Elections


Graphic courtesy of Election Guerilla. Click to enlarge.

Much has already been said about the very peculiar electoral law proposed  by the Orthodox Gathering and endorsed by all of Lebanon’s Maronite  leaders. Civil society groups say that it further entrenches sectarianism. Michael Young writes that it deepens Christian isolation. Meanwhile, Ziyad Baroud is hedging his bets.

My biggest problem with the proposal is very simple: it leads to enormous inequalities of suffrage. What does this mean?

Imagine a country with a parliament divided into quotas based on colors of hair. For example, 20% of the seats are devoted to blond-haired MPs, 35% to redheads, 20% to brown-haired people, 15% to salt-and-pepper, etc.

Once upon a time, this proportional arrangement of seats matched the actual hair-color demographics in the country, but over time, the blonds (who, as a rule, tend to have more fun) multiplied more vigorously than the redheads, while an unfortunate epidemic of male-pattern balding eviscerated the once healthy ranks of the brown-haired.

The redheads, however, are insistent upon maintaining the old quotas, even though demographics have changed. What’s more, they insist that districts should be drawn in such a way as to guarantee that redheaded representatives are elected by majorities of redheads. Why? Because, they argue, a blond MP surely would not advocate for a redhead’s rights in the way that a fellow redhead would.

This is where the troubles begin. If you draw districts in such a way as to maintain “chromatically pure” majorities, then certain districts will inevitably have a much higher ratio of MPs to voters than other districts. For example, redheaded districts might have 1 MP per 10,000 voters, while blond districts could have 40,000 voters to each MP.

The only way around this problem would be to draw much larger districts composed of voting populations with all kinds of hair color, but then you’d have redheaded MPs being elected by blond voters, which is a big problem for the redheaded politicians.

So small districts remain, for the time being…until, one day, the redheaded and brown-haired leaders get together and decide that the current system is still problematic. Even in their well-coiffed enclaves, there are odd pockets of blond and gray-haired voters who can help swing an election the wrong way.

And so they propose a different approach, a law that is the apotheosis of the principle of hair-color representation, and it goes something like this:

“Let’s dispense with the hassles of gerrymandering and turn the entire country into a single district. Let’s institute a system of proportional representation whereby each citizen is only allowed to vote for a list of candidates who have the same color hair as their own. So, for example, if there are 22 seats in Parliament reserved for redheads, then each redhead in the country would cast a vote for one of several different lists of 22 redheaded political candidates, and the seats would be divided up between the lists according to a proportional formula.”

Under this proposed system, the problem of unequal suffrage that we witness in the current system with the small districts would become even more drastic, because there would be no little pockets of blonds and black-haired voters to “dilute” the redheaded and brown-haired votes. Under the new law, the ratio of MPs to voters is no longer dictated by districting, but rather by the cold hard facts of hair color demographics. A redheaded voter would have more voting power than a blond, purely because of the color of their hair, and not because of the district they live in.

Graphic courtesy of Election Guerilla. Click to enlarge

This is, in a nutshell, the Ferzli proposal. (For more reading on inequality of suffrage, check out this post I wrote last year on the subject).

Let me just conclude by pointing out the obvious, namely that nobody but Najib Mikati and President Suleiman are actually interested in implementing proportional representation. When I met with several of Hariri’s allies, advisors, and representatives last month, they all basically regurgitated the same set of talking points: “If we adopt PR, Hizbullah will be able to win 10 Sunni seats, while we’ll only be able to take one Shiite seat. We can’t have PR until there’s a level playing field, and our Shiite candidates are not intimidated or threatened by Hizbullah.”

Naturally Walid Jumblatt is completely opposed to PR, as is Nabih Berri. The Christians don’t like it because it will require having larger voting districts (12-14 rather than the current 28 or so), which means that many Christian MPs will be elected by Muslim majorities. (This is what makes it particularly nauseating to listen to Amin Gemayel and Michel Aoun going on about restoring “Christian rights” when the system they are championing is so ludicrously out of step with democratic principles and demographic realities. See the second graphic above for a clear proof of just how good the 2009 law is for Christian representation…)

Therefore, the current proposal from Elie Ferzli is probably being supported by the Christian leadership only to guarantee that the end result of the bargaining process over the electoral law will be the 2009 law, warts and all.

Arabic speakers can read an introduction to the actual law here. I’d also like to thank my good friend Election Guerilla for the very helpful graphics above. As he suggested to me in an email: “The proposed system simply flaunts the inequality of confessional representation (and it is perhaps unsurprising that the most over-represented Christian group under the proposal would be … the Greek Orthodox!”

More on this as the story develops…

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Now that the mystery of Moussa al-Sadr’s disappearance has been solved, Lebanon needs a new vanished imam to contemplate.

Why not Saad al-Hariri? Even by his own peripatetic standards, al-Hariri’s absence from the political scene over the past several months has been something to behold. The man has well and truly left the building, and the situation is so bad that even NOW Lebanon has noticed. Michael Young recently had this to say about Hariri’s Houdini act:

Hariri has been abroad for months, an affront to those who elected him. His money problems are genuine and have not yet been resolved, taking a toll on his patronage network and political authority. The former prime minister is not out yet, however if his occultation lasts much longer, his leadership will melt. Many sympathizers wonder what Hariri actually stands for. Who did they mobilize to elect in the 2009 elections? No answer has come from the Future Movement, which has morphed into something of an annoying jack-in-the-box—popping its head up episodically to deliver some statement or barb against Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

In my view, Saad is trying to pull a page from from his father’s playbook. In 1998, after Emile Lahoud was installed as Syria’s man in Baabda, Rafiq al-Hariri resigned. He told a reporter from al-Hayat the reasons behind his calculations in a revealing interview.

Hariri excused himself from forming the first government in the Lahoud era, after a dispute about the delegation of MPs’ votes, which left Lahoud with the freedom to name the prime minister-designate. In fact, some of his friends advised him to leave office, and one of them was then-Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam. Khaddam told him that Lahoud was beginning his mandate in a Buick that was fresh from the dealer, while “you’re driving an Opel that has been ground down by exercising power.” Khaddam suggested that Hariri let Lahoud use up some of the power of his car, and then they would see. This is what happened when Hariri returned to power in 2000 after a clear election victory, a victory that did not anger some Syrian parties that had not been enthusiastic about Lahoud in the first place.

Saad probably hopes that by the time the 2013 elections roll around, the Lebanese will have had enough of Najib Miqati and his Buick — to say nothing of Michel Aoun’s Batmobile and Nasrallah’s STL getaway car — and will welcome Hariri back to town with open arms. It is, in other words, a policy of “offshore balancing,” whereby a once-dominant power sits back and lets its enemies destroy each other before swooping in to tilt the balance in its own favor. (In this case, Hariri is the one who is perpetually offshore, trying to manage the affairs back home…)

My sense is that this gambit will fail. Miqati’s government — just by dint of being in the right place at the right time — will be able to take credit for solving the electricity problem, giving Lebanon high-speed internet, maintaining relative peace and stability while not compromising on the STL issue or crossing any Syrian red lines, and perhaps even introducing proportional representation. Furthermore, depending on how things play out in Syria, the Saudis may  find it more  advantageous to try to  co-opt Lebanon’s new quadripartite alliance (Hizbullah, Aoun, Jumblatt, and Miqati) rather than supporting an electoral “war of elimination” against March 8th in 2013.

Whatever the case may be, the near future doesn’t look so great for al-Mustaqbal.

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Lebanon's various electoral maps (courtesy of IFES, see report below)

The Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) has published an excellent primer on Tunisia’s upcoming elections. It is succinct, well-written, and will bring you up to speed on all of the most important players, issues, and questions in about twenty minutes. I highly recommend checking it out (download the PDF here).

Speaking of elections, Lebanon’s Interior Minister Marwan Charbel unveiled a new electoral draft law a couple of days ago. It contains several positive elements, such as a 30% gender quota, pre-printed ballots, and an open-list proportional representation system, but disappoints in other ways — several small districts, no independent supervisory commission.

The big debate over the law will focus on the question of how many electoral districts to include. Unless the districts are large, proportional representation will not generate the major benefit that its advocates ascribe to it, namely a diverse representation of political parties. For some background reading on the subject of electoral districting in Lebanon, here is another excellent primer, this one by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (whose work we have highlighted on many occasions).

Thoughts on electoral reform issues are welcome in the comment section.
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I recently read an interesting profile of ex-Minister of the Interior Ziad Baroud in Al-Akhbar English (which, by the way, you should all be reading on a daily basis). The last two paragraphs, in particular, caught my eye:

As part of his interest in electoral law, Baroud is in contact with Bahij Tabbara, a former Lebanese minister. Together they are preparing a proposal on proportional representation, an electoral system many believe would undermine the current sectarian structure governing Lebanon. Baroud says their proposal “is not about a political party, tendency, movement or coalition,” but simply a campaign calling for proportional representation and hoping to raise awareness about the issue. Baroud confirms that they have not gone into the project’s details, but he feels that Tabbara is an intelligent person who will help move the project forward.

Although Baroud hopes to see proportional representation implemented in Lebanon, he is pessimistic about its acceptance among Lebanon’s political elite. He predicts that the prevailing political groups will never agree to such electoral reforms, because their direct or indirect interest are heavily vested in the status quo.

Is this true? Baroud is right that many of the bigger parties have no interest in changing the existing majoritarian system, but I think that a few important players would be far better served by proportional representation (PR), while at least one major party is probably agnostic on the issue.

In particular, Prime Minister Mikati would stand a much better chance of increasing the size of his legislative bloc if majoritarianism were to be replaced by a proportional scheme for the 2013 elections. With Hariri’s political relevance being depleted by the day, in fact, all of Lebanon’s “independent” Sunni politicians (particularly Mikati and Safadi) would seem to have a good shot at making inroads into Mustaqbal’s share of Parliament under a PR system.

On the other hand, any party that anticipates winning its seats by a margin short of a landslide is probably going to be against PR. This applies not only to Hariri’s Future Movement but also to Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and the rest of the Christian parties. All of these groups (as I argued in an article from a couple years ago) won their seats in the 2009 elections by decent margins (in the 55%-65% range) but not by total landslides. This means that under a PR system, they would likely lose seats in those same districts to their opponents. (See also this post for more reading on electoral districting in Lebanon and PR).

Meanwhile, if Hizbullah’s support in 2013 is anything like it was in 2009, they would have very little to lose from a PR system. In fact, they might even gain seats under this scheme, by running resistance-friendly candidates against Hariri’s people in the districts that the latter won by a narrow margin.

(Note: the same could be said of Aoun. While losing seats in districts like Jbeil and Kisrawan, the FPM might pick up seats in Beirut and elsewhere, particularly given all the new political capital that has accrued to the party as a result of its visible successes in the areas of telecommunications and energy.)

In sum, I’m not particularly optimistic that PR will be implemented in time for 2013, but my lack of optimism has less to do with the fact of entrenched political interests as it does with political inertia. Still, it would be nice if it happened.
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Mona Yacoubian and I chat here about the new Lebanese cabinet and the challenges facing it, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the events in Syria, and the new US draft legislation targeting Hizbullah.

Be sure to also check out Joshua Landis’s conversation with Ausama Monajed about the Syrian uprising. I believe it was recorded prior to President Assad’s latest speech, but it’s still worth watching.

I hope to record another segment later this week with a friend of mine who is an expert on Turkish-Israeli relations. Stay tuned.
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I’ve written a brief essay for Foreign Policy about the challenges facing the Mikati government, which you can read here. There are a couple of other observations I’d like to make that are too Lebanon-wonky for FP’s audience but may be of interest to regular readers of QN:

Veto politics: Najib Mikati has made a point of saying that while the March 8 coalition holds a majority in his cabinet, they don’t hold a two-thirds-plus-one supermajority. Out of thirty ministers, only eighteen belong to the FPM, Hizbulah, Amal, and their allies, while the remaining twelve are divided among the shares of Mikati, President Suleiman, and Walid Jumblatt. Is it an accident that Jumblatt’s share is just big enough (i.e. three ministers) to give March 8 a supermajority of twenty-one, if push comes to shove? Once again, Jumblatt makes sure he’s the man in the middle.

FPM: Mikati’s cabinet is already being labeled a “Hizbullah government”. This, to my mind, is an oversimplification, given that Hizbullah only holds two ministries (and insignificant ones at that). Of course, cynics will scoff and say that the Hizb doesn’t need ministries to exert its dominance over the cabinet, and that may well be true. But if they don’t need ministries to dominate a cabinet, then what makes the dynamic in this cabinet different from every other time they have held two or three insignificant ministries?

To my mind, what really makes this cabinet different is the considerable haul that the Free Patriotic Movement and its allies in the Change & Reform Bloc were able to net. Think about it: Defense, Justice, Telecoms, Energy, Labor, Tourism, Industry, Culture, plus a couple freebie ministers without portfolio. That’s tremendous, no matter how you spin it. The Aounist movement has never held that kind of power, and you can bet that they are not going to squander this opportunity to consolidate their position and win more supporters. (See here for my profile of the FPM, which dates back to just before the 2009 elections, but in certain ways remains very relevant to the situation the party finds itself in today).

The 2013 elections: The fact that Tripoli has several of her most prominent sons represented in this cabinet has not been lost on anyone. Mikati is clearly making a play to boost his profile as the most popular political figure in Tripoli, which is the first step toward challenging Saad Hariri’s claim to uncontested leadership of Lebanon’s Sunnis. When Mikati was first appointed back in January, he appeared on Marcel Ghanem’s show Kalam al-Nas, and was asked by the host about what he had to say regarding Hariri’s claims that Mikati did not represent the Sunnis. Mikati, who is usually very cool under pressure, exploded into a comical tirade of sectarian one-upsmanship (click here for the YouTube video in Arabic; English translation below):

Mikati: “I don’t accept anyone to question my Sunnism. If there’s a Sunni in Lebanon, it’s me. I won’t accept it! And those who want to hand out certificates (of Sunnism) can go do it on their own. I’m Sunni in belief, Sunni in practice, Sunni in politics, and I’m the number one defender of the Sunnis in Lebanon. If you want to talk about Sunnis, I’m the one with the highest number of Sunni votes. In the ballot boxes of Tripoli, 87% of the Sunnis voted for Najib Miqati, which has never happened in the history of elections in Lebanon. So [whoever is questioning my Sunnism] can get lost, with all my respect for the muftis and who else is concerned with this issue. I’m the number one Sunni in Lebanon!”

Marcel Ghanem: Great. Moving on…

That always cracks me up. I see great potential for some sort of party game…

It should also be noted that the FPM appointed two ministers (Nicholas Sehnaoui and Gabi Layyoun) from tough electoral districts that they lost in the last elections (Achrafieh and Zahle, respectively).

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Najib Miqati and Michel Aoun are, as of today, the two most important men in Lebanese politics (for now).

Four and a half months after Hizbullah and its allies dumped Saad al-Hariri’s fractious national unity government, Lebanon finally has a new one. It is led by Prime Minister Najib Miqati and is composed of parties from the political coalition known as “March 8th” which includes Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, Hizbullah, and Amal. It also includes a number of “independents” from Walid Jumblatt’s PSP, and a few ministers allied with President Suleiman and Prime Minister Miqati.

As anticipated, the biggest winner today is Michel Aoun. Having spent 15 years in the political wilderness, he returned to Lebanon in 2005 from his Parisian exile to find Saad al-Hariri and Walid Jumblatt rebuffing his demands for a seat at the big kids’ table. Aoun sat out Saniora’s government and then endured the disappointment of the 2009 elections, which failed to deliver the parliamentary majority he seemed intent on getting. Two years later, he finally gets to play the role of the political heavyweight in a Lebanese cabinet.

A few notes on the new cabinet (via the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, thanks Richard):

It is noteworthy that there are no women in the proposed cabinet. Five Ministers are reappointed to their previous positions. Two Ministers have moved portfolios. While a number of the new members of the cabinet have held ministerial positions in previous cabinets, this cabinet includes a high proportion of new members. Media reports indicate that Talal Arslan has already declined his participation in the Cabinet. In line with the Constitution, (Article 64.2), the proposed Cabinet now has 30 days to prepare and present its proposed Policy Statement to the Chamber of Deputies. If the Policy Statement gains the approval of a majority of the 128 Deputies, the Government will be formed. If not, then the Prime Minister may choose to resign, or may seek to nominate a new Cabinet, or may seek to nominate the same Cabinet but propose a new Policy Statement.

There’s much more to say about this new dynamic which we’ll be exploring here at Qifa Nabki over the next couple days, but in the meantime, here’s the list of ministers (click here for a downloadable copy):

Cabinet line-up:

Prime Minister: Najib Mikati (Sunni)

Deputy Prime Minister: Samir Moqbel (Orthodox)

President’s share:

Interior: Marwan Charbel (Maronite, also considered close to the Free Patriotic Movement)

Environment: Nazem al-Khoury (Maronite)

Prime Minister’s share:

Finance: Mohammad Safadi (Sunni) Moved from Economy

Economy: Nicolas Nahhas (Orthodox)

Education: Hassan Diab (Sunni)

Information: Walid Daouq (Sunni)

State: Ahmad Karami (Sunni)

Change and Reform bloc:

Justice: Shakib Qortbawi (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement)

Labor: Charbel Nahhas (Catholic, Free Patriotic Movement) Moved from Telecommunications

Tourism: Fadi Abboud (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement) Reappointed

Energy and Water: Gebran Bassil (Maronite, Free Patriotic Movement) Reappointed

Telecommunications: Nicolas Sehnaoui (Orthodox, Free Patriotic Movement)

Culture: Gaby Layoun (Catholic, Free Patriotic Movement)

Defense: Fayez Ghosn (Orthodox, Marada Movement)

State: Salim Karam (Maronite, Marada Movement)

State: Panos Manajian (Armenian Orthodox, Tashnaq Party)

Industry: Freije Sabounjian (Armenian Orthodox, Tashnaq Party)

Progressive Socialist Party:

Public Works and Transportation: Ghazi Aridi (Druze) Reappointed

Social Affairs: Wael Abu Faour (Druze) Moved from State

The Displaced: Alaeddine Terro (Sunni)

Hezbollah:

Administrative Reform: Mohammad Fneish (Shia) Reappointed

Agriculture: Hussein Hajj Hassan (Shia) Reappointed

Youth and Sports: Faisal Karami (Sunni)

Amal:

Foreign Affairs: Adnan Mansour (Shia)

Public Health: Ali Hassan Khalil (Shia)

Lebanese Democratic Party:

State: Talal Arslan (Druze) [The latest reports say that Arslan is refusing to join the government.]

Independents:

State for Parliament Affairs: Nicolas Fattouch (Catholic)

SSNP:

State: Ali Qanso (Shia, Syrian Social Nationalist Party)

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In a week from today, Lebanon will have been without a functioning government for three months. That’s not quite as long as the four and a half month stint that the country endured in 2009 following the legislative elections, but it’s still an embarrassingly long delay.

Perhaps the most embarrassing thing about it is the fact that the March 14th coalition has opted to stay out of the next government, giving March 8th (the new majority) free rein to put together a cabinet without having to manage the whims and stalling tactics of its opponents. When Saad al-Hariri set about forming a government in 2009, he had to deal with the demands of his own allies as well as those of Hizbullah, Amal, the Free Patriotic Movement, and Abu Tanjara, who all had something to say about a myriad of contentious issues, from the sanctity of the resistance to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

This time around, things should be simpler, right? So what’s taking so long? Inquiring minds (not just my own, but also Nabih Berri’s and Ghazi al-Aridi’s) want to know. There has been much speculation on the various issues that are at stake, but it seems clear that the main obstacle can be summarized as follows:

Two former Lebanese Army generals named Michel want the right to appoint one of their allies to the Interior Ministry. One of the generals represents the largest bloc of MPs in the current parliamentary majority. The other general is the President of the Republic and must sign off on any cabinet lineup for it to be legally approved. Without the bloc leader’s votes, the President would have no cabinet decree to sign. Without the President’s signature, the bloc leader would have no seats in the cabinet.

In other words, you’ve got two equal and diametrically opposed forces bearing down on the same area. What is the result? Stalemate.

As usual, the problem is basically a structural one. The Lebanese Constitution does not provide any elucidation for how to move beyond the current impasse. Aoun is within his rights to demand any portfolio he would like, and President Sleiman is within his rights to accept or refuse any cabinet lineup that is placed before him. Both men are at each other’s mercy. Ironically, however, they are also each at the height of their own powers. Consider the following:

Aoun has never had a better opportunity to shape a cabinet under circumstances as favorable as the current ones, where his bloc represents the senior partner in the parliamentary majority and where the opposition has decided not to join the cabinet. (Given his age and health concerns, he may never get a clearer shot to control the agenda than this one.) Without Aoun, there would be no March 8th cabinet, and if Miqati fails in his efforts, it would be exceedingly difficult for Hizbullah and its allies to appoint anyone else to the job who could pick up where Miqati left off. Aoun knows this, so he is doing what he does best: sticking to his guns and waiting for his opponents (or, as the case may be, his allies) to blink first.

Similarly, Sleiman knows that a Lebanese president is never more powerful than when he is being asked to sign off on a cabinet-forming decree. Almost all of the president’s powers are either ceremonial or revocable. One of the only truly significant things that he can do is to refuse to sign a decree forming a new cabinet. For a nice reflection on the importance of this principle, take a look at the following excerpt from Wikileaks cable  07BEIRUT1724 (which dates back to Nov. 5, 2007, when the US was pushing its March 14th allies to elect a new president with a simple majority.)

The danger is that a compromise over the presidency combined with the “blocking/toppling third” in the cabinet that the pro-Syrians will insist upon puts March 14 in potentially a worse position than it is today, no matter how stellar a good PM’s March 14 credentials might be. The pro-Syrian ministers could not topple Siniora’s cabinet a year ago because they did not have sufficient numbers to do so. In a new cabinet, they are likely to have that third, meaning that they can topple the cabinet at will. This is not an insurmountable problem if the president is March 14: he can work with the parliamentary majority to see that the replacement cabinet is an improvement, without a toppling third given again to the pro-Syrians. But if the president is weak or under Syrian influence, he will likely use his signatory power over the cabinet formation — signatory power that cannot be overridden — to insist again that the pro-Syrians have the toppling third, continuing the cycle of pro-Syrian vetoes over cabinet action… All of this argues, of course, for a credible president committed to March 14 principles as the first step to resolving Lebanon’s political crisis.

In other words, once Sleiman signs that piece of paper, the clock strikes midnight and his carriage turns back into a pumpkin. He has virtually no way to dictate the government’s agenda besides holding out for the best deal he can get right now. What this means, among other things, is that he is probably coming under a great deal of pressure from March 14th (and perhaps also the US ambassador and the Saudis) to continue to play hardball with Aoun.

So why all the fuss over the Interior Ministry? That’s a subject for another post.
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It took them a while, but Lebanon’s March 14th coalition has finally gotten around to officially opting out of Najib Miqati’s government. Let no one imagine that this has actually made Miqati’s job any easier: it has been clear for the past several weeks that the major obstacles to this latest round of cabinet formation politics have nothing to do with the challenges that beset Saad al-Hariri’s effort in 2009. This time, it’s all about Michel Aoun and his desire to land the coveted Interior Ministry, which very few politicians — even among his own allies — are particularly jazzed about.

All eyes are on the parliamentary elections of 2013. With electoral issues (from districting to registration to long-awaited reforms like pre-printed ballots) in the hands of the Free Patriotic Movement, Jumblatt would have to worry about his own backyard, Berri would be eyeing Jezzine, and President Sleiman could kiss his chances to bless a successful “independent” Christian slate in the Metn goodbye. It’s not a little deal, hence the political gridlock.

So, now that Hariri and co. are out of a job, whatever do you suppose they plan to do with themselves? Answer: organize a huge rally downtown on March 14th protesting Hezbollah’s arms. On the face of it, it’s not a bad idea; revolution is in the air these days, and the unemployed and disgruntled youth of Lebanon’s cities have no decrepit dictators to rebel against. Sectarianism is too squishy a target, so weapons it is!

Here’s a question, though: which weapons are objectionable? Hariri’s latest speech left me a little confused on this score. On the one hand, he’s anti-weapons, but on the other, he’s pro-resistance. What does that mean? And what is he suggesting Hizbullah should do? Hand over its pistols, bowie knives, and slingshots, but hold on to its 9M133 AT-14 tank killers and C802 anti-ship missiles? Most Lebanese I know who have a problem with the “weapons issue” are not worried about being killed by a Hizbullah fighter firing an AK-47; they’re worried about their house being flattened by an Israeli F-16 retaliating against the Hizbullah fighter with the AK-47.

So let me just say that I’m not on the edge of my seat, awaiting the results of March 14th’s latest publicity gambit, the so-called “referendum on Hezbollah’s weapons”. It seems to me that this is a pretty straightforward issue to campaign on, and yet they always manage to sound like they don’t really know what they are in favor of.

I hope to have an interesting interview with Gary Gambill for y’all, later this week. In the meantime, let’s have some fun with a poll.

Michel and Saad, during their honeymoon phase.

Apologies for the brief posting hiatus. The last time I sat down to write something on this blog, Hosni Mubarak was still president of Egypt. Maybe I should take these breaks more often.

So, what’s happening in Lebanon? It appears that Najib Miqati will not be able to throw together a technocrat cabinet as effortlessly as some had supposed. I don’t imagine that the current stalemate will last as long as the 2009 edition, but at least for the time being, there is no solution in sight. What is interesting to me is that the same politician whose intransigence led to much of the delay the last time around is the one causing problems today: good old General Aoun. (For a brief recap of his role in the 2009 cabinet formation process, see here and [for some comic relief] here).

As much as I’d like to blame the General for the current crisis, however, I believe the real culprit is the Lebanese Constitution. As I’ve tried to argue in the past (here and here):

It should be obvious to all of us that this game they call governance is being played with an unsatisfactory rulebook. In the absence of clear and established procedures, we have to resort to deal-making through public offers and quid pro quos. This is just not sustainable. Nowhere in the Lebanese Constitution does it say anything about cabinet veto powers. Nor, for that matter, does it explain what rules should govern the formation of any cabinet. As far as I can tell, the coalition that wins a majority in parliament could technically put together a cabinet consisting of seven fried won-tons, a shrimp springroll, and nine fortune cookies, without violating the Constitution.

In 2009, Aoun argued that each bloc’s share in the cabinet should be proportionally equivalent to its share in Parliament. Today, he argues that March 14th should not be granted a blocking third in the Miqati cabinet because he does not want the government to be mired in the legislative gridlock that (he helped ensure) plagued Saad Hariri’s cabinet. Hypocritical? Of course. But can you blame him? He’s simply exploiting the ambiguities of the current system to maximize the power of his own bloc.

I argued in 2009 that President Sleiman should have refused to sign any cabinet formation decree without insisting that the principle used to form that cabinet be enshrined in the Constitution (whether it was proportional representation or the unilateralist whims of a majoritarian prime minister). That way, I suggested naively, “we won’t have to watch this movie again four years from now.”

Well, it has barely been a year since Hariri formed his government and we find ourselves in the same position again. This time, we can’t blame the failure-to-launch on the Doha Accord, the Syrian-Saudi reconciliation, or the imperatives of a national unity formula. None of those conditions apply anymore, and the Lebanese politicos still can’t figure out how to divvy up the spoils. Something needs to be done.

So here’s my crowd-sourcing challenge of the day: How is the cabinet formation process managed in other multi-party parliamentary democracies? I presume a constitutionally mandated time limit would go a long way to helping the process along, but there are probably more efficient ways to do this. What are they?

Go forth, find out, report back, and make me smarter.

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