As I expected, Bashar al-Assad’s speech today was completely reactionary and devoid of any bold conciliatory gestures…
Ok, so that’s not exactly what I expected. Let me be the first to admit that I was surprised by Bashar al-Assad’s disappointing (and, in my opinion, dangerously conservative) address to the Syrian people, earlier today. Rather than inaugurating a substantial step in the direction of reform — as many Syrians had been hoping he would do — Bashar offered only a few vague promises sprinkled in a bland stew of boilerplate pronouncements on Syrian unity and foreign conspiracies.
For other reactions to the speech, I suggest you check out the comment sectionof Joshua Landis’s blog, as well as his latest post. As in the case of QifaNabki‘s readership, the speech seems to have united both former supporters and critics of the regime (in Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and beyond) in condemnation of Bashar.
See also this interesting video of a protester attacking Assad’s car following the speech (although I’m sure the Syrian state media will claim that she was throwing herself at his BMW in a gesture of adoration):
What happens next? It all depends, I would imagine, on whether a credible opposition can coalesce and gain momentum in Syria’s urban centers. If the demonstrations remain in far-flung places like Deraa, the regime may gradually suffocate them. But if they find their way to places like Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, then all bets are off.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is scheduled to address his people tomorrow afternoon, one day after sacking his cabinet in the wake of increasingly bloody nationwide protests. Speculation is rampant on Twitter, Facebook, and the media about what al-Assad is likely to say. In my view, he has two broad options:
He can play the blame game that Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Qadhafi played before him (and that some of his advisors indulged in over the past couple weeks), pointing the finger at meddlesome outside forces who were intent on disturbing the peace in Syria.
Or, he can address some of the protestors’ grievances. The question here is, of course, how far is he willing to go?
My sense is that Bashar is likely to try to “shoot the moon”, as he has done at other moments of pressure and instability. Anyone who has followed his political career over the past decade can attest to the following qualities of Bashar’s governing style:
He tends to cultivate a reputation as a bit of a maverick, making counter-intuitive choices that keep his opponents guessing, and which have gotten Syria out of several tight spots.
While the regime has a reputation for being conservative and not gambling in its strategic choices, it can be induced to move rather quickly when stability is at stake. In 2005, Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon was carried out far more quickly than anyone could have imagined, and proved to be a winning decision (despite looking like a dangerous capitulation by a weak and untested young president, at the time). Similarly, following a period of intense hardball in Lebanon from 2006-08, Bashar turned around abruptly and announced to the world that Syria had reached an advanced stage in its peace negotiations with Israel. His allies and opponents were befuddled; that, I think, was the point.
He relishes catering to a wealth of audiences; think of his simultaneous courtship of European powers and the U.S., the ‘moderate’ Sunni Arab regimes and Iran, etc. When at all possible, he likes to keep his options open.
The critical thing to note, however, is that most of his riskier gambits have taken place in the sphere of regional politics. Al-Assad has yet to take any real risks on the domestic political scene. The experimental reform period dubbed the “Damascus Spring” was short-lived, and there have been few real attempts to liberalize the country’s political arena since then.
So what can we expect from Bashar in his speech tomorrow? I could very easily be mistaken, but my sense is that we’re approaching another one of those moments where he tries to throw his critics off balance by going beyond the conservative and expected response. I would be surprised, in fact, if he does not declare the emergency law lifted and/or permit the formation of opposition parties. He may also promise compensation for the families of those killed in protests and launch an “investigation” into the events that led to the “security incidents”.
Anything less than such an aggressive response is likely to be too little to assuage the growing mass of critics. I think al-Assad knows that, and he’s going to try to pull another rabbit out of a hat.
Some friends and colleagues better positioned than I to speculate on the likely outcome of the protests in Der`aa have promised to write a few commentaries on the subject, perhaps early next week.
In the meantime, let’s have an open forum on the subject. Please do post links to news items and videos in the comment section, and I will add them to the main post. Here are a few things worth reading, just to kick us off:
As Protests Mount, Is There A Soft Landing for Syria? (Joshua Landis, TIME.com)
The Baathist regime that has ruled Syria for 48 years is on the ropes. Even President Bashar al-Assad himself seems to have been shocked by the level of violence used by Syria’s security forces to suppress demonstrations that began a week ago, and on Thursday afternoon his office announced unprecedented concessions to popular demands. But the question of whether those concessions assuage protesters’ concerns or prove to be too little too late may be answered on the streets after Friday prayers.
The protests began a week ago in the dusty agricultural town of Dara’a, near the border with Jordan, over the arrests of high school students for scrawling antigovernment graffiti. Those demonstrations quickly spun out of control, with thousands joining in, inspired by the wave of revolutions that have rocked the Arab world, to demand political freedoms and an end to emergency rule and corruption. The government responded brutally, killing over 30 demonstrators and wounding many more, according to activists. Gruesome videos of the crackdown, disseminated via the Internet in recent days, have enraged Syrians from one end of the country to the other. (keep reading)
Syria‘s repressive leadership came under unexpectedly heavy pressure on Thursday as thousands of angry demonstrators massed again in the southern city of Dara’a, demanding democratic reform and protesting the deaths of more than a dozen people shot by security forces in the past week.
The government of President Bashar al-Assad, unaccustomed to concessions, rapidly announced a series of reforms, including a salary increase for public workers, greater freedom for the news media and political parties, and a reconsideration of the emergency rule that has clamped down the nation for 48 years.
Mr. Assad also ordered prisoners taken during the crackdown this week to be freed. An adviser said publicly that Mr. Assad had ordered troops not to fire live rounds at protesters in Dara’a and that “there were, maybe, some mistakes.” (Keep reading)
International Crisis Group Conflict Risk Alert on Syria
Syria is at what is rapidly becoming a defining moment for its leadership. There are only two options. One involves an immediate and inevitably risky political initiative that might convince the Syrian people that the regime is willing to undertake dramatic change. The other entails escalating repression, which has every chance of leading to a bloody and ignominious end. Already, the unfolding confrontation in the southern city of Deraa gives no sign of quieting, despite some regime concessions, forceful security measures and mounting casualties. For now, this remains a geographically isolated tragedy. But it also constitutes an ominous precedent with widespread popular resonance that could soon be repeated elsewhere. (keep reading)
Andrew Tabler: Syria Protests Call for Strong U.S. Stance
…Thus far, the Asad regime has refused to accept Washington’s criticism of its record on human rights and democracy. This month’s protests provide Washington with the opportunity to reiterate calls for universal freedoms — whether Damascus likes it or not. On March 24, the State Department condemned the “Syrian government’s brutal repression of demonstrations, in particular the violence and killings of civilians at the hands of security forces,” and also said, “Those responsible for the violence must be held accountable.” To achieve this, and to ensure that Asad follows through with his promises to enact domestic reforms, the United States should publicly pressure the regime to respect human rights and political freedoms, and institute rule of law in the country. (keep reading)
Over the past several weeks, as Wikileaks has released its reams of US government cables full of politically damaging statements by the leaders of Lebanon’s March 14th coalition, many have remarked on the fact that Hizbullah and its allies have not exploited the documents as purposefully as they could have.
Sure, there has been the odd snide remark in a press conference, and Hizbullah is now making noises about suing March 14th figures for inviting Israel to invade Lebanon, but one gets the sense that much more could have been made of the scandal. So why the silence?
The obvious reason is that no one really knows what else Wikileaks has in the way of embarrassing transcripts. By allowing ministers like Elias al-Murr to claim that Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman was putting words in his mouth (when it was revealed by Wikileaks that he was coordinating the Lebanese Army’s response in a future hypothetical encounter with the IDF), Hizbullah was ensuring that its own allies would have the same space to maneuver, in case they were caught saying similarly damaging things.
Which brings us to the latest revelations, made possible by al-Akhbar’s serialized Wikileaks bonanza. There are four new cables available on the newspaper’s website that provide a glimpse into several meetings that Speaker of Parliament (and staunch Hizbullah ally) Nabih Berri held with American officials (including Ambassador Feltman and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch) during the July 2006 War.
(Update: There’s also a cable about a meeting between Minister of Health Mohammed Jawad Khalifeh and Ambassador Feltman, which I pasted at the bottom of the lot below).
Nothing Berri says is nearly as egregious as what a vodka-swilling Walid Jumblatt was whispering in the Americans’ ears around the same time, but it is telling nonetheless. Most notable is a statement that Berri allegedly made regarding the future of the Lebanese resistance:
If Shebaa Farms are not turned over to Lebanon, Berri said that he personally would oppose disarming Hizballah. But if the Shebaa Farms are “”liberated,”" then “”who needs”" Hizballah?
Now, this obviously doesn’t make Berri look so good, and one can imagine that there will be a letter to the editor from Berri’s office published in al-Akhbar tomorrow decrying the statement attributed to him in the cable. He probably won’t take much of a political hit, and all will be forgiven and forgotten in due course.
However, I think it’s still worth pointing out that a very significant majority of Lebanon’s political leaders (across ideological and confessional lines) were basically in agreement on the need to “deal with” Hizbullah, in some way or another. March 14th’s leaders obviously wanted the party’s military apparatus to be crushed by Israel, while Aoun wanted it to be reined in through the framework of his February 6th agreement with Nasrallah.
Meanwhile, although Berri insisted that the resistance had a legitimate right to exist as long as Israel remained on Lebanese territory, he also made it clear that Hizbullah would have to give up that right if Israel withdrew from Shebaa. Most strikingly, the cables show that even the Americans were beginning to be convinced that this broad consensus among Lebanon’s leaders on Shebaa might actually provide a solution to the Israel-Lebanon conflict.
Of course, we all know what happened. Tzipi Livni rejected the idea that Shebaa be dealt with at all, and the issue was put to bed. On the other hand, who knows how serious Berri and Aoun would have been about advocating Hizbullah’s disarmament when push came to shove? It’s not hard to imagine any of a wide range of potential pretexts to replace Shebaa. The links to the various cables are below; check them out and discuss amongst yourselves…
PS: For those of you waiting for some big pronouncement on my part about the events going on in Syria, I’m waiting for some expert commentary to come through. In the meantime, check out Syria Comment. (For Arabic speakers, there’s also Kafa Samtan, which I haven’t checked out yet, but Mustapha over at Beirut Spring vouches for them.)
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06BEIRUT2440 (July 22, 2006) | Subject: SPEAKER BERRI SAYS HE IS WAITING FOR ISRAEL’S FINAL OFFER
06BEIRUT2464 (July 25, 2006) | Subject: BERRI SAYS ISRAEL WON’T WIN
“The Ambassador argued that Israel will not accept a return to the status quo ante. At the same time, Lebanon has an opportunity now that the USG is considering ideas that might resolve the Shebaa Farms issue. Berri noted that the Shebaa Farms are crucial. If Shebaa Farms are not turned over to Lebanon, Berri said that he personally would oppose disarming Hizballah. But if the Shebaa Farms are “”liberated,”" then “”who needs”" Hizballah? Berri concluded that he understood that inclusion of the Shebaa Farms issue this was a positive step, and agreed to keep looking for a solution to the current crisis. (Comment: Berri stuck to the same line he had used with the Secretary — cease-fire and prisoner exchanges — which the Ambassador said would lead to a quick dead end. But, today, Berri seemed to offer a hint of support for a different approach, if he was assured that Shebaa Farms would be part of the package. Berri seems to have moved ever so slightly overnight. End comment.)”
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06BEIRUT2541 (August 6, 2006) | Subject: A/S WELCH MEETS WITH SPEAKER BERRI
“Berri believed that if the Israelis do not withdraw from Shebaa, he cannot pressure Hizballah to relinquish their arms. He told A/S Welch that the resistance will have a right to remain as long as Israel is present in Lebanon.”
“Berri recommended that in the first phase, Israeli soldiers should withdraw and 10,000 soldiers from the Lebanese Army would deploy to the south. In what was an unprecedented statement for a Lebanese Shia leader, Berri vowed that he would lead the army to the south, driving a jeep in front of the tanks.”
“Berri stated that he will rebuild the south again, but could not do so with Israeli forces there. “”What I built in 22 years they have destroyed in 22 days,”" helamented. However, he stated that he is adamant to lead the Shia back to the south when Israeli troops leave, just as he claimed to do after previous times of strife. A/S Welch assured Berri that the U.S. would be a partner in rebuilding Lebanon with emphasis on the south.”
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06BEIRUT2600 (August 11, 2006) | Subject: LEBANON: FOR BERRI RESOLUTION COMES DOWN TO ONE THING
“Berri admitted that the events of 1983 set a bad example for multinational forces in Lebanon under Chapter 7. Berri told A/S Welch that perhaps he is afraid of Chapter 7, and the U.S. friendship with Israel makes him even more afraid. He recognized that Israel wants the right to protect itself and said that “”this will be included.”" He reminded A/S Welch that Resolution 426 establishes precedent for Chapter 6 with a clause for self-defense.”
“Berri informed A/S Welch that Shebaa Farms will always be the pretext for Hizballah to remain armed. He warned that the language in the current draft of the resolution on Shebaa farms is not sufficient.”
“Berri accused the U.S. of not wanting to engage on the Shebaa Farm issue because it does not want to give Hizballah a victory. A/S Welch agreed. Berri declared that it is his right to state for the record that problems will continue with Israel until Shebaa Farms is resolved.”
“Berri reluctantly accepted the reality that if Israeli troops are fired on they have the right to defend themselves on the ground at the point of attack. However he added that defending themselves does not mean air bombings on civilian areas.”
“A/S Welch offered that when the U.S. votes on the resolution, it could say that civilian areas should not be used as launching areas and should not be attacked. Berri cautioned that the wording should be precise and clear. Winking (and implying he was thinking of his “”Hizballah partners”"), he fears that the time between the cessation of hostilities and the deployment of an enhanced UNIFIL could be used by people who “”do not want peace”" to ignite the conflict again. Berri stressed the importance of assurances from the U.S. and UN that Hizballah fire on Israeli soldiers inside Lebanon will not start the conflict again because he doesn’t “”trust Hizballah.”"
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06BEIRUT2699(August 19, 2006) | Subject: SHIA MINISTER CLAIMS BERRI TRICKED HIZBALLAH, NOW AT ODDS WITH NASRALLAH
QN Comment: This cable, which details a meeting between Feltman and the Berri-allied Minister of Health, Mohammed Jawad Khalifeh, is perhaps the most damning and mind-blowing of the lot. I’m not going to excerpt it because I’d just end up quoting the whole thing. Read it all.
Apologies for the brief absence, folks. Things have been busy, but not busy enough to keep me from devouring all of the Wikileaks cables about the July 2006 War that al-Akhbar has been publishing. Mesmerizing stuff…
For English speakers who may have trouble navigating the newspaper’s website, I’ve posted links to all of the relevant cables below along with their dates, subject headings, and the occasional excerpt. If I have some time later this week, I’ll share some thoughts about the content of the cables.
If anyone’s interested and in the area, I’ll be giving a talk at the University of Oklahoma two weeks from today, where I look forward to seeing my friends Yaron Ayalon (an Ottoman historian who teaches there) and Joshua Landis, author of the indispensable Syria Comment (which is a must-read these days, given all that’s going on in Syria).
Without further ado, I give you…
AL-AKHBAR’S WIKILEAKS CABLES
06BEIRUT2351 (July 13, 2006) | Subject: INITIAL REACTION TO NASRALLAH’S SPEECH JUSTIFYING HIZBALLAH’S ABDUCTION OF IDF SOLDIERS
“Aounist advisor MP Ibrahim Kanaan expressed frustration and deep concern over the present course of events in Lebanon and said he has advised his party leader General Michel Aoun to put distance between himself and Hassan Nasrallah. Kanaan is convinced that Hizballah, with “its extreme overconfidence,” will soon lose control over the rapidly escalating hostilities. In his view, the resulting loss of life and stability will produce a severe backlash in Christian, and possibly Sunni, communities that could destroy Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, since it is currently viewed as a Hizballah ally. Kanaan suggested, however, that the current crisis may offer an opportunity for Aoun and PM Siniora to form a pro-reform “partnership.” Senior Aoun advisor Gebran Bassil, on the other hand, defended Hizballah’s actions and said Siniora’s government was merely reaping the whirlwind created by its passivity and refusal to share power. Moderate Aounist MP Farid el-Khazen, meanwhile, split the difference: strongly criticizing Hizballah’s duplicity and recklessness, while recommending aloofness from the star-crossed Siniora government.”
“In a July 13 discussion with poloff, MP Ibrahim Kanaan, who is frequently used as an intermediary and spokesperson by Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun, said that FPM’s association with Hizballah has been a mistake. Declaring that Michel Aoun did not have the slightest idea that Hizballah was planning such a provocative act, Kanaan professed deep concern that Hizballah was now effectively steering the ship of state. When asked if he thought Hassan Nasrallah was acting like a Minister of Defense, Kanaan retorted, “no, no, much more than that.”
“Kanaan half-heartedly defended the troublesome February 6 compact between the FPM and Hizballah, saying it originally held the promise of bringing Hizballah into Lebanon’s political mainstream. But he conceded that the previous day’s “reckless” ambush in Israeli territory is threatening to completely undo Lebanon’s struggling democracy and threatens to deliver the country back into the tender mercies of Syria.”
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06BEIRUT2403 (July 17, 2006) | Subject: LARSEN TO PROPOSE HANDOVER OF ISRAELI SOLIDIERS TO GOL…
“Mid-way through the meeting three visitors arrived at Larsen’s room unannounced. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, and Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi entered the room in good humor and indulged in generous orders to room servicewith the others present. The three Lebanese politicians reacted positively to Larsen’s proposal to call for a transfer of the Israeli soldiers to the GOL…”
“Over a glass of red wine, a large bottle of vodka (the quality of which sparked a long exchange between Jumblatt and the startled room service waiter), and three bottles of Corona beer, Jumblatt gave a briefing on the thinking of the March 14 coalition which had met that evening. Jumblatt noted the heavy destruction of Lebanese infrastructure but bemoaned the irony that Hizballah’s military infrastructure had not been seriously touched. Jumblatt explained that although March 14 must call for a cease-fire in public, it is hoping that Israel continues its military operations until it destroys Hizballah’s military capabilities.”
“Responding to Jumblatt’s complain that Israel is hitting targets that hurt the GOL while leaving Hizballah strategically strong, the Ambassador asked Jumblatt what Israel should do to cause serious damage to Hizballah. Jumblatt replied that Israel is still in the mindset of fighting classic battles with Arab armies. “You can’t win this kind of war with zero dead,” he said. Jumblatt finally said what he meant; Israel will have to invade southern Lebanon. Israel must be careful to avoid massacres, but it should clear Hizballah out of southern Lebanon. Then the LAF can replace the IDF once a cease-fire is reached. A defeat of Hizballah by Israel would be a defeat of Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, Hamadeh added. For emphasis, Jumblatt said that the only two outcomes are total defeat or total success for Hizballah.”
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06BEIRUT2413 (July 18, 2006) | Subject: [FRENCH AMBASSADOR] INCENSED BY ISRAELI TARGETING OF LAF…
“In closing, Minister Mouawad re-emphasized two issues: the urgent necessity of starting humanitarian operations now and the advantages of using that effort to strengthen the standing of the GOL with the Lebanese people. She stated the first step is the immediate establishment of
humanitarian corridors inside Lebanon to the villages of the south. Finally, she urged that USG support and protect three critical figures: Fouad Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, and unexpectedly, Nabih Berri — who in her opinion may be the best available Shia alternative to Nasrallah.”
“Gemayel said Aoun had cooperated with Mossad through the duration of Lebanon’s civil war, and said he allied himself with Syria and Hizballah now because he believed they offered him the best chance at winning his long coveted seat in Baabda Palace.”
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06BEIRUT2471 (July 25, 2006) | Subject: SAMIR JA`JA` SUPPORTS PROPOSED PATH TO CEASEFIRE…WITH A SUGGESTION
“On the night of July 28, the Ambassador and econoff met with Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh at his apartment. “An Nahar” General Manager Ghassan Tueni was also there for much of the meeting, his main contribution filling us in with breaking press reports (almost all of which later proved to be erroneous).” [QN: That explains Naharnet...]
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06BEIRUT2504 (August 1, 2006) Subject: SINIORA BELIEVES HE HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS PEOPLE…
“When asked about his inexplicable confidence that Hizballah would either move north of the Litani with its heavy weapons, or allow itself to be disarmed by the LAF, Siniora said he wasn’t certain, but his on-going communication with Hizballah through Nabih Berri and other Shia interlocutors led him to believe they were “considering” and close to such action.”
“In an awkward attempt to straddle the fence, Aoun insisted he was not really in an alliance with Hizballah, but then proceeded to tear down the “inconstant” leaders of March 14 — Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri — who in his view did not deserve the “confidence” of the Lebanese people. The implication (although never stated explicitly) was that Nasrallah is a more trustworthy partner…”
“For those who hoped the tragedy of the current crisis might be the catalyst to inject some sanity in Michel Aoun’s relationship with Hizballah, this meeting proved a disappointment. In what was essentially a disjointed, repetitive, and often contradictory performance, Aoun displayed the qualities that engender so much antipathy and distrust among Lebanon’s political class. He rarely admits a mistake or miscalculation and through exquisite twists of logic, always manages to replay his diplomatic/political “triumphs” and interpret other leaders’ efforts as feckless and ill-conceived…We have noticed developing fissures in the FPM movement and strong disagreement with Aoun’s policies in his second-tier of advisors, but Aoun’s lack of movement toward the country’s other pro-reform leaders implies that the post-conflict political scene may be as contentious as it was on July 11. We agree with him that the Shia community in Lebanon cannot be ignored and cannot be made to feel defeat as a community. But, unlike Jumblatt and Hariri, Aoun has not yet awakened to the fact that Nasrallah has used him.”
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06BEIRUT2511 (August 1, 2006) |Subject: HAMADEH SEES RESOLUTION OF SHEBAA FARMS AS MEANS TO NEUTRALIZE HIZBALLAH IDEOLOGICALLY
“Hamadeh described a significant change in Minister of Defense Elias El-Murr’s demeanor, characterizing him as playing both sides. Hamadeh said that El-Murr believes the Hizballah will “win” in the current conflict and is trying to save himself politically for the post-conflict sorting-out of the political scene here. Hamadeh recounted that Siniora was furious at El-Murr at a recent cabinet meeting for his comments to the media to the effect that, “the 7 points (of Siniora’s paper) do not exist”. Other ostensibly “pro-Syrian” members of the cabinet have been surprisingly quiet, Hamadeh said. Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, an erstwhile ally of President Emile Lahoud, has been, “playing it better than Elias (El-Murr),” offered Hamadeh. Rizk has even been pushing forward the Cabinet’s work on the establishment of an international tribunal to try suspects in the crimes under the purview of Serge Brammertz’s UNIIIC. According to Hamadeh, Rizk has made great progress, appointing “two good judges.” Hamadeh stressed that they should take advantage of Rizk’s openness to work on this issue. For Hamadeh, now is the time to pass a resolution to establish the tribunal, as this would serve to “keep Syria quiet” on the current Lebanese-Israeli conflict as well as further contain the Syrians in the long run.”
Quote: “[Harb] recommended that a strong Israeli advance that completely controls the Hizballah strongholds of Maroun El Ras and Bint Jbeil would provide a chance for the U.S. impose a ceasefire while showing that Hizballah has been overpowered… He also stressed that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a reluctant Hizballah ally, will become the political victim of Hizballah.”
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06BEIRUT2540 (August 6, 2006) | Subject: JUMBLATT AND HAMADE ON TWO-PHASE SOLUTION
“Jumblatt expressed regret that, in his view, Israel failed to assess Hizballah’s operations on the ground. He questioned how Israel was completely taken by surprise on July 12. He concluded that today the tables have turned to Hizballah’s advantage as the organization is founded on a “culture of death.” Hizballah fighters want to die as martyrs and will not hesitate to blow themselves up to kill Israelis. In addition, there is a new generation of Israeli soldiers that are not as driven and motivated as their predecessors. He thinks this was illustrated in the past weeks of fighting and warns that it is dangerous for Israel and the region for this to be revealed.”
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06BEIRUT2544 (August 7, 2006) | Subject: CHRISTIAN POLITICAL LEADERS SAY SHEBAA IS KEY
“On August 5, A/S Welch and Ambassador Feltman met with Christian leaders from the anti- Syria March 14 movement, including former President Amin Gemayel, his son and Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, Dory Chamoun, Carlos Edde, Fares Souaid, George Adwan, and presidential hopefuls Nayla Moawad (Minister of Social Affairs), Nassib Lahoud, and MP Boutros Harb. While claiming to be fully supportive of Prime Minister Siniora’s call for a ceasefire, they are troubled that the current conflict might leave Hizballah in a stronger position within Lebanon than at the beginning. The Lebanese government will need to be in a position of strength to deal with Hizballah once the conflict is over, the leaders argued. To this end, they would support a continuation of the Israeli bombing campaign for a week or two if this were to diminish seriously Hizballah’s strength on the ground.”
“Claiming to reflect PM Siniora’s private thoughts, several of the assembled leaders urged that Hizballah be given a “real pounding” by the Israelis to the point that the group would be “soft enough to listen to reason.” According to Boutros Harb, “if we are convinced that Israel can finish the job, then we can allow a few more weeks,” though the consensus seemed to rest between seven to ten days. If on the other hand Hizballah were to emerge emboldened with a perceived sense of victory, “that would be a disaster.”
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06BEIRUT2553 (August 8, 2006) | Subject: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID LAF DEPLOYMENT
“Murr stated clearly that the LAF was prepared to hit back at Hizballah if they attempted to fire at Israel or tried to draw Israeli fire by placing launchers near to LAF positions.”
“In contrast to his earlier dismissals that Israel had significantly harmed Hizballah, Murr claimed that Hizballah had suffered losses of 50 percent of its equipment as well as 400 fighters during the conflict. While he estimates that Hizballah has fired off 3000 of its rockets, he believes that the Syrians were able to resupply Hizballah with 2500 before the Israelis took out the road links.”
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06TELAVIV3079 (August 8, 2006) | Subject: ISRAEL FM LIVNI SAYS ISRAEL DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT DRAFT OF UN RESOLUTION
“According to Hariri, “Nabih Berri is furious with Hizballah.” While Berri will maintain a united Shi’a front for some months following the conflict, Berri will put pressure on Hizballah to keep in line and, ultimately, “Berri’s dream is to finish off Hizballah” and reclaim Amal’s primacy among the Shi’a. Hariri said that Berri had compelled Hizballah to accept the LAF deployment plan, and that this spells “the beginning of the end” for HIzballah.”If we play our cards right,” Hariri added.”
“Asking that his comments be kept close-hold, Hariri whispered that, “We need to remove Lahoud, (LAF commander Michel) Sleiman, and (Head of the G2 army intelligence) George Khoury. They are in bed with Syria. They are in bed with Hizballah.” While Hariri hopes to eventually recruit Nabih Berri’s critical support to achieve this, he asked that international pressure on Iran and Syria continue unabated.”
“On a positive note, Hariri praised with seeming sincerity the performance of PM Fouad Siniora during this crisis.”If I had picked Bahije (Tabbarah, former Minister of Justice) a year ago,” he said, his voice trailing off as he shook his head. We think that this was a tacit acknowledgement, Saad-style, that the strong advice we and the French gave him to pick Siniora over his initial choice of Tabbarah was the right one. But what was encouraging in Saad’s praise for Siniora was the suggestion that the two of them will now be able to cooperate without the internal rivalries and jealousies that had plagued their relationship earlier this year. In general, we think Siniora has done a better job when he hasn’t had to worry about the less experienced but politicaly more powerful Saad second-guessing him. But we also believe that it’s good Saad is home: the image of Saad Hariri staying at the Plaza Athenee in Paris and globe-trotting with an sizable entourage, while hundreds of thousands of Lebanese felt forced to leave their homes, was not good for the future of the March 14 movement.”
Gary Gambill, current editor of Mideast Monitorand former editor of the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, is one of the sharpest commentators on Lebanese affairs. His analysis is always meticulously well researched and well written, and I’ve enjoyed reading him for years. This interview was conducted over email. Please feel free to respond with your own questions, and perhaps Gary will take some time to engage the readership in the comment section.
In other news, I’ll be giving a talk about Lebanese electoral reform at Stanford University’s Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, this Thursday at 12:00 PM. Feel free to stop by if you’re in the area. And finally, check out Jesse Aizenstat’s iPad ebook about surfing and politics in the Middle East.
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QN: In your recent article, Dreaming of Damascus, you argued that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad could not sign a peace deal with Israel because this would undermine the legitimacy of his Alawite regime in a Sunni-majority country.
GG: Well, I argued that the unique sectarian composition of Syria’s regime makes it less politically capable than a representative government of making peace with Israel. One of the problems with writing op-eds is that one doesn’t have the space to clarify everything, so let me underscore a few points:
First, I’m not saying Assad doesn’t want a peace treaty with Israel – I suspect he would sign one if the expected gains outweighed the political risks. But what what are the political risks of accepting the terms currently demanded by Israel (breaking with Iran, an end to all direct and indirect support for anti-Zionist movements, trade relations, an occasional bouquet of flowers, etc.) for an Alawite-dominated regime in a majority Sunni country?
Second, my hypothesis is essentially structuralist. The constraint on foreign policy I’m postulating is generated primarily not by the preferences of either the Alawite minority or the Sunni majority (neither of which strikes me as more averse to peace than Egyptians, Jordanians, or Palestinians), but by the fact that a regime dominated by the former is governing the latter. The Assad regime has long managed Sunni resentment at being ruled by an Alawite-led regime (which we all know is common, particularly among the religious) by advancing regional causes that resonate with Sunnis (particularly anti-Zionism). This is why Al-Qaeda and non-Syrian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood have been friendly to Assad, and it is partly why Syria has been so stable. A strategic realignment away from the rejectionist axis would make the regime more vulnerable to internal and external subversion.
Third, my substantiation of the argument is essentially deductive. There haven’t been any other cases of heterodox Islamic minorities governing Sunnis in the modern era, so we have only the Syrian case to look at. The empirical data from this one clinical trial is consistent with my hypothesis (the Assad regime has, justifiably or not, repeatedly declined whatever terms happen to be acceptable to Israel at any given time), but it’s also consistent with other explanations of Syrian behavior. Although I lead the article with the claim that Assad “can neither be bribed nor intimidated into making a ‘strategic realignment’ until he first reconciles with the Syrian people,” I’m not saying that the sectarian power imbalance in Syria is the only determining factor.
QN: How would you explain Assad’s repeated attempts to get Israel to negotiate on the Golan, as well as the assessment of many of Israel’s top military advisors that Assad is serious about pursuing peace? Is he just playing the process and fooling even the most hard-nosed of his enemies?
Well, clearly Assad derives enormous benefits from the process of negotiating with Israel, irrespective of the outcome, so his desire to negotiate does not itself reveal much about ultimate intentions. Even if we take him at his word that he wants a settlement, he has said little publicly to suggest that he would be willing to make the kind of strategic realignment demanded by Israel even if it is willing to withdraw completely from the Golan.
Of course, Assad has every right to insist that normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel not automatically entail full-blown friendship (a demand that is certainly not typical of most peace settlements). I just don’t think he’s going to get his way. He doesn’t have his father’s international credibility, and he played a far deadlier role in sponsoring terrorism against Israelis. He’s going to have to show them the money to get the Golan back, and I don’t see him doing that anytime soon.
QN: In Syria’s Triumph in Lebanon: Au Revoir les Ententes, you argued that Syria has returned to dominance in Lebanon. How is the present state of affairs different from the conditions that obtained in the 1990s and early 2000s?
GG: Regional and international toleration has always been a critical enabler of Syria’s domination of Lebanon, and the attitudes of all the major external players are gradually reverting back to form. The fact that Western and Arab governments have stopped criticizing Syria’s conduct in Lebanon (apart from its transshipment of weapons to Hezbollah) and embraced the contrived fiction that Assad is “mediating” between Saad Hariri and Hezbollah is eerily reminiscent of the days when they pretended there wasn’t an occupation (the word itself was literally absent from American official statements on Lebanon until 2003). Continuing American antagonism toward Hezbollah suits the Syrians just fine – their value as a “mediator” is enhanced if Hezbollah isn’t getting along with the international community.
Internally, most Lebanese political elites are seeking amicable relations with Syria (even as many denounce Hezbollah). The lack of uproar over the recent disappearance of four Syrian political dissidents in Lebanon is really sad.
Syrian troops haven’t returned, but that’s the beauty of it for Assad. Domination without (or nearly without) occupation is exactly what Assad was trying to achieve in 2001-2004 with the drawdown of Syrian forces and the elevation of President Emile Lahoud over Hariri.
QN: Are there any opportunities for Lebanon to gain a credible measure of sovereignty over its affairs?
What is “sovereignty” in a country as divided as Lebanon? If you mean a government that asserts its prerogatives in accordance with the “will of the people,” Lebanon has the most sovereign state in the Arab world – it performs exactly as the country’s democratically elected leaders intend it to. The problem is that the “will of the people” is fractured and contradictory.
The Lebanese people will have to take it upon themselves to strive for something higher. The demonstration against sectarianism in Beirut earlier this month was a hopeful sign, but a few thousand people is a far cry from the kind of popular mobilization needed for the Lebanese to follow in the footsteps of Egypt and Tunisia.
QN: Who killed Rafiq al-Hariri?
GG: I’ve been very careful not to play into the Syria-bashing that has been in vogue in Washington, and I have serious doubts as to whether Syria was involved in some of the subsequent assassinations frequently attributed to it (especially Pierre Gemayel and Brig.-Gen. François al-Hajj). But in my view the Assad regime was almost certainly responsible for the Hariri killing. I’ll explain my reasoning step by step:
1. It would have been virtually impossible for anyone outside of Syria’s extended network of clients and proxies to cleanly pull off such a complex operation in the heart of Syrian-occupied Beirut. There certainly was no precedent of uninvited guests operating at anywhere near this level of sophistication under the nose of the Syrians. Israel probably could have pulled off the hit, but not cleanly (hundreds of former Israeli agents rotting in Lebanese prisons today testify to its sloppy covert ops). If the Israelis did it, there would have to have been a conspiracy on the part of both the UN investigative commission and at least some Lebanese security officials to bury evidence pointing in that direction. That seems wildly implausible to me.
2. It’s virtually inconceivable that elements inside this network would have taken it upon themselves to kill a leading Lebanese political figure without say so from Syrian intelligence officials in Lebanon, and virtually inconceivable that the latter would have given the order without authorization from Assad. There is no precedent of either, and it’s difficult to plausibly reconstruct what factional interests might have been served by “rogue” operators killing Hariri.
3. The behavior of Jamil al-Sayyid and other top Syrian appointed Lebanese security officials after the killing simply isn’t consistent with the frenzy of activity one would expect in the wake of an unapproved killing of such a major figure. These are the same guys who once sent tanks through the streets of Beirut because of a false rumor that Aoun was returning from exile.
4. The telecommunications evidence that Hezbollah members were conducting surveillance of Hariri before and during the assassination is pretty damning once you closely examine the methodology (e.g. “collocation” of cell-phone signals). Hezbollah would not have gotten involved without Syrian collaboration.
5. The Syrians had by far the strongest motive of anyone for wanting Hariri dead. Hariri was quietly coordinating with the emerging Christian and Druze opposition with the intention of crushing pro-Syrian loyalists in the 2005 elections, as well as with French and American efforts to pressure Syria to disengage from Lebanon. Hariri got killed right at the moment when everyone was wondering what in the hell the Syrians were going to do about Hariri.
Am I ABSOLUTELY certain that the Syrians killed Hariri? No. Am I absolutely certain that the Libyans killed Musa Sadr or that Geagea’s Lebanese Forces killed Prime Minister Rashid Karami? Or for that matter that Lee Harvey Oswald killed JFK? No. But let’s not kid ourselves. Let’s also not pretend that every other government in the Arab world wouldn’t resort to murder in fending off serious political challenges. Recently leaked Egyptian State Security files indicate (if authentic) that the Mubarak regime carried out the Alexandria church bombing in a clumsy attempt to strengthen its pretext for tyrannical rule.
QN: You’ve argued that the STL (and the UNIIIC before it) was compromised by the blunders of Detlev Mehlis.
GG: Yes. Mehlis either was duped into staking the credibility of the UNIIIC on dubious witness testimonies in his first interim report to the Security Council or knowingly attempted to pass off unreliable witness testimonies as solid evidence. So he was either incompetent or unethical. All hope of a judicial process that would be broadly perceived by the Lebanese people as impartial and just was lost on his watch, which is a shame because his successors seemed to have pulled it together. The upcoming indictments are, according to all indications, based on compelling evidence that has in no way been tainted by the missteps of Mehlis, but they won’t be perceived as such by a great many Lebanese of all sects. Don’t be surprised if Hezbollah one day erects a statue of the German prosecutor.
QN: What kind of effect, if any, will the published indictments have upon the political arena in Lebanon, particularly if they do name members of Hezbollah?
GG: It’s difficult to say. On the one hand, incontrovertible evidence of Hezbollah’s involvement is a glaring violation of its long-standing pledge not to use violence to settle domestic political disputes. This is a much more serious violation of its so-called “purity of arms” than its route of Sunni and Druze militias in May 2008 (which at least was in defense of a fiber optic telecommunications system unquestionably vital to its military struggle against Israel). The late Hariri made no secret of his desire for peace with Israel and unquestionably encouraged his foreign allies to intercede on his behalf with Syria, but he cannot be said to have posed a clear and present danger to the “resistance” – killing him was out and out murder even under Hezbollah’s own moral code. I myself was VERY skeptical of the allegation when Der Speigel first broke the story of Hezbollah’s involvement in May 2009, but the evidence now appears indisputable.
However, Hezbollah’s saving grace is the fact that large numbers of Lebanese (85% of Shiites, 54% of Christians, and 21% of Sunnis, according to one recent poll) don’t accept the legitimacy of the tribunal. Moreover, there has been a long lead time between confirmation of Hezbollah’s rumored indictment last summer and the indictments themselves. People have had a long time to adjust to the news and draw their own conclusions, so unless the indictments contain a surprise we don’t know about, the worst may already be over for Hezbollah.
QN: How do you assess the current position and identity of the Free Patriotic Movement? How durable is the alliance between the Aounists and the “Resistance camp”?
GG: I haven’t been paying close attention to the inner workings of the FPM as of late, but I expect its alliance with Hezbollah to endure for quite some time. Aoun’s decision-making, from his choice of election partners in 2005 to his alliance with Hezbollah the following year and subsequent reconciliation with Syria, has been largely driven by the constraints and opportunities afforded by the positions of other players. The refusal of March 14 to accept his presidential candidacy (despite the fact that his party won over two-thirds of the Christian vote in the 2005 elections) made this alignment an inevitability. Any other Lebanese politician in his situation would have done the same thing (indeed, Hariri and Jumblatt DID do essentially the same thing when they allied with the Shiite bloc against Aoun in the 2005 elections). That’s how the game is played in Lebanon, and Aoun has proven to be a quick learner since returning from exile. The presidency is his if he can live long enough to claim it in 2014.
It took them a while, but Lebanon’s March 14th coalition has finally gotten around to officially opting out of Najib Miqati’s government. Let no one imagine that this has actually made Miqati’s job any easier: it has been clear for the past several weeks that the major obstacles to this latest round of cabinet formation politics have nothing to do with the challenges that beset Saad al-Hariri’s effort in 2009. This time, it’s all about Michel Aoun and his desire to land the coveted Interior Ministry, which very few politicians — even among his own allies — are particularly jazzed about.
All eyes are on the parliamentary elections of 2013. With electoral issues (from districting to registration to long-awaited reforms like pre-printed ballots) in the hands of the Free Patriotic Movement, Jumblatt would have to worry about his own backyard, Berri would be eyeing Jezzine, and President Sleiman could kiss his chances to bless a successful “independent” Christian slate in the Metn goodbye. It’s not a little deal, hence the political gridlock.
So, now that Hariri and co. are out of a job, whatever do you suppose they plan to do with themselves? Answer: organize a huge rally downtown on March 14th protesting Hezbollah’s arms. On the face of it, it’s not a bad idea; revolution is in the air these days, and the unemployed and disgruntled youth of Lebanon’s cities have no decrepit dictators to rebel against. Sectarianism is too squishy a target, so weapons it is!
Here’s a question, though: which weapons are objectionable? Hariri’s latest speech left me a little confused on this score. On the one hand, he’s anti-weapons, but on the other, he’s pro-resistance. What does that mean? And what is he suggesting Hizbullah should do? Hand over its pistols, bowie knives, and slingshots, but hold on to its 9M133 AT-14 tank killers and C802 anti-ship missiles? Most Lebanese I know who have a problem with the “weapons issue” are not worried about being killed by a Hizbullah fighter firing an AK-47; they’re worried about their house being flattened by an Israeli F-16 retaliating against the Hizbullah fighter with the AK-47.
So let me just say that I’m not on the edge of my seat, awaiting the results of March 14th’s latest publicity gambit, the so-called “referendum on Hezbollah’s weapons”. It seems to me that this is a pretty straightforward issue to campaign on, and yet they always manage to sound like they don’t really know what they are in favor of.
I hope to have an interesting interview with Gary Gambill for y’all, later this week. In the meantime, let’s have some fun with a poll.
After their 141-39 drubbing by WCU, they're gonna need it: MT @ToccoaFalls Pray for basketball team as they travel to Florida for games tmrw 1 week ago
As I expected, Bashar al-Assad’s speech today was completely reactionary and devoid of any bold conciliatory gestures…
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is 
Over the past several weeks, as Wikileaks has released its reams of US government cables full of politically damaging statements by the leaders of Lebanon’s March 14th coalition, many have remarked on the fact that Hizbullah and its allies have not exploited the documents as purposefully as they could have.
Gary Gambill, current editor of 
Second, my hypothesis is essentially structuralist. The constraint on foreign policy I’m postulating is generated primarily not by the preferences of either the Alawite minority or the Sunni majority (neither of which strikes me as more averse to peace than Egyptians, Jordanians, or Palestinians), but by the fact that a regime dominated by the former is governing the latter. The Assad regime has long managed Sunni resentment at being ruled by an Alawite-led regime (which we all know is common, particularly among the religious) by advancing regional causes that resonate with Sunnis (particularly anti-Zionism). This is why Al-Qaeda and non-Syrian branches of the Muslim Brotherhood have been friendly to Assad, and it is partly why Syria has been so stable. A strategic realignment away from the rejectionist axis would make the regime more vulnerable to internal and external subversion.
GG: I’ve been very careful not to play into the Syria-bashing that has been in vogue in Washington, and I have serious doubts as to whether Syria was involved in some of the subsequent assassinations frequently attributed to it (especially Pierre Gemayel and Brig.-Gen. François al-Hajj). But in my view the Assad regime was almost certainly responsible for the Hariri killing. I’ll explain my reasoning step by step:
