March 14


The only issue of real import in Lebanon these days — as far as political reform is concerned — is Nabih Berri’s controversial call to establish a committee to explore the ways and means to abolish political sectarianism.

Yes, you heard me right. Berri has called a meeting. A brown bag lunch. A coffee hour. And everybody — from Samir Geagea to Michel Aoun to Saad al-Hariri — has thrown a huge hissy fit.

Let’s pause for a moment and appreciate the irony of this situation. Abolishing political sectarianism — which is ostensibly a core component of Free Patriotic Movement and March 14 values — has now become the issue over which the likes of Aoun, Geagea, and Hariri find common ground to rail against.

Their excuse? It’s too much, too soon. “We have to eliminate sectarianism in our hearts before we eliminate it in our institutions,” says Patriarch Sfeir. Fair enough. But what harm will be done by establishing a commission and starting a national conversation? How else do these politicians propose to eliminate sectarianism in the hearts of the Lebanese? They can barely keep the electricity on 18 hours a day.

Most questionable, to my mind, are the “shoot the messenger” articles that one reads in the press by liberal-minded civil society types. The argument runs as follows: Abolishing sectarianism is important and necessary, but not if Nabih Berri is proposing it:

“Who is [Berri] fooling? The primary benefactors of the abolition of political sectarianism would be the Shia, demographically the largest community in Lebanon, who overwhelmingly side with Hezbollah and Amal. Despite the urgency of eliminating sectarianism from both Lebanese society and the country’s official texts, it would be hard to accept that the largest community, the one controlled by the Hezbollah-led opposition and its arsenal, would be then able to control the country, its institutions and decisions, including UN Security Council resolutions 1559 and 1701.”

This strikes me as nothing but cynical fear-mongering. Let’s assume that Hanin Ghaddar is right, and that the primary benefactors would indeed be “the Shia”. What does that have to do with Nabih Berri “fooling” anyone? Would she be less perturbed if a Christian was calling for the commission? Let’s say Ziad Baroud or President Suleiman proposed the commission (as they actually have done on the record) would that mean that “the Shia” would not be the primary benefactors of abolishing sectarianism? Why is it ok if Baroud proposes it, but not if Berri does? She goes on:

“Berri’s timing is also questionable. He decided to launch his campaign, despite objections from other political leaders, right before preparations for the national dialogue, in which Lebanese leaders are to sit down to discuss Hezbollah’s arms and the national defense strategy. As more March 14 Christians raise the call to disarm Hezbollah, and despite the consensus on the ministerial statement, Berri – and by extension Hezbollah – thought it might be a good idea to warn the Christians with the anti-sectarian mantra, as it threatens them directly.”

Really? No one in Lebanon is under any illusion that any national dialogue talks are going to “disarm Hezbollah”. It’s not even on the table. There is absolutely no political willpower or military firepower to even make it worth raising. So why would Berri have to threaten “the Christians” with de-confessionalism? Which Christians? Does she think that Hezbollah is worried about the Lebanese Forces? And Aoun is Hezbollah’s ally, so why would Berri be trying to scare the FPM?

I interpret Berri’s call for deconfessionalism in a different way. The Speaker understands just as well as anyone that the process of abolishing the current system is going to be long and drawn out. It will involve several steps and will take years. Some of these steps will include the creation of a senate, the redistibution of powers between the different branches of government, administrative decentralization, electoral reform, etc. We’ve discussed these issues on this blog ad infinitum.

However, one of the most important elements of this process is going to have to be the eventual disarmament of Hezbollah. None of the other parties are going to accept a non-confessional system that allows one party to maintain a militia that is stronger than the Lebanese Army. And guess what? AMAL won’t either. This is the subtext of Berri’s strategy, in my opinion. By championing deconfessionalism, he is hitting two birds with one stone. Abolishing the current system would give his coreligionists a fair share in the government of their country, to be sure, but it would also clip the wings of his party’s biggest competitor.

Is Nabih Berri one of the most corrupt sectarian leaders in Lebanon? Yes. Is it farcical for him to be proposing abolishing sectarianism? Yes. Does he have ulterior motives? Probably. But who cares? Civil society should be calling his bluff (if that’s what it is), and trying to make the most out of an opportunity that may not come along again for years. That’s how political reform is achieved, like it or not.

Rather than getting on a high horse, Lebanese civil society should be getting into the trenches.
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View over the Litani dam towards the Anti-Lebanon Mountains.

It had to happen sooner or later. I can imagine that when Majd al-Assad died last week, Saad Hariri’s advisors all reached for their cell phones at the same time and called Qoreitem. “This is our chance. Let’s get it over with.”

On the occasion of Hariri’s visit to Damascus, I found myself reflecting on the developments of the past five years, trying to assess what had changed in Lebanon since the Syrian withdrawal. Have we returned to where we started? Is Lebanon today in more or less the same position that it was in on the morning of February 14, 2005?

On the one hand, many of the same internal power dynamics are in place. A Hariri leads the most powerful Sunni political party; AMAL and Hezbollah monopolize the support of Lebanon’s Shiites; Jumblatt remains the strongman in the Chouf and a mercurial kingmaker; Hezbollah remains armed and unchallenged; the Christian anti-Syrian opposition (Kata’eb and LF) is politically weak; and Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are the dominant foreign players on the Lebanese stage.

On the other hand, there is little doubt that the landscape has been altered in fundamental ways. Syria, for all of its influence among certain political groupings in Beirut, no longer has the Lebanese parliament on a leash, as it did from 1990 to early 2005. Many who once supported Syria (Sunnis in particular) today regard their eastern neighbor with a great deal of suspicion — brotherliness and Arabism be damned. Michel Aoun is back, and his movement had become a political force to be reckoned with. There are Lebanese and Syrian embassies in Damascus and Beirut. A new electoral law was implemented last year that was not drawn up by Rustom Ghazali in a smoke-filled office somewhere in Anjar, and Lebanon’s civil society is pushing for many more reforms for 2013. Hezbollah, despite maintaining its weapons, has been constrained in its activities both by UNSCR 1701 and by its own political calculations. In short, this is not the same Lebanon that Syria controlled so effortlessly less than five years ago.

Many March 14ers I know have been feeling sorry for themselves since the cabinet was formed. With every piece of news that suggests improved relations between Syria and the West or warmer relations between the parliamentary majority and minority blocs, my M14 friends grow slightly more bitter.

I feel that such an outlook is entirely counter-productive. It’s time for people to stop grumbling, stop pining for revenge, stop waiting for Bellemare to ride in on a white horse and have Bashar drawn, quartered, and replaced with Farid Ghadry. This doesn’t mean that we should welcome a Syrian strong hand in our politics again. But I think that it no longer serves anyone’s interests to keep banging the drum.

**

Lebanon Drama Adds Act With Leader’s Trip to Syria

By ROBERT F. WORTH | The New York Times

BEIRUT, Lebanon — In any other part of the world, a new prime minister’s visit to a neighboring country would be a fairly routine event. But Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s trip to Syria over the weekend has been treated here as a kind of Lebanese national drama, the subject of almost endless commentary in newspapers and television shows.

It is not that anything really happened. Mr. Hariri and President Bashar al-Assad of Syria exchanged some thoroughly forgettable diplomatic banter and posed for photographs.

Instead, the trip epitomized a national story with anguished, almost operatic dimensions: a young leader forced to shake hands with the man who he believes killed his father. And it served as a reminder of this region’s deep attachment to political symbolism.

For many Lebanese, the visit was a measure of Syria’s renewed influence over Lebanon after years of bitterness and struggle since the Syrian military’s withdrawal in 2005. That withdrawal came after Mr. Hariri’s father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, was killed in a car bombing that many here believe to have been ordered by Syria.

The withdrawal was a blow to Syrian prestige, and afterward Saad Hariri seemed to have the entire Western world at his back as he built a movement for greater Lebanese independence and pushed for an international tribunal to try his father’s killers.

But since then, the United States and the West have chosen to engage with Syria, not isolate it. And Saudi Arabia, which has long backed Mr. Hariri and competed with Syria for influence here, reconciled with the Syrians earlier this year, leaving them a freer hand to guide politics in Lebanon as they once did.

All this has been known for months, but it was still tremendously important for Mr. Hariri to actually cross the mountains — in his first visit since before his father’s killing — and pay his respects in Damascus.

“The image of Syrian soldiers retreating was a huge blow to them,” said Elias Muhanna, a political analyst and the author of the Lebanese blog Qifa Nabki. “So the image of Hariri coming over the mountains means they’ve come full circle. It demonstrates to all the power centers in Damascus that Bashar has restored Syria’s position of strength vis-à-vis Lebanon.”

The visit also has vivid historical echoes for many Lebanese. In 1977, the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt visited Damascus just weeks after his own father was killed in a car bomb that is believed to have been set by Syria. Like Mr. Hariri, he had little choice: he had to reconcile with Syria if he wanted to continue playing a political role.

“The stability of Lebanon always depends on its environment, and basically this environment is Syria,” Mr. Jumblatt said in an interview on Sunday. “For the sake of Lebanese stability, we have got to put aside personal animosity.”

It is difficult to say exactly what Mr. Hariri’s visit portends in terms of Lebanese-Syrian relations. By one measure, he has already achieved his most important goals: the Syrian Army is gone, and no one expects it to return. The two countries restored diplomatic relations this year. The international tribunal that was formed in 2005 under United Nations auspices to try the elder Hariri’s killers continues its work here and in the Netherlands, where it is based. It could still indict high-ranking Syrians, although most analysts say that seems less likely than it did four years ago.

But most agree that Syria will once again have a powerful, undisputed voice here on issues ranging from cabinet positions to the militant Shiite movement Hezbollah, which Syria supports. The influence is not likely to be as crude as it was during the 1990s, when Syrian officers strutted through Beirut and were accused of raking profits from Lebanese industries. To some here, that is improvement enough. To others, Mr. Hariri’s trip across the mountains was a tragic concession.

“Whether Saad Hariri admits it or not, it was a severe setback to everything that happened starting in 2005,” said Michael Young, a Lebanese columnist who has long been critical of Syria’s role here. “I think he did it reluctantly, but he never had a choice.”

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There’s been a lot of chatter about when, if, and how Saad Hariri will make his first visit to Damascus. Some even believe it could happen as soon as this weekend. I’m not as interested in the “when” as in the symbolic potential of this event.

Therefore, I thought we’d have a poll and a discussion on the topic. Given that we’ve got all kinds of readers here at QN.com — communists, dyed-in-the-wool Cedar Revolutionaries, wannabe Hezbollah commandos — I figure that people probably have some strong  opinions.

Go forth and vote…

Other notable links

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charbel nahasFor a period of a couple months, the cabinet formation was help up by a dispute about the appointment of Gebran Bassil — Michel Aoun’s son-in-law — as Telecommunications Minister. Aoun wanted him re-appointed; Saad Hariri did not. Eventually, a compromise was reached: the FPM was allowed to keep the Telecommunications Ministry as long as Bassil did not head it.

While it seems that the deal allowed both parties to save face, I can’t help but wonder whether the entire operation was an elaborate (and ingenious) bait-and-switch on Michel Aoun’s part.

Why? Consider the outcome. Gebran Bassil ended up landing a different prestigious ministry (Energy and Water) which, like Telecommunications, is a candidate for privatization and desperately in need of high-profile reform. Meanwhile, the Telecommunications Ministry is going to be skippered by Dr. Charbel Nahas, a deeply learned economist and a vociferous critic of Hariri & Co.’s management of the country’s finances.

Nahas, who was educated in France and spent twelve years teaching at the Lebanese University in addition to working in the private sector, has published widely in the areas of urban and physical planning, banking and economics, social anthropology and history (see his website for more information). The leftists love him and can scarcely believe that he has been appointed as a minister; indeed, he wasn’t even among the names being floated earlier in the summer, which deepens my conviction that Aoun deliberately planned to whip him out him as a “compromise candidate” at the opportune moment.

Dr. Nahas’s diverse background leads me to wonder whether the FPM is planning to use him as a kind of shadow Finance Minister, or at least as the point man to challenge the policies of the Finance Ministry — which has been in the hands of the Hariri family since 1992. Nahas would be ideally suited for this job, if his publications are any indication. See, for example, the text of an argument presented before the Constitutional Court, delightfully titled (in rhymed Arabic prose, according to the custom of classical literature) The Noble Petitioner’s Guide to the Secret of Wondrous Accounting. The text criticizes a law which allocated “the proceeds of privatization, the foreseen primary surplus in the budget, and the proceeds of the sale of future public revenues (hidden under the title of securitization)” to servicing Lebanon’s huge public debt. This formula, Nahas notes, is no different from “the formulas of the Public Debt Funds that the colonial powers imposed on the Ottoman Empire or on Egypt or on China in the XIXth century.” In Lebanon, however, it is not a foreign power that is doing the imposing, but rather a corrupt political elite that is in bed with the country’s creditors. You get the idea.

As an impressionistic little confirmation of my suspicions regarding Nahas’s real purpose in this cabinet, consider the fact he wasted no time in calling for a review of the Lebanese economic system, in the context of the first ministerial meeting to discuss the cabinet statement. “Yes, Mr. Telecommunications Minister, we’ll definitely look into that…”

A couple of days ago, Angry Arab wrote:

I expect this brilliant economist (and I only heard positive things about him) to be the star of the new cabinet, and the most persistent critic of the Hariri apparatus. He is fiercely opposed to the Hariri disastrous policies, and is determined to combat the corruption of Hariri’s plans. Nahhas as a choice is a punishment for the Hariri movement: they wanted to excluded Jubran Basil from the Ministry of Telecommunication because he was defiant and assertive, so `Awn brought in somebody who will prove to be more defiant and more persistent.

Ms. Tee, over at B-side Beirut has this to say:

The Free Patriotic Movement has chosen no other than economist, activist, and intellectual Sharbil Nahhas for the post of Minister of Telecommunications. To those of you not familiar with Sharbil Nahhas, his website (trilingual) gives a good idea of his qualifications. Nahhas is a reformer in spirit with a fundamental critique and understanding of our sectarian system. Over the past two decades, Nahhas has put together several proposals, such as a strategy for social development and a law proposal for a pension scheme, that, needless to say, never made it through the system. As the inside man, there is reason to hope a little.

Will Nahas be the reformer that everyone is waiting for? Time will tell. I’m particularly interested in observing how the FPM is going to negotiate the political shoals with its ally, Hezbollah, when the issue of privatization and other economic reforms come up.

A final note while we’re on the subject of reform: the new issue of the Arab Reform Bulletin is online. Have a good weekend.
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trophyI wasn’t really planning to write a post on this subject, but since people like winners and losers, maybe it’s worth saying something. One commenter writes:

I’d be interested to read your analysis on who you think “won” from this cabinet haggling/negotiation. Do you think by holding out so long and getting more or less what he wanted, Aoun succeeded in gaining stronger footing for himself in this government? In the end, can we say that Hariri couldn’t stand his ground and caved? If so, what does that mean for this government’s future policies and in particular for the ministerial statement? In terms of bargaining skills, it seems to me that Aoun proved his mettle, and also that Hariri’s bluff resignation didn’t really have much of an effect on reinforcing his position. Thoughts?

There’s no doubt that Michel Aoun got the better of Hariri in this protracted standoff. But this had little to do with Hariri’s negotiating skills and mostly to do with the fact that Hariri had no option but to form a unity government. The threats to pursue a majority government were never credible — given the Syrian-Saudi reconciliation — and Aoun knew it.

So given that Aoun had Hariri over a barrel from the very beginning, it’s no wonder that his chosen strategy — spanking him until he got what he wanted — proved effective. And were it not for the rest of opposition growing tired of the charade, Aoun probably would have kept spanking until Gebran Bassil was appointed Telecommunications Minister.

As for what this means for the future, I’m not particularly optimistic. As long as ‘national unity’ remains the non-negotiable principle undergirding any governing effort, then it is going to be far too easy for any single bloc to play spoiler. This spoiler could be anyone: the LF, the FPM, the Future Movement, Jumblatt, Hezbollah, anyone.

In other words, everybody has everyone else over a barrel. In such a situation, the “winner” is simply the one with the least to lose.

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The dust still hasn’t settled on the new cabinet — partly because some ministers are actively trying to kick it up — but it’s worth remarking briefly on some of its features, and on the challenges facing PM Hariri over the next week or so.

kataeb1) The Kata’eb Defection: As we’ve all heard by now, the Kata’eb — a key Christian party in the March 14 Forces, led by former President Amin Gemayel — has threatened to turn down the ministry it was offered (Social Affairs) and drop out of the March 14 alliance.

There are two broad questions that should be asked about this development. The first is, essentially: why? Why is the party pursuing this course of action? Are they really so furious about the ministry they received, or just feigning indignation in order to extract some other concessions out of the PM?

On the one hand, I can understand the frustration: Social Affairs is a pretty lousy ministry, especially given the fact that the Lebanese Forces (another Christian ally of March 14 with more or less the same parliamentary weight as the Kata’eb) was given two portfolios in the new cabinet, one of them the highly visible Ministry of Justice. Sami Gemayel had been calling publicly for the Education Ministry earlier last week, presumably so that it would look like Hariri gave them what they were demanding, were he only to give them one seat. But to dump them with Social Affairs alone looks like a snub, which brings us to the next issue.

2) National Unity, the sequel: Imagining for a moment that Hariri’s move wasn’t an innocent oversight, the second question to be asked is, “Why did the PM feel ok about snubbing the Kata’eb and risking a defection?” There have been signs that the party has grown disenchanted and suspicious of Hariri (if you recall, they rejected his first proposed cabinet lineup in September.) Hariri had to have known that Gemayel and co. may try to go all in if he didn’t give them the Education Ministry, so why did he provoke them (and why is he now calling their bluff)?

saad with berri and nasrallahHere’s a guess. As we’ve said before, the era of the March 14-March 8 rivalry is over. It died, more or less, on the day after the election, and Jumblatt’s decision to drop out of Hariri’s coalition was the final nail in the coffin. The March 14 coalition, or what’s left of it, doesn’t command a majority in parliament, so what’s the point of trying to maintain it anymore?

If Hariri wants to be able to govern effectively, he needs to build a new coalition. Or, at least, he needs to re-build the kinds of partnerships that his father constructed and manipulated so masterfully, reaching across the aisle to court erstwhile opponents like Hezbollah, AMAL, and the FPM. Those are the parties with the real clout in their communities and the seats in parliament. If I had to guess, this is more or less what’s in the back of the young PM’s mind.

3) Hezbollah’s Arms & Israel: The final major issue on the horizon is how Hariri decides to deal with the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, in the cabinet statement. Given the change in the regional atmosphere (moving from confrontation to reconciliation and diplomatic engagment), I’d say it’s almost certain that the same language is going to be used that went into the previous statements: Hezbollah is not a militia, it’s the legitimate expression of the Lebanese people’s resistance to regain their land, etc.

What happens if Israel decides to test Hariri’s tight-rope act? We’ll have to wait and see.

I’ll be updating this page as more news comes in, so stay tuned. In the meantime, the Gray Lady has given us the nod.
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** See below for continuing updates **

IFES-lebanese-cabinet-lineup

A report on the new cabinet (h/t Richard Chambers at IFES).

At approximately 8PM Beirut time, President Michel Suleiman signed the following decrees, dissolving the current cabinet and appointing the new one.

Decree #2837: The cabinet led by Prime Minister Fouad Siniora is now resigned.

Decree #2838: Saad al-Hariri is hereby appointed Prime Minister.

Decree #2839: Pursuant to the previous decree, the following are the ministers in the new Lebanese cabinet:

Saad al-Hariri (M14, Future Movement): Prime Minister

Rayya al-Haffar (M14, Future Movement): Minister of Finance

Hassan Mneimneh (M14, Future Movement): Minister of Education

Mohammed Rahhal (M14, Future Movement): Minister of Environment

Michel Pharaon (M14, Future Movement): Minister of State

Tarek Mitri (M14, Future Movement): Minister of Information

Mohammed Safadi (M14, Independent): Minister of Economy

Jean Ogassapian (M14, Future Movement): Minister of State

Akram Chouhayib (PSP): Minister of the Displaced

Ghazi al-Aridi (PSP): Minister of Public Works

Wael Abou Faour (PSP): Minister of State

Ibrahim al-Najjar (M14, Lebanese Forces): Minister of Justice

Salim Wardeh (M14, Lebanese Forces): Minister of Culture

Boutros Harb (M14, Independent): Minister of Labor

Salim al-Sayegh (M14, Kata’eb): Minister of Social Affairs

*

Ziad Baroud (President’s share): Minister of Interior

Elias al-Murr (President’s share): Minister of Defense (and vice-PM)

Mona Afeish (President’s share): Minister of State

Adnan al-Sayyed Hussein (President’s share [and Hezbollah's presumable swing vote]): Minister of State

Adnan al-Qassar (President’s share): Minister of State

*

Charbel Nahhas (Opposition, C&R): Minister of Telecommunications

Fadi Abboud (Opposition, C&R): Minister of Tourism

Ibrahim Dadayan (Opposition, C&R): Minister of Industry

Gebran Bassil (Opposition, C&R): Minister of Energy

Youssef Saade (Opposition, C&R): Minister of State

Ali al-Shami (Opposition, AMAL): Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mohammed Khalifeh (Opposition, AMAL): Minister of Health

Ali Hussein Abdallah (Opposition, AMAL): Minister of Youth & Sports

Hussein al-Haj Hassan (Opposition, Hezbollah): Minister of Agriculture

Mohammed Fneish (Opposition, Hezbollah): Minister of State for Administrative Development

**

In yet another twist to the five month-old cabinet saga, the Kata’eb Party — a key Christian ally in the March 14 alliance — has threatened to drop out of the coalition and resign from the cabinet, expressing displeasure at the ministry that it was dealt (Social Affairs). PM Saad al-Hariri has not yet issued a statement about this development, and it is unclear as to how it will impact the stability of the new government. Stay tuned…

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champagneWell, it took five months (almost to the day) but Lebanon seems to have finally turned the page on the historic parliamentary elections held on June 7, 2009.

Not to jinx things, but the media is rife with reports that efforts to form a national unity government have succeeded, with the majority March 14 Forces holding fifteen seats in a cabinet of thirty ministers, while the alliance composed of the former opposition parties will hold ten seats, and the remaining five ministers will be appointed by the President of the Republic.

Rumor has it that Michel Aoun’s Change & Reform Bloc has been appointed the Telecommunications, Energy, Tourism, and Industry portfolios, along with a fifth Minister of State.

Nabih Berri’s Development and Liberation Bloc is expected to retain Foreign Affairs, Health (almost certainly Mohammad Khalifeh), and Youth & Sports.

Hezbollah, as per usual, will happily sit back and content itself with a measly two portfolios — people are talking about Agriculture (giving up Labor — I know some deported journalists who’ll be happy to hear about this…) and the Ministry of Administrative Affairs.

** There are several conflicting cabinet lineups being circulated on the internet. I’m not going to publish any of them until there is an official confirmation.

Stay tuned: a confirmed full lineup should be forthcoming pretty soon…

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Three developments in the past couple of days have signaled that we may indeed be nearing the end of Lebanon’s five-month stretch without a government.

1) As reported earlier, Suleiman Frangieh — the leader of the Marada party, and a member of the Change & Reform Bloc — expressed his annoyance with the fact that Aoun has kept changing his demands vis-à-vis which portfolios would be granted to C&R.

Originally, this story was only reported in the pro-March 14 media, but Aoun himself made a scornful comment about Frangieh in his press conference yesterday, so I think that rumors of a rift between the two men are probably accurate.

2) Staunchly pro-Syrian former minister Wi’am Wahhab was on TV yesterday, expressly calling for Aoun to quit messing the Lebanese people around and take the deal that Hariri was offering, namely that Aoun’s son-in-law Gebran Bassil would become Minister of Energy rather than Telecommunications. Usually, when Wi’am Wahhab speaks, you can assume the message is coming from Damascus.

[NB: I love the bit where Wahhab comments (indirectly to Aoun): "What's the big deal if Gebran Bassil is in charge of Energy rather than Telecommunications? If he's capable of achieving successes in the Telecommunications Ministry, then why can't he achieve successes in the Energy Ministry? Plus, the Energy Ministry is even more in need of successes..."

Note the complete absence of any discussion as to whether or not Gebran Bassil is even qualified to be Minister of Energy! Quite a consolation prize, don't you think? It kind of reminds me of my attempts to convince my three year-old daughter that the pair of pyjamas that I want her to put on is even prettier than the pair that she wants to wear...]

3) Nabih Berri is threatening to launch a one-man sit-in at the Parliament if the cabinet crisis is not resolved soon.

To sum up, then: Suleiman Bek, Wi’am Wahhab, and Nabih Berri are all getting fed up of the stalemate, and two of them have directed their ire at their own ally, Michel Aoun.

What’s it going to take for the General to get the message?
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I’ve written an opinion piece on the senselessness of consensual politics for The National. It will be out in print this Friday, but the editors at The Review have agreed to put it up a couple of days early on the website, given the timeliness of the subject matter.

The first few paragraphs are below. Finish reading it on The National’s website, and then come on back to comment.

All for None

All For NoneWhat’s wrong with Lebanon? Nearly four months after a landmark election handed the western-backed March 14 coalition a victory over the opposition alliance of Hizbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, all efforts to form a government have failed. Rather than taking advantage of his coalition’s victory by putting together a cabinet composed exclusively of his own allies, prime minister-designate Saad Hariri has spent weeks coaxing and cajoling the opposition to join him in a national unity government, in which they would wield significant power.

His reasons for doing so are manifold. On the one hand, his coalition no longer commands a clear majority in parliament, due to the recent defection of the mercurial Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. At the same time, there are the wishes of an important regional ally to consider: Saudi Arabia, which is believed to be courting Syrian co-operation in Iraq in exchange for prodding its Lebanese dependants, the March 14 coalition, into a power-sharing arrangement with Hizbollah. Most importantly, Hariri seems determined to avoid a return to the polarisation of the previous parliamentary term, during which the opposition, demanding more power, quit the government and went on to paralyse the country with massive demonstrations, strikes and an 18-month downtown sit-in.

The opposition’s objective then, as it is now, was to replace the majority cabinet with a national unity government in which it would have veto power over important legislation. Appealing to the timeworn argument that Lebanon cannot be ruled by simple majorities because of its diverse sectarian make-up, leaders like Hassan Nasrallah and Michel Aoun have insisted on transforming the principle of consensual decision-making from an abstract desideratum into a practical necessity.

While March 14 figures have publicly insisted on upholding their prerogative to form a majority cabinet, they too have quietly accepted the idea of sharing power by virtue of a face-saving compromise, the so-called “15-10-5 formula”. Under this arrangement, March 14 would control half the seats of a 30-member cabinet; the opposition would control 10 seats (one short of the votes required to veto major legislation); and the President, Michel Suleiman, would appoint the last five ministers, with the understanding that one of them would be free to vote with the opposition on major, “life-and-death” issues (such as the matter of Hezbollah’s weapons).

The fact that even the majority parties have been more interested in trying to get the best deal they can under this framework, rather than questioning its legitimacy in the first place, betrays their belief – to paraphrase Churchill – that while consensual democracy may be the worst form of government, it is better than all the others.

(Keep reading)

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