Michael Young’s op-ed over at the Daily Star makes sense on the following point, I find:

But right after shattering the jar of complacency on Hizbullah, Sfeir was asked about the abolition of political confessionalism. And here the patriarch fell back into a disposition that showed why, for all his qualities, he is no innovator. He, quite correctly, stated, “What is the advantage of abolishing political confessionalism in [national] texts before doing so in [people’s] minds, if everyone says ‘I’m a Maronite, or a Druze?’” And when asked about Walid Jumblatt’s proposal for a communal rotation of the three presidencies, Sfeir responded that he did not understand it.

Jumblatt’s proposal was intentionally ambiguous. Did the Druze leader mean that all communities would benefit from being rotated into the three top posts in the state, or that the rotation would occur between the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites, who already hold those posts? The Taif Accord outlines the abolition of confessionalism, but it does so in parallel with the establishment of a Senate which would retain a sectarian breakdown, and which Jumblatt would like to see led by a Druze.

Sfeir is not a politician, so his evasiveness was defensible. However, his uneasy response showed he was still thinking, in a most conventional way, that the Maronites’ final protection remains the presidency. It’s true, confessionalism cannot be abolished in law before the outlook of the Lebanese is transformed. However, that line of reasoning is self-reinforcing. Unless you abolish confessionalism institutionally somewhere, unless you change laws somewhere, nothing will ever alter the confessional mindset. But what is needed is a gradual, self-sustaining process of change, where you modify texts to help modify minds, in a way that those who feel most threatened by such change find simultaneous compensations, institutional or otherwise, elsewhere.

Take the Senate. Regardless of whether it is headed by a Druze or not, such a body would be a valuable corresponding institution to a deconfessionalized Parliament, and according to Article 22 of the Constitution should address “major national issues.” The aim of a Senate would be to reassure those expected to lose most from deconfessionalization, namely the Christians, who continue to benefit from a 50-50 ratio in the legislature even though they make up less than that in the population. Sooner or later Christians will face challenges to the ratio. Better for them to negotiate a new formula from a position of strength than to obstinately defend a system that, if Sunnis and Shiites ever reach agreement, may be forcibly overturned in their disfavor.

What of Jumblatt’s rotation plan? Sfeir’s mistake, and that of many Christians, is to read too much into a Maronite presidency, whose powers have been depleted. In fact, the presidency has brought only woe to the community. Competition for the post has divided Maronites in a way the prime ministership and speakership of Parliament have not Sunnis and Shiites. The powers of the president are by and large less proactive than those of his Muslim partners. Therefore, why remain so unyielding toward a plan that would give Maronites a taste of political positions often more effective than the presidency, thereby offering them a chance to transcend their sense of communal decline; a plan, also, that might rejuvenate the political order by creating more frequent openings for fresh leaders?

The symbolism of being head of state is important to Maronites, but it is also an illusion. The presidency has power, but on a day-to-day basis, in the formulation of long-term policy, its latitude is more limited. Instead of resisting this, the patriarch, like all Christians, should consider new ways his community can reinvent itself in a Lebanon that is changing rapidly, where Christian irrelevance is, alas, becoming ever more flagrant.

I think Young is exactly right on this point, and frankly have never understood why the Christians are so attached to the Presidency and yet simultaneously so aware of its limited powers.

To my mind, rotating the three posts would not really amount to a legitimate confessional re-balancing act. It would simply represent a confidence-building measure, in advance of taking more dramatic steps. But confidence is surely what is most needed, no?
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trophyI wasn’t really planning to write a post on this subject, but since people like winners and losers, maybe it’s worth saying something. One commenter writes:

I’d be interested to read your analysis on who you think “won” from this cabinet haggling/negotiation. Do you think by holding out so long and getting more or less what he wanted, Aoun succeeded in gaining stronger footing for himself in this government? In the end, can we say that Hariri couldn’t stand his ground and caved? If so, what does that mean for this government’s future policies and in particular for the ministerial statement? In terms of bargaining skills, it seems to me that Aoun proved his mettle, and also that Hariri’s bluff resignation didn’t really have much of an effect on reinforcing his position. Thoughts?

There’s no doubt that Michel Aoun got the better of Hariri in this protracted standoff. But this had little to do with Hariri’s negotiating skills and mostly to do with the fact that Hariri had no option but to form a unity government. The threats to pursue a majority government were never credible — given the Syrian-Saudi reconciliation — and Aoun knew it.

So given that Aoun had Hariri over a barrel from the very beginning, it’s no wonder that his chosen strategy — spanking him until he got what he wanted — proved effective. And were it not for the rest of opposition growing tired of the charade, Aoun probably would have kept spanking until Gebran Bassil was appointed Telecommunications Minister.

As for what this means for the future, I’m not particularly optimistic. As long as ‘national unity’ remains the non-negotiable principle undergirding any governing effort, then it is going to be far too easy for any single bloc to play spoiler. This spoiler could be anyone: the LF, the FPM, the Future Movement, Jumblatt, Hezbollah, anyone.

In other words, everybody has everyone else over a barrel. In such a situation, the “winner” is simply the one with the least to lose.

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crowsnestThe cabinet formation process seems to be chugging along (fingers crossed), and the expectation is that the executive branch will finally get down to business later this week. It’s the end of an era, and some readers believe that this means that I should engage in a dab of ponderous reflection. Who am I to disappoint them?

The first thing to say is that I think we called it pretty well, didn’t we? Long before the first vote was cast on that sunny day in June, the writing of impending kerfuffledom was all over the wall of the Lebanese state. (For those of you who’d like to re-live the drama, here’s a link to all the election-related posts).

Maybe the five-month delay was inevitable, although I rather doubt it. And maybe next time will be better, although I doubt that too. If the process of forming a government in Lebanon is ever going to become any less fraught with uncertainty, inefficiency, and hilarity, then someone is going to have to re-write the rules, beginning with the one that ostensibly requires all governments to be consensual. Re-framing that constitutional clause will not solve the problem in one fell swoop, but it would represent a decent first step.

Looking ahead…

As some of you recall, we held a poll a few days ago about what the next government’s priorities should be. I’d like to continue this conversation over the next few weeks in the form of a series of posts and discussions on some of the top ten or fifteen priorities. It’s all well and good to say, for example, that Lebanon needs to address its energy problems. But how? What should the strategy be? Wind energy? Solar? Hydroelectric? Should it be government-sponsored or opened up to private venture? You get the idea.

What we’re going to do, in other words, is to crowd-source governmental reform to the smart folks in the QN readership.  I can’t wait.

In other news, be sure to keep checking in on the expanding Lebanon Bibliography, and if you’re so inclined, become a fan of this blog on Facebook. I will be posting shorter, more-timely, less Ciceronian-style updates there on a regular basis, so if you’re curious to hear about which film opening I attended last night, whether I’m rocking Gucci or Prada, or which celebrity hairstylist grooms my toy poodles, come join the club.

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circling the wagons

Michael Young had an excellent op-ed in yesterday’s Daily Star about the dangerous course charted by Lebanon’s Christian leaders, particularly the young Sami Gemayel. I’ve disagreed with some of Young’s writings before in these pages, but I think that he is consistently among the most astute observers of Christian politics in Lebanon. Those who airily dismiss his articles as M14 propaganda would do well to read this critique of Gemayel’s isolationist politics. Here are the key paragraphs:

“An alarming number of Maronites today appear to have lost any sense of the collective nature of the Lebanese state. The Aounists, Sami Gemayel, Nadim Gemayel, even Sleiman Franjieh, have shown an inability to come to grips with the sectarian contract of 1943, the National Pact, and its successor, the Taif Accord. Taif is the real culprit to them, documentary proof of Christian decline – a decline they have all received with bitterness, even if their responses have differed.

“For the Aounists, Taif handed Maronite power to the Sunnis, hence their effort to reverse this by allying themselves with another rural community, the Shiites, to regain what was lost. For people like Sami Gemayel, the solution lies in greater Christian unanimity against the outside, which when you peel away the layers is really just a strategy bound to enhance Christian isolation. For Franjieh and not a few Aounists, the way out is through an alliance of minorities, with the Alawites in Syria and the Shiites in Lebanon, against the Sunni majority in the Middle East. Each of these notions is foolish in itself, an avenue toward communal suicide, and all have one thing in common: antagonism toward the Sunni community.

“There is no small amount of historical irony, and hypocrisy, here. For decades the Maronites took pride in saying that they were the true defenders of “Lebanon first.” Now that the Sunnis have adopted the slogan as their own, too many Maronites have reacted as if this were a threat to the Lebanese entity because Sunnis are extensions of an Arab majority. Ultimately, the message this sends is that the Maronites only defended a “Lebanon first” option when the Lebanon in question was one they dominated. Now that the community feels it is losing ground, the preference is for Christians to envelope themselves in a tight defensive shell.

When Sami Gemayel speaks about the Christians “being stepped upon,” what does he mean? This is the language of demagoguery, and in some respects of war. Who has stepped on the Christians? Judging by Gemayel’s actions and statements, the simple answer is “the Muslims” whoever that may be. Yet being stepped upon is a very different concept than accepting the reality of Christian numerical regression. It is very different than grasping that Taif, the hated Taif, hands Christians representation well beyond their real numbers. When one feels stepped upon, the world looks like the bottom of a shoe, and it becomes very difficult to follow a sensible path away from one’s resentments.”

samigemayelI agree with Young’s analysis. Listening to some of these Christian leaders — on both sides of the political divide — I often catch myself thinking: “What chutzpah!” Is it arrogance or naïveté (or a blend of both) that permits one to complain about the weakened powers of the presidency after Ta’if? In what sense is it reasonable to imagine that Lebanon could be governed today solely by a powerful Maronite president, when the Christians, as a whole, represent a minority of the population?

I recall meeting with Alain Aoun (Michel’s nephew) a few months ago, and discussing different potential electoral laws. He was a little bit cagey about what kind of law would be the FPM’s ideal formula, and when I pointed this out to him, he replied: “Well, obviously, we feel strongly about a law that maximizes the number of Christian politicans voted in by Christian voters.” I replied by asking him how this squared with the FPM’s purported desire to dismantle political confessionalism. His answer was revealing, particularly because of its subtle self-contradiction: “Yes of course the FPM’s goal is to bring about a nonconfessional state. By why not try to do this from a position of strength?”

Come again?

The notion of a “Third Republic” is not, in and of itself, a bad idea. But the problem with the FPM’s Third Republic was that it did not address the most crucial part of it — deconfessionalism — in a detailed enough fashion. March 14′s Christian leaders, on the other hand, have offered no meaningful discourse on this issue whatsoever, beyond support for administrative decentralization.

The current historical moment represents a rare window of opportunity for Lebanon. With the various foreign “sponsor” states seemingly recalibrating their relationships with the country as a result of a larger geopolitical reshuffling of power relations, a space has been opened up for a new grand bargain to be struck, or an old grand bargain to have its vows renewed (and fulfilled). However, the shared strategy of Lebanon’s Christian leaders — circling the wagons only to fight one another within a self-imposed confessional corral — does not inspire confidence in the future.

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grandserailLet’s have a look at the question of cabinet formation, post-June 7. When all the votes are counted and a victor is declared, the choice of a prime minister and the composition of the cabinet will be the next items on the agenda (after the fistfights and neighborhood gloat-bys, of course.)

I met recently with Ghassan Moukheiber, an opposition MP in the Change & Reform Bloc. He seemed optimistic that the distribution of seats in the next cabinet would be executed on a pro rata basis, i.e. that ministerial portfolios would be allocated based on the proportion of seats won by each party in parliament. Of course, this depends on who wins. March 14, as we know, has not promised to grant the opposition even a basic blocking third, let alone a pro rata share. And while March 8 has promised to form a power-sharing government (with a veto-wielding cabinet minority), they could do that to the tune of a blocking third rather than full-fledged pro rata representation.

Why does this matter, one way or the other? A veto is a veto, right? Not really. Over burgers at DT, Moukheiber also suggested that “on issue politics, we may see a reshuffling of majorities and minorities after the election. On financial and economic issues, for example, Change & Reform is more in line with the Future Movement than with Jumblatt and Hizbullah. On structural and confessional issues, we are probably more in line with the Lebanese Forces.”

In this context, the question of balance within the cabinet becomes important, and may make a difference on legislative fights where one or both coalitions are divided on a specific issue. Let’s say, for example, that the opposition wins the election, 68-60. With 53% of the parliament, they would then be entitled to 16 spots in a 30-member cabinet (if pro rata representation is used), and not the 19 they would command in a one-third-plus-one formula. Those three extra seats that would go to M14 parties could make a difference in helping to build opposition to legislation on a case by case basis (or, theoretically, even a supermajority, for issues of major “national significance”).

Does this make sense? Someone tell me if I’m completely wrong here.wordpress stats

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