up again in Lebanon, with Amin Gemayel reportedly asking (at the national dialogue talks) whether Lebanon should be a “confrontation” state or a “neutral” one, vis-a-vis the conflict with Israel. Here’s Michel Aoun’s response (which is, more or less, that Lebanon has no choice but to be a confrontation state because it is directly targeted by Israel), and here’s a piece by Walid Maalouf arguing that neutrality is Lebanon’s only hope.

Finally, see Nick Blanford’s short piece on the national dialogue talks for the Christian Science Monitor.