Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

As I was perusing some of the latest Wikileaks cables, I came across this little nugget about Asif Shawkat, the former head of Syrian Military Intelligence and brother-in-law of President Bashar al-Assad:

05PARIS6580 (September 26, 2005) — President Jacques Chirac’s Technical Advisor on Middle East/Americas Dominique Boche “reiterated that the content of the final Mehlis report would be decisive. If the report established direct [Syrian government] responsibility for Hariri’s assassination, Boche speculated that Bashar may give up second-tier officials up to the level of Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan and former [Syrian Military Intelligence] Chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazaleh, without touching brother-in law Asif Shawkat, in-laws the Makhlufs, or his brother Mahir. Boche added that he could not exclude any possibilities for regime stability after the Mehlis report; there could be a “palace coup,” with other powerful Alawis taking over; the Alawites could lose control to the Sunnis, who lack leaders; or Bashar could seize the moment to consolidate his authority and marginalize others, as he has started to do since the last Ba’th party congress. [French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary-equivalent for Egypt/Levant] Besancenot was more cautious than Boche in reiterating to us that the [Government of France (GoF)] did not want a “total destabilization” in Syria, nor did the GoF want isolation of Syria to lead to it increasing its “nuisance capacity” in the region…”

“Boche confirmed that [Syrian Military Intelligence] Chief Asif Shawkat had visited Paris and met with [French intelligence agency DST] head Bosquet and no other GoF officials, before departing France. Boche described Shawkat’s visit as part of long-standing liaison relationship between French and Syrian security services, and noted Shawkat usually visited France twice a year. Boche described timing for the visit as “unfortunate,” and claimed that there was a lack of coordination within the GoF, with the Elysee learning of the visit only after Shawkat had arrived. He added that Shawkat has a sick child, which could have been another reason for the visit. Boche offered no details on the contents of Shawkat’s discussions with the DST.”

Comment

As is clear from the cable, the French were very uneasy about seeing Syria destabilized as a result of the Mehlis Report. If they were that anxious about the political fallout of a humble UN investigation report, I can only imagine what kinds of conversations are taking place today between French and American diplomats about the situation in Syria. For anyone still puzzled about the double standard of the Obama administration on Libya vs. Syria, these cables offer a sobering reminder of the fact that for all the bluster about the Axis of Evil, Hizbullah, Iran, yada yada yada, the prospect of an Assad-less Syria is even more problematic to the West than the “nuisance capacity” of the current regime.

Also, why hasn’t anyone else commented on the fact that Asif Shawkat was visiting France twice a year “as part of a long-standing liaison relationship between French and Syrian security services“? This is Asif Shawkat we’re talking about: the man with no face, the hidden hand of the Syrian mukhabarocracy, etc. Try to find a picture of the guy online and you might luck out with a couple grainy shots here and there. Meanwhile, the French were hosting him on a biannual basis to talk intelligence.

It is well-known that Shawkat (who made Foreign Policy’s list of the Middle East’s Most Powerful Spooks in 2009) also worked with the Americans after the 9/11 attacks to set up intelligence sharing and cooperation, but that this relationship broke down after Syria declined to join the Iraq war in 2003. I guess what I’m saying is that, like Jamil al-Sayyid (whom Feltman outed as an American intelligence asset in another Wikileaks cable), Shawkat is a perfect example of a Middle Eastern strongman whom the West likes to vilify as a public enemy, but who is, in reality, very much a private ally.

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The Pre-Trial Judge of the the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has approved the lifting of confidentiality on “the full names and aliases, biographical information, photographs and charges against the individuals named in the indictment, confirmed on 28 June.”

As previously reported in the press, the four individuals’ names are below (click the links for more information).

1. Salim Jamil Ayyash
2. Mustafa Amine Badreddine
3. Hussein Hasan Oneissi
4. Assad Hassan Sabra

Well gee, now that we know where they all live, maybe Mr. Miqati can send a nice policeman over and invite the fellas downtown to answer a few questions.

Several new embassy cables were released three days ago by Wikileaks. They are the same cables that al-Akhbar (which obtained advanced access to them) has been commenting on since July 13, so they’ll be old news for regular readers of the Arabic press. For the rest of you, here’s a basic summary of the most important revelations.

As early as May 5 2006, Serge Brammertz (the UN commissioner investigating the Hariri murder) had “expressed concern about the quality of the evidence that was used to recommend the arrest of four Lebanese senior security officials” and told American Embassy officials that Lebanese General Prosecutor Said Mirza was “growing increasingly uncomfortable with the extended incarceration of the officials.” In spite of the fact that Brammertz felt that there was not yet enough evidence to support “a strong case” against the generals, he assured the Americans that “he would not reverse the recommendation of his predecessor, Detlev Mehlis.”

Another cable dated June 20 2006 reveals that Brammertz was “deeply worried” about the “eroding basis for continued detentions” but was still not willing to order their release. Rather, he seemed more inclined to pass the hot potato to the Lebanese judiciary, arguing that such a decision fell under its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the judiciary was clearly looking to the UN for guidance on the matter. No one wanted the job of turning the generals loose. Ambassador Feltman, for his part, was well aware of the “seismic effect” that Jamil al-Sayyid’s release would have on the political situation, and judged that releasing him could greatly impact America’s position in Lebanon.

A year later, a fascinating cable recounted an exchange between Ambassador Feltman and Minister of Justice Charles Rizk about the optics of how and when the generals should be released. I highly recommend you read the entire thing, but this is one of the most interesting bits:

The Ambassador noted that an international prosecutor could very well order the release of one or more of the [four generals] for lack of evidence.  After all, all of us have heard from UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz that the detention of some if not all is “awkward,” given the dearth of credible evidence.  The four were arrested because of the testimony of witnesses who later recanted, their testimony now thoroughly discredited.  Yes, Rizk said, but a release from the UN would be different than a release from the GOL [government of Lebanon]. If the GOL releases them now, “it will be a scandal.”  People will say, “why did you hold them for two years?” If the UN releases them, however, the situation is different:  The GOL picked them up at the request of the UNIIIC and then held them until they could be transferred to the Special Tribunal.  So, in this case, the GOL merely acted on behalf of the UN. If [the Lebanese judiciary] releases them, by contrast, it appears as though the GOL had authority all along and chose to ignore it.

As it turned out, the generals would not be released for another two years after the date of this cable, and the reasons were entirely political. Ambassador Feltman says as much in the above cable, when he comments: “whatever the merits of their initial arrests and however awkward the continued detention of one or all is, we agree with Rizk that Syria’s Lebanese allies would score an enormous victory, should the four generals be released now.”

Comment

These cables represent yet another blow to the public image of the UN Tribunal. More seriously, they are a significant indictment of the integrity of the UNIIIC Commissioner and the various Lebanese officials involved in the Hariri investigation, to say nothing of the evidentiary standards in place and the UNIIIC’s judicial independence. Of course, many critics of the Tribunal have been making this case for years (and none so stridently as al-Akhbar‘s justice editor, Omar Nashabe), and the publication of these cables vindicates their position in certain ways.

March 14 partisans would counter that no investigation is perfect, and while some regrettable mistakes were made, these leaks are more of a public relations embarrassment than a reason to denounce the investigation as a whole. While this may be true, the problem is that the Tribunal’s public image has arguably become as important as its ability to indict suspects and prosecute them. When a UN Tribunal is seen as having no more independence and credibility than a judge appointed by an authoritarian regime, then is it safe to say that it has (to use an au courant phrase) “lost its legitimacy”?

Ambassador Feltman clearly understood the significance of a messenger’s credibility when he argued in 2007: “If [Judge Eid] would release any of the four generals, March 14 leaders would suspect Syria’s hand at play, further deepening the distrust and divisions in this country. But if an international prosecutor makes the same decision, it will be viewed as one based on the legal merits of the case.”

Perhaps this was still true when he wrote it. How true is it today?

Click to enlarge. (See below for link to Google Maps)

There’s been a great deal of discussion lately on the issue of Lebanon’s maritime border with Israel, and how it will impact Lebanon’s plans for off-shore drilling.

If you haven’t been following along, I highly recommend a piece Matt Nash wrote on the subject about a week ago. (Matt, as I think I’ve said before, is one of the few journalists in Lebanon who reports the hell out of a story; I’m regularly impressed by the amount of research he does.)

Here’s the gist of the dispute:

• Lebanon signed an agreement with Cyprus in early 2007 which established their maritime borders and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of each country. [Sibylle Rizk informs me that this is not true... Lebanon's EEZ was established in 2009, once it had set its borders with Syria as well]. The southernmost point of that border was called Point 1.
• In 2010, Cyprus signed an agreement with Israel establishing their maritime borders, and used the same Point 1 as a terminal reference.
• By then, Lebanon had determined that Point 1 was actually too far north and the real point of intersection between all three countries was several kilometers to the south, known as Point 23. It filed papers with the UN to that effect in July 2010.
• Initially choosing Point 1 was a major blunder on Lebanon’s part, as admitted by the relevant officials in charge
• Israel has, of course, taken exception to Lebanon’s claim, reminding the UN that this new border violates Lebanon’s original agreement with Cyprus.
• The UN and the US have both gotten involved as mediators, but there have been no breakthroughs as of yet.

Based on the various sets of coordinates filed by Israel, Cyprus, and Lebanon with the UN, I drew up a Google map showing the precise area under dispute (see above).

My question is the following: what led Lebanon to revise its opinion on the location of the border? Was it based on a new survey? If anyone has any information on this score, please provide it in the comment section.

Update: Sibylle Rizk has an article coming out in Le Commerce du Levant next month which will apparently address this question.

Thirteen years ago, one of my oldest friends, Omar Naim, made a documentary film about Beirut’s Grand Theatre, a landmark building that once hosted the great touring theatrical groups and musical stars of Europe and the Middle East. The film was Omar’s senior project at university, and it went on to win a Best Picture nomination at the 1999 Student Academy Awards.

I composed the score for the film, and when I played it for my grandmother a couple of years later, she told me that her father had worked as a backstage grip in the theater in its heyday, and then later as a projectionist when it was turned into a cinema during the 1950s or 60s.

Apparently, during rehearsals for the production of Rasputin that is mentioned in the film, the great Egyptian actor Youssef Wahby (who played the title role) demanded that a real baby be used in one of his pivotal scenes, rather than the toy prop that he deemed not lifelike enough. According to the story, my great-grandfather stepped forward and offered up his youngest daughter for the role (my great-aunt Fadia), who was only a few months old at the time. Her siblings would always joke that her acting career had begun brilliantly with an appearance opposite Youssef Wahby.

According to the Solidere Annual Report of 2009 (here’s a PDF, see pp. 86-87), the Grand Theatre is to be turned into a boutique hotel within the next few years. This is yet another sad chapter in the history of the building, and a fitting epilogue to the film.

You can now watch Omar’s documentary on YouTube. It’s half an hour long in three parts. I look forward to hearing your thoughts about it.

My friend Nicholas Noe is on a mission. For several years, he has been arguing that Washington’s hard-line, take-no-prisoners approach to dealing with Syria and Hizbullah is completely misguided. The continuous diet of pressure and isolation tactics from the West, Noe believes, has only served to improve the fortunes of the Resistance Axis, not weaken it, and he has painstakingly documented this legacy of ashes in a variety of opinion pieces published in the New York Times, the Huffington Post, and various other outlets (including his blog).

Interestingly, Noe does not take the view of certain commentators to whom he is often compared (such as Alistair Crooke and Nir Rosen) that the West should be criticized for waging a war on parties whose resistance agenda is perfectly legitimate. Rather, his beef with Washington is that this strategy is wrong because it is not effective enough. In other words, Noe does not have a problem with the ends of US policy; he simply disagrees with the means.

Take his most recent article for The National Interest. In it, he argues that Hizbullah has been painted into a corner because of the unrest in Syria and the indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL). Washington and its allies have sensed Hizbullah’s weakness and are now hoping to press their advantage, which Noe thinks is a terrible idea:

…Many influential voices in Washington and European capitals need to very carefully consider the wisdom of the road that they are going down—a road that will, in all probability, bring great destruction to the region, including to Israel whose home front will undoubtedly be a main frontline. Saying this, however, does not have to mean simply withering away in the face of a threat. Instead, it could mean—it should mean—that outside actors who hold such comparatively great power…might finally have to find a means and a discourse to grant concessions to far weaker…parties—a course that would actually fatally undermine their ability and desire to exercise violence over time, either against their own people or against other nations.

In other words, now is not the time to push Syria and Hizbullah further into a corner, but rather to use one’s increased leverage over them to extract valuable (but unspecified) concessions.

I think Nick’s voice is an important one to listen to on these issues, but I also think that his policy proposals are too vague in this case, and that he is overly optimistic about the positive outcome of a so-called “third way” with regard to Syria and Hizbullah.

To take another example, here’s an excerpt from a recent post of his about the mistakes that the US and March 14 made in pursuing a “maximalist” track on the STL:

The US and M14, we can now pretty clearly see, would have done FAR better on several scores if they had allowed the Tribunal process to go forward in a manner that drew Hizbullah ever further into the process rather than stupidly alienating them at virtually every turn – this means in general that they should have traded the hard edge Tribunal stick for a more mixed one, with a less sharp edge, if you will…

I find this argument problematic for many reasons. First of all, we should note that Noe is precisely not criticizing the Tribunal for being a cynical tool used by the West to target Hizbullah. He doesn’t have a problem with that. Rather, his critique is that the STL was a tool that was not wielded in the proper way, for maximum effect. In other words, by using the STL as a bludgeon rather than a scalpel, America and its Lebanese allies missed many opportunities to force concessions out of Hizbullah that they now have lost the ability to do.

Again, this strikes me as flawed reasoning. It wasn’t the West’s “alienation” of Hizbullah that led the party to shun the Tribunal; the record clearly shows that Hizbullah was — from the beginning — totally opposed to the Tribunal. They may have paid lip service to the ideals of justice, but when push came to shove, they consistently worked to undermine the creation of the court. Let us recall the following:

1. Hizbullah was opposed to the UN dispatching Peter Fitzgerald on a fact-finding mission a few weeks after the Hariri assassination, calling instead for a Lebanese investigation (which would have been a farce) rather than an international one.
2. When the Siniora cabinet voted (on December 15 2005) to request that the UN establish a tribunal, the Hizbullah and Amal ministers suspended their cabinet membership.
3. When the draft resolution establishing the Tribunal was circulated in the fall of 2006, Hezbollah began calling for a veto in the Siniora cabinet. When they were rebuffed, their ministers walked out, thereby launching the eighteen-month protest outside the Serail.
4. During this period, there were more assassinations of March 14th figures and a great deal of tension on the streets of Beirut, culminating in the events of May 7 2008.

I am not rehearsing these events to argue that Hizbullah was acting like a guilty party. My point is, rather, that “maximalism” is not the exclusive preserve of the United States and its Lebanese allies. Noe treats the establishment of the UN investigation commission and the subsequent tribunal as if these were developments that came about effortlessly, when in fact these bodies came about via a protracted and bitter struggle, in which both March 14 and Hizbullah were active participants.

The notion that some kind of third-way accomodationist stance on the STL could have been found that would have satisfied Hizbullah, March 14, Syria, and the US is unconvincing to me. The process got ugly because everybody was playing hardball, not because the US hurt Hizbullah’s feelings.

Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah is scheduled to give an address this evening about the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (STL) indictments against members of his party. I will attempt to live-blog it, pending the quality of the internet connection. Refresh this page to follow the translation, once the address begins.

**

8:30: Nasrallah begins speaking.

8:34: Le Figaro said a long time ago that Hizbullah members would be targeted, and we already commented on that. We have already explained what the objectives of this project are.

8:35: We know that it is impossible to annul the STL, because this is an American project anyway. Its goal is to tarnish the image of the Resistance, and even to create civil strife in Lebanon.

8:36: I’m going to speak about 3 subjects. I am in the habit, as you know, of giving you a table of contents for my speeches. The first subject is the investigation. The second subject is the Tribunal. And the third subject is our position on the indictments.

8:39: Over the past year, we have suggested to the various authorities that they investigate the Israeli hypothesis [that Israel killed Hariri]. We held a major press conference and presented all kinds of evidence, involving drone footage, witness testimony, etc. We presented all this evidence and said: “Here you go. This constitutes a lead for you to pursue.” Did they follow it? No.

8:40: The evidence we presented is circumstantial, and it is enough to suspect Israel of the crime. But they didn’t even bother looking into it, let alone taking it seriously and building a case on it.

8:42: It’s not my job or the job of Hizbullah to launch an investigation and present evidence to Mr. Bellemare. But we did, and we found once again that there was no interest because this Tribunal is completely politicized.

8:43: In 2005, Mehlis admitted to Le Figaro that he was getting information from Israel. Rather than investigating Israel, this investigation has cooperated with Israel.

8:44: I have a question with regard to the investigation. When the UNIIIC was annulled and the offices in Lebanon were transferred to the Netherlands, everything was taken out via Beirut International Airport, with the exception of the computers. There were 97 computers that were not taken out via the airport, but rather via Israel. So the question to Mr. Bellemare is: Why didn’t you take them out via the airport or the seaport? Why did you take them out of Lebanon via Israel?

8:47: [Shows a video presentation presenting information about the transfer of computer equipment to The Hague via Israel. Shows multiple documents allegedly showing transfer of computer equipment to Israel. Name on the document: Miho Hirose. (Someone please Google this...)]

8:49: This shows that the investigators are hardly objective. As you will see, one of Bellemare’s top officers is from the CIA.

8:51: [Shows another video presentation]. Nick Kaldas was involved with the CIA in Iraq. Michael Taylor, a British officer in the investigation since 2010, and former anti-terrorism officer in New Scotland Yard. Darryl Mendes, an American officer who served in the CIA and FBI and continues to coordinate with these agencies. Was also a general prosecutor for the US Navy. Durayd Bsharawi, a Lebanese officer, known to have bad relations with Syria and Hizbullah. Robert Baer, an American former CIA official who was in charge of hunting Imad Mughniyyeh. (Shows a clip from an interview with Baer, where he talks about hunting and failing to catch Mughniyyeh). In 2010, Baer turned up as an advisor to the STL. [QN: So what?]

8:59: Nasrallah: What’s the point of showing this montage? It’s simply to make the point that this team of advisors is hardly capable of investigating the Israel hypothesis, given its experience of fighting the Resistance.

9:01: Gerhard Lehmann was Mehlis’s deputy. I believe that the time they spent in Lebanon was the golden age of their life. We’re going to show you evidence of Lehmann’s complete corruption.

9:03: [Shows another video presentation] Gerhard Lehmann worked for German intelligence and was Mehlis’s deputy. During his tenure in German intelligence, he worked with Israel. He tried to make a deal with Jamil al-Sayyid. We’re showing you a video capture of Lehmann receiving payment in 2006 from someone. [Hidden camera].

9:05: We have previously talked about corruption in the STL. Did anyone investigate them? We are happy to present Mr. Bellemare with more evidence.

9:06: You have all seen, via New TV’s series “Haqiqa Leaks” how the various investigators were sitting around with the false witnesses. We have even more to say on this score, which we will save til later.

[Internet connection is acting up...stay tuned]

9:09: The worst instances of leaking happened a couple of days ago. The STL delegation meets with the Lebanese delegation. While they were sitting and talking, the Lebanese TV stations were already talking about the names, which are supposed to be secret! So who leaked them? Where is the investigational secrecy?

9:11: The indictments are being used for a political side, not for the cause of finding the truth. There were names that appeared in Der Spiegel and CBC that the indictments did not name but Bellemare said that there would be more indictments.

9:12: Do you remember when Der Spiegel came out with its report? It was just before the 2009 elections. The elections in which hundreds of millions of dollars were spent by March 14? The Der Spiegel leak was part of the electoral campaign against the Resistance.

9:13: All of the leaks and actions by the STL have coincided with key events in Lebanese politics. They want to bring down PM Miqati’s government by any means possible. The indictments were confirmed and announced to give a weapon to the other side (i.e. March 14) to bring down this government. This is the end of the first subject.

9:15: The second subject is the Tribunal. People are saying that these men who are accused should present themselves to the STL and defend themselves.

9:16: Did this Tribunal treat the four generals with any fairness or justice? Jamil al-Sayyid has been pleading his case with the STL tirelessly after being imprisoned for 4 years. Did anything come of it? No. So how do you expect this Tribunal to treat people who have fought against Israel??

9:17: Who is in charge of the STL? Mr. Antonio Cassesse. This man is a dear friend of Israel. [Shows a video presentation]. At a conference in Herzliya (in Israel), Professor George Fletcher apologized to the attendees: “One of the great heroes of our field is not able to be here today… his name is Antonio Cassesse… He is a great friend of Israel.”

9:21: Nasrallah: Cassesse believes that the Resistance is a terrorist organization. So this man is supposed to bring about justice? This man is supposed to be impartial?

9:22: [Video presentation] In 2006 Cassesse sent a letter to Israel which says things like “Israel is a democratic state, etc.” [QN: Yes, but the point of the letter was actually to criticize Israel for its acts that violate humanitarian law, if you look closely at the letter. That was a mistake by Nasrallah... someone should have caught that.]

9:26: Is it possible for a Tribunal like this, with such a president and officers and track record, to actually find out the truth?

9:27: To the final subject: the current situation. To the Lebanese people, I say to them the following: don’t worry about civil strife. Those who talk about civil strife in Lebanon actually want that to come about. There will be no Sunni-Shiite strife, and no civil war in Lebanon. Everyone should be assured that we have a responsible government and trustworthy that will confront this situation effectively. So, to the Lebanese people, don’t worry. Everything is fine.

9:29: To the March 14 forces, I say the following. You consider yourself an opposition to PM Miqati’s government, and that is your right. If you think that the international game is aiding your fortunes, that’s also your right. I have, however, two pieces of advice for you, or let us say two thoughts (since you don’t like to be advised). (1) Don’t ask PM Miqati’s government to try to arrest the indicted individuals, because you wouldn’t be able to do it yourself even if you had a 100% March 14 government. Even if you held every single portfolio, you wouldn’t be able to arrest these individuals, so don’t expect PM Miqati to do it. (2) My second piece of advice is: Don’t demand that PM Miqati be less flexible than PM Hariri was with respect to the STL. The Foreign Ministers of Qatar and Turkey gave me a document that stated that Prime Minister Saad Hariri was ready to accept a certain set of demands (with respect to the STL). I can show you this document. So don’t expect PM Miqati to refuse demands about the STL that Saad al-Hariri accepted. That document was signed by the Qataris, Turks, Syrians, Saudis, and Saad al-Hariri, and we were told that Ms. Clinton was ready to bless the agreement as well.

9:37: To the supporters of the Resistance: there has been a war waged upon us for years. This is no surprise. We have always been prepared for it. Whether the war takes the form of military conflict or media wars or psychological war or whatever, we are prepared. The path of resistance has succeeded in liberating land, and defending our country. So we will confront this issue of the Tribunal just as we have confronted other issues.

9:42: There are people in Lebanon who want to see Sunni-Shiite strife, particularly some Christians in March 14. We will not succumb to this.

9:43: Presents a summary of his speech and some concluding comments. The Resistance has never been stronger.

*

Well, there you have it folks. I’ll have some thoughts about the speech either later today or tomorrow, but right now I have to go prepare for a BBQ. Tfaddalo!