Peace negotiations


Moving right along in our series of interviews with various experts and friends of the blog, I’m pleased to bring you this conversation with Dr. Joshua Landis, Associate Professor of Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, and author of the widely-read Syrian affairs blog, Syria Comment.

Josh and I sat down over a virtual finjain qahweh to chat about Syrian-U.S. relations and the prospects of a peace deal between Syria and Israel. As always, feel free to leave questions and criticisms in the comment section, and perhaps our guest will respond in person.

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QN:  Engaging Syria seems to be a low priority for the current administration. At the same time, President Assad looks content to cultivate his relationships with regional powers like Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. With little urgency on either side, how likely would you say it is that we will see any substantive change in the U.S.-Syrian relationship over the next few years?

JL: Without peace between Israel and Syria, there will be no real change in the regional security architecture or the relationships that define it.

Israel and America are very close allies. No US administration is going to be good friends with Israel’s main Arab enemy. There are tremendous pressures in Congress and at every level of US society to punish Syria further.

QN: President Bashar al-Assad has publicly stated that he is prepared to sign a peace agreement with Israel, and the two countries have come close to an agreement on at least two occasions in the last ten years. What is preventing a deal from going forward, and how might the obstacles be overcome, in your opinion?

JL: The single most important reason why Israel and Syria have not been able to achieve peace is that Syria is too weak. Israel does not believe it will achieve sufficient security, economic, or diplomatic gains by giving back the Golan. Syria is not a major threat to Israel even with a beefed up Hizbullah and new friend in Turkey. So long as Washington remains resolutely on Israel’s side, preserving Israel’s military edge, sanctioning Syria, and thwarting diplomatic efforts to hinder Israel’s expansion into neighbors’ land, Jerusalem has little incentive to withdraw from the Golan. Only very heavy pressure will convince Israelis to make the difficult decision to repatriate its 20,000 settlers and allow the 100,000 inhabitants of the Golan who were expelled in 1967 to return to their land and homes.

QN: President al-Assad has suggested that he could bring Hizbullah to the negotiation table, if Israel got serious about signing a peace deal with Syria. Some analysts argue, however, that much has changed since 2000, and Syria no longer has the same influence over Hizbullah. What’s your read?

JL: First, this is a silly argument for not making peace with Syria. Second, it is based on a misinterpretation of the nature of the alliance between Iran, Syria, and Hizbullah. The presumption is that since Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005, Hizbullah no longer has to fear a Syrian invasion of southern Lebanon and thus may thumb its nose at Syrian interests. But this is to misunderstand the nature of their cooperation, which is not based on coercion. It is based on common purpose and interest. Both Iran and Hizbullah have stated that they understand that Syria’s primary national interest is to get back the Golan. They accept this. That is why in 2000, when an ailing Hafiz al-Assad flew to Geneva to sign a peace agreement, neither Iran nor Hizbullah sought to torpedo the agreement.

Syria, Hizbullah, and Iran have preserved their alliance and amicable relations through major changes over the last three decades. Syria has said that the strategic environment in the region will change with peace. Hizbullah will move in tandem with Syria and reposition itself in Lebanon and the region when Syria signs peace with Israel. That does not mean that Hizbullah will cease to exist or commit suicide. But its priorities will change, as will Syria’s.

It must be remembered that Hizbullah’s arms and missiles come across the border from Syria.There is no other dependable route for them to reach southern Lebanon. Syria, for its part, depends on Lebanon’s Shiite community and Hizbullah for much of its influence within Lebanon. The two will need each other even when peace is signed with Israel. They will not break over that issue. They have not in the past and there is no reason for them to do so in the future.

QN: Do you think war is on the horizon? And if so, will Syria get involved militarily?

JL: I do think that war is on the horizon — not the immediate horizon, but it will come sooner or later so long as the casus belli is not resolved. Syria will not give it up without a fight. It is looking for wars to change the balance of power and to push Israel back on its heels.

During the 2006 war, Israel bombed Lebanon with 7,000 tons of explosives, while the explosives from the approximately 4,000 rockets and missiles Hezbollah fired on Israel added up to “only” 28 tons.

This was a very bad deal from Hizbullah’s point of view, and Nasrallah was quick to apologize to Lebanon and explain that he had neither wanted nor intended war. All the same, both Iran and Syria were shocked and gratified by Hezbollah’s professionalism and fighting prowess. The low-tech missiles worked better than anyone could have expected.

In short, the 2006 war was inconclusive enough to provide Syria, Iran and Hizbullah with a strategy for the future — lots of improved, mobile and smallish missiles spread out over a greater expanse, including Syria. Assad has made it very clear that if Israel doesn’t chose peace by returning the Golan, Syria will remain committed to war and keep stocking up on and improving its missiles and air defense systems.

Syria will try to stay out of any war, as it has in the past. But President Assad understands that he must be willing to go all the way in order reassure his allies and push the Israelis to reconsider their assessment that Syria is too weak and incapable. If Hezbollah’s powers and war plan are to be enhanced, it must have the strategic depth that only Syria can provide. This means greater Syrian involvement and risk. Syria has little choice but to assume greater risk.

Damascus figures that its only hope of getting back the Golan is to force Israel to reassess its security calculations. Hopefully, this will happen without another war, but momentum in the region does not seem to be on the side of the peacemakers.

Syrians say that Israel got a small taste of this possibility in 2006. Israelis counter by pointing to Gaza and claiming that in the next round all of Lebanon will be returned to the Dark Ages and the Assad regime will be terminated.

This may all be posturing but I don’t think so. If there is one thing Syrians agree on, it is that the Golan is theirs. They have grown in confidence since 2006 and are convinced more than ever that what was lost in war, can only be regained by war. Likewise, Israelis have become more militant and righteous. They are increasingly convinced that only military solutions can provide them with results that they want and deserve. All of this suggests that war lies in the future.

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scowcroftTaking a cue from Bruno, former U.S. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft thinks we need to find a way to talk to hummus. Watch this clip to hear all about how hummus won’t want to be left out of the peace process.

Interviewer Landrum Bolling looks positively ravenous just listening to him (especially at 6:00 when he actually licks his lips).

Whatever happens, I just think it’s important that hummus not be able to acquire BLT’s.

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syria-israel-map1DAMASCUS, Syria (AP) — Fresh on the heels of a regional summit in Doha where President Bashar al-Assad had reaffirmed his support for resistance against Israel while expressing reservations about the Arab Peace Initiative, the Syrian president dropped a bombshell by embarking on an epoch-making visit to Tel Aviv, Wednesday morning.

“Nobody saw this coming,” said Mark Burnes, a State Department analyst who monitors Syrian affairs. “We knew that they were close to a deal, but the Israelis didn’t tell us how close.”

Security arrangements appeared to have been made in advance to permit the passage of the presidential aircraft into Israeli airspace, and a small retinue of high-level ministers and military officials awaited al-Assad at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International airport.

The highly secret preparations for the visit, however had produced an improbable breach of diplomatic protocol: the absence of Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu among the ministerial welcoming delegation. Official sources say that earlier that same morning, the Israeli PM had himself embarked upon an epoch-making visit to Syria, touching down in Damascus International Airport only 6 minutes after President al-Assad arrived in Tel Aviv.

A high-level source in the Syrian Foreign Ministry said that they were baffled by an alert from the Syrian Air Defense Force, notifying them that an Israeli civilian aircraft had entered Syrian airspace and was requesting permission to land in Damascus.

“We had scrambled four MiG-29 interceptors, but when the pilots of the Israeli jet explained who was on board their aircraft, our Air Force High Command relayed the message to us with a request for clarification,” the Foreign Ministry source said.

Asked if the Syrians had been expecting a reciprocal visit from Netanyahu at a later stage, the source responded, “All that I can say is that the scheduling error was committed by the Israelis. We were supposed to visit first.”

The Israeli Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the mix-up, but a source in the Prime Minister’s office confirmed that the ball appeared to have been dropped by the Israelis.

“Our staff has been stretched to the breaking point for the past three weeks, trying to form the ruling coalition and putting together the cabinet. Netanyahu has been meeting MK’s until all hours of the night; he’s exhausted and over-worked. It’s understandable that a scheduling error might occur under these circumstances,” the advisor said.

Responding to a question about the potential outcome of this logistical mishap, a source in the British Foreign Office said: “Well, it certainly changes the story a bit, doesn’t it? This was supposed to be the “Sadat goes to Jerusalem” moment, but they fouled it up. They’re like ships passing in the night… or, airplanes passing in the day, or whatever.”

As of this writing, Prime Minister Netanyahu was still in the air returning from Damascus to Tel Aviv, where he will be received by President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.

By QIFA NABKI – 3 hours ago

[To read more about the visit, click here.]
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hershOnce upon a time there lived a legendary journalist named Sy Hersh, who wrote for The New Yorker, won five George Polk Awards and a Pulitzer Prize. His coverage of Lebanon, particularly in the period 2006-07, uncovered American complicity in Israel’s premeditated war on Hizbullah and American-Saudi-March 14 complicity in the Fatah al-Islam phenomenon. These were conclusions that many critics took issue with, lambasting Hersh for relying solely on opposition sources, while others applauded the veteran journo for speaking truth to power.

I have a feeling that Hersh’s latest piece is not going to have the same folks clapping. In a long article for The New Yorker entitled “Syria Calling“, Hersh makes the case that while the road ahead is difficult and there are several challenges facing all parties involved, there is absolutely no question about the seriousness of the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. You should read the entire article, but here are some select bits with comments:

“Nonetheless, a few days after the Israeli ceasefire in Gaza, Assad said in an e-mail to me that although Israel was “doing everything possible to undermine the prospects for peace,” he was still very interested in closing the deal.”

That’s right: Bashar emails. He’s the approachable, disarming kind of autocrat, not stentorian, ruthless, or crazy. He’s just like you and me, just with better job security.

“A major change in American policy toward Syria is clearly under way. “The return of the Golan Heights is part of a broader strategy for peace in the Middle East that includes countering Iran’s influence,” Martin Indyk, a former American Ambassador to Israel, who is now the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution, said. “Syria is a strategic linchpin for dealing with Iran and the Palestinian issue. Don’t forget, everything in the Middle East is connected, as Obama once said.””

Ahhh, vindication

A former American diplomat who has been involved in the Middle East peace process said, “There are a lot of people going back and forth to Damascus from Washington saying there is low-hanging fruit waiting for someone to harvest.” A treaty between Syria and Israel “would be the start of a wide-reaching peace-implementation process that will unfold over time.”

This is what is so brilliant about Bashar. When Bush was in office, Syria was regarded as a “low-hanging fruit” by the neocons and their democratization agenda. When that agenda crashed and burned, Syria came to be regarded as a “low-hanging fruit” by the Obama realists. Amazing brand marketing! Now that we know Syria is a low-hanging fruit to everyone at all times, all that’s left to ask is what kind of low-hanging fruit it is. My bet is on the Syrian prickly pear, a fruit so evocative that I was once moved to write an allegorical poem about it on Syria Comment (see caption).

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"Ode on a Syrian cactus-fruit," By Elliott Abrahms: Orb of rapturous, nettlesome pulp, how I long / To pluck you and make haste to yonder castle to devour you / In the shade of my noble cross-bearing forbears’ walls, / Making ribbons of my palm-flesh as I squeeze / A levantine elixir to quench, if only sparingly, / A thirst for higher, less yielding fruits. / You taunt me, hanging low like the bosom of an old mountain gypsy, / Or the testicles of a fat valley ox, / How I long for you! But do I dare pluck this pendulous orb, / This prickly, persnickety grenade of desert nectar? / Alas, I trudge by, my eyes scanning the lonely path, / For a yet less lofty repast.

Farouk al-Shara, the Vice-President of Syria, was, as Foreign Minister, his nation’s chief negotiator at Shepherdstown. When he was asked whether Syria’s relationship with Iran would change if the Golan Heights issue was resolved, he said, “Do you think a man only goes to bed with a woman he deeply loves?” Shara laughed, and added, “That’s my answer to your question about Iran.”

Indeed, indeed, ha ha, yes exactly…  Actually, wait, I don’t get it. Can someone explain Farouk al-Shara’s point? Never mind, here’s my point: if Seymour Hersh, Martin Indyk, Itamar Rabinovich, Alistair Crooke, and of course Bashar al-Assad agree that Syria is serious about a deal, then how silly do the rest of you look when you say the opposite? (Sorry for my slightly combative tone… March Madness has turned to March Sadness for me, as of last Thursday).
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Update: Joshua Landis responds to this piece; I’ve posted his comments below the article.

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I’ve got an article over at Joshua Landis’s Syria Comment. I reproduce the text below.

nasrallah-elephantspeechIn a speech Friday evening commemorating the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah rejected the recent American offer of dialogue along with its pre-conditions (recognition of Israel and renunciation of violence).

This, in and of itself, was unsurprising. More noteworthy, however, was Nasrallah’s language concerning the Syrian-Saudi reconciliation and the strategic choices that face a more united Middle East, particularly vis-à-vis Israel. In the context of Syria’s peace negotiations, and coming on the heels of President Bashar al-Assad’s recent statement concerning his allies in Lebanon and Palestine (“I will work to involve Hizbullah and Hamas in the negotiations to achieve peace in the region”), one wonders whether Nasrallah’s words were not at least partially intended for Syria. Indeed, as he directed his comments “to those who delight in American delegations coming to Lebanon,” one could hardly help wondering what he made of the American delegations coming to Syria.

Here is the relevant paragraph, with translation below:

اليوم وغدأ وبعد سنة وبعد مئة وبعد ألف سنة، إلى قيام الساعة ، نحن وأولادنا وأحفادنا وأجيالنا ، طالما نحن حزب الله لا يمكن أن نعترف بإسرائيل. ماذا يعني إسرائيل، إسرائيل كيان غاصب ودولة غير قانونية وغير شرعية، دولة عنصرية ودولة معتدية ودولة إرهابية، بأي معيار يمكن لإنسان مسلم أو عربي أنّ يعترف بكيان من هذا النوع وأن يأتي ببساطة ويقول نعم هذه هي إسرائيل وثلاثة أرباعها أو أكثر أعطوه لشذاذ آفاق جيء بهم من كل أنحاء الدنيا، أمّا أصحاب الحق الشرعيون وأهل الأرض وأهل الديار وأهل المقدسات من الشعب الفلسطيني مسلمين ومسيحيين هؤلاء يجب أن يتركوا وأن يخرجوا وأن يستسلموا وأن يخضعوا! دلوني ما المعيار، في الدين ما المعيار، في الأخلاق ما المعيار، في الإنسانية ما المعيار، في الوطنية ما المعيار، في القومية ما المعيار، على أي معيار، نعم هناك معيار واحد هو معيار القبائل والعشائر العربية التي انهزمت أمام جيش أبرهة، أي ماذا نقدر أن نعمل فهذه إسرائيل وفي ظهرها أمريكا، كما قال أولئك هذا جيش الحبشة ولا نستطيع مواجهة الفيل، فلنهرب ونحيد ونترك أقدس مقدساتنا لأبرهة، يوجد فقط هذا المنطق منطق عام الفيل الذي يقول نحن لا نقدر على إسرائيل وإسرائيل بظهرها أمريكا وليس لدينا خيار فالواقعية والواقع والمنطق والتعايش والكذا والكذا ويفتشون عن تعابير ما أنزل الله بها من سلطان ليفرضوا  علينا القبول بهذا الأمر

“Today, and tomorrow, and after one year, and one hundred years, and one thousand years, until the Hour of Judgment, we and our children and our grandchildren and our people… as long as we are Hizbullah, we will not recognize Israel. What is Israel? Israel is a plundering entity, an illegal and illegitimate state, a racist, belligerent, terrorist state. By what standard can a human being, Muslim or Arab, recognize an entity of this kind, and come and say, simply: “Yes, this is Israel,” while three quarters of it or more has been given to foreigners brought from all corners of the world, and while the people who are in the right, who are the legitimate ones, the people of the land and the holy places, the Palestinians – Muslims and Christians – have to let go, and leave, and surrender, and submit! Show me that standard! What is the religious standard? What is the moral standard? What is the humanitarian standard? What is the nationalist standard? What standard is it?!

“Yes, there is one standard, which is the standard of the Arab tribes and clans that were defeated before the army of Abraha, [the standard which says]: “What can we do? This is Israel, supported by America,” just like those who said: “This is the army of the Ethiopians, and we are unable to confront the elephant, so let’s flee and give up and abandon the holiest of our holy places to Abraha…” There is only this logic, the logic of the Year of the Elephant, which says: “We cannot overcome Israel, for Israel has America behind it, and we have no other choice, and we must be realistic, and common sense, and coexistence, blah blah blah… They search for baseless explanations so as to force us to accept this issue…”

Who was Nasrallah’s audience here? Was it merely the usual suspects (the ‘moderate Arabs’ and March 14th), or was he also firing a shot across Syria’s bow, sending the signal that this was all a little too much, too soon?  After a week in which Britian announced a dialogue with Hizbullah’s political wing, the Americans made a similar offer with strings attached, and the Syrians stated publicly for the first time that they would work to bring Hizbullah to the negotiating table, it is not so hard to imagine that Nasrallah sought to lower expectations.

Hizbullah and its allies are in a good position to become the majority after the June 7 elections. While a victory for either side is unlikely to be a resounding one and will almost certainly result in a consensual government (i.e. one in which the opposition has a cabinet veto), the elections nevertheless promise to be hard fought. The last thing that Hizbullah needs right now is the public impression (created by offers of dialogue from Britain and the U.S., the American engagement of Iran and Syria, and Bashar al-Assad’s suggestion that Hizbullah will agree to negotiations) that the resistance movement is softening its stance vis-à-vis Israel.

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Joshua Landis (author of Syria Comment) responds:

Dear Qifa – Excellent and provocative post.

I think we are seeing a lot of hot air being blown by all sides in the region. Anyone willing to listen to Syria knows it is not going to flip. Those who pretend that it is are simply going through an exercise so they can feign shock… shock… that Syria isn’t being forthcoming and flipping. Then they will be able to turn on Obama and declare him naive and a dupe for possibly believing the Syrians could change their nasty ways — but of course no one in the West is offering Syria any real incentive to change or think differently about the Wests motives or capabilities to do anything but whisper sweet nothings to the Palestinians as they are dispossessed of their land.

Syria knows that Netanyahu is not going to cooperate with any US sponsored peace thing to get the Golan back. The US knows that Israel is not giving up land. Netanyahu knows that the notion of economic development for Palestinians in the West Bank is a charade, as does everyone else who has any clue about the economic realities of the West Bank which has been chopped into economically nonviable mince meat.

So what does it cost Nasrallah to make some political hay by restating his “principled” rejectionist stand that Israel

We could read Nasrallah’s statement to be intended as a shot across Syria’s bow if for a minute we thought that anyone in Syria actually believed that peace was in the offing. But it is not and Syrians know this.

So what are they doing? They are seeing what is on offer by the US, which is very little. The US is seeing what Syria has on offer without the Golan being on the table, which will not be much but tinkering in Lebanon and Palestine. Iraq cooperation is a no brainer for Syria. It is the easy file to work with the Americans on because Syria is happy with the Iraqi government and wants trade from Baghdad and little else, save not to threaten Damascus, which is doesn’t so long as it resists US plans to allow Special Forces to operate against Syria from Iraq.

Without the Golan on the table, Syria cannot possibly be expected to even hint at flipping or pressuring Hizbullah or Hamas to disarm. Hizbullah knows this, Syria knows it. Hizbullah is reminding the Americans and all those in Israel or the West that nothing has changed in the regional calculus.

The Israelis lack a leader such as Sadat. They have no interest or imagination to change the dynamics of the region.

Hizbullah is underlining this.

I have no reason to believe that Nasrallah needs to send Syria a message or that Bashar al-Assad is contemplating making any important changes to his regional strategy.

There will be a modicum of US – Syrian cooperation on a number of issues because it is in the interests of both countries to cooperate where they can, but do not expect fundamental change in relations in the region.

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I hate to say “I told you so…”, but this time I just can’t resist. Do y’all remember our lovely discussion from a few days ago, when I wrote a post about Lebanon’s role in the peace talks? The QN groupies (is it alright if I call you that?) said I was crazy to imagine that it would be in Syria’s or Israel’s interests to bring Hizbullah to the table. Well, here it is, from the horse’s mouth:

Syrian President Bashar Assad emphasized the importance of including major parties in a peace process with Israel, adding that he would work to bring Hamas and Hizbullah to the table. “I will work to involve Hizbullah and Hamas in the negotiations to achieve peace in the region,” Assad told Japan’s Asahi Shimbun in an interview published Wednesday.

He said his country could hold direct peace talks with Israel if the United States acted as an arbitrator.

Put that in your arghile and smoke it. ;)
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shebaaJoshua Landis, over at Syria Comment, has a good analysis entitled “Why Syria Will Not Get the Golan Back“. In it, he argues that obstacles such as mutual mistrust and the imbalance of power will overwhelm the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, producing “talks and plenty of discussions and process, but no peace.” Landis is planning to argue the case from the opposite side of the courtroom later this week, which should be interesting. In the meantime, I’d like to respond to one of his points. He writes:

“The US is playing a difficult game with Syria. It insists on making Syria pay for every diplomatic concession with an equal concession of its own. The problem with this chit-for-chit game is that Syria has few chits to play. Yes, Syria can reopen the American school it closed a few months ago. It can once again agree to issue visas to Fulbright professors and American scholars. It can allow Amid-East and other State Department-funded organizations back into Syria. It can let out a few political prisoners, such as Michel Kilo, but these small tokens will quickly be exhausted. The US has a rich array of sanctions and privations it has placed on Syria that it can lift one at a time for many years. Syria has nothing of comparable worth, save support for Hizbullah, Lebanese sovereignty (which, to America, is practically the same thing as disarming Hizbullah) and support for Hamas. These cards are absolutely necessary for successful negotiations over the return of the Golan. Syria cannot give them up before getting back the Golan, as the US and Israel are demanding.

Landis’s analysis is remarkable for its candidness. He gives voice to the awkward truth: Syria would like peace, but it is too weak to let go of its few cards before receiving any Israeli or American guarantees on the Golan. In fact, Syria cannot even be seen to be considering letting go of its few cards; why make a weak hand even weaker by tipping it and embarassing its partners? The problem, therefore, is not that Syria is unwilling to pay the price that Israel is asking; it is rather that Syria is unwilling to pay it in advance.

Faced with this scenario, the United States and Israel have three options:

(1) Play hardball: Try to capitalize on Syria’s weaknesses by remaining firm on the precondition to cut ties with Hizbullah and Hamas; delaying the appointment of an American ambassador to Damascus; keeping all sanctions regimes in place; escalating anti-Syrian rhetoric; and generally tightening the screw.

(2) Play softball: Drop all preconditions regarding Hizbullah and Hamas, and resume the negotiations.

The first option would represent a return to the Bush policy, which produced few positive results between 2006-08, led to two wars, and put the Syrian-Israeli talks on hold. On the other hand, the second option is completely unrealistic, given the level of mistrust between the two sides. What is needed is an alternative approach.

(3) Bring Lebanon on board (aka, the “curveball” option).

syrialebanon1Last August, I wrote an article for Syria Comment entitled “Syria & Lebanon Should Hold Simultaneous Talks With Israel”. In it, I outlined the reasons that such a strategy would be beneficial for Syria as well as the United States and Israel, not to mention Lebanon. At the very least, it would send a signal of Syrian commitment and seriousness regarding the talks, as well as a demonstration of its clout with its allies in Lebanon. (You can read the entire article, along with the engaging discussion which followed it in the comment section here).

Bringing the Lebanese into the game — even if only in a ceremonial capacity — could also help the current parties get around the obstactle represented by the Hizbullah precondition. How? By creating a situation where the continuity of Hizbullah’s resistance is treated as a function of Lebanon’s grievances with Israel, rather than a Syrian card to be played or withheld, Syria would effectively be signalling to the U.S. that it is prepared to have Hizbullah dismantle its resistance as long as this is achieved through a process which addresses the various outstanding issues on the Lebanese side (refugees, security, territory, etc.) in addition, of course, to settling the question of the Golan.

Several objections spring to mind, but before addressing them, I’d like to make my assumptions clear. First of all, this proposal is predicated on the notion that all parties involved (Syria, Israel, and the United States) are not merely playing the process. In other words, I’ve set aside all skeptical arguments and assumed that both Syria and Israel are actually serious about reaching a land-for-security deal, and that the U.S. is willing to assume the role of broker.

If this is the case, then it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Syria is prepared to play a role in dismantling the Lebanese resistance, should the Golan be returned. Just as Syria kept Hizbullah in check during the various peace processes and negotiations of the 1990′s, so too will it do so — one way or another — after a final Golan settlement. The question, therefore, is not whether or not Syria’s relations with Hizbullah will be addressed by these talks, but rather when and how. My argument is that by bringing Hizbullah into the negotiations (using the fig leaf of the Lebanese government), Syria will be allowing these questions to be addressed and settled, and in a more methodical and responsible fashion, rather than through some kind of spectacular and meaningless public gesture.

Some Objections

What about Hamas? I believe that this issue will become easier to finesse if the Syrians allow the Lebanese to come on board. Nobody in Israel is enthusiastic about the Palestinian track, and standing firm on the precondition to cut its ties with Hamas is tantamount to calling off the Syrian track as well. Unlike Hizbullah — which has made no secret of its willingness to turn to other affairs once the resistance has achieved its objectives –  Hamas has no other arena to turn to, and so Syria cannot bring it into the picture without addressing the entire Palestinian-Israeli issue. The Americans surely understand this, and so I believe that the Hamas precondition is a fairly soft ‘red line’.

What about the Lebanese? How can Syria guarantee that Israel will not try to make a deal with Lebanon at its own expense? As much as I would like to imagine that such a scenario were even possible, I have no doubt that it is not. Hizbullah answers to nobody in the Lebanese government — at least on military matters. Lebanon has nothing valuable to offer to Israel that Syria cannot veto. Therefore, there is virtually no chance for the Lebanese to spoil the party. Lebanon’s presence would be, as I said earlier, completely gratuitous, but it would serve an important function nonetheless. Like the brown paper bag that gave cops an excuse not to arrest drunks on street corners, Lebanon’s presence at the negotiating table would give the Americans and Israelis an excuse to engage Syria without the precondition of cutting its ties to Hizbullah.
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syria-israelAs someone who came to consciousness during the period of Syrian control of Lebanon, I’d be lying if I said I wasn’t sympathetic to those Lebanese who regard Damascene politics with an innate sense of trepidation. Growing up in such an environment, I’d heard the old box-of-matches-and-pail-of-water argument countless times, while listening in on discussions about Syria’s role in the region. This was a straightforward argument to make, particularly in the context of Lebanese politics. Does it matter that the Lebanese parties were perfectly adept at starting their own fires or inviting Syria to start fires for them, and that no one (besides Syria) was very good at putting them out on their own? Syrian heavy-handedness in Lebanon made up for this fact, hence the persistence of the arsonist-fireman argument, which Jonathan Spyer rehashed recently in The Jerusalem Post:

The method to be used to achieve [its emergence from isolation] will be the tried and tested Syrian practice of holding a Molotov cocktail in one hand and a fire hose in the other. That is – Syria will offer itself as the indispensable mediator for the solution of problems which Damascus itself has helped to create, and for which its clients and allies are directly responsible.

The logic of this argument has recently begun to wear thin on me. Has Syria played a “spoiler” role in the past? Sure. Is it doing so at the moment? Maybe. These, however, are not the most relevant questions anymore. To my mind, it has become increasingly pointless to try and isolate the spoiler when there is no credible strategy for them to spoil. By sponsoring Hamas and Hizbullah, it’s not as though Syria has thrown a rusty monkey wrench into a smoothly purring, well-oiled machine. The machine itself is rusty and held together by temporary fixes, makeshift parts, and lots of duct tape. It’s already limping along, smoking from the bonnet and leaking all over the road. The monkey wrench that Syria has tossed into it is only one of many that have already been deposited within by Americans, Israelis, Arabs, and the Palestinian leadership itself.

Given this state of affairs, therefore, I would not be surprised if President Obama’s “backstage” Mideast strategy revolved entirely around the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. Why? Because this is the only area of potential success in a sea of structural failure. If Obama wants to squeeze a single drop of good news out of this conflict within his first term, his only real option is Syria.

Critics of this line of reasoning point to Bashar al-Assad’s  insistence that a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement would not come at the expense of his  alliances with Hizbullah, Hamas, and Iran. “Why bother engaging Syria,” they ask, “if Bashar is not going to flip?” (It is a remarkable irony of history, and a sign of how far we’ve come from the late 1970′s, that the ally Syria is being asked to give up — and from whom, therefore, Bashar seeks  minimal cover — is not the PLO but rather Iran and its Levantine proxies.) While the “Why engage?” question is legitimate, I feel that it leads to more credible and compelling responses than the question “Why not engage?” The first of these compelling responses is, simply: because Syria is practically begging for it and has much to gain from a successful deal. The second response is that a deal would necessitate changes on the ground that would amount to a de facto ‘flip’, a new strategic equation. The third response is that there are simply no other credible alternatives at this stage. Israel may be willing to tolerate an indefinite state of low-intensity warfare, but the U.S.-allied Arab regimes must realize that the higher the body counts go, the worse they will look. This fact makes some people furious. But anger and frustration with Syria’s ability to outmaneuver its adversaries and win the battle of public opinion in the Arab world is not a reason to continue to shut it out.

In fact, it is a reason to do the opposite. By giving the Syrians a leading role in the peace process pageant, Obama and his Arab allies will finally acquire the ability to leave the dead cat at Syria’s doorstep. Or, to go back to the old metaphor, Syria will be less inclined to play arsonist or fireman when it is tasked with building a new house.
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Everybody is talking about Obama’s need to engage Syria.

The pro-engagement crowd has grown beyond the initial cadre of Arab-friendly analysts and now includes taste-makers and heavy hitters who have the ear of the President: people like Martin Indyk, Richard Haass, and others. Only a year ago, when Syria Comment and Creative Forum hosted discussions about Syrian-Israeli peace, one could hardly help feeling that the initiative was promising but ultimately destined for the garbage heap of failed negotiations, due to the fact that the U.S. was displaying zero interest in getting involved. Today, by contrast, it seems as if there isn’t a single analyst besides the Charles Krauthammer types who does not believe that the United States should get behind Syria-Israel in a big way. Fantastic! There’s just one problem: the talks are off, thanks to Gaza.

It is extremely difficult to see the way forward, under the current conditions. There is so much obstructing the view, both on the ground and in the air. On the ground lie the ruins of Gaza, the ruins of Palestinian leadership, the ruins of Arab unity, the ruins of ’indirect’ negotiations. In the air float the results of upcoming Israeli elections, Lebanese elections, and Iranian elections, all of which make it well nigh impossible to plot the course ahead.   

All of this uncertainty works in the favor of Syria, which is well-positioned to reap the benefits of a new engagement policy should Obama and Clinton choose to pull the trigger. While the war in Gaza may or may not have weakened Hamas politically, it has surely strengthened Syria, at least for the time being. When George Mitchell sits down to figure out how to make Fatah and Hamas reconcile, the Egyptians and Jordanians will have less leverage than ever before. Bashar has been biding his time very patiently, waiting for George W. Bush to depart, precisely to have a new American president come to the time-honored conclusion that “there is no peace without Syria”.  For its part, however, Syria cannot afford to play hard-to-get. The Obama administration will likely make an early and subtle overture towards Damascus, and when Washington comes calling, Bashar should answer loud and clear. If he plays the ‘raise-the-price’ game, it could all slip away and the anti-engagement crowd will spend the rest of Obama’s tenure saying “I told you so.”

Turkey, Qatar, Dubai, etc. are helping Syria for one reason: they also fear Iran, but they think that the Iranian threat is best contained by gradually pulling Syria back into the Arab/Western orbit, rather than by encouraging Israel and the U.S. to try to weaken Syria, Hizbullah, and Hamas. If Syria — like its allies — is also sincerely looking for a way to move closer to the West, then it needs to seize the hand extended by Obama. Furthermore, it needs to do this in a very decisive and public fashion, or else all of those who have no interest in re-starting a serious peace process will find a way to shoot this initiative down. Bashar cannot afford to let the mountain come to Muhammad. He needs to meet it halfway.
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