Arab Politics


Beirut will host a rare summit of regional leaders this weekend–all the more remarkable for having been organized on very short notice.

There are reports that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad will be joined by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani. Erdogan and Ahmadinejad are apparently planning visits as well in the next several weeks.

The aim of the visit is to “defuse tension” on the local Lebanese scene, a euphemism for figuring out what the heck to do about an alleged impending indictment against Hizbullah members by the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

The fact that the Saudi and Syrian leaders are personally handling this crisis suggests that they are leaving nothing to chance: an STL indictment against Hizbullah could thrust Lebanon into complete political paralysis and possible sectarian violence. What the summit also reveals, however, is that, unlike in years past, the Saudis and Syrians seem to be working together to make sure that everyone is on the same page. Had the current crisis emerged two or three years ago (when the Middle East was in the grip of a mini Cold War) it is safe to imagine that the March 14 coalition and its Saudi allies would have been very happy to use the indictments to try to push Hizbullah into a corner, furthering pressuring its regional sponsors in Damascus and Tehran.

Instead, what we’re seeing today from Saad al-Hariri and the Saudis is a much more cautious policy of containment which recognizes the valuable political capital that may soon be delivered via an STL indictment against Hizbullah, but which also recognizes the folly of bearing down too hard on the Shiite party. If Hizbullah feels pressured, as they did in late 2006, there’s a significant likelihood that they will respond as they did then, by resigning from Hariri’s cabinet along with their allies. If they are joined by AMAL, the FPM, and Jumblatt’s ministers, this would bring down the government.

This seems to be an outcome that both the Saudis and the Syrians want to avoid. The question is, however, what kind of middle path is available? If the summit is a success, we should know within about a week.
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A couple of days ago, I sat in on a lecture about Nasser’s foreign policy in the 1950′s-60′s, and the importance of regional axes in the Cold War world. It left me wondering about the extent to which we still live in such a world today, at least as far as Middle East politics are concerned.

This question would have been easier to answer a few years ago, when the region was conveniently divided into “moderates” and “radicals” (or the camps of “resistance” and “surrender”, depending on your perspective.) These days, however, as I noted in a Year in Review piece back in 2009, the divisions are not so straightforward.

Rob Malley and Peter Harling concur. In an excellent op-ed for the Washington Post, they argue that international relations in the Middle East today reflect a far messier reality, one that is full of opportunities for engagement by a superpower that tragically can’t seem to read the writing on the wall. Check out the whole article, but here are some suggestive bits:

Changes over the past few years have blurred the region’s purported lines. Qatar brokered the inter-Lebanese accord in May 2008, while Turkey started to mediate Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Neither country “belongs” to one axis or the other; both have earned reputations for talking to all sides. While Saudi Arabia had long echoed U.S. skepticism and overall objectives regarding Syria, engagement between the two has resumed. Riyadh and Damascus reached common ground in implicitly rebuking any Iranian role in Yemen, much to Tehran’s irritation, and in quietly opposing Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who enjoys U.S. support. The Saudis also renewed contact with the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas after a period of estrangement.

From Syria, too, come interesting signals. Uncomfortable with what had turned into a monogamous affair with Iran, Damascus began courting Qatar, France and, most prominently, Turkey. Deep strategic ties notwithstanding, Damascus and Tehran are waging a discreet proxy war in Iraq, backing different allies and combating different foes. Damascus broke a historic taboo in dispatching an ambassador to Beirut. In Lebanon itself, segments of the two political camps — until recently split in ways that mirrored the militants-vs.-moderates divide — are signaling a desire to reshape the political landscape.

Today, the relevant competition in the Middle East is not between a pro-Iranian and a pro-American axis but between two homegrown visions. One, backed by Iran, emphasizes resistance to Israel and the West, speaks to the region’s thirst for dignity and prioritizes military cooperation. The other, symbolized by Turkey, highlights diplomacy, stresses engagement with all parties and values economic integration. Both outlooks are championed by non-Arab emerging regional powers and resonate with an Arab street as incensed by Israel as it is weary of its own leaders.

These developments, Malley and Harling argue, are remarkable, and yet have largely gone unnoticed by the Obama Administration, which is still stuck in the rigid “moderates-versus-militants” paradigm of its predecessor. The Leveretts make a similar plea for more engagement with Iran and Syria by the White House, while plenty of others believe that the engagement policy has proven to be a complete failure (see here and here).

Meanwhile, the issue of regional axes has recently come up again in Lebanon, with Amin Gemayel reportedly asking (at the national dialogue talks) whether Lebanon should be a “confrontation” state or a “neutral” one, vis-a-vis the conflict with Israel. Here’s Michel Aoun’s response (which is, more or less, that Lebanon has no choice but to be a confrontation state because it is directly targeted by Israel), and here’s a piece by Walid Maalouf arguing that neutrality is Lebanon’s only hope.

Finally, see Nick Blanford’s short piece on the national dialogue talks for the Christian Science Monitor.

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I love how seriously the QN readership is taking my challenge to come up with the most important developments of 2009 in Lebanon (favorite so far: “my cousin’s wedding in Chekka”).

In the meantime, here’s a piece I wrote for The National this week about the Middle East in 2009. (If you’re going out to party tonight, please don’t drink and drive.)

Twelve months

The year 2009 began with the Middle East ablaze. On January 1, for the fifth day running, Israeli jets continued to pummel Gaza in advance of a ground invasion that produced over 1,000 Palestinian deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees. The war’s effects rippled across the region in an all too familiar way: suicide bombers in Iraq targeted groups of civilians protesting the Gaza invasion, while America’s allies in the region criticised Hamas for provoking the onslaught. Meanwhile, Iran castigated Egypt for collaborating with the enemy and Syria called off its peace negotiations with Israel. The region had slipped back into the trenches of its Cold War, in which a single Katyusha could trigger a massive military response and an international diplomatic crisis.

A year later, the atmosphere in the region is markedly different. Bitter rivals have visited each other’s capitals to mend fences and the media is full of reports about a new age of reconciliation and diplomatic engagement. Following the turmoil of the previous five years, which witnessed a series of proxy wars between the Western-supported Sunni Arab regimes and the axis consisting of Iran, Syria, and their non-state allies (Hamas and Hizbollah), the relative calm that prevailed in 2009 was just one of many signs that a realignment of interests had begun to take shape.

The reasons for this realignment stem from two basic uncertainties. On the one hand, there is a question mark about the effects of a new – and still seemingly undefined – American policy for the region. Indeed, as disruptive as the neoconservative experiment was to Arab power dynamics, the presence of a new administration in Washington with a different outlook and a different set of priorities has forced the region to reorganise itself once again. On the other hand, Iran’s growing influence and the concomitant challenges to its regime’s authority have further muddied the waters, as its allies and adversaries try to gauge the health and durability of the Islamic Republic on its 30th anniversary. When these two unknown variables are combined, in attempts to assess shifting American policy toward the volatile regional heavyweight, the tea leaves become all the more difficult to read.

(Keep reading)
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There are few issues that provoke such a strong response among the Lebanese as the question of the Palestinian refugees’ future in Lebanon. Interestingly enough, unlike most other controversial issues, there is a remarkable degree of consensus about this one. I have met very few Lebanese who do not strongly believe that the Palestinians must never, under any circumstances, be settled permanently in Lebanon as citizens.

The reasons advanced for this view are many, and I will consider the most prominent of them below, in the hopes of generating a good discussion. But first, a few background remarks.

There are over 400,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The actual number is unknown, and estimates vary between 250,000 to upwards of half a million. The living conditions of these refugees — most of whom were born in Lebanon — is dismal. They have few civil rights; they are banned from working in over seventy trades; they are dependent almost entirely on the welfare of UNRWA for basic social services like education, water, food, etc. Of all the Palestinian communities in the diaspora, the Lebanese one is surely the worst off.

It seems to me that while most Lebanese are solidly against the naturalization of the Palestinians, most also believe that their conditions should be improved. The question is: how can this be achieved without risking the integration of the communities into Lebanese society, which — as people will tell you — is the thin end of the wedge.

Now, I’ve had the so-called “tawteen” (naturalization) conversation so many times that I can practically rehearse in my sleep the arguments that are commonly advanced. They break down into the following four genres:

I. The Sectarian Argument

“Lebanon’s political system, which is based upon a delicate sectarian balance, cannot handle the influx of several hundred thousand new citizens, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims.”

I can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard this argument. It’s usually the opening gambit, particularly when listening to either a Shiite or Christian politician, whose communities will (allegedly) be politically disenfranchised by the swelling of Sunni ranks.

There are several problems with this argument, as I see it.

  1. First of all, it implies that the current system of political confessionalism is actually functional and worth preserving.
  2. Second of all, it assumes that the current system is an accurate and just reflection of demographic realities, when it is not. Given the fact that the quotas accorded to each sect in Parliament are already out of sync with the actual sectarian balance in the country (and yet, nobody is making a big deal out of this), and given the fact that (for example) there are nine thousand voters per MP in Bsharre and twenty thousand voters per MP in Sur, isn’t it intellectually dishonest to pretend that the sectarian system mirrors the sectarian reality?
  3. Thirdly, if Lebanon moves to abolish its system of political confessionalism, as called for in the Ta’if Accord, then why is the influx of additional Sunnis an insurmountable problem? Often enough, even the most fervent Lebanese proponents of secularism will continue to argue against naturalization on sectarian grounds. “Yes, of course I am for abolishing sectarianism. But this will take generations, and this is why we cannot naturalize the Palestinians,” is a common refrain. I find this deeply unconvincing.

II. The Socio-Economic Argument

“Lebanon is barely big enough for its own people. We don’t have room for anyone else. “

The Maronite Patriarch made a comment along these lines last week. I find this to be a very strange objection. Don’t these politicians realize that the refugees are already in Lebanon? They’re not arriving by the shipful, Moldovan-bouncer-style. They already live here. Obviously, they’re disconnected from the services of the state (such as they are), but is integration really going to cause mass shortages of kibbe nayyeh for everyone else?

This argument sounds especially disingenuous when it is advanced by people who simultaneously argue that the Palestinians’ conditions must be improved. Where do they think the improvements are going to come from? UNRWA? Obviously, they want the Lebanese state to step in and play a stronger role, but when it comes to integrating the Palestinians into that state as full legal citizens, the charity ends.

III. The Moral Argument

“We did not create the refugee problem — Israel did. Therefore, Israel should be responsible for solving it either through the right of return, or through compensation. Naturalizing the Palestinians deprives them of their right to restitution.”

This is usually the argument that people whip out to browbeat you when the previous two run aground on the shoals of common sense. In its basic outline — the idea of a right of return or compensation — it is not that problematic. But let’s say we accept its premise. What happens then?

In other words, what if we imagine a hypothetical scenario where Israel signs a peace deal with Lebanon and Syria, accepting a certain number of returning refugees and compensating the rest? Should those compensated refugees be entitled to naturalization in Lebanon?

“No!” insist the anti-tawteen crusaders, reverting back to either the sectarian or socio-economic argument. “We can’t accept them! Lebanon is too fragile! Lebanon is too small! Why can’t another Arab country take them?!”

Which brings us to the final argument, one of my favorites…

IV. The “Why-Can’t-Someone-Else-Take-Them?” Argument

“Why can’t they go to Saudi Arabia or Jordan? In a larger country, four hundred thousand new citizens would be nothing. It’s the size of a small city in Syria!”

So let me get this straight. When politicians in a certain country to the south start advocating the mass transfer of Palestinians to other Middle Eastern nations, we refer to this with terms like “the destruction of a nation,” “the persecution of a people,” etc.

But it’s ok for us to insist that these same people be uprooted again and transplanted in a foreign country, despite the fact that they’ve been living in Lebanon for three generations? Why is it acceptable for us to deport a few hundred thousand Palestinians to a specially-constructed Refugeeville, built for them in the middle of the Saudi desert, but it’s not ok for Israel to do it? (Note that I’m NOT arguing that Israel should be able to do it either.)

**

This post might anger and frustrate some readers. Please be assured that my objective is not to diminish or make light of the bitter experiences of the Lebanese Civil War; I understand where the distrust between many Lebanese and Palestinians comes from. However, I also feel that there is a poverty of rational thinking around this issue, and I’d like to see that change.

Finally, please note that this entire discussion is predicated on the idea that a peace deal is reached which provides a solution to the refugee crisis that does not involve a massive return of Palestinians to their homeland. If Israel agrees to take them back, then this discussion is moot. Furthermore, I am not advocating that the refugees be naturalized prior to a peace deal, only that their living conditions be dramatically improved.

The floor is yours…
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bashar-abdullah

Prominent members of Lebanon’s parliamentary majority and opposition have expressed displeasure at the prospect of a Syrian-Saudi effort to determine the composition of Lebanon’s next government. Everyone from Michel Aoun to Walid Jumblatt to Naim Qassem to Amin Gemayel have spoken out against the idea of Saad al-Hariri handing over the reins of power to the Syrians and the Saudis, arguing that the formation of the cabinet should be up to the Lebanese alone.

A noble idea perhaps, but how realistic is the dream of Lebanese sovereignty? Not very, says the latest evidence unearthed by the muckraking masterminds here at The Qnion. Loyal readers, I give you the transcript of a top secret meeting held in Riyadh between PM-designate Saad al-Hariri, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and President Bashar al-Asad of Syria.

Remember, you read it here first!

**

[Scene: The royal reception room at one of King Abdullah's palaces; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia]

Hariri: Your Excellency!

King Abdullah: Saad!

Hariri: I’ve missed you so much! How is everything?

King Abdullah: Splendid, my boy! We’ve missed you around here too. It’s been, what… ten days since your last visit?

Hariri: Has it really been that long? God, it felt like an absolute eternity

King Abdullah: Well, the important thing is that you’re home. I mean, ahh, well, what I meant to say was…

Hariri: (uncomfortable) Ahem, yes… ummm

King Abdullah: … Make yourself at home! That’s what I meant.

Hariri: Yes of course.

King Abdullah: Saad, come over here, I’d like to introduce you to President Bashar al-Asad of Syria.

Bashar: Greetings Sheikh Saad. Congratulations on your appointment! I’m sure your father would have been very proud.

Hariri: (gritting his teeth) Yes. Thank you. Pleased to meet you. Finally.

Bashar: Wow, is it me or is it unbearably hot in here?

King Abdullah: We have the royal air conditioners on at full blast, but this is Riyadh you know, heh heh. Not quite as balmy and breezy as lovely Syria, that’s for sure.

Bashar: No kidding. I suppose it’s also perhaps a bit worse for me as I am slightly taller than both of you.

King Abdullah & Hariri: (nodding uncomfortably)

Bashar: You know, they say that heat rises, and given that I’m… what? A good foot and a half taller? It probably makes a difference.

King Abdullah: (annoyed) I don’t think you’re that much taller, Mr. President. Maybe a few inches.

Bashar: No, I do think that my shoulders are taller than your head, Your Highness. That is to say, I’m head and shoulders above you, ha ha. Physically speaking, of course.

King Abdullah: (straining to smile) Ok ok, I get it…

Bashar: I mean, I’m not saying that you’re half as tall as me, or anything, ha ha ha…

King Abdullah: No, no, I understand…

bashar-tableBashar: Maybe if you stood on this little brown table with the mother-of-pearl inlay, you’d be as tall as me. Wait a minute… I have a table just like this in my reception room too!

King Abdullah: No way!

Bashar: I’m serious! Exactly like it.

Hariri: Me too! Come to think of it, so does every other Arab leader that I’ve ever visited. Huh.

Bashar: Well, they’re so useful, you know? Like, when you’re meeting with other world leaders, and stuff. Ideal place to put your coffee.

Hariri: Exactly. It’s like the perfect size. Not too big…

Bashar: (finishing his sentence) …but not too small! Exactly! Plus they’re just tasteful. Not too showy, and the craftsmanship is just fabulous.

King Abdullah: Totally. Oh my God, what a crazy coincidence! Anyway, where were we?

Hariri: We were about to discuss the Lebanese cabinet formation.

King Abdullah: Right.

Hariri: Now, in view of the fact that March 14 won the election fair and square, and that there is absolutely no constitutional basis for anything like a cabinet veto for the opposition, I believe that it is more than fair that…

King Abdullah: Ah, Saad?

Hariri: … we give the opposition absolutely no more than…

King Abdullah: Saad?

Hariri: … which is already more than one could expect under the…

King Abdullah: Saad!!!

Hariri: Yes sir! Sorry, you were saying?

King Abdullah: President Bashar has a proposal.

Bashar: Thanks, Your Excellency. Saad, this folder contains a list of helpful suggestions that King Abdullah and I came up with, just as a way to… you know, help you complete the cabinet formation process as easily as possible. Give it a read on your way home to Beirut tonight. You might find it useful.

Hariri: (opening the folder) Umm…

King Abdullah: That’s right, Saad. We just want the best for Lebanon, and given that this is your first time as Prime Minister…

Bashar: (smiling) And hopefully not your last.

King Abdullah: Ahem…

Bashar: That came out all wrong. What I meant was…

King Abdullah: Never mind. Just read what’s in that folder, Saad, and brainstorm it. By yourself.

Hariri: (incredulous) But… these aren’t suggestions. (Pulling out a single sheet of paper from the folder.) There’s just a list of ministerial portfolios with names attached to them!

Bashar: Like I said,these are some suggestions designed to help grease the wheels, so to speak.

Hariri: (frantic) And if I refuse? This is unacceptable! It’s blackmail! Lebanon is an independent country!

King Abdullah: There, there. No need to get upset. Sleep on it and call me in the morning.

Bashar: We’re sure you’ll come to the right decision.

Hariri: (steaming) Alright. I’ll be in touch. (Storms out)

King Abdullah: (To Bashar) Don’t worry. He’ll be fine.

Bashar: Do I look worried? God damn it, it’s hot up here.

King Abdullah: Just shut the hell up, ok?

Bashar: Sorry. Couldn’t resist.

King Abdullah: Freak of nature… What do they grow in Damascus, magic beans?

Bashar: (snickers) Something like that…Qnion-small

By QIFA NABKI

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beirut.port.lebanon.antique.1841That’s right, friends. QN is leaving the old country and returning to the New World where a dissertation and several sections of over-ambitious undergraduates await. I hope to keep the blog up so keep stopping by, won’t ya?

What a difference nine months make. Back when we set up shop, the media was full of news about Syria’s emergence as the go-to power for regional influence-mongering. Today, Saudi Arabia is thumping its chest again. And yet… things don’t seem all that different.

Later this week, I hope to be back to regular posting, but for now I leave you with a conversation between me and the doorman of my building, about my impending departure.

Kamal: We’re going to miss you Mr. Elias.

QN: I’m going to miss you too, Kamal. Are you planning on staying in Lebanon for long?

K: Nope. I’m going to try and smuggle myself into Greece.

QN: Interesting. Sounds dangerous.

K: Yup.

QN: Why take the chance?

K: The economy’s terrible here. I only make $300 a month.

QN: Where’s your family?

K: Deir az-Zor [eastern Syria].

QN: Near the secret nuclear plant that the Israelis bombed?

K: I wouldn’t know anything about that, Mr. Elias.

QN: Why not just go back to Syria?

K: Ha ha ha. You’re joking right? As bad as Lebanon is, it’s 100 times better than Syria.

QN: Really? In what way?

K: Look, our foreign policy is good, but everything else is terrible. The economy is bad, the infrastructure, the jobs, education… everything.

QN: That’s too bad.

K: Plus, the worst thing… the censorship. It’s just awful.

QN: You mean, journalists? Intellectuals?

K: Well sure, that too, but I mean the internet. What are the three most important sites on the internet?

QN: Umm, I don’t know. Google? Ummm…

K: (with a pained expression) No! No, no no no… The three most important sites are: Facebook, YouTube, and Hotmail.

QN: Oh yes, those too.

K: Facebook, YouTube, and Hotmail. Those are the three most important sites on the internet, and they are ALL banned in Syria. (Shooting me an incredulous look). I mean, can you believe that?

QN: Must be rough.

K: I mean seriously. Think about it. If I go back to Syria… how am I supposed to check my email?
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sinioraAbd al-Rahman al-Rashid pens a curious editorial in Asharq al-Awsat (via FLC) about the misspent foreign aid that Saudi Arabia has been doling out. After bashing Nabih Berri’s abusive treatment of Fouad Siniora and discussing the inevitable squabbles that will surround the billion dollar gift that KSA is planning for Gaza, al-Rashid takes aim, oddly, at Siniora’s government:

ومهما كان المستفيد فإن على متعهد المعونة السعودية، وغيرها من المساعدات الموعودة، أن تكشف بشكل تفصيلي وعلني عن المستفيدين منها، حتى يعرف أنها تحقق الغرض منها، بإيصالها للمتضررين المحتاجين، وبالسرعة القصوى، بخلاف المعونة السعودية في لبنان التي مر عامان عليها ولم ينفق إلا القليل منها. فقد صرفت الحكومة اللبنانية معظمها على حاجاتها. وهو أمر غريب، ولا أعتقد أن الجانب السعودي منحها هدية للحكومة، بل للناس المتضررين من الحرب، وعلى السنيورة إعادة الأموال إلى المتبرع بها.

[Translation: "Whoever the beneficiary may be, it is incumbent upon the one in charge of [disbursing] the Saudi gift and any other promised aid, to reveal in a detailed and public fashion the beneficiaries of the aid so that it may be known that its purpose was achieved… in contrast to the Saudi aid in Lebanon, of which little has been spent over the past two years. The Lebanese government has spent most of it on its own needs. This is a puzzling matter, and I don’t think that the Saudis granted it as a gift to the [Lebanese] government, but rather for the people affected by the war, and Siniora is responsible for returning the funds to their donor.“]

What to make of this? Are the Saudis slapping Siniora’s wrist? If so, why, and particularly now, when he is looking for a graceful exit strategy from the PM’s office? Some may suggest that this has something to do with the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation, but it seems a bit too heavy-handed. For insight, I turned to my good friend Alex, from Syria Comment, a veritable expert on the subtle and not-so-subtle messages conveyed by Saudi newspapers.  Here is what he had to say:

I see it as part of the series of opinion pieces in Asharq, QN.

Check out the other one by their stupid editor [Tareq Alhomayed] who insists on seeing everything in his own favorite way … now he sees Syria and Iran panicking and therefore they will cause Lebanon some future pain:

For the coming months expect Asharq to be engaged in trying to influence the Lebanese elections by tarnishing the reputation of Aoun, Hizbollah and of course Syria and Iran.

The difference between Tareq and Abdel Rahman, is that Abdel Rahman always finds some creative issue through which he can deliver an indirect blow to the bad guys, whereas Tareq is more straightforward.

Any thoughts? Are the Saudis letting Siniora hear the branch creak? Or is this Asharq’s attempt at even-handedness?

musalahaLebanese newspaper al-Akhbar carried a report today about the surprise reconcilliation that took place at the Kuwait summit yesterday. It claims that Saudi King Abdullah’s speech came out of the blue and was unexpected by Hosni Mubarak, who remained “cold” towards Bashar al-Assad, and then got on his plane and left. What’s more, the Akhbar report suggests that the mood of “openness” initiated by Abdullah did not translate into any breakthroughs during the closed-door meetings between the various envoys and ministers present. Everybody is still sticking to their guns: the Syrians want to cancel the Arab Peace Initiative while the Saudis are insisting that doing so leaves the Arabs with no serious alternative vis-a-vis Israel.

I wonder what Bashar and Abdullah are discussing in that photograph… “Now you see, your Highness, what I meant by “half-men” was not what you thought at all! I was making a simple observation about the differences in physical appearance between my rather lanky stature and your own well-proportioned self… and of course President Mubarak and King Abdullah II as well…”

bashar-al-assad-mubarak1

Talal Salman had an editorial in today’s as-Safir, in which he rightly criticized the three summits called by the Arabs in support of Gaza. “Sale! Three for the price of one,” he mocked.

I am so tired of the stupid “Arab Cold War”, and we’re only, what, five years into it? Is there some way to fast forward? I really do think I’ve seen this terrible movie before.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia want to curtail Iran’s encroaching influence while the “resistance” axis does not want to see Egypt broker a truce with Hamas at its expense.  Everybody is trying to throw their own “look-at-how-important-I-am” party, but only their friends are showing up. Bah humbug. What’s the point of being important if the people whom you deem as unimportant don’t recognize you as important?

Meanwhile, innocents die.
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