Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

Dr. Nadim Shehadi (bio) has very kindly agreed to answer some questions about the issue of improving the civil rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This blog hosted two very interesting discussions on this topic a couple of weeks ago, and so I’m grateful to Nadim for agreeing to discuss the policy dimensions of the issue.

Please feel free to leave any additional questions you may have in the comment section.

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QN: How likely do you think it is that this Lebanese government will pass some kind of legislation aimed at improving the civil rights of Palestinian refugees?

NS: My view is that the likelihood is quite high, I feel that the debate has evolved a lot in the past four years and that the mood in the country is to discuss things in the open. It is normal for all the skeletons to come out of the cupboards on such a sensitive subject. I think that if a positive outcome is reached it would mean that Lebanon has really recovered from the civil war.

QN: If legislation is passed, what do you think its broad outlines are likely to be (as far as health, social security, labor, and property rights are concerned)?

NS: There are two options. One is that they resolve the issues gradually, one by one (i.e. employment, reciprocity, association law, property etc.) Two is that they do a whole package and resolve all the pending legal issues in one legislative move.

I am in favor of option two because the political cost of each gradual move is the same as for all the bundle together. They must hit it on the head and finish with this problem once and for all. If they do that then it will strengthen the government’s hand in discussing arms and security issues later. But to get to that stage they must also resolve the legal issues unilaterally without linking them to any quid-pro-quo over arms.

The danger with option one is that they would compromise at every stage and use up all the political credit leaving things unresolved. If this happens then the government’s position will be weakened when they come to discussing arms. If they use rights to leverage over arms they will get nowhere.

QN: Walid Jumblatt introduced the emergency laws at a plenary session of Parliament on June 15th, catching many of his allies and adversaries off guard. Why, in your opinion, has this issue come up at this moment in time?

NS: Jumblatt’s democratic gathering made a statement about Palestinian rights in 2005. At the time it was a demand to resolve outstanding issues away from the internal Lebanese political wrangling. This was partly a reaction to President Lahoud repeating over and over again that he wanted to renew his presidency and would never resign because he was there to protect Lebanon from the conspiracy of tawteen or permanent settlement. The issue of tawteen was exploited also by the Syrians who repeated that they were there to protect Lebanon from it.

Then there was the question of appointing Wael Boufaour of the PSP as minister of state for Palestinian Refugees. That mobilised the PSP into organizing a conference in January. After the conference it took them a long time to mobilize and produce the draft that was presented on the 15th of June. They took that long because they lost steam after the appointment of Boufaour did not materialize.

The laws were presented in a normal manner and they would have usually been automatically been sent to the parliamentary committees for discussion. But it seems that Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri tabulated them for discussion and a vote on that day and this is what took everybody by surprise.

QN: Do you believe that any such legislation is “a step towards naturalization”, as many politicians are claiming, or is this simply a scare tactic?

NS: The problem is that since there is no legal definition of what constitutes ‘naturalization’ or tawteen, potentially any step that facilitates or prepares the ground for permanent settlement could be interpreted as anti-constitutional.

A necessary step to break the deadlock is to agree on a legal definition of tawteen. The SSNP presented a draft law to that effect last week and if it is adopted it would be a very positive move.

In reality, the status of refugees is completely unrelated to naturalization. Their rights are the same whether they live in poverty in a camp or whether they live in luxury and even have acquired another citizenship. A Palestinian in Canada with Canadian nationality can still claim the right of return and compensation, it is theoretically an individual right that is not dependent on status. In any case, whatever the outcome of the negotiations over refugees, no refugee will be forced to do anything they do not want to do. The refugees will be presented with options that are clearly defined and each individual with exercise a choice between the different options. The implementation process will take at least 10-15 years after the agreement has been reached.

QN: Are fears about the impact of such legislation on the economy and on security justified?

This is the only really tangible question and a very important one. The problem is that we do not have proper data or impact analysis related to these legislations. The reason is that the debate so far has been more emotional than rational and touches on all the traumas and phobias that are the legacy of the civil war. This is true both for Palestinians and Lebanese.

It is very important to understand that the laws will not change things radically; this is because Palestinians in Lebanon work in most professions and do not obtain a work permit. The law is not really enforceable. The figures are really misleading too. In one of the speeches today, it was mentioned that there are 136,000 foreigners who were given work permits in 2007 and that only 261 Palestinians were given work permits and that this is discrimination. This is a false and very misleading image, it gives the impression that there are 422,000 Palestinians in Lebanon and that 421,739 of them are being ‘denied’ a work permit, denied is an often used word. The reason there are only 261 work permits is that only 261 were applied for.

In reality what you need in Lebanon is a residence permit and to obtain it you need to have a work permit. So if you are a resident already, like Palestinian refugees are, and do not need a resident permit then you do not need to bother getting one. The disadvantages are there, you do not get social security, and you can get exploited by your employer – and your employer exploiting you may even be another Palestinian refugee.

Doing away with the work permit requirement for the refugees will ease things and will probably not increase the Palestinian work-force by much. They are already here and they are already working they will just be happier and working legally. Many advocates insist on saying that Palestinians cannot work in 72 jobs and if you say no its 71.5 then you are treated worse than a holocaust denier.

The truth it that we do not really know the exact number of jobs they cannot legally do even if they wanted to. The Ministry of Labour lawyers identified 14 jobs that all foreigners are banned from if they do not belong to a country that has reciprocity agreements with Lebanon. A study of the various laws and agreements may reveal one or two more. But in the end what difference does it make? Palestinians have no incentives to apply for a work permit and you can neither force them nor stop them. Changing the law in a way adjust the texts to reality on the ground.

Advocates of Palestinian rights in Lebanon do a lot of harm by exaggerating the situation. Some of them are probably also still fighting the Lebanese civil war or the civil rights movement in the US.

I can give loads of examples. How many times have you read that Palestinians in Lebanon are denied the “right of association”? Whereas in reality there are in Lebanon more Palestinian associations, parties, NGOs, civil society organizations and clubs than anywhere else. The truth about this is that those who want to register their association have to have a board with a Lebanese citizen on it. If not they just don’t register and it does not make that big a difference. Allowing Palestinians to sit on the board of associations will only mean that more associations will register – it does not mean that you will create hundreds or thousands of new associations. The impact is minimal.

Property law is the worst; I do not see how the discrimination can be justified. It was only passed in 2001 and its application is even worse than the law itself. However, the amendment to the law that discriminates against the Palestinians will cancel itself out once a Palestinian state is recognized and since Lebanon accepts this through its affiliation to the Arab Peace Initiative then it is Lebanese policy to recognize the state. The impact of changing the property law to allow Palestinians the same quota as other non Lebanese citizens will initially mean that all those who own property already will be legalised. This is a complex issue and I am not sure about its impact. One thing is sure, the Lebanese state will never take away any Palestinian property in Lebanon on the grounds that it is illegally owned.

The big unknown is the issue of Social Security. Again numbers are not as frightening as it is assumed but we need to do a proper impact analysis on this to reassure those who are claiming that it will cost billions. Only Palestinians who are regularly employed and make social security contributions will benefit from it. Again the figures being thrown around are very inflated and alarmist. The entire Palestinian population in Lebanon is around 250,000 at most. Of these a maximum of 40-50, 000 are active and according to some studies up to 70 percent of them are in entrepreneurial businesses i.e are not employed in a job that would require social security registration.

QN: Any other thoughts?

NS: Khalass bikaffi

Tayyib, one last thought if only to repeat the importance of not linking any solution to rights with any thinking about security.

Don’t miss Jean Aziz’s excellent op-ed in al-Akhbar today; it’s a letter to President Michel Sleiman, asking him to explain his reasons for arresting three young Lebanese for slander and defamation against the president, on Facebook.

The Western press is claiming that the incriminating Facebook posts were taken down, but you can find copies of them on this Orange Room forum.

According to this report at France24, “Lebanon’s general prosecutor must take action in any case of libel, slander or defamation against the president or any “sister state” of Lebanon regardless of whether a plaintiff comes forward to press charges.”

Hmmm, I wonder which “sister state” that might be…

Hilal Khashan, Professor of Political Studies and Public Administration at the American University of Beirut, recently claimed that Hezbollah sent several hundred members to Iran last year to help clamp down on the anti-regime protests.

Khashan, who is frequently quoted in the foreign press on Lebanon-related stories, says that his source for this information is a Hezbollah official whom he has known for twelve years and who asked to remain anonymous. The information provided by the source is as follows:

Hizbullah had airlifted to tehran 300 men to help in clamping down at the protesters in the aftermath of Iran’s presidential elections in June 2009. The Iranian riots police used an additional number of about 200 Hizbullah trainees at Lavizan training camp and Imam Ali garrison training grounds. There are no Hizbullah men attached to Iranian security police at the time. Hizbullah men assisting Iranian police were mostly enlisted men with a few junior officers. Hizbullah men felt it was their duty to assist the Islamic Revolution and many others in Hizbullah would not have hesitated to go to Iran and lend their services to the regime. There is no doubt that Hizbullah would send men to Iran to perform security duties in the future should need arise.

I initially received this information from Ghassan Karam, and then contacted Dr. Khashan asking him to verify his connection with the story, which he did.

Obviously, I have no way of knowing whether his source was telling the truth, but he was clearly someone that Khashan trusts enough to put himself out on a limb.

The floor is open for discussion…

Maybe you all can help me understand an idea that I’ve repeatedly encountered among various neoconservative Mideast watchers, with regard to the question of whether or not to engage Syria.

In a nutshell, the idea is that the best way for Washington to get what it wants–namely a Syrian regime that doesn’t threaten American or Israeli interests in the region–is to isolate Damascus, instead of engaging it with the aim of facilitating a peace agreement between Syria and Israel.

There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it is out of touch with recent historical experience. With the exception of the first few months after the Hariri assassination–which witnessed a Syrian withdrawal of troops, etc.–the tough isolationist policy toward Syria did not seem to reap many lasting benefits. As tough as things got for Damascus during the dark days of 2005-08, the regime never showed any signs of buckling and Bashar al-Assad eventually emerged more popular than ever (just as Hezbollah did after the 2006 war).

The second problem with this idea is its odd shortsightedness. Here’s an excerpt from a Hudson Institute event featuring Lee Smith, Jeffrey Feltman, and Elliott Abrams, in which the latter expresses this idea very directly:

MR. ABRAMS: The Bush administration did not favor, at the time it began, Syrian-Israeli negotiations because they let Syria out of the box we had carefully constructed for Syria. Syria was – in that period, if you go back to, for example, the number of European foreign minister visits over a 12-month period, very, very, very small. Syria was quite isolated. And the price it paid for the break in this isolation was zero.

Now that’s mostly a criticism of the government of Israel; much less so a criticism of the government of Turkey in the sense that if two governments want to negotiate and they ask you to facilitate, I think your culpability is a great deal less than if you are the author of this engagement. There was no point – there was nothing to be gained by criticizing the Turkish role and I don’t believe the United States ever did criticize the Turkish role. The problem, I would say, was trying to figure out what Israel or the cause of peace or the Syrian population or the Lebanese population or the Iraqi population gained from this. And I think the answer is nothing. (Download the entire transcript here)

Andrew Tabler also recently made a similar argument (i.e. with respect to Israel letting Syria out of the box) in an event hosted by the Middle East Institute, saying:

“I think it’s also quite ironic that… for all the talk about regime change during the Bush administration, it was actually Israel that saved Syria in that debate.” [NB: Tabler does not actually argue in favor of isolating Syria.]

Am I missing something here? Do these folks really believe, with the benefit of hindsight, that a few more years of uninterrupted isolation would have brought the Syrians to their knees, and that had it not been for the Turkish-brokered peace talks, the Bush policy would have been a success? This strikes me as a very peculiar position.

In my opinion, if you’re going to be against an engagement policy, you need a better reason than: “It lets Syria out of the box.”  You can argue that the Syrians aren’t democratic enough to be friends of the United States, or that they shouldn’t be “rewarded” for working against American interests, etc., but these are not particularly convincing reasons either.

At the end of the day, if the goal of the U.S. policy toward the Assad regime is to end the state of war between Syria and Israel, problematize the Syrian-Iranian relationship, and create lasting stability in Lebanon, how would this goal not be best achieved by directly pursuing a Syrian-Israeli peace deal? Tell me what I’m missing, people.

Somehow, I missed this incredible BBC Arabic documentary about Lebanon’s Jewish community. It follows the stories of several people who left Lebanon for Israel after 1948, reconstructing these narratives both from their own testimonies as well as the memories of their friends and neighbors whom they left behind.

I highly recommend watching the entire thing (provided you understand Arabic). It’s one of the best documentaries I’ve seen on a contemporary Lebanese topic.

Contrary to what many reported immediately after the fact, the debate in the Lebanese Parliament last Tuesday over the issue of Palestinian rights did not slam the door on any potential future reforms.

True, no law was passed. But the outcome — a decision to send the draft laws to a review committee and bring them back to Parliament for a vote in one month — is not just acceptable; it was probably the right thing to do. As a friend on the inside recently wrote to me: “It is not acceptable for this or any other parliament to discuss laws that have not had the chance for proper review.  It’s about time someone started holding parliament to account for the job that they do.”

There’s an excellent article in today’s Daily Star that surveys the issue; apparently, several analysts are very optimistic that the law will be passed when it comes up again, thereby rolling back several decades’ worth of institutionalized discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon. And while I don’t want us to get ahead of ourselves, the fact that this government is actually tackling one of the stickiest issues in Lebanese political culture holds out hope that other similarly radioactive topics might somehow be raised as well in the near future.

Take, for example, the issue of deconfessionalizing the political system. Nabih Berri’s recent proposal to establish a national commission to explore the idea fell flat, largely because it was issued informally via the media. Let’s imagine, instead, that Berri and Jumblatt jointly sponsored a draft electoral law for the 2013 parliamentary elections, based on a non-confessional framework. No one could ignore such a law; they’d have to debate it in Parliament and then vote it down, justifying this decision to their constituents. At the very least, such a move would have the effect of putting the issue in the national spotlight once again.

In other words, both the Palestinian rights question and the deconfessionalism question suffer from similar problems of misinformation, messy thinking, and political fear-mongering. We saw last Tuesday that these problems can be mitigated by separating fact from fiction in the form of a concrete legislative proposal. Deconfessionalism can benefit from this approach as well.

Update: I’m grateful to Rex Brynen, professor of political science at McGill University and expert on the Palestinian refugee problem, for weighing in on this issue in the comment section:

Arguments can be made in favour of extending basic civil (not political rights) to Palestinians in Lebanon on a variety of humanitarian and human rights grounds. For me, frankly, those grounds are enough in and of themselves.

However, quite apart from humanitarian arguments in favour of Jumblat’s proposals, a strong argument can also be made on Lebanese national security grounds.

Can anyone seriously argue that the dangers of violent radicalism are somehow *reduced* by having 250,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon permanently poor, marginalized, and discriminated against? The Fateh al-Islams of this world thrive on the poverty of the camps. The impulse to improve Palestinian conditions (initially under the Siniora government, and now with Hariri supporting Jumblat’s proposed reforms) has been underpinned by the recognition that Lebanese security interests were better served by allowing the Palestinians more normal lives.

Of course, the scarecrow of tawteen always gets raised at this point. The naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon, however, has nothing to do with whether they can work or own property–it would require a political decision by a future Lebanese government to extend citizenship. That won’t happen, and in any case is constitutionally prohibited.

Should arms be retained inside the camps? I would prefer not– I think they do the refugees far more harm than good. However, given political realities (and, for that matter, the interests of some Lebanese parties) the camps aren’t going to be disarmed soon. Consequently, it is pointless holding human rights hostage to the arms issue. It provides no leverage at all, and only makes the situation worse.

Finally, it is not as if Palestinian refugees have anywhere else to go in the meantime. If and when a Palestinian state is established, then they’ll have the right and ability to repatriate, as well as whatever return might take place to Israel. In the meantime–tragic as it is–the Lebanese and Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are stuck with each other. They might as well make the best of it. That’s precisely what the recent proposals propose to do.

For those of you who support the current initiative, I’ll throw out a challenge: what can be done to move this forward? The PSP have been great on the issue, and Hizbullah will likely continue to be supportive provided they don’t decide to prioritize their alliance with the FPM. Support within Amal and Future is, I suspect, a little more uneven, despite the positions taken by Berri and Hariri in parliament. Finally, for this to really go forward, it is important that at least some of the concerns put forward by the Christian parties be addressed, and–if at all possible–the reformist coalition expanded. How? Does anyone have any concrete, actionable ideas?

Conspiracy Chronicles series, no. 7

Iran is sending a convoy of aid ships to Gaza, according to Iranian state radio. Reuters is reporting that one ship left on Sunday and another “loaded with food, construction material and toys” will leave by this Friday.

We haven’t had an episode in our conspiracy chronicles series in a while, so I’m pleased to bring you the following nugget from a Beirut-based source who describes himself as “a western expert brainwashed by bad operas dedicated to Imad Mughniyeh and bought by iranian petro-lucre…”

According to my source (who got his information from “a bearded taciturn birdie”) these Iranian ships are under the protection of the muqawama. “Any trouble, and whoosh whooosh boom…”

You should know that this isn’t the first time that Iran has sent aid ships, and on previous occasions the ships have been turned around by the Israeli Navy without any incident. I don’t imagine that Hizbullah would actually take any serious action in the event of a repeat of the Freedom Flotilla disaster, but don’t say you weren’t warned…

Click to see the full comic.

The blogosphere is boiling over with rage at the news that the Lebanese government may ban several voice-over-IP (VoIP) services this week in a crass move to boost revenue for the Telecommunications Ministry.

Here at Qifa Nabki, we’re wondering what all the fuss is about. Surely there are alternatives to Skype, no? Are we so addicted to the Internet that we’ve lost the capacity to communicate using other means? Click the image to the right to see what Maya Zankoul and I came up with…

[For previous collaborations between Qifa Nabki and Maya, click here.]

Well, it seems the rumors are true. The Lebanese Parliament will be calling a special session tomorrow to discuss banning Skype. Apparently, several other VoIP (voice-over-IP) services have already been blocked, such as Magic Jack, and if all goes according to plan, Skype and Gchat could be next. Imad Atalla breaks it down in the Daily Star:

No one has noticed, but the Lebanese government is writing yet another chapter in the endless mockery of our rights as private citizens and social entrepreneurial agents of progress and change. The state is extending censorship over the remainder of our liberties into the last frontier of freedom – the internet and its supposed neutrality.

Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is a cost effective and sometimes free way of long-distance voice calling and video conferencing. It is also illegal in Lebanon, according to the telecoms law of 2002. Unlike Instant Messaging, VoIP allows users to speak from phone to phone via the internet. While extremely economical for average consumers and businesses, it greatly reduces revenues to the (monopolistic) landline network and, in some cases, wireless telephone companies – read Ogero, MTC, Alfa, and the Finance Ministry as the direct beneficiaries of long-distance communication revenues.

Last week the Telecommunications Ministry began implementing the short-sighted telecoms law to the letter: It activated new hardware and software equipment to enforce the ban on VoIP communications. The new equipment, which was tested in recent months, now effectively blocks internet telephony for good. (Keep reading)

Lebanon’s telecommunications sector is a national embarrassment. With the least competitive cellular market in the Middle East, the 172nd slowest internet speed in the world, and some of the most expensive calling charges anywhere, the telecommunications industry has long been used shamelessly as a coffer-stuffer for the Lebanese government.

If I’m not wrong, telecommunications alone provides the single  largest revenue stream for the government. Is it any wonder, therefore, that efforts are now being made to curtail the inroads of VoIP alternatives to exorbitant calling rates?

I have to wonder, though: what’s the angle? Even by the standards of this lousy government, doing away with services like Skype will be a deeply unpopular move. As Atalla attests in his piece for the Daily Star, the proposed ban has already enraged business people and entrepreneurs who are trying to compete in an increasingly global market. Students and other young professionals (who generally provide the energy and muscle for any political movement in Lebanon) are up in arms. And, most importantly, this has the potential to further alienate the most important constituency of all: Lebanese expatriates living abroad.

For all of those hard-working folks slaving away in hellish places like Dubai, the Congo, and Quebec, Skype is a lifeline. Rather than sinking all of your savings into expensive telephone calls to Mama, Baba, Teta, and Jido, the internet has made staying in touch with the motherland affordable. As a result, so the theory goes, more people are likely to send more money home. Now, thanks to the Telecommunications ministry, remittances are likely to take a hit.

Seen on the FPM online forum... (Translation: "Together towards the Stone Age")

But is it really the Telecommunications Ministry that is to blame? Could Charbel Nahhas (the man we thought would be Aoun’s shadow finance minister) seriously have screwed up this badly? The FPM forums are seething over this move, demanding an explanation, and even calling for Gebran Bassil to be re-instated as Telecoms chief.

The only thing I can think of as a possible explanation for this move is the notion that Nahhas is trying to circumvent the likely loss of telephone revenue once Lebanon receives fiber optic upgrades in the next couple of months. The upgrades will enhance internet speeds, making it easier for people to Skype their Teta to get her recipe for koosa mi7sheh… unless Skype is banned.

PS: I just received the draft law on information technology, which is supposedly responsible for this mess. (Warning: if you live in Lebanon, this file is 2MB, and so may take you three weeks to download.)

Update: Here are some links to further reading by other Lebanese bloggers, on this issue: Social Media Exchange, Maya Zankoul, Beirut Spring.

Update 2: Here’s a relevant comment by RedLeb:

Apparently, facts are irrelevant when whipping up a finger waving hysteria.

There is no connection between the draft law QN posted (and allegedly going to a vote today) and the VoIP ban.

As the Daily Star article points out, the VoIP ban was set by the 2002 telecom law. It also has much earlier antecedents in the fact that any unlicensed telephony operations are illegal in Lebanon. VoIP has in fact been illegal for some time now, and there are periodic clampdowns on the those that provide it locally.

That target is really unlicensed international phone call providers, not so much the home user. It’s dumb and idiotic, but telecom is the government’s cash cow, and until more enlightened financial policies are in place, we’re stuck with this ban.

The law linked to, and that is also generating hysterical reporting in the press, is concerned with electronic transactions and signatures. While everyone seems to believe it allows the government to spy on you, it actually allows the government to spy on regulated certificate authorities. And that’s a good thing.

I just spent the last hour and a half watching a fascinating webcast of a seminar on the Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon. It was organized by the Aspen Institute, and featured Nadim Shehadi (former director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies at Oxford, current Associate Fellow at Chatham House, and friend of the blog) and Ghaith al-Omari (lead Palestinian drafter of the Geneva Initiative, former senior advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, and participant at the Camp David summit and Taba talks, etc.)

For those of you interested in both the situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon (see my thoughts here) as well as the refugee issue and the right of return, I highly recommend that you watch the entire thing. Here, though, are some interesting bits:

13:00 – Nadim discusses the complexity of any issue involving Palestinians in Lebanon, even something as trivial as “the width of a staircase…”

41:00 – Ghaith discusses “the bitter pill that the Palestinians will have to swallow when it comes to accepting a deal” on the right of return, which he says that the PLO has not prepared the refugees adequately to accept.

49:00 – Nadim explains that the bottom line for any final deal on the refugees is that it cannot make their situation worse than it is now, which is a very real threat.

59:50 – Ghaith discusses the various mechanisms (compensation, settlement in host countries, etc.)

62:45 – Firas Maksad asks about how the situation of the refugees might be improved, considering that this issue is seen by many in Lebanon (and manipulated by political actors) as the first step towards naturalization.