It took them a while, but Lebanon’s March 14th coalition has finally gotten around to officially opting out of Najib Miqati’s government. Let no one imagine that this has actually made Miqati’s job any easier: it has been clear for the past several weeks that the major obstacles to this latest round of cabinet formation politics have nothing to do with the challenges that beset Saad al-Hariri’s effort in 2009. This time, it’s all about Michel Aoun and his desire to land the coveted Interior Ministry, which very few politicians — even among his own allies — are particularly jazzed about.

All eyes are on the parliamentary elections of 2013. With electoral issues (from districting to registration to long-awaited reforms like pre-printed ballots) in the hands of the Free Patriotic Movement, Jumblatt would have to worry about his own backyard, Berri would be eyeing Jezzine, and President Sleiman could kiss his chances to bless a successful “independent” Christian slate in the Metn goodbye. It’s not a little deal, hence the political gridlock.

So, now that Hariri and co. are out of a job, whatever do you suppose they plan to do with themselves? Answer: organize a huge rally downtown on March 14th protesting Hezbollah’s arms. On the face of it, it’s not a bad idea; revolution is in the air these days, and the unemployed and disgruntled youth of Lebanon’s cities have no decrepit dictators to rebel against. Sectarianism is too squishy a target, so weapons it is!

Here’s a question, though: which weapons are objectionable? Hariri’s latest speech left me a little confused on this score. On the one hand, he’s anti-weapons, but on the other, he’s pro-resistance. What does that mean? And what is he suggesting Hizbullah should do? Hand over its pistols, bowie knives, and slingshots, but hold on to its 9M133 AT-14 tank killers and C802 anti-ship missiles? Most Lebanese I know who have a problem with the “weapons issue” are not worried about being killed by a Hizbullah fighter firing an AK-47; they’re worried about their house being flattened by an Israeli F-16 retaliating against the Hizbullah fighter with the AK-47.

So let me just say that I’m not on the edge of my seat, awaiting the results of March 14th’s latest publicity gambit, the so-called “referendum on Hezbollah’s weapons”. It seems to me that this is a pretty straightforward issue to campaign on, and yet they always manage to sound like they don’t really know what they are in favor of.

I hope to have an interesting interview with Gary Gambill for y’all, later this week. In the meantime, let’s have some fun with a poll.

NOTE: This piece is being updated as the story develops. Updates will be added to the bottom of the post. See below.

The Lebanese opposition led by Hizbullah is expected to resign from PM Saad al-Hariri’s cabinet later today. Coupled with the resignation of one additional “neutral” minister, the Hariri government would be brought down and replaced by a caretaker cabinet until such time as a new premier and cabinet are selected. If history is any judge, such a process is liable to take months, under the best circumstances.

The current crisis has its roots in Hizbullah and AMAL’s cabinet walkout of late 2006, which led to over a year and a half of government paralysis, a huge downtown sit-in and protest, escalating street violence, the May 7 clashes, and, eventually, the Doha Agreement. The opposition’s principal demand at that stage was greater representation in cabinet — the so-called “blocking third” — so as to be able to meaningfully block legislation proposed by Hariri’s majority March 14 coalition. More fundamentally, the opposition was seeking a “nuclear option”: the ability to bring down the government in precisely this kind of situation, whereby Saad al-Hariri and his allies would remain committed to supporting the Special Tribunal for Lebanon all the way until the release of indictments.

If the opposition resigns later today, they will have finally exercised the option that they fought to gain between 2006 and 2008.

Many questions come to mind:

  1. Why now? What prompted the breakdown of the Saudi-Syrian initiative that was supposedly drawing close to some kind of temporary solution in Lebanon? Did the negotiations fall apart as a result of US pressure (as some are suggesting) or was the whole thing a charade from the beginning?
  2. Where do the local parties go from here? Will the opposition call for protests and strikes in an effort to display popular support for their call to end Lebanon’s cooperation with the STL? How will March 14th respond?
  3. When will the STL release its indictments? Rumors suggest that this could be imminent, but we are unlikely to learn the content of the indictments for weeks, given that the pre-trial judge will probably review them privately.
  4. Finally, and more crassly, who will come out on top in this confrontation between March 14 (and its allies in Washington and Riyadh on one hand) and March 8 (and its allies in Damascus and Tehran)? Are we headed for a “Doha 2″ agreement?

Let’s not jump the gun. The opposition still needs to make good on its threat. Until then, the floor is open for discussion.

PS: I’m current traveling and will try to follow the story from the road, but I’m counting on the QN readership to post relevant news items in the comment section in case I am late to provide updates.

**

Update [5:30PM]: The deed is done. Lebanon’s cabinet opposition has resigned. The eleventh minister (Adnan Sayyed Hussein) is reportedly on his way to Baabda now to tender his resignation to President Suleiman. This was the way that the blocking third mechanism was supposed to work.

It’s a little bit early to get into the speculation game, but my sense is that the  opposition’s maneuver was premature. They probably timed it to happen when Saad Hariri was meeting with Obama, so that the symbolism wasn’t lost on anyone. But if that was really the rationale, then I think it was a bit of a boneheaded move. One would have imagined that the opposition would have tried first to pressure Hariri by mobilizing a major public demonstration against the STL in order to give their demands a veneer of popular support, before withdrawing from the government. As is, all they’ve done is ensure that when the indictments do become public, there will almost certainly be no Lebanese government in place to formally denounce them.

More later.

 
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A happy new year to all, and many apologies for my brief absence from the blogosphere. Judging from the lively discussion taking place in the last post, no one seemed to notice I was gone.

Firstly, I’d like to thank everyone for continuing to read and participate over the past year. I’ve been amazed by the blog’s constantly growing readership, and by the wide-ranging discussions that have developed on a daily basis. According to WordPress, if this blog were an exhibit at the Louvre Museum, it would take 13 days of Louvre-esque traffic to generate the number of visitors that we had this past year. And it’s not a quiet crowd that comes shuffling through here each day; the average number of comments per blog post in 2010 was 70! Wow! May 2011 bring even more armchair general-ing and Monday morning quarterbacking. (How many visitors do we need to start selling t-shirts, mugs, and tote bags? Hmmm…)

Ok, back to business. I’ve just returned from three weeks in Beirut. What to report?

  • The traffic is awful. Gone are the days when one could exert some semblance of control over one’s comings and goings in Ras Beirut. I literally spent half an hour one day trying to get out of the ABC parking garage in Achrafieh. That’s right: there are even traffic jams underground.
  • Hamra is the new Gemmayzeh. Or maybe it’s the old Gemmayzeh and Mar Mikhail is the new Hamra. What do I know?
  • The amount of construction going on is a little hard to believe. Walk around Hamra and count the number of luxury high-rises going up. Then leaf through a copy of Middle East Airlines’ in-flight magazine, Cedar Wings, and count the number of advertisements for luxury high-rises. Multiply those two numbers together and you get 10,452 (i.e. the exact number of square kilometers of Lebanese territory). Divide the larger one by the smaller one and you get 18 (i.e. the number of sects in Lebanon). Amazing.
  • All that anyone wanted to talk about was Wikileaks and the Hariri investigation. Particularly interesting to me was how jaded everyone I spoke to seemed to be about the Tribunal. For the most part, the pro-haqiqa types have largely lost interest in al-haqiqa and the anti-haqiqa types aren’t penciling in the dates of Nasrallah’s television addresses on their calendars. There is an air of general resignation and a sense that Lebanon is returning (or has already returned) to the state of Syrian-Saudi stewardship that was the rule in the 1990′s and early 2000′s. One minister expressed his doubts to me that Lebanon would even hold parliamentary elections on time in 2013… More on this later.

In the meantime, if you haven’t already read the International Crisis Group’s report on the STL and its potential implications, you can download a PDF copy here. Spoiler alert: according to Peter Harling and co., there are no good solutions to the current standoff. I will have more to say about this, perhaps tomorrow or later this week.

I know several foreigners who are traveling to Lebanon this summer, and so I’m routinely asked about the chances of “something happening” while they are there.

I usually adopt a thoughtful expression, pause for a moment, and tell them not to worry. This seems to work.

Sometimes, if I am feeling mischievous, I adopt a thoughtful expression, cock an eyebrow and say: “Do you want me to be honest?” After the color drains from their face, I squint into the distance, furrow my brow, and scratch my head as though I am preparing to break some tough news. And then I say, not very convincingly: “You probably don’t have to worry about anything. Have fun!”

All of this travel advice has gotten me thinking, though. Is there any other country in the region that is vulnerable to so many (apparently) existential threats? We Lebanese seem to cultivate them. Rather than a single sword of Damocles, we seem to have acquired an entire armory’s worth, a flashing chandelier of watered-steel blades suspended over our heads.

Here are some of my favorites:

1. The War — You know, the Big One. The one that’s coming soon, maybe as soon as next week. It’s just a matter of time before Israel decides to launch another war against Hizbullah, and this time there won’t be anything left once the dust settles. It’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

2. The Hariri Tribunal — Once indictments are issued, we can expect the country to descend into chaos, particularly if Syria’s allies are implicated in any way. The mini-era of reconciliation will be over and it’ll be back to the street riots, but this time things will escalate into a full blown civil war. It’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

3. The Debt — Now over $52 billion USD (or around 150% of GDP), Lebanon’s public debt threatens to capsize the country’s fragile economy and send it the way of Greece and California. If that it happens, it’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

4. The Emigrants — Lebanon’s youth are emigrating in record numbers to the Gulf, Europe, Canada, Africa, Australia, etc. because they can’t find decent jobs in their own country. Pretty soon, Beirut will be populated entirely by wealthy foreign expats (and their exploited housekeepers). It’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

5. Pollution — Lebanon’s famously green forests and picturesque mountains are being chopped down and detonated into rubble by fat-cat oligarchs and their wasta-obtained rukhsas. Meanwhile, the Mountain of Trash in Saida is turning our coastline into a disease-ridden Petri dish. Pretty soon, there will be no reason for wealthy foreign expats (and their exploited housekeepers) to buy property here at all, which means that it’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

6. The Earthquake – An undersea earthquake off the coast creates a massive tsunami that washes us all away. As we all know, the country is crisscrossed by fault lines. One big quake, and it’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

What am I missing?

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michael_young_140x140Michael Young, opinion editor of the Daily Star, has an interesting op-ed today (“On Not Debating Christopher Hitchens”) about Hitchens’ visit to Beirut and the lecture he gave, entitled “Who are the Revolutionaries In Today’s Middle East?” In the article, Young sets his sights on a surprising target: the audience at the lecture, the majority of whom were students at the American University of Beirut. From Young’s perspective, Hitchens’ talk was a sad exercise in throwing pearls before swine, such was the ingratitude and boorishness of his interlocutors:

“You could distil his argument down to one sentence: The Arab world is better off without Saddam Hussein, and the US, alongside the true “Arab revolutionaries”, is responsible for this outcome. Instead of addressing that point, many in the audience resorted to the oldest of rhetorical subterfuges: When you don’t like an argument, change the subject; which only tended to show how we in the region seem incapable of engaging in constructive self-doubt about our own affairs.”

I was at the lecture, and while I might agree with Young about the lackluster quality of most of the questions, I think he does a disservice to the intelligence of most of the attendees when he accuses them of failing to lap up whatever slop Hitchens threw before them.

And slop it was, if we are being fair. Christopher Hitchens is a deeply learned man and one worth listening to on a great many subjects, but his performance at AUB that night was one that a younger version of himself would have brilliantly and mercilessly eviscerated. The subject matter at hand – the moral prerogative of interventionism, the role of the United States in overthrowing dictatorships and spreading democracy, the utter bankruptcy of the Arab nationalist project, the oppressiveness of various theocratic movements, etc. – are all worthy and serious themes for debate. And this is precisely why I was so disappointed to hear Hitchens make his case, because he did it so poorly and childishly. Rather than laying out a thoughtful and carefully-reasoned answer to the important question of what it means to be a revolutionary in today’s Middle East, he waxed on endlessly about Kurdistan, Walid Jumblatt, Kurdistan, head scarves, gas chambers, and Kurdistan. It was a flashy, overbearing, and jingoistic performance that really fooled no one. Except, surprisingly, Michael Young.

The problem with the lecture was not its thesis (“The Arab world is better off without Saddam Hussein, and the US… is responsible for this outcome”), but rather Hitchens’ unwillingness or inability to outline the corollaries and conclusions that derive from it. Should Middle Eastern revolutionaries pledge themselves to the cause of the United States even when it does not act “in the defense of universal liberal values”? What about in the vast majority of cases where it acts in direct opposition to those values? Does the acceptance of Saddam’s deposal validate the means by which it was achieved, and exonerate the mistakes made in the course of the war effort? These were not questions meant to evade Hitchens’ thesis; rather, they constituted one invitation after another (consistently rejected and evaded by the real master of rhetorical subterfuges in that room) to make his case for an America-centered theory of Middle Eastern revolution.

At one point in his article, Young argues that Hitchens is one of the few Western public intellectuals to confront the burning question that has faced the left in recent years, namely:

“If a tyrannical leader is abusing his own people, is it the duty of the left to confront him in all ways possible, including force, because that may be the only course open in defending human rights and human liberty, even if this requires depending on the United States for its success?”

A valid question, but a naïve one? After all, in how many cases can leftist revolutionaries depend on the United States to confront tyrannical and abusive leaders in our region? No one made this point more convincingly and thoughtfully than Rami Khoury, who argued that while many people would agree with Hitchens about the failure and oppressiveness of the existing state system, they cannot count on a muscular and principled stance against tyranny from the United States in the vast majority of cases. The entire hall erupted in applause when Rami made his point. Hitchens’ response? A sulking one-liner about moral equivalency.

Mr. Young, Christopher Hitchens did not come to Beirut to debate anyone. He came to make a spectacle of himself on the streets of Hamra and in the newspapers. There are many eloquent and sensible advocates of the United States out there; the Lebanon Renaissance Foundation shouldn’t confine itself to an opportunistic and glib ex-communist who “once wrote a book with Edward Said.”
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15marchLawrence Osborne was part of the media junket flown to Lebanon last week by the March 14th lobby in Washington. Along with Christopher Hitchens and Michael Totten (and Charles Krauthammer, for all we know), he was brought in to observe the big rally and presumably to collect enough soundbytes to drizzle in his writings over the next few months. Why March 14th thought that a travel writer and wine connoisseur who knows little about Lebanon would be an effective propagandist is puzzling. Were they hoping that he would manage to slip in a few cheery mentions of Siniora, UNSCR 1701, and the Hariri tribunal in an article about the effects of the Andean snowmelt on the acidity of Chilean cabernets? No, it seems that Osborne felt he had it in him to try some political commentary on for size. Here are some choice tidbits:

We walked all along the Corniche first, passing the war-ruined Holiday Inn and the new Dubai-style condo towers of Waffic Sinno: children carrying flagpoles bigger than themselves, old women with faces painted red and blue, teenage girls in blue hats crying “Saad! Saad!”–the name of Rafiq’s son, now the anointed hero of what has come to be called the “March 15 movement.”

M15, huh? A felicitous slip of the pen? (The impressions throughout the article do have an Ian Fleming-ish cast to them). Aww, who can keep all these Marches straight? I mean, there are two after all.

Beirut is a schizophrenic city these days. Driving along its coastal roads near Juneirah it looks like Genova or Nice.

I’ll tell you what happened here. I’m fairly sure that Lawrence meant “Jounieh”, but couldn’t be bothered to reach for his guide book to figure out how to spell the name of the town with all the Bulgarian strippers, so he played a little fast and loose and mixed it up with Jumeira, i.e. the island in Dubai in the shape of a palm tree. Hence, Juneirah. No big whoop.

Like the denizens of an Evelyn Waugh tale, the “March 15 movement” is opposed by the “March 8 movement” of Islamicists, and ubiquitous armed checkpoints keep the two Marches apart. The Beirut papers that weekend reported Nasrullah’s opinion that his men now needed “air defense weapons,” and as Hezbollah’s power rises, there is a feeling among the non-insane citizens of the city that bad times could return at any moment.

Fast forward to June 2009, where March 8th wins a slim majority in Lebanon’s parliament. Lawrence’s expert conclusion: over 50% of Lebanon’s voters are not only Islamists, they are also insane.

But later that night, three of our “scoop” brigade–Jonathan Foreman, Michael Totten and Christopher Hitchens–got involved in a street brawl with some thugs of a Syria-loving skinhead party called the SNPN after Hitchens rather gallantly insulted their swastika flag.

Yes, you know, the SNPN, arch-enemy of the M15 movement, with its headquarters in Juneira. The Syrian Nazi Party errrr… Nationalists? Whatever. M15 tells me they’re good-for-nothin’s and I believe them.

We tore up to the Shuf at 120 mph in SUVs, forcing people off the road and blasting horns. These are the most blood-soaked foothills on earth, a maze of valleys and pinnacles that make up the feudal mystery of Mount Lebanon… [Jumblatt] offered me the wine he helps make on his estates, Chateau Kefraya.”Socialist wine,” he murmured, since the party he heads is officially called the Progressive Socialist Party. The party isn’t very socialist, and the wine wasn’t very socialist either–it was perfectly international, though.

Mmmm, yes, blood-soaked foothills, feudal mysteries… our stock in trade. By the way, Lawrence, everybody who drives up to the Shuf does it at 120 mph, forcing people off the road and blasting horns. You weren’t getting preferential treatment. And would it have killed you to throw in a subtle segue from “blood-soaked hills” to the pungent terroir of Chateau Kefraya? That would have been sweet.

On the one hand, I’m glad that there’s someone in Washington spending money to bring opinion-makers to Lebanon. I just wish that they were doing it in a slightly less boneheaded fashion. I mean, who am I to quibble with a strategy that has wine writers pressing the flesh with Geagea, Jumblatt, and Chalabi? On the other hand, if anybody who’s anybody in Washington is taking this stuff seriously, they will have to conclude that Lebanon is caught in a struggle between two diametrically opposed movements: one that is a combination of insane Nazis and Islamists, and the other that is somehow a Lebanese extension of British military intelligence headquartered near a floating island in the shape of a palm tree.

Memo to March 14th: The 2005 vintage seems to have been a beaujolais nouveau. It’s held up fairly well but it will soon be undrinkable. If you’d let Lawrence meet anybody else, he would have discovered that for himself.

Update: The errors in the Forbes article have been corrected.
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So I was having dinner the other night at the home of J, a lovable Beiruti architect whose incredible tabbouleh depends on the secret ingredients of pomegranate molasses and sumac in its dressing.

Oops. Sorry J.

Anyway, the topic of conversation was Beirut’s recent annointment as one of forty-four  must-visit destinations for 2009, by The New York Times. And where did Beirut fall on that list of uber-trendy locales? That’s right. Number one, baby.  We remain hip, interesting, and newsworthy, may God be praised.

Amidst much self-congratulatory clinking of araq glasses, J sat back and said happily: “Well, I suppose this means that we will get at least one summer of stability.”

Beat.

“What do you mean, J?”

“I mean, if The New York Times said it’s ok to visit Lebanon, then this means that the U.S. is not planning any more adventures, right?”

“Come again?”

J continued, unaware of my befuddlement: “But the thing that bothers me about this is that they are sending mixed messages. I mean, why issue a travel advisory to Lebanon, and then say that you should Lebanon, at the same time?”

“Umm, J? The New York Times did not issue the travel advisory. The U.S. government did.”

“I know.”

“So… one thing is not connected with the other. The U.S. government does not coordinate its policies with the media. They are two separate things altogether.”

J looked at me as if I had suddenly started speaking in Swedish.

“But surely they talk to each other.”

“J, the job of newspapers is to interrogate and investigate the actions of government, not to justify and enable them.”

Actually, I didn’t say that. I started to, but then stopped. I’m still not sure why.
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