Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

In the spirit of all the recent discussion about secularism and deconfessionalism in Lebanon, I thought I’d write a post that approached the issue of electoral districting. What’s the connection between electoral districting and abolishing confessionalism, you ask? Grab a chair…

As most of us know, the ratio of voters to members of parliament varies across Lebanon’s electoral districts. This is a necessary byproduct of the need to square the mandatory confessional balance in Parliament with demographic realities on the ground. Article 24 of the Lebanese Constitution states that until such a time as a non-confessional electoral law is adopted, the distribution of seats in Parliament must give equal representation to Christians and Muslims. Obviously, in order to achieve this, you either have to give certain districts greater representation than others, or you have to let certain districts elect representatives who are not from the same sect as the majority of their constituents.

This latter condition prevailed in the 2000 electoral law, where districts had a more uniform ratio of voters to representatives than the current law, but many Christians  complained that the majority of Christian MPs were being elected on the lists of non-Christian heavyweights like Rafiq al-Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri, etc.

The question that I’d like to raise in this discussion is the following: What would happen to Lebanon’s electoral landscape in the context of a non-confessional electoral law AND a district map that was based on equal suffrage (i.e. the principle that every citizen’s vote should have the same value)?

In my opinion, simply advocating the abolishment of confessional quotas doesn’t quite go far enough in producing a fairer system because a non-confessional Parliament based on the current geographical distribution of seats would still under-represent certain regions and over-represent others. Think about it: if someone living in Bint Jbeil feels that the current system discriminates against them because their vote counts less than the vote of someone living in the Shouf, how would their situation change if the confessional quotas in parliament were dropped BUT the same districts still elected the same number of MPs? The resident of Bint Jbeil’s vote would still count less than the resident of the Shouf.

So, how does one go about producing a new distribution of seats? I propose the following simple exercise, which is mostly just a thought experiment to get a conversation going (or to put you all to sleep, whichever comes first.)

The first thing to do is to calculate an “ideal” ratio of voters to parliamentary seats  by dividing the total number of registered voters in Lebanon (3,251,731) by the number of parliamentary seats (128), which gives us an ideal average ratio of 25,404 registered voters to each member of parliament.

How does this ideal average ratio match up with the current electoral law? (Note that I’m not interested whatsoever in the issue of which sects get more or less than their fair share; I’m interested purely in which districts are over/under-represented). Click the table below to enlarge it.

Click to enlarge

All I’ve done here is to divide the number of registered voters in each district by the ideal average ratio (25,404) in order to come up with the “correct” number of parliamentary seats for each district, under our system. On the right hand side (highlighted in blue), you can see the new list of parliamentary seats arranged by district, as well as the difference between the old system and the new one. Here’s a summary of the results:

1. Twelve districts have a ratio that conforms, more or less, to the ideal average ratio. These districts are: Tripoli, Zgharta, Bsharreh, Batroun, Jbeil, Baabda, Aley, Baalbek, Beirut 2, Beirut 3, Saida, and Marjayoun.

2. Eight districts have a ratio that over-represents them by one seat each: Koura, Kisrawan, Metn, Shouf, Zahleh, West Bekaa, Beirut 1, and Jezzine.

3. Six districts have a ratio that that under-represents them by a range of 1-2 seats: Akkar, Miniyeh-Dinniyeh, Zahrany, Nabatieh, Tyre, and Bint Jbeil.

So far, this should not be very surprising. But wait, there’s more! The next question that I would like to ask is: what would have been the result of the last election had we had a system like this one in place, rather than the existing law?

Obviously, this is very speculative, but it is not an entirely unreasonable exercise given that during the last election, every district (with the exception of the Metn) was swept by either the loyalist or opposition list. In other words, a majority voters in every district elected the whole slate of candidates presented to them, “zayy/mitl ma hiyyeh” (and in the case of Aley and Beirut 2, the mixed results were pre-arranged by the opposing sides ahead of time).

This fact makes it easier for us to simply adjust the geographical distribution of seats to conform to the ideal average ratio described above, and then model the outcome of a hypothetical election using the 2009 returns. So, for example, we are assuming that if Nabatiyyeh had five seats rather than three in the last election, Hizbullah would almost certainly have won all five (because people voted overwhelmingly for their entire list), and if Kisrawan had four seats rather than five, the FPM would have won 4 instead of the 5 they won in 2009.

Still with me?

Click to enlarge

Ok, so if we adjust the number of seats across all of these districts to conform to the ideal average ratio, and if we assume that the same parties/coalitions swept the same districts that they swept in 2009, the final result would seem to be that March 14 would have won 69 seats and March 8 would have won 61 (for a total of 130 seats; the readjustment of seats required an addition of two seats for the rounding-up math to work out). The new margin of victory is 53%-47%, rather than 55%-45% (as it was in 2009, when M14 won 71 seats and M8 won 57).

So, obviously, the election would have been closer, but not by much. The March 14 coalition (such as it is) would still have won, a fact which surprised me, given what we know about the discrepancy between the popular vote and the actual results. Hizbullah and Amal would have benefited substantially to the tune of 7 extra seats because of the new math, but the March 8 Christians (Aoun and Frangieh, etc.) would have lost 3 seats (in Kisrawan, Metn, and Jezzine). Meanwhile, the Future Movement would have gained 3 seats in Akkar and Miniyeh-Diniyyeh, but various March 14 parties would have lost 5 seats in Koura, Shouf, Zahleh, West Bekaa, and Beirut 1.

It seems to me that the takeaway conclusion from all of this is that: (a) current voter/representative ratios are not that out of whack with the ideal ratio; (b) even if we were to adjust the ratio (which I think we must do), it would not fundamentally change the basic landscape of Lebanese politics, which requires a lot of coalition building and inter-party (and, by extension, inter-sect) cooperation.

What would seem to me to have a much stronger effect on political dynamics would be the adoption of proportional representation. If I have some time (or some help!) I will try to run the above simulation using a PR model, just for fun. (Yes, I know how lame that sounds, thank you very much, but you all should know me by now…)

Those of you who are still awake should feel free to pillory and critique!

Hi folks. I’ve written a brief piece about tomorrow’s secularism march for The Guardian’s “Comment is Free” section. Feel free to comment either there or here.

Who, by the way, is going? Anyone? Can someone do me a solid and take some pictures?

The SCUD-D (above) vs. the Fateh-110 (below).

The Syria-Hizbullah-SCUD crisis has generated an incredible amount of press in the last week. Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman was dressed down yesterday before Congress for defending Obama’s engagement policy with Syria, and Foreign Policy alone has carried something like three opinion pieces about the issue just in the past couple of days.  (For an up-to-date survey of all the most recent stories, I suggest checking Syria Comment.)

What nobody seems to be asking, though, is why these hypothetical SCUDs are so much more “game-changing” than all of the other armaments that have apparently flowed to Hizbullah from Syria since 2006, and in particular the Fateh 110 missile. The two rockets, when you compare them, are not hugely different, at least when one considers the geographical and strategic context that we’re dealing with. Let’s compare the specifications:

Ok, so the SCUD-D can travel farther than the Fateh 110, and it can carry a heavier payload. But how important are these differences, strategically speaking? The Fateh 110′s range is around 200-250 km, which is far enough to strike Tel Aviv from as far north as Beirut. Sure, a SCUD-D could hit Be’er Sheva from Tripoli, but is that really the definition of “game-changing”?

Plus, the SCUD is more difficult to hide, harder to maneuver, and probably easier to shoot down than the Fateh 110. If you were an Israeli, what would you rather face? A dozen SCUDs or a thousand Fateh 110′s?

I can’t help but wonder if all of the hullabaloo in the Western press isn’t stemming from the Soviet mystique of the SCUD, one of the most famous missiles in history, and the weapon used by Saddam against Israel in 1991. To put it in medieval terms, it would be like raising the threat level to DEFCON 1 because the enemy’s army (previously equipped with standard issue longswords) had just recently received a shipment of scimitars. Whoooooo, scimitars! They’re… umm, sharper.

Or am I being obtuse?

Click to enlarge.

Several thousand miles, two kids, and an unfinished dissertation prevent me from attending the secularism walk scheduled for this Sunday in Beirut. But that won’t stop me from guilting the rest of you into going, assuming that you’re in Lebanon and aren’t hung over from Saturday night partying in Gemmayzeh (where, I hear, Syria will soon be building a nuclear weapons plant. Groovy.)

So anyway, here’s the info. The march will begin in Ain Mreisseh, in front of the Abdel Nasser statue at 11AM on Sunday morning, proceeding from there (presumably downtown).

The campaign has a Facebook group page, a Facebook event page, a Twitter page, a blog, and a mailing list (email the subject heading “subscribe” to leblaique@gmail.com).

There’s also a graffiti campaign planned (including a Maya Zankoul creation designed for the Qifa Nabki blog, to be unveiled somewhere on Bliss Street), and demonstrations planned at Lebanese embassies and consulates worldwide. So get out there and make your voices heard!

For new readers who are interested in what all of this secularism business is, you can read up on the issue here, here, here, here, here, and here.

DAMASCUS, Syria — U.S. and Israeli officials have reacted negatively to reports that Syria has transferred Scud missiles to the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.

Israel has called the development a “game-changing” move by Syria which has the potential to tip the region into a military conflagration.

“Syria claims it wants peace while at the same time it delivers Scuds to Hezbollah, whose only goal is to threaten the state of Israel,” said Israeli President Shimon Peres recently to an Israeli radio station.

Meanwhile, both Syria and Hezbollah are denying that any such transfer of armaments has taken place. However, high-level officials within the Syrian regime spoke to Qnion senior correspondent Jacob Tafnis yesterday evening, quietly confirming that Syria had been considering the move.

“We will not say that any Scuds have gone into Lebanon… yet,” said one official, asking to remain anonymous. “But we reserve the right to assist our neighbor whether or not they are interested in our assistance.”

When asked what the effect of such a move might be on Syrian engagement with the U.S. and the upcoming appointment of Robert Ford as ambassador to Damascus, the official responded: “We are confident that nothing is going to stop President Obama from engaging with us,” citing a recent article in Haaretz that alluded to Obama administration officials saying that “the Scud transfer made a U.S. diplomatic presence in Syria all the more necessary.”

“You see?” the official said. “The more we send weapons to Lebanon, the more they want to engage us,” he chortled happily. “I can tell you that we also have plans to establish a nuclear weapons facility in Gemmayzeh, a chemical weapons plant in Burj al-Barajneh, and a dedicated airstrip for unmanned drones right at the Beirut International Airport,” adding with a conspiratorial wink, “but you didn’t hear that from me.”

Meanwhile, in Gemmayzeh (Beirut’s popular nightlife district), rents are reported to be rising in anticipation of the new nuclear weapons plant, while local residents are hoping that the radiation will convince revelers to take their boisterous partying across town.

Today marks the 35th anniversary of the event traditionally considered to have provided the spark for the beginning of Lebanon’s Civil War. Lebanon’s politicians are commemorating it with a friendly game of soccer.

The game starts at 6:30 PM Beirut time, and apparently will have no spectators. Does anyone know if it will be televised? If not, then the choice of the memorial will be absurdly fitting: a bunch of politicians gathering together to replay their heroic struggles away from the prying eyes of their meddlesome followers, who will simply have to wait patiently for the results.

PS: I apologize for the light posting but I’ve been busy with various writing projects, some of which I’ll be able to link to soon enough. For anyone in the New Haven area who has an interest in Classical Arabic literature, there’s a wonderful colloquium taking place this weekend.

Update: The red team won the game, thanks to the goal-scoring prowess of Sami Gemayel. Gemayel had this to say after the game:

سامي الجميل بعد المباراة السياسية: اهم رسالة اليوم ان استراتيجية الحاج علي عمار الدفاعية عاطلة جدا

Pretty cute. I’ll try to find some pictures. [Update: see below]

Back in June 2005, Joshua Landis’s Syria Comment blog ran a post entitled “Whither Syria?” in which Josh discussed a recent article by Sami Moubayed characterizing President Bashar al-Asad’s liberalization attempts as a kind of Syrian “glasnost”. Moubayed concluded his piece by saying:

As the press became more open in the USSR, the Soviets, just like the Syrians today, began to understand why the truth had been kept away from them for so long. The truth is that the USSR was in a mess, and for the first time since 1917, the people were demanding answers to the question: what went wrong, and why? The same mood prevails in Damascus today: Syria is in a mess, and the people want answers.

In many ways, that mood could not have been more different than it is today. At the time, al-Asad was under tremendous international pressure, his troops had withdrawn ignominiously from Lebanon, and many believed that the regime was on its last legs.

Today, Syria’s star (as we are frequently told in the press) is in the ascendant. Aside from the renewed diplomatic engagement with various Western and Middle Eastern governments and the steady traffic of Lebanese politicians on the road to Damascus, there is also, apparently, a boom in economic activity. There are plans to build a new oil refinery, expand gas production,  and liberalize the investment and real estate sectors. What’s more, the Syrians are playing hard-to-get with the EU over trade agreements, and eating more sushi (a fact which apparently augurs changing political tastes, suggests The Economist).

These changes naturally bring to mind some of the reforms introduced by Bashar al-Asad during the abortive “Damascus Spring,” following his father’s death in 2000. When Syria decided not to join the Iraq War in 2003 and relations soured between the U.S. and some of its Arab allies following the Hariri assassination, Bashar battened down the hatches so as to consolidate his power base and prepare for the long hard slog that he has recently emerged from.

Are we, today, witnessing the beginnings of a Damascus Spring II? (I hereby claim the copyright for that phrase if people start using it regularly in the press.) How far will al-Asad go this time? And what effects would serious reforms like an amnesty law, a political parties law, and further economic and political liberalization — if enacted — have on the future of the regime? After all, let’s not forget the unintended consequences that glastnost had for the Soviet Union.

Can Bashar rebuild Syria like Theseus rebuilt his ship, one decaying plank at a time, preserving the basic ideologies of his father’s party while transforming its particulars? Or will the uncharted waters towards which Bashar’s patchwork ship inevitably veers spook the regime into tacking back towards the shore? (Here ends that over-taxed maritime metaphor…)

The floor is yours.

Apologies for the radio silence over the past week. I was in New Orleans attending the annual conference of the American Comparative Literature Association, and the lure of great music, great seafood, and great company proved more irresistible than Lebanese politics.

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Jeffrey Feltman, will be giving a talk at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs tomorrow evening. I plan to attend and, given the opportunity, I will ask him one question on behalf of a reader of this blog.

So let’s hear it. What should I ask Mr. Feltman? I’ll select what I think is the best question and then report back with his response.

Update: I did indeed attend the Feltman talk, but apparently all of the talks in this Middle East Initiative series are off-the-record, so I won’t be able to report back on what he had to say. Sorry guys.

Some links…

• An excellent, thoughtful review of Lee Smith’s book by Andrew Exum.
• On the Vero-Moda-fication of Hamra Street.