Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

Lebanese television station Al-Jadeed released another titillating episode in its series “Haqiqa Leaks” a few days ago, this time featuring the notorious Hussam Hussam, a Syrian intelligence agent who came forward early in the Hariri investigation with information incriminating Syrian and Lebanese security officials.

Hussam, like Siddiq (who was the star of his own Haqiqa Leaks primetime special), would later recant his story and claim that he was pressured by March 14th figures to fabricate his testimony. The leaked recording is from an interview conducted with him by a member of the U.N. investigation team in Damascus in 2007. It’s full of all kinds of accusations, among them that he was tortured by Gerhard Lehmann in a subterranean building abutting the headquarters of the Special Tribunal in Monteverdi (a residential neighborhood just northeast of Beirut), and that he was offered $5 million by Saad al-Hariri to round up other false witnesses to help substantiate the tale that he was made to tell.

According to the STL, neither Siddiq nor Hussam’s testimonies are part of the evidence presented to the pre-trial judge, having been deemed unreliable once they recanted. This will not stop many from continuing to argue, however, that the entire case is based on false witness testimony…

And whether or not one chooses to believe a word that the guy says, it’s obvious that whoever is behind these leaks knows just how damaging they will be to the Tribunal’s credibility in Lebanon. Does al-Jadeed have their own Bradley Manning deep in the bowels of the STL’s offices in The Hague? How much more embarrassing material is waiting to be revealed, and when will we see other parties circulating their own “leaks” to counter the Al-Jadeed narrative?

More importantly: don’t you just love Lebanese politics? Not content to be the first country ever to trigger a UN Special Tribunal devoted to the prosecution of a political murder, we are also the first country to coopt the Wikileaks phenomenon (and brand) in the service of undermining said Tribunal. Ghazi Kanaan didn’t know who he was dealing with when he told the Lebanese to stick to entertainment and leave the politics to Syria. Talk about a false choice.

(I’ll  be traveling for the next few days, so please behave yourselves in the comment section…)

If recent history is any indication, this is probably the conversation taking place in the Egyptian presidential palace right about now…

To join or not to join? That is the question that Michael Young and many other Lebanese analysts have been asking, as PM-designate Najib Miqati sets about trying to form a government. Young comes down on the side of Hariri’s participation in the Hizbullah-led March 8th coalition cabinet, but on the condition that March 14th can secure a minority veto.

Meanwhile, today’s editorial at staunchly pro-M14 website Now Lebanon argues in favor of boycotting the Miqati government as a way of staying true to the ideals of majoritarian government:

A majority government is what March 14 wanted after winning the May 2009 parliamentary elections, but it was denied the right after the opposition’s blocking third was imposed upon it. It therefore came as no surprise that what was sold to the people as a national-unity government built on supposed consensus turned out to be a mechanism for governmental inertia.

March 14 must now demonstrate the values it advocated in government as an organized and focused opposition. For to accept to be part of Mikati’s new administration would undermine the coalition’s previous calls for majority rule, to stand or fall according to its performance. It would also highlight the lust for power rather than the desire to create a genuine parliamentary process. And in this way, it will have set itself apart from its political opponents.

Alas, NOW Lebanon’s argument would make more sense if the legislative branch of the Lebanese government was actually empowered to provide oversight over the executive, but that is sadly not the case. As Michel Aoun found out the hard way in 2005, sitting out a government in Lebanon gives you little more than the right to vociferous but anemic protest. There are very few mechanisms in place that permit a principled opposition to also be one that is effective at prosecuting the case against the ruling party in the public sphere.

QN‘s community of highly opinionated political strategists went to town a couple days ago in the comment section of the last post, debating the merits of Hariri’s various options. I recommend you check out the whole thread, but here are some interesting contributions:

(For those of you unfamiliar with the increasing stock of Lebanese political acronyms, here’s  a quick guide to navigating the below comments: M14 = March 14; M8 = March 8; FM = Future Movement; HA = Hizbullah; STL = Special Tribunal for Lebanon; FPM = Free Patriotic Movement; QN = Qifa Nabki)

MM writes:

“1-Future Movement need not participate in this government if M14 is to get a blocking third.

2-Giving the PM (Mikati in this case) the free hand to choose Sunni Ministers works in favor of Hariri in the future.

3- Mikati is being put on the defense and with regards to any political salvation within his community he will have to be an extra stubborn defender of “sunni rights” (if there is such a thing)within the government. I don’t doubt that he will.

4- With regards to the STL, if there is a blocking third to M14 then this third will try to thwart any cancellation attempts of the STL and resign at will when most appropriate.

5- Everybody needs to look ahead to the 2013 elections. We all know that the real electoral battles will be in Christian areas and the biggest prize is the vote of Aounis or quasi Aounis who are with the STL, and they are many. (yes there will be some extra seats up for grabs in the Mountains as well)

6-FM should prop their christian allies in the next government and they should give up any seats allocated to the FM to their Christian allies.

7- FM should stay out of the government and should work on putting its house in order. (A tall and arduous assignment)”

Gabriel says:

“M14 should sit out as opposition. Mikati should be given free reign. Let’s see what he’s made of. Will he follow the path of truth and justice, or will he buckle like a deck of cards.”

Tosk59 writes:

“Your scenarios assume that HA (and M8) actually want a government in place… My thought is that after pulling the plug they ‘leaned’ on enough folks (Jumblatt) to deny M14 a majority and the ability to get their PM and govt. This means that M8 has a majority, and they put forward a PM candidate to prove it, but will NOT form a govt. They will spend the next several weeks and months talking a lot about a unity government, but making it as difficult for Hariri as possible, and counting on him to not go along with it. However, they will refrain from setting up a M8-only version.

Essentially, the name of the game *right now* is to temporize and buy time, pending the STL indictments being made public (and then seeing how it pans out). Rather than a M14 govt backing the STL, or a M8 govt against the STL (but not credible), best for them right now would be NO government. Clearly this is not tenable for the long haul, but HA is in a tough spot and buying time is the best they can do *right now*…”

S writes:

“QN, There is a third option that you missed. If Future does not join the government (or even if it does), Hizballah can remain outside of it by choosing not to have any ministers in the government, and thus technically remaining in the opposition. They have already announced that they will not take part, and I wonder if this means zero cabinets for them. In many ways though, I think many people will then call this a puppet government with the Hizb effectively controlling it from the outside. But this would be one way to keep Future in check and also to answer your question of how to minimize Future’s effectiveness as an opposition. Mikati has suggested a government of technocrats. That’s another option.”

David writes:

“For lots of reasons, everyone wants to make this about HA’s encounter with “national politics,” but just as interesting (and just as vexing for the concerned party) is that of Hariri, Jr.’s. Can HA as we know it survive leading a governing coalition: possibly not. Can Sheikh Saad survive being outside the government: possibly not.

What we have now is a weakening of both positions: Hariri is now even more dependent on his “foreign support” and HA is now even more dependent on their Lebanese and Syrian allies. Does this relative and respective weakening make them more amenable to a coming deal? Probably. Will some Lebanese get killed in the process? Hopefully not.

Was there a deal? Is there a deal? Who knows, who cares. The real crisis point remains where “they” always prefer it: in the near distance. And really that’s the thing about inevitability: it’s always around the next corner.”

J. Estiphan writes:

“I think what is most likely to happen is that the Future Bloc/Lebanese Forces “March 14″ will be a Loyal Opposition, and a constructive Opposition with a coherent programme. They can have influence on individual laws and in the committees of Parliament and just by helping to frame the debate ahead of the 2013 elections. It could be the start of something closer to a two party alternate governing arrangement.”

New-at-posting writes:

“In terms of Hizbullah’s political strategy, there is another option that hasn’t been considered in the post above: allow M14 a blocking third in the cabinet but focus on corruption & false witnesses, rather than pulling out of the STL. It’s possible that they no longer have an interest in the government pulling out of the STL; perhaps that is part of the “before/after the indictment” difference. In a recent speech, SHN mentioned the false witnesses issue, corruption and “conspiracy against the Resistance” as issues the opposition won’t be silent about; he’s also made a separation between the two tracks of gov’t & STL. “Conspiracy against the Resistance” is certainly vague, but it does leave open the possibility that they’ve moved on to a new phase in which getting the gov’t to pull out of the STL doesn’t matter. Maybe an investigation into the false witnesses will do enough to discredit the STL… So maybe that’s the end-game (for now)? If the M8 government focuses on corruption and false witnesses, does M14 really have a good reason to bring down the government?”

UPDATE:

Mickanthrope’s comment on this thread was too good not to post up here:

“1. Mikati will assemble a consensus cabinet, in which neither Hizbullah nor FM are represented. Today, Mikati emphasized his “technocratic” approach. This cabinet will consolidate the Opposition’s victory in the battle since 2005 on whether government should be governed by consensus or majoritarian decision-making. They won this as a concession to return to the government after the first walk-out (with the promise that decisions will be made by consensus not majority vote). Then, at Doha, won this again with the formation of the new cabinet (ensuring a blocking third). Then, after with the formation of the government 6 months after the elections, they consolidated this formation. To their credit, both M14 and the opposition have stood by their principled positions: M14 for majoritarian government; opposition for consensus. My prediction: Opposition will prove its position on consensus government by allowing a technocratic cabinet in which (and I agree here with S) there are no Hizbullah ministers (thus taking the wind out of the sails of those who would raise concerns about a Hizbullah-dominated cabinet); FM of M14 will prove its stance on majoritarian, but the rest will opt-in (since a majoritarian stance only favors Sunnis in confessional calculations). The formation of a consensus cabinet of technocrats of the various confessions (rather than zaims) will settle the dispute about the cabinet left unresolved by the ambiguous language of Taif. I also agree with “New to Posting” that this cabinet would address “false witness” etc rather than pulling out of STL.

2. Even with a technocratic consensus cabinet, we might still see clashes in the coming weeks:

A. February 10 GLC strike. Previous clashes (in Jan 2007 and May 2008) coincided with GLC strikes. The relationship between the opposition and the GLC (which offers power of the street) has been recognized by M14 to the extent that Harb and other M14 politicians have sought to shift the leadership of the GLC and generate competing commissions.

B. Feb 14. After the day of rage, this will likely involve street actions. Moreover, if FM sees the cabinet moving forward without them, this will increase the “rage” factor.

C. Nasrallah specifically de-linked cabinet negotiations with response to the indictments and the STL. If the indictments are leaked around that time, then this could be an epic conflagration. If I were very cynical and conspiratorial (which I am sometimes), I would suggest that if the cabinet appears to be going in a direction that consolidates Hizbullah power (formally or informally), the indictments could be leaked opportunistically to instigate street action that would discredit Hizbullah and take the wind out of the sails of a new cabinet that M14 does not dominate. Right now, the US seems to be taking a “wait and see” attitude toward Mikati (til the cabinet is formed, presumably). Hariri seems to be playing hardball–indeed far harder than his hand seems to warrant. Why would be be doing so if he were not receiving reassurance that he would be backed?”

The political story in Lebanon is changing so quickly that I’m loathe to forecast how things are going to play out over the next couple of weeks. A few quick thoughts, though, on the calculations of the various players and the choices they face:

1. Tables are turned

Lebanon’s Sunnis are calling for a “day of rage”, but  it’s more apt to call it a day of deep hypocrisy and cynicism. Consider the following:

• In 2005, after winning a majority in the elections, the March 14th coalition wanted to nominate a Shiite Speaker of Parliament other than Nabih Berri. The main Shiite parties, Hizbullah and Amal, made a big fuss over this and claimed that such a move would violate that infamously vague clause of the Lebanese Constitution (Preamble, j), which states that “there shall be no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the pact of communal existence.” March 14th acquiesced and appointed Berri.
• In 2006, Hizbullah and Amal withdrew from the Siniora government and then called it illegal and unconstitutional because of the lack of Shiite participation. Speaker Berri then refused to allow Parliament to convene for over a year and a half, so as to prevent the body from ratifying the Lebanese government’s cooperation agreement with the UN Special Tribunal (later passed via Chapter VII), and voting on Emile Lahoud’s presidential successor. (I recommend reading Gary Gambill’s superb discussion of the 2006 constitutional crisis for more background on this issue.)

So, these two parties — Hizbullah and Amal — have played the “consensual democracy” card to the hilt over the past six years, using its logic to demand executive appointments, block legislation, and, eventually, bring down Hariri’s government. And yet, today, these same parties are the ones acting like the fish-out-of-water majoritarians whom they accused March 14′s leaders of being between 2005-09.

Meanwhile, March 14th supporters are calling for a day of Sunni rage, burning cars, and rioting in the streets, while the West threatens Hizbullah to respect Lebanon’s pact of communal coexistence. How d’ya like them apples?

2. Consensual vs. majoritarian democracy

While I sympathize with those who chafe at the hypocrisy of March 8th’s newfound majoritarian impulses, I strongly support the democratic principle that legitimizes Hizbullah’s current move. The March 8th coalition is now Lebanon’s parliamentary majority. They should have the right to bring down this government and form their own. Governments fall all the time, all around the world. This should be able to happen in Lebanon without sparking sectarian protests.

On a slightly more abstract note, I found myself wondering today (as I did back during the 2006-08 constitutional crisis), what effect the majority coalition’s pro-democracy rhetoric would have on Lebanon’s political culture in the long term. The fact that we’ve seen both sides of the political divide appealing to a majoritarian logic within the space of six years seems significant to me. No?

Obviously, what I would like to see happen is for this new method of choosing prime ministers (and speakers) to be enshrined in the Constitution, such that we don’t keep flip-flopping between consensual and majoritarian procedures every other year. A precedent has been set. Let’s stick with it. But you can bet that won’t happen.

3. Another desperate move?

Setting aside the cynicism of Hizbullah’s political strategy, I continue to think that it’s somewhat desperate and uncharacteristically short-sighted. What has Hizbullah really achieved by replacing Hariri with Miqati? The Daily Star (now owned by Hariri, fyi), argues vociferously against Miqati’s candidacy today in its editorial, on the basis that he is not a consensus candidate and that he would have had to agree to March 8th’s conditions with regard to the Tribunal before being nominated.

But even if Miqati did agree to doing the opposition’s (excuse me, “the new majority’s”) bidding, isn’t it obvious that he can’t end Lebanon’s cooperation with the STL on his own? He needs the cabinet to vote on it. And since both he and Nasrallah are currently calling for a national unity government, the Miqati government would effectively be hamstrung by the same conditions that Hariri’s was, and so any move to withdraw the Lebanese judges from the court, stop financing, and abrogate the cooperation agreement could be torpedoed by Hariri’s coalition. The only way that Hizbullah and its allies could ram through their agenda on the STL would be by either:

1. denying March 14th a blocking third in the cabinet, which would be the biggest act of chutzpah I’ve seen since… well, since Hizbullah appointed a Sunni PM other than Hariri;
2. counting on the fact that Hariri would refuse to join their government, thus giving March 8th leeway to do whatever they wanted.

The first option is highly unlikely; the second is deeply unsatisfactory, as it will simply re-energize Hariri’s base in Lebanon, and make Hizbullah look like it is willing to contravene every principle, custom, and precedent of Lebanese consociationalism in order to suffocate the STL. And it wouldn’t work! That’s what so desperate and puzzling about this whole strategy. The court has been set in motion. The evidence is going to be made public sooner or later. It’s just that it will now come out with an angry Sunni audience in Lebanon led by a politician who has less to gain than ever from playing by Hizbullah’s rules. Had they tried to find a way to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again, they could have at least made Hariri do the talking when Lebanon got around to formally denouncing the STL indictments. Now it will have to be Miqati, who has already been branded as a Hizbullah puppet. (That’s too bad, because I think he’s actually light years more competent and a better fit to be PM than Hariri will ever be.)

What would you do if you were in Hariri’s shoes? Join the government and play the role of spoiler (as Hizbullah/FPM have done since 2008)? Or stay out of the government, hoping that March 8th will fall on its sword before the 2013 elections? The floor is open.

PS: Andrew Exum has a very interesting piece on where Israel fits into this picture.

The above graph provides a visual representation of the current balance of power in the Lebanese Parliament. (Click for large PDF version)

Last Saturday, Lebanon’s As-Safir newspaper published an excellent analysis of the different possible scenarios that could lead to the nomination of a new Prime Minister. It sheds important light on the political math behind the question of who will lead Lebanon, now that Saad al-Hariri’s government has fallen. Download the As-Safir report here. (The above graph, produced by a friend of mine, puts the basic balance of power in visual context for all of you non-Arabic speakers.)

According to Article 53.2 of the Lebanese Constitution, the Prime Minister is appointed by the President of the Republic following binding consultations with Parliament. In other words, Parliament basically votes for the new Prime Minister, but does so via the back-room politicking of the “presidential consultations” ritual.

The solid parliamentary majority that March 14th won during the 2009 elections evaporated once Walid Jumblatt decided to forge his own path independent of his former allies. Today, Jumblatt is playing the role of kingmaker, which is one of the principal reasons he dropped out of March 14th in the first place. The question of who will be Lebanon’s next Prime Minister turns on Jumblatt’s decision to stick with Saad al-Hariri, betray him to the opposition, or abstain and let the MPs in his bloc make up their own minds about where to hang their hats.

Which brings us to the numbers game. As-Safir outlines four possible scenarios for how the various parliamentary blocs and independents might vote, once President Sleiman gets around to launching the consultation session:

1. Status quo: March 14th’s 55 MPs are joined by Jumblatt’s bloc of 11 MPs plus 6 independents (Miqati, Safadi, Fattoush, etc.) leading to a majority of 71 to the opposition’s 57 votes. Result: Saad al-Hariri is re-appointed (71-57)
2. Stalemate #1: Jumblatt’s bloc is split such that 4 MPs vote with March 14th, and 7 vote with March 8th, while the independents also vote for March 14th. Result: Deadlock in the Parliament (64-64).
3. Stalemate #2: Two members of Jumblatt’s bloc vote with March 14th but the rest abstain along with all of the independents. Result: No majority for either side (57-57).
4. March 8th prevails: Most of Jumblatt’s bloc and some of the independents vote with the opposition, while March 14th only attracts six additional votes. Result: March 8th names a new Prime Minister (67-61)

Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement have already declared that Hariri will not be their candidate, while Berri and Jumblatt have been more circumspect, preferring to find a way to re-nominate Hariri as part of a larger deal on Lebanon’s response to the Special Tribunal indictments. When push comes to shove, Berri will line up with his allies in the opposition, but Jumblatt is still wavering. This explains the Druze leader’s recent meetings with Bashar al-Assad as well as U.S. Ambassador Maura Connelly’s meetings with MPs like Nicola Fattoush: both sides are trying to pressure the independents to break for their allies.

This may sound over-optimistic, but as bleak as things look these days, the fact that politics in Lebanon still comes down to a matter of counting votes and persuading (read: intimidating?) MPs to vote one way or another strikes me as something to feel good about. Sort of.

UPDATE: 7:45 PM (Beirut time)

Saad al-Hariri just gave a televised address to the nation from his residence in Beirut. Here are the basic points:

• I will not sacrifice the dignity of my family and my father’s memory just for the sake of politics (read: I’m not going to cut a deal on the STL)
• I was willing to look for some kind of compromise in order to safeguard Lebanon’s stability, but the various foreign initiatives to reach this compromise were met by the opposition’s refusal to re-nominate me as Prime Minister (read: I’m not going to cut a deal on the STL)
• We (i.e. March 14th) will go to the parliamentary consultations when President Sleiman launches them, and we will accept their outcome because we support the Constitution and not the politics of the street.

I have to say that I thought this was a surprisingly decent performance by Hariri. He put a positive spin on the possibility that he will not be nominated PM, and he also sent the message to his followers to shy away from any acts of civil disobedience that may result from the transfer of power.

If the opposition does succeed in mustering the votes necessary to bring Omar Karami into office (as is being reported now), then I would hope that Hariri would sit that government out and leave March 8th to face the music. A cult of consensus has poisoned the well of Lebanese governance for far too long, and I’m tired of hearing excuses  from this side or that about why nothing seems to get done.

More later…