Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) issued an important media advisory today, clarifying the next steps in the post-indictment phase of the Hariri trial. It discusses the arrest warrants, the rights of the accused, proceedings in absentia, and other issues.

Here’s what happens next:

1. The Lebanese government has 30 days to find the four suspects, serve them with the indictment, arrest them, and transfer them to the STL headquarters in Leidschendam.
2. If after 30 days, no one is arrested, and “if the STL President considers that reasonable attempts to serve the indictment have been made, he may order a public advertisement after consulting the Pre-Trial Judge. The Registrar would then send an advertisement calling on the accused to surrender to the Lebanese authorities for publication in the media.”
3. “If the accused has not been arrested within 30 calendar days of the public advertisements the Pre-Trial Judge can ask the Trial Chamber to initiate in absentia proceedings.”

The other noteworthy clarification is the following:

The confirmation of an indictment does not mean that the person(s) named in the indictment is/are guilty of the crimes of which they are accused. It simply confirms that the case put forward by the Prosecutor has met the burden of proof required at this stage of the process – prima facie evidence. In simple terms this means that if this evidence were presented uncontested at the trial, it would lead to a conviction.

Of course, the evidence will not be presented uncontested. Even if the accused individuals never show up, the STL itself would appoint defense counsel for them. On the other hand, if they are in fact still kicking around, one wonders whether Hizbullah will decide to face the charges head on by appointing their own defense counsel.

It is not controversial to recognize that the Hariri investigation has been hobbled (some would say deeply compromised) by problems of unreliable testimony, sullied crime scenes, unprofessionalism, and witness intimidation (and perhaps liquidation, in the case of Wissam Eid). If the case largely depends on evidence from telecommunications data (as the CBC account suggests), maybe Hizbullah thinks that they can beat the rap. Or, at the very least, they may find it easier to undermine the court with their own narrative from the inside, rather than standing on the sidelines and pretending not to notice as the STL sails effortlessly toward a guilty verdict.

Of course, the risks of such a venture would be considerable. By participating in it, Hizbullah would in effect be lending legitimacy to the Tribunal, and they could find their image damaged further if they fail to put up a plausible defense to a compelling case by the prosecution.

One day down, twenty-nine to go…

The STL is the big story again, and everyone is hungry for more information. Who are the four men that the Tribunal has indicted? Will the prosecutor’s office stop here or does it have evidence connecting the suspects with higher-ups within Hizbullah or the Syrian regime, as has been previously claimed? What else is in the indictment by way of material and circumstantial evidence?

In all likelihood, there will be another waiting period before we start to get the answers to these questions. The good news, however, is that a great deal of information about the case, the evidence, the suspects, and the crime is contained in a wealth of previous reports and leaked information that is freely available on the Internet, much of which we’ve discussed at length here at QifaNabki.com over the past few years.

For those who would like to brush up on their STL knowledge and dig around for information on the identities of the suspects, I’ve assembled a list of relevant documents and posts that should keep you busy. See below.

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2005: Report of the UN Fact-Finding Mission to Lebanon (.pdf): This document was prepared by Peter Fitzgerald, an Irish police commissioner tasked by the UN to visit Lebanon just after the Hariri assassination. It provides a useful introduction to the political context and background of the crime, as well as the response of the Lebanese and Syrian security forces immediately following the explosion.

2005-08: Reports of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission: The UN commission, led by three different investigators (Detlev Mehlis, Serge Brammertz, and Daniel Bellemare) produced 11 detailed reports about the crime over the course of three years. You can find all the reports at the link above. The first one, the infamous “Mehlis Report“, cause d a huge stir when it identified key witnesses who blamed top Syrian and Lebanese politicians and security officials for being involved in the crime.

August 10, 2008: The Hariri Investigation and the Politics of Perception: An essay by Gary Gambill that explores the credibility problems of the Special Tribunal and its reliance on unreliable witness testimony.

April 30, 2009: Tribunal Releases the Four Generals: Detlev Mehlis, the first UN investigator, famously had four top Lebanese generals put into custody for their alleged involvement with the Hariri crime. Nearly four years later, they were released by Daniel Bellemare for lack of evidence. It was a big blow to the confidence of the March 14th movement, one from which it never quite recovered.

May 23, 2009: The Der Spiegel Leak: Widely dismissed as politically expedient nonsense at the time (including by yours truly), this story provided the first major indication that members of Hizbullah and not the Syrian regime were the primary suspects in the Hariri case. Note that two of the indictees who are connected with Hizbullah were mentioned by the Der Spiegel article three years ago: (al-Hajj) Salim Ayyash and Mustafa Badreddine.

August 8, 2010: Hizbullah Presents Its Case that Israel Killed Hariri: In an epic news conference, Hizbullah Secretary-General Hasan Nasrallah built a fascinating case detailing Israel’s involvement in the murder, based on intercepted Israeli drone footage, witness testimony, etc. It had to be seen to be believed; this wasn’t your daddy’s conspiracy theory.

September 6, 2010: Saad Hariri Exonerates Syria: After five years of blaming the crime on Syria, the son of Rafik Hariri publicly accepted that he and his movement had been mistaken for doing so. Nobody believed he was sincere.

November 21, 2010: The CBC Leak: Following the same basic thread of the Der Spiegel story of 2009, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation published an explosive story about the Hariri investigation, with details about the evidence it had turned up that tied Hizbullah members to the crime.

November 23-26, 2010: Qifa Nabki & Friends Dispute the Logic of the CBC Story: Several astute readers of this blog point out discrepancies in the logic of the CBC story. When this is brought to the attention of its author, Neil Macdonald, he offers this reply. Upon further investigation, I turn up even more evidence that not all is as it seems…

January, 2011: The Witnesses Come Out of the Woodwork: Lebanese TV station al-Jadid (or New TV) somehow gets its hands on a bunch of audio recordings of conversations held between Saad Hariri, STL officials, and the “false witness” Zuhayr Siddiq. This is tremendously embarrassing for the March 14 camp, and aids Hizbullah’s case that the whole investigation is a scam. (See here as well.)

January 18, 2011: The STL: Prerequisites for Injustice?: Dr. Omar Nashabe, a PhD in Criminal Justice and an editor at Al-Akhbar newspaper presents a lecture at the LSE about the problems of legitimacy, credibility, and procedure plaguing the court.

June 30, 2011: STL Indicts 4 Suspects for Hariri Murder: Six years after the crime, four individuals (two of whom we know are connected to Hizbullah) are indicted.

If you have links to other important stories about the STL, please post them in the comment section and I may add them to this list.

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has confirmed Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare’s indictments of four suspects in the Hariri murder. While the indictment has not yet been made public, media leaks (which accurately predicted the indictment’s release) suggest that the four suspects are the following individuals:

1. Mustafa Badreddine
2. Salim Ayyash
3. Hasan Aineysseh
4. Assad Sabra

BEIRUT: A U.N.-backed court probing the 2005 assassination of statesman Rafik Hariri handed over Thursday the Lebanon-portion of the indictment, which accused four Hezbollah members, a judicial source told The Daily Star.

The indictment identified the suspects as Mustafa Badreddine, Salim al-Ayyash, Hasan Aineysseh and Asad Sabra.

A three-man delegation from the Special tribunal for Lebanon met State Prosecutor Saeed Mirza before midday Thursday and submitted the sealed indictment and arrest warrants for the four suspects.

Hezbollah has denied involvement in the Hariri assassination and has described accusations as an “Israeli-American project.”

Speaking to a local radio station during a break from talks at Baabda Palace, Minister of State of Administrative Affairs and Hezbollah member Mohammad Fneish said: “When we see the [STL] indictment, we will comment on it.”

Badreddine is a cousin and a brother-in-law of Hezbollah’s slain commander Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in Syria in 2008. Badreddine eventually replaced Mughniyeh as Hezbollah’s chief operations officer.

According to the indictment, Badreddine masterminded and supervised the plot to assassinate the Lebanese statesman while, Ayyash, 48, is alleged to have headed the cell that carried out the assassination of Hariri.

Lebanon, according to experts, now has 30 days to serve out the arrest warrants. If the suspects are not arrested within that period, the STL will then make public the indictment and summon the suspects to appear before the court.

Official: Tribunal Issues Indictments in Lebanese PM Hariri’s Killing (CNN)

A U.N. source familiar with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon said the people include alleged perpetrators on the ground. The next two lists of indictments are expected later this summer and are expected to include the organizers and planners of the attack, the source said.

Lebanese Politicians React to Indictment Announcement (Daily Star)

Reactions began pouring in from Lebanon’s various political factions Thursday, after a Special Tribunal for Lebanon delegation handed over an indictment over the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, reportedly accusing Hezbollah members.

Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea urged lawmakers to look at the suspects in the STL indictment as individuals accused of a crime, rather than affiliating them with their party, religion or country.

“We need to look at the accused as a person rather than link them with their party, sect, or country that he belongs to,” Geagea said, shortly after a Special Tribunal for Lebanon delegation delivered its indictment, said to implicate two Hezbollah members, to the country’s state prosecutor Thursday.

Hariri Investigation Timeline (by Aljazeera)

Some Reactions to the News on Twitter (please use #STL)

@BeirutCalling (Michael Young) — After 6 years of investigation, the Special Tribunal for #Lebanon indicts four Hezbollah suspects. The mountain has given birth to a mouse.

@rmslim (Randa Slim) — @DavidKenner Two of the names are senior level and the other two are Hezb members but not so senior. #STL #Lebanon

@nmoawad (Nadine Moawad) — The #STL has so far cost over $160 million USD – half of which was payed by #Lebanon (i.e. our tax money)

@abumuqawama (Andrew Exum) — Whew. A quick scan on those indicted in the #STL reveals I have never played soccer with any of them. http://bit.ly/mmENGL

More news reports and reactions to be updated throughout the day. Stay tuned. 

While previous Lebanese governments have expressed their strong support for the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the new government is expected to take a more equivocal stance in its ministerial policy statement. The committee in charge of drafting the statement has kept the language under tight wraps for the past two weeks, but our muckraking magicians here at The Qnion have managed to secure an advance copy of the Tribunal clause. Don’t forget where you saw it first!

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“The Government of Lebanon, which is commited to seeking justice — here construed according to the Rawlsian acceptation of an impartial distribution system of social goods and opportunities — will spare no effort to cultivate the ideals of legality, transparency, and moral rectitude in all cases of crimes committed against Lebanese citizens, and, to this end, will deploy a broad-based array of strategies (such as statements of righteous indignation, 24-hour anonymous tip hotlines, municipal police investigations [pending budget constraints], and candlelight vigils) to ensure that the nation’s sacrifices will not have been in vain.

“As regards the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), this government puts itself and its security services entirely at the disposal of the Special Prosecutor’s Office and will diligently respond to its every request, a responsibility clearly outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757. Furthermore, recalling that all United Nations resolutions carry the force of authoritative (if not binding) statements of international law with respect to their member-states, this government will — as a gesture of moral support for the sanctity of this most hallowed institution — make its compliance with UNSCR 1757 contingent upon the fulfillment of all heretofore neglected U.N. resolutions (with particular reference to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 242).

“Failing the implementation of the aforementioned UN resolutions in a timely manner, the Lebanese goverment will, nevertheless, continue to honor its obligations to the international community by cooperating with the Special Tribunal on all matters with the exception of a few issues which will require, on a case-by-case basis, a standard internal consultative review process before they can be approved. These issues include: material evidence inquiries; arrest warrants; extradition requests; expert witness subpoenas; telecommunications data requests; immigration reports; administrative support (including but not limited to photocopying, translation services, word-processing, collating, stapling, envelope stuffing and courier services, coffee orders, late night Barbar runs, and taxi fares). Tribunal officials are kindly advised that the standard internal consultative review for each request requires 6-10 weeks for approval and is subject to an administrative processing fee, following which a decision may be appealed (subject to another 6-10 week review and processing fee). Requests not pertaining to the above list will be responded to promptly.”

I, the humble author of this blog,

NOTING that two developments related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are rumored to be just around the corner: (1) the adoption, by the new Lebanese government, of a ministerial policy statement that may end Lebanon’s official cooperation with the STL; and (2) the confirmation of the indictments by the STL’s pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen;

OBSERVING that, on the first issue, what’s most likely to happen is that some kind of vague language is put in place that commits the government to “justice” in the matter of the Hariri assassination, without mentioning the STL by name;

RECALLING that even if the Mikati government were to dismiss the STL altogether or just not mention it in its policy statement, that would probably not constitute a violation of Lebanon’s Memorandum of Understanding with the STL (as the government would likely have to refuse to cooperate in an extradition or arrest request for the cooperation agreement to be considered violated);

REITERATING  that even if the indictments are confirmed by Fransen in the next few days, he is not under any obligation to make them public, and could instead order the indictment to be “sealed” until the accused are notified;

CONJECTURING that all the hoopla about the earth-shaking character of these rumored developments may actually not be so earth-shaking after all;

ADMITTING that all the hoopla is perhaps understandable given that we’ve been waiting over six years to hear this punch-line;

POINTING OUT that, just for comparison’s sake, the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, established in 1993, is only supposed to start wrapping up its proceedings in 2014;

INTIMATING that, by extension, we could still be in for a very long ride;

ACKNOWLEDGING that everything I’ve said thus far is not going to make a whit of difference to all those who remain convinced that we are on the brink of a major new phase in the STL saga;

HEREBY PROPOSE that the following links may be of some interest:

• The Memorandum of Understanding between the Lebanese government and the STL (regarding cooperation)
• UN Security Council Resolution 1757, which set the STL in motion;
• A “Frequently Asked Questions” document about the STL indictment.
• Everything I’ve written on this subject;
• Gary Gambill’s excellent story on the false witness fiasco;
• Detlev Mehlis’s interview with Michael Young;
• More links to come…

Mona Yacoubian and I chat here about the new Lebanese cabinet and the challenges facing it, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the events in Syria, and the new US draft legislation targeting Hizbullah.

Be sure to also check out Joshua Landis’s conversation with Ausama Monajed about the Syrian uprising. I believe it was recorded prior to President Assad’s latest speech, but it’s still worth watching.

I hope to record another segment later this week with a friend of mine who is an expert on Turkish-Israeli relations. Stay tuned.

I’ve been having a debate with several of my regular commenters over the past month and I thought it was time to dig it out of the forum and give it its own post. The topic: how Hizbullah plans to face the upcoming indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which everyone assumes will accuse the party of assassinating Rafiq al-Hariri.

Let me set the stage by referring you back to something I wrote immediately after the Hariri government collapsed back in January:

Setting aside the cynicism of Hizbullah’s political strategy, I continue to think that it’s somewhat desperate and uncharacteristically short-sighted. What has Hizbullah really achieved by replacing Hariri with Miqati? [...] Even if Miqati did agree to doing [their] bidding, isn’t it obvious that he can’t end Lebanon’s cooperation with the STL on his own? He needs the cabinet to vote on it [...] And it wouldn’t work! That’s what so desperate and puzzling about this whole strategy. The court has been set in motion. The evidence is going to be made public sooner or later. It’s just that it will now come out with an angry Sunni audience in Lebanon led by a politician who has less to gain than ever from playing by Hizbullah’s rules. Had they tried to find a way to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again, they could have at least made Hariri do the talking when Lebanon got around to formally denouncing the STL indictments. Now it will have to be Miqati, who has already been branded as a Hizbullah puppet.

Okay, so bringing down Hariri’s government did not solve Hizbullah’s problem with the STL. That much is clear. The question is: what do they do now?

Some of my readers have claimed that Hizbullah’s game plan was simply to keep the government in limbo until after the indictments came out, because it would not be in the party’s interest to be seen as leading a government that refuses to uphold its obligation to the UN and the international community. While they did waffle for almost five months (not quite as long as the king of waffles, but still…) they eventually did form a government with Najib Mikati in charge. This seems to suggest that there is some kind of plan in place for how to deal with the indictments.

One reader, RedLeb suggests the following:

As regards the STL, which frankly is a much weaker threat to Syria and Hizbullah than Syria’s domestic strife, there will be a course alteration, but not a full 180 degrees flip. We will switch from a cabinet that cooperated with the STL, but circumscribed by Hizbullah suspicions, to one non-cooperative with the STL, but circumscribed by Sunni sensitivities. It will not collapse when the indictments are issued. Hizbullah will rely on Miqati to maintain domestic stability and manage international relationships while the trial is underway…

They will go along with the bare minimum required to not cause a confrontation, without any enthusiasm. We’re talking foot dragging, endless discussion of every request, and haggling over semantics. Any time they sense the US is losing patience, they will give just a little to keep things afloat.

Another reader, AIG, finds this unconvincing. He says:

Lebanon may be asked to arrest some of the people indicted. What will the government do then? In addition, Hizbullah will have a hard time disassociating itself from the defendants if higher ups in Hizbullah are named. For example, relatives of Mugniyeh… Miqati will need to perform a tight rope act on a non-existent rope. There is just no way he can please both the US and March 8. Unlike Syria, Lebanon will suffer greatly from sanctions on its banking system or from its inability to roll its debt. The best solution for Lebanon is to hide behind the excuse of a caretaker government. Any other strategy is super risky.

So what’s a billionaire prime minister to do? Does Mikati have any options? Or is this government a farce? What is Hizbullah’s calculation vis-a-vis the STL? Are there any deals (in the vein of the ill-fated “Syrian-Saudi” initiative of 2010) to be made between Lebanon and the UN? Here are some thoughts:

What Hizbullah wants from the Lebanese government is what it has always wanted: a certificate of legitimacy (and in this case, innocence). Has Lebanon ever been sanctioned for “harboring terrorists”? No. Has a Lebanese government ever faced an attack on its banking sector because Hizbullah has members of parliament and ministers? No. Has Lebanon ever had to deal with the repercussions of a cabinet statement that justifies the existence of a national resistance against Israel? No.

Hizbullah is hoping that it can maintain this status quo even in the context of STL indictments. It wants Mikati to find a way to fudge Lebanon’s responsibilities to the STL without having the country pay an exorbitant price (in the same way that Lebanon gets to harbor a militia with tens of thousands of missiles pointed at Israel without facing serious sanctions by the West.)

This is the game plan. Many people want to believe that this is simply not an alternative that is available to Hizbullah and they may be right. If the West decides to play hardball with Lebanon and puts the screws on it as a way to pressure Hizbullah, then they can certainly do that. But Hizbullah is betting that it can win that battle as well. They are betting that people are sick and tired of the STL and want to get on with their life, and don’t really give a hoot about Rafiq al-Hariri anymore and will become more angry and frustrated with the West and Israel than with Hizbullah if sanctions are applied.

That, in my view, is what Hizbullah is thinking. Even if the STL puts on an incredible show with all kinds of compelling evidence, forensics data, DNA testing, iron-clad witness testimony, etc., Hizbullah will be able to live with that. At the end of the day, they feel confident that most of their supporters will not believe it, while many others in Lebanon just won’t care.

What they want to avoid, on the other hand, is having to take some kind of military action against a Lebanese government that is forced to arrest party members because it is being threatened with a full frontal sanctions regime. If Mikati can find a way of maintaining Lebanon’s formal commitment to the STL while recusing his government from the responsibility of arresting suspects and avoiding sanctions and diplomatic isolation, Hizbullah probably thinks that it will be able to live with the bad press.

Let the rebuttals begin…

I’ve written a brief essay for Foreign Policy about the challenges facing the Mikati government, which you can read here. There are a couple of other observations I’d like to make that are too Lebanon-wonky for FP’s audience but may be of interest to regular readers of QN:

Veto politics: Najib Mikati has made a point of saying that while the March 8 coalition holds a majority in his cabinet, they don’t hold a two-thirds-plus-one supermajority. Out of thirty ministers, only eighteen belong to the FPM, Hizbulah, Amal, and their allies, while the remaining twelve are divided among the shares of Mikati, President Suleiman, and Walid Jumblatt. Is it an accident that Jumblatt’s share is just big enough (i.e. three ministers) to give March 8 a supermajority of twenty-one, if push comes to shove? Once again, Jumblatt makes sure he’s the man in the middle.

FPM: Mikati’s cabinet is already being labeled a “Hizbullah government”. This, to my mind, is an oversimplification, given that Hizbullah only holds two ministries (and insignificant ones at that). Of course, cynics will scoff and say that the Hizb doesn’t need ministries to exert its dominance over the cabinet, and that may well be true. But if they don’t need ministries to dominate a cabinet, then what makes the dynamic in this cabinet different from every other time they have held two or three insignificant ministries?

To my mind, what really makes this cabinet different is the considerable haul that the Free Patriotic Movement and its allies in the Change & Reform Bloc were able to net. Think about it: Defense, Justice, Telecoms, Energy, Labor, Tourism, Industry, Culture, plus a couple freebie ministers without portfolio. That’s tremendous, no matter how you spin it. The Aounist movement has never held that kind of power, and you can bet that they are not going to squander this opportunity to consolidate their position and win more supporters. (See here for my profile of the FPM, which dates back to just before the 2009 elections, but in certain ways remains very relevant to the situation the party finds itself in today).

The 2013 elections: The fact that Tripoli has several of her most prominent sons represented in this cabinet has not been lost on anyone. Mikati is clearly making a play to boost his profile as the most popular political figure in Tripoli, which is the first step toward challenging Saad Hariri’s claim to uncontested leadership of Lebanon’s Sunnis. When Mikati was first appointed back in January, he appeared on Marcel Ghanem’s show Kalam al-Nas, and was asked by the host about what he had to say regarding Hariri’s claims that Mikati did not represent the Sunnis. Mikati, who is usually very cool under pressure, exploded into a comical tirade of sectarian one-upsmanship (click here for the YouTube video in Arabic; English translation below):

Mikati: “I don’t accept anyone to question my Sunnism. If there’s a Sunni in Lebanon, it’s me. I won’t accept it! And those who want to hand out certificates (of Sunnism) can go do it on their own. I’m Sunni in belief, Sunni in practice, Sunni in politics, and I’m the number one defender of the Sunnis in Lebanon. If you want to talk about Sunnis, I’m the one with the highest number of Sunni votes. In the ballot boxes of Tripoli, 87% of the Sunnis voted for Najib Miqati, which has never happened in the history of elections in Lebanon. So [whoever is questioning my Sunnism] can get lost, with all my respect for the muftis and who else is concerned with this issue. I’m the number one Sunni in Lebanon!”

Marcel Ghanem: Great. Moving on…

That always cracks me up. I see great potential for some sort of party game…

It should also be noted that the FPM appointed two ministers (Nicholas Sehnaoui and Gabi Layyoun) from tough electoral districts that they lost in the last elections (Achrafieh and Zahle, respectively).

More soon.

Najib Miqati and Michel Aoun are, as of today, the two most important men in Lebanese politics (for now).

Four and a half months after Hizbullah and its allies dumped Saad al-Hariri’s fractious national unity government, Lebanon finally has a new one. It is led by Prime Minister Najib Miqati and is composed of parties from the political coalition known as “March 8th” which includes Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah, and Amal. It also includes a number of “independents” from Walid Jumblatt’s PSP, and a few ministers allied with President Suleiman and Prime Minister Miqati.

As anticipated, the biggest winner today is Michel Aoun. Having spent 15 years in the political wilderness, he returned to Lebanon in 2005 from his Parisian exile to find Saad al-Hariri and Walid Jumblatt rebuffing his demands for a seat at the big kids’ table. Aoun sat out Saniora’s government and then endured the disappointment of the 2009 elections, which failed to deliver the parliamentary majority he seemed intent on getting. Two years later, he finally gets to play the role of the political heavyweight in a Lebanese cabinet.

A few notes on the new cabinet (via the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, thanks Richard):

It is noteworthy that there are no women in the proposed cabinet. Five Ministers are reappointed to their previous positions. Two Ministers have moved portfolios. While a number of the new members of the cabinet have held ministerial positions in previous cabinets, this cabinet includes a high proportion of new members. Media reports indicate that Talal Arslan has already declined his participation in the Cabinet. In line with the Constitution, (Article 64.2), the proposed Cabinet now has 30 days to prepare and present its proposed Policy Statement to the Chamber of Deputies. If the Policy Statement gains the approval of a majority of the 128 Deputies, the Government will be formed. If not, then the Prime Minister may choose to resign, or may seek to nominate a new Cabinet, or may seek to nominate the same Cabinet but propose a new Policy Statement.

There’s much more to say about this new dynamic which we’ll be exploring here at Qifa Nabki over the next couple days, but in the meantime, here’s the list of ministers (click here for a downloadable copy):

Cabinet line-up:

Prime Minister: Najib Mikati (Sunni)

Deputy Prime Minister: Samir Moqbel (Orthodox)

President’s share:

Interior: Marwan Charbel (Maronite, also considered close to the Free Patriotic Movement)

Environment: Nazem al-Khoury (Maronite)

Prime Minister’s share:

Finance: Mohammad Safadi (Sunni) Moved from Economy

Economy: Nicolas Nahhas (Orthodox)

Education: Hassan Diab (Sunni)

Information: Walid Daouq (Sunni)

State: Ahmad Karami (Sunni)

Change and Reform bloc:

Justice: Shakib Qortbawi (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement)

Labor: Charbel Nahhas (Catholic, Free Patriotic Movement) Moved from Telecommunications

Tourism: Fadi Abboud (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement) Reappointed

Energy and Water: Gebran Bassil (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement) Reappointed

Telecommunications: Nicolas Sehnaoui (Orthodox, Free Patriotic Movement)

Culture: Gaby Layoun (Catholic, Free Patriotic Movement)

Defense: Fayez Ghosn (Orthodox, Marada Movement)

State: Salim Karam (Maronite, Marada Movement)

State: Panos Manajian (Armenian Orthodox, Tashnaq Party)

Industry: Freije Sabounjian (Armenian Orthodox, Tashnaq Party)

Progressive Socialist Party:

Public Works and Transportation: Ghazi Aridi (Druze) Reappointed

Social Affairs: Wael Abu Faour (Druze) Moved from State

The Displaced: Alaeddine Terro (Sunni)

Hezbollah:

Administrative Reform: Mohammad Fneish (Shia) Reappointed

Agriculture: Hussein Hajj Hassan (Shia) Reappointed

Youth and Sports: Faisal Karami (Sunni)

Amal:

Foreign Affairs: Adnan Mansour (Shia)

Public Health: Ali Hassan Khalil (Shia)

Lebanese Democratic Party:

State: Talal Arslan (Druze) [The latest reports say that Arslan is refusing to join the government.]

Independents:

State for Parliament Affairs: Nicolas Fattouch (Catholic)

SSNP:

State: Ali Qanso (Shia, Syrian Social Nationalist Party)