June 16, 2010

Palestinian Rights in Lebanon: Reform on the Way?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , |
[88] Comments 

Contrary to what many reported immediately after the fact, the debate in the Lebanese Parliament last Tuesday over the issue of Palestinian rights did not slam the door on any potential future reforms.

True, no law was passed. But the outcome — a decision to send the draft laws to a review committee and bring them back to Parliament for a vote in one month — is not just acceptable; it was probably the right thing to do. As a friend on the inside recently wrote to me: “It is not acceptable for this or any other parliament to discuss laws that have not had the chance for proper review.  It’s about time someone started holding parliament to account for the job that they do.”

There’s an excellent article in today’s Daily Star that surveys the issue; apparently, several analysts are very optimistic that the law will be passed when it comes up again, thereby rolling back several decades’ worth of institutionalized discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon. And while I don’t want us to get ahead of ourselves, the fact that this government is actually tackling one of the stickiest issues in Lebanese political culture holds out hope that other similarly radioactive topics might somehow be raised as well in the near future.

Take, for example, the issue of deconfessionalizing the political system. Nabih Berri’s recent proposal to establish a national commission to explore the idea fell flat, largely because it was issued informally via the media. Let’s imagine, instead, that Berri and Jumblatt jointly sponsored a draft electoral law for the 2013 parliamentary elections, based on a non-confessional framework. No one could ignore such a law; they’d have to debate it in Parliament and then vote it down, justifying this decision to their constituents. At the very least, such a move would have the effect of putting the issue in the national spotlight once again.

In other words, both the Palestinian rights question and the deconfessionalism question suffer from similar problems of misinformation, messy thinking, and political fear-mongering. We saw last Tuesday that these problems can be mitigated by separating fact from fiction in the form of a concrete legislative proposal. Deconfessionalism can benefit from this approach as well.

Update: I’m grateful to Rex Brynen, professor of political science at McGill University and expert on the Palestinian refugee problem, for weighing in on this issue in the comment section:

Arguments can be made in favour of extending basic civil (not political rights) to Palestinians in Lebanon on a variety of humanitarian and human rights grounds. For me, frankly, those grounds are enough in and of themselves.

However, quite apart from humanitarian arguments in favour of Jumblat’s proposals, a strong argument can also be made on Lebanese national security grounds.

Can anyone seriously argue that the dangers of violent radicalism are somehow *reduced* by having 250,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon permanently poor, marginalized, and discriminated against? The Fateh al-Islams of this world thrive on the poverty of the camps. The impulse to improve Palestinian conditions (initially under the Siniora government, and now with Hariri supporting Jumblat’s proposed reforms) has been underpinned by the recognition that Lebanese security interests were better served by allowing the Palestinians more normal lives.

Of course, the scarecrow of tawteen always gets raised at this point. The naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon, however, has nothing to do with whether they can work or own property–it would require a political decision by a future Lebanese government to extend citizenship. That won’t happen, and in any case is constitutionally prohibited.

Should arms be retained inside the camps? I would prefer not– I think they do the refugees far more harm than good. However, given political realities (and, for that matter, the interests of some Lebanese parties) the camps aren’t going to be disarmed soon. Consequently, it is pointless holding human rights hostage to the arms issue. It provides no leverage at all, and only makes the situation worse.

Finally, it is not as if Palestinian refugees have anywhere else to go in the meantime. If and when a Palestinian state is established, then they’ll have the right and ability to repatriate, as well as whatever return might take place to Israel. In the meantime–tragic as it is–the Lebanese and Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are stuck with each other. They might as well make the best of it. That’s precisely what the recent proposals propose to do.

For those of you who support the current initiative, I’ll throw out a challenge: what can be done to move this forward? The PSP have been great on the issue, and Hizbullah will likely continue to be supportive provided they don’t decide to prioritize their alliance with the FPM. Support within Amal and Future is, I suspect, a little more uneven, despite the positions taken by Berri and Hariri in parliament. Finally, for this to really go forward, it is important that at least some of the concerns put forward by the Christian parties be addressed, and–if at all possible–the reformist coalition expanded. How? Does anyone have any concrete, actionable ideas?

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April 29, 2010

Electoral Districts in Lebanon

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , |
[21] Comments 

In the spirit of all the recent discussion about secularism and deconfessionalism in Lebanon, I thought I’d write a post that approached the issue of electoral districting. What’s the connection between electoral districting and abolishing confessionalism, you ask? Grab a chair…

As most of us know, the ratio of voters to members of parliament varies across Lebanon’s electoral districts. This is a necessary byproduct of the need to square the mandatory confessional balance in Parliament with demographic realities on the ground. Article 24 of the Lebanese Constitution states that until such a time as a non-confessional electoral law is adopted, the distribution of seats in Parliament must give equal representation to Christians and Muslims. Obviously, in order to achieve this, you either have to give certain districts greater representation than others, or you have to let certain districts elect representatives who are not from the same sect as the majority of their constituents.

This latter condition prevailed in the 2000 electoral law, where districts had a more uniform ratio of voters to representatives than the current law, but many Christians  complained that the majority of Christian MPs were being elected on the lists of non-Christian heavyweights like Rafiq al-Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Nabih Berri, etc.

The question that I’d like to raise in this discussion is the following: What would happen to Lebanon’s electoral landscape in the context of a non-confessional electoral law AND a district map that was based on equal suffrage (i.e. the principle that every citizen’s vote should have the same value)?

In my opinion, simply advocating the abolishment of confessional quotas doesn’t quite go far enough in producing a fairer system because a non-confessional Parliament based on the current geographical distribution of seats would still under-represent certain regions and over-represent others. Think about it: if someone living in Bint Jbeil feels that the current system discriminates against them because their vote counts less than the vote of someone living in the Shouf, how would their situation change if the confessional quotas in parliament were dropped BUT the same districts still elected the same number of MPs? The resident of Bint Jbeil’s vote would still count less than the resident of the Shouf.

So, how does one go about producing a new distribution of seats? I propose the following simple exercise, which is mostly just a thought experiment to get a conversation going (or to put you all to sleep, whichever comes first.)

The first thing to do is to calculate an “ideal” ratio of voters to parliamentary seats  by dividing the total number of registered voters in Lebanon (3,251,731) by the number of parliamentary seats (128), which gives us an ideal average ratio of 25,404 registered voters to each member of parliament.

How does this ideal average ratio match up with the current electoral law? (Note that I’m not interested whatsoever in the issue of which sects get more or less than their fair share; I’m interested purely in which districts are over/under-represented). Click the table below to enlarge it.

Click to enlarge

All I’ve done here is to divide the number of registered voters in each district by the ideal average ratio (25,404) in order to come up with the “correct” number of parliamentary seats for each district, under our system. On the right hand side (highlighted in blue), you can see the new list of parliamentary seats arranged by district, as well as the difference between the old system and the new one. Here’s a summary of the results:

1. Twelve districts have a ratio that conforms, more or less, to the ideal average ratio. These districts are: Tripoli, Zgharta, Bsharreh, Batroun, Jbeil, Baabda, Aley, Baalbek, Beirut 2, Beirut 3, Saida, and Marjayoun.

2. Eight districts have a ratio that over-represents them by one seat each: Koura, Kisrawan, Metn, Shouf, Zahleh, West Bekaa, Beirut 1, and Jezzine.

3. Six districts have a ratio that that under-represents them by a range of 1-2 seats: Akkar, Miniyeh-Dinniyeh, Zahrany, Nabatieh, Tyre, and Bint Jbeil.

So far, this should not be very surprising. But wait, there’s more! The next question that I would like to ask is: what would have been the result of the last election had we had a system like this one in place, rather than the existing law?

Obviously, this is very speculative, but it is not an entirely unreasonable exercise given that during the last election, every district (with the exception of the Metn) was swept by either the loyalist or opposition list. In other words, a majority voters in every district elected the whole slate of candidates presented to them, “zayy/mitl ma hiyyeh” (and in the case of Aley and Beirut 2, the mixed results were pre-arranged by the opposing sides ahead of time).

This fact makes it easier for us to simply adjust the geographical distribution of seats to conform to the ideal average ratio described above, and then model the outcome of a hypothetical election using the 2009 returns. So, for example, we are assuming that if Nabatiyyeh had five seats rather than three in the last election, Hizbullah would almost certainly have won all five (because people voted overwhelmingly for their entire list), and if Kisrawan had four seats rather than five, the FPM would have won 4 instead of the 5 they won in 2009.

Still with me?

Click to enlarge

Ok, so if we adjust the number of seats across all of these districts to conform to the ideal average ratio, and if we assume that the same parties/coalitions swept the same districts that they swept in 2009, the final result would seem to be that March 14 would have won 69 seats and March 8 would have won 61 (for a total of 130 seats; the readjustment of seats required an addition of two seats for the rounding-up math to work out). The new margin of victory is 53%-47%, rather than 55%-45% (as it was in 2009, when M14 won 71 seats and M8 won 57).

So, obviously, the election would have been closer, but not by much. The March 14 coalition (such as it is) would still have won, a fact which surprised me, given what we know about the discrepancy between the popular vote and the actual results. Hizbullah and Amal would have benefited substantially to the tune of 7 extra seats because of the new math, but the March 8 Christians (Aoun and Frangieh, etc.) would have lost 3 seats (in Kisrawan, Metn, and Jezzine). Meanwhile, the Future Movement would have gained 3 seats in Akkar and Miniyeh-Diniyyeh, but various March 14 parties would have lost 5 seats in Koura, Shouf, Zahleh, West Bekaa, and Beirut 1.

It seems to me that the takeaway conclusion from all of this is that: (a) current voter/representative ratios are not that out of whack with the ideal ratio; (b) even if we were to adjust the ratio (which I think we must do), it would not fundamentally change the basic landscape of Lebanese politics, which requires a lot of coalition building and inter-party (and, by extension, inter-sect) cooperation.

What would seem to me to have a much stronger effect on political dynamics would be the adoption of proportional representation. If I have some time (or some help!) I will try to run the above simulation using a PR model, just for fun. (Yes, I know how lame that sounds, thank you very much, but you all should know me by now…)

Those of you who are still awake should feel free to pillory and critique!

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April 23, 2010

Lebanon’s Confused Secularism

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, My articles | Tags: , , |
[19] Comments 

Hi folks. I’ve written a brief piece about tomorrow’s secularism march for The Guardian’s “Comment is Free” section. Feel free to comment either there or here.

Who, by the way, is going? Anyone? Can someone do me a solid and take some pictures?

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April 21, 2010

Lebanon To March for Secularism

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , |
1 Comment 

Click to enlarge.

Several thousand miles, two kids, and an unfinished dissertation prevent me from attending the secularism walk scheduled for this Sunday in Beirut. But that won’t stop me from guilting the rest of you into going, assuming that you’re in Lebanon and aren’t hung over from Saturday night partying in Gemmayzeh (where, I hear, Syria will soon be building a nuclear weapons plant. Groovy.)

So anyway, here’s the info. The march will begin in Ain Mreisseh, in front of the Abdel Nasser statue at 11AM on Sunday morning, proceeding from there (presumably downtown).

The campaign has a Facebook group page, a Facebook event page, a Twitter page, a blog, and a mailing list (email the subject heading “subscribe” to leblaique@gmail.com).

There’s also a graffiti campaign planned (including a Maya Zankoul creation designed for the Qifa Nabki blog, to be unveiled somewhere on Bliss Street), and demonstrations planned at Lebanese embassies and consulates worldwide. So get out there and make your voices heard!

For new readers who are interested in what all of this secularism business is, you can read up on the issue here, here, here, here, here, and here.

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March 4, 2010

The End of Political Confessionalism in Lebanon?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, My articles, Reform | Tags: , , , , , , , |
[15] Comments 

Many thanks to everyone for all of their kind words and well wishes about the new baby: both mother and daughter are doing very well. As noted yesterday, I will not be at the Safadi/POMED event in Washington tomorrow, but you should still plan on going to hear Mona Yacoubian and Jared Cohen speak about political reform in Lebanon.

If you’d like to know what I was going to talk about, you could do worse than to read this article in The Review, which, as it happens, I managed to finish just in the nick of time.

Here’s are the first couple of paragraphs and a link to the rest of the story. Come back over here to comment.

**

The End of Political Confessionalism in Lebanon?

Elias Muhanna | March 4 2010

Last month, Lebanon’s Speaker of Parliament, Nabih Berri, called for the creation of a committee. Across the land of the cedars, eyebrows rose and pulses quickened.

For this was to be no ordinary committee. Its task, Berri explained, would be to explore the notion of abolishing Lebanon’s system of political confessionalism, in which government posts are divided among the country’s 18 officially recognised religious communities, according to a decades-old formula. Calling the current system a source of corruption and instability, Berri – who heads the Shiite political party Amal – insisted that abolishing it was a “national duty” mandated by the Lebanese Constitution.

Berri’s rather modest proposal immediately provoked a display of unctuous outrage from Lebanon’s Christian politicians. Under the existing framework, seats in parliament are divided equally between Christians and Muslims, despite the fact that the Christian population of Lebanon has fallen well below 50 per cent over the past half-century. Replacing confessionalism with a more democratic system would almost certainly erode the number of Christian elected officials, which is why even Berri’s Christian allies wasted no time in quietly distancing themselves from the idea. Meanwhile, his opponents were outspoken in their rejection of the proposal, many pointing out the irony of a man they consider a corrupt, dyed-in-the-wool confessional leader and former warlord portraying himself as a born-again democrat. Even Lebanon’s active civil society, for whom deconfessionalism is a perennial cause célèbre, sniffed condescendingly at the initiative, leaving it to die a quiet death in a handful of newspaper editorials.

Moves to eliminate political confessionalism in Lebanon have a long history of failure, dating back to the earliest days of the republic. Leftist political parties and secularists advocated for the abolition of the system in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Taif Agreement (which ended the country’s 15-year civil war) called explicitly for the establishment of a non-confessional bicameral legislature, a demand that has gone unheeded for two decades.

(Keep reading)

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February 23, 2010

Abolishing Confessionalism in Lebanon: A Poll By Information International

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , |
[34] Comments 

Click to enlarge

Information International, the polling and research firm that publishes The Monthly, one of my favorite publications  about Lebanese politics and economics, released the results of an interesting survey in January on the subject of abolishing confessionalism in Lebanon.

I was traveling at the time and never had a chance to blog about it, but I’ve put together a graph of some of the most relevant figures. Click the graphic to the right to enlarge it.

Update: This is the full text (PDF) of the article about the poll that was published in as-Safir. It contains additional information about the study, including figures for other sects.

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January 22, 2010

Confessionalism or Cronyism?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , |
[19] Comments 

How much of the current fight about administrative appointments is about sectarian politics, and how much of it is just about politics?

When one hears reports about how so-and-so is demanding that such-and-such position is given to this or that sect, it’s tempting to get up on the soapbox and proclaim that confessionalism is rearing its ugly head again. In a non-confessional system — so the secular activist’s complaint goes — there would be no impediments to finding “the right person for the job.”

In my view, this way of looking at the issue is problematic. At any given time there are probably several people, from several different sects, who could fill an administrative position and do a very good job. The problem, in most cases, is not that the ideal candidate is prevented from getting the job because of his/her sect, but because they are not part of the relevant patronage network.

Take, for example, the current quarrel about the directorship of General Security. Supposedly, Aoun wants the position to go to “a Maronite” and Berri wants it to go to “a Shiite”. But surely it’s not as simple as that. Aoun wants the position to go to a Maronite who is loyal to the FPM, and Berri wants a Shiite loyal to AMAL. I would venture to say that Aoun would rather have a Shiite loyal to the FPM in the spot rather than a Maronite loyal to AMAL.

In other words, the real obstacle to getting qualified people in the right jobs is cronyism, not confessionalism. If we got rid of the system of confessional quotas in administrative appointments, it would not suddenly throw open the gates to a legion of qualified bureaucrats who had been prevented from getting the right jobs because they came from the wrong sect.

The real role that confessionalism plays in all of this is that of a smokescreen. By pretending that they are the defenders of Maronite and Shiite interests,  Aoun and Berri provide sectarian cover for their mundane political squabbles, just as Hariri does for the Sunnis, and Jumblatt does for the Druzes, etc.

I think that this has broader implications for the anti-confessionalism debate in parliament as well. Simply put, it’s not enough to just advocate for the abolishment of confessionalism. You have to identify what kind of a system you want to replace it with, and how you are going to counter-act the effects of patronage, cronyism, corruption, etc.
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January 18, 2010

Picking on Berri

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14, Reform | Tags: , , , |
[26] Comments 

The only issue of real import in Lebanon these days — as far as political reform is concerned — is Nabih Berri’s controversial call to establish a committee to explore the ways and means to abolish political sectarianism.

Yes, you heard me right. Berri has called a meeting. A brown bag lunch. A coffee hour. And everybody — from Samir Geagea to Michel Aoun to Saad al-Hariri — has thrown a huge hissy fit.

Let’s pause for a moment and appreciate the irony of this situation. Abolishing political sectarianism — which is ostensibly a core component of Free Patriotic Movement and March 14 values — has now become the issue over which the likes of Aoun, Geagea, and Hariri find common ground to rail against.

Their excuse? It’s too much, too soon. “We have to eliminate sectarianism in our hearts before we eliminate it in our institutions,” says Patriarch Sfeir. Fair enough. But what harm will be done by establishing a commission and starting a national conversation? How else do these politicians propose to eliminate sectarianism in the hearts of the Lebanese? They can barely keep the electricity on 18 hours a day.

Most questionable, to my mind, are the “shoot the messenger” articles that one reads in the press by liberal-minded civil society types. The argument runs as follows: Abolishing sectarianism is important and necessary, but not if Nabih Berri is proposing it:

“Who is [Berri] fooling? The primary benefactors of the abolition of political sectarianism would be the Shia, demographically the largest community in Lebanon, who overwhelmingly side with Hezbollah and Amal. Despite the urgency of eliminating sectarianism from both Lebanese society and the country’s official texts, it would be hard to accept that the largest community, the one controlled by the Hezbollah-led opposition and its arsenal, would be then able to control the country, its institutions and decisions, including UN Security Council resolutions 1559 and 1701.”

This strikes me as nothing but cynical fear-mongering. Let’s assume that Hanin Ghaddar is right, and that the primary benefactors would indeed be “the Shia”. What does that have to do with Nabih Berri “fooling” anyone? Would she be less perturbed if a Christian was calling for the commission? Let’s say Ziad Baroud or President Suleiman proposed the commission (as they actually have done on the record) would that mean that “the Shia” would not be the primary benefactors of abolishing sectarianism? Why is it ok if Baroud proposes it, but not if Berri does? She goes on:

“Berri’s timing is also questionable. He decided to launch his campaign, despite objections from other political leaders, right before preparations for the national dialogue, in which Lebanese leaders are to sit down to discuss Hezbollah’s arms and the national defense strategy. As more March 14 Christians raise the call to disarm Hezbollah, and despite the consensus on the ministerial statement, Berri – and by extension Hezbollah – thought it might be a good idea to warn the Christians with the anti-sectarian mantra, as it threatens them directly.”

Really? No one in Lebanon is under any illusion that any national dialogue talks are going to “disarm Hezbollah”. It’s not even on the table. There is absolutely no political willpower or military firepower to even make it worth raising. So why would Berri have to threaten “the Christians” with de-confessionalism? Which Christians? Does she think that Hezbollah is worried about the Lebanese Forces? And Aoun is Hezbollah’s ally, so why would Berri be trying to scare the FPM?

I interpret Berri’s call for deconfessionalism in a different way. The Speaker understands just as well as anyone that the process of abolishing the current system is going to be long and drawn out. It will involve several steps and will take years. Some of these steps will include the creation of a senate, the redistibution of powers between the different branches of government, administrative decentralization, electoral reform, etc. We’ve discussed these issues on this blog ad infinitum.

However, one of the most important elements of this process is going to have to be the eventual disarmament of Hezbollah. None of the other parties are going to accept a non-confessional system that allows one party to maintain a militia that is stronger than the Lebanese Army. And guess what? AMAL won’t either. This is the subtext of Berri’s strategy, in my opinion. By championing deconfessionalism, he is hitting two birds with one stone. Abolishing the current system would give his coreligionists a fair share in the government of their country, to be sure, but it would also clip the wings of his party’s biggest competitor.

Is Nabih Berri one of the most corrupt sectarian leaders in Lebanon? Yes. Is it farcical for him to be proposing abolishing sectarianism? Yes. Does he have ulterior motives? Probably. But who cares? Civil society should be calling his bluff (if that’s what it is), and trying to make the most out of an opportunity that may not come along again for years. That’s how political reform is achieved, like it or not.

Rather than getting on a high horse, Lebanese civil society should be getting into the trenches.
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February 13, 2009

A Nineteenth Sect, or None at All?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , , |
[10] Comments 

mosaiqueThe editorial in today’s Daily Star discusses Interior Minister Ziad Baroud’s order authorizing “personnel at his ministry to grant any request to have confessional identity removed from one’s official file at civil registries across the country…”

This is a very significant move, yet another feather in the activist minister’s cap. As the editorial goes on to say, it represents “a long-overdue first stage toward meeting a key term of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s 1975-1990 Civil War: preparing for the abolition of sectarianism.” I support the minister’s initiative and look forward to visiting a civil registry to perform this operation. I’m hoping that it will involve some kind of purification ritual, something akin to wading into a secularist mikveh or swearing on a copy of The Origin of Species, but it will probably just amount to standing around in a smoky waiting room and being told after three hours to come back the next day. For once in my life, I probably won’t mind.

Just to play devil’s advocate, though, let’s compare this initiative to a similar one that surfaced a few years ago to create a “nineteenth sect”, namely the non-sectarian sect. The idea was that people who did not identify with their particular sect could join this one, and eventually, over time, their numbers would grow to the point that they could begin to demand proportional representation for their “non-sectarian sect” within the government.

At the time, my problem with the 19th-sect initiative was that it seemed to further entrench the sectarian model by virtue of the fact that it did not propose abolishing it altogether, but rather creating one more fish in a sea of confessional identities. Upon reflection, however, I don’t really see how the no-sect initiative is actually different. It creates a 19th category, just like the 19th-sect initiative, which will raise the same questions and concerns, for example:

1. How will a member of either the 19th sect or the zero sect (let’s call them 19′ers and 0′ers) aspire to any governmental or municipal position that is traditionally given to a member of a particular sect? How will they be able to run for parliament, when the Ta’if Accord says nothing about 19′ers or 0′ers?

2. What is the legal status associated with the act of leaving one’s sect, from the perspective of religious law? I think it is perfectly straightforward to make the argument that removing one’s confessional identity from an official file does not amount to renouncing one’s faith, however I can also imagine that many people would be uneasy about doing so without an explicit statement along these lines from a religious authority. What interest would such an authority have, however, in making such a statement if it meant that people would drop their sectarian affiliation?

3. What happens if the people who choose to join the 19′ers or 0′ers come disproportionally from one sect? In other words, if 300,000 people decide to become 19′ers or 0′ers and the vast majority of them are Greek Orthodox or Shiite, this will tip the confessional balance of the country, raising questions about the proportional distribution of governmental positions.

4. I know what you’re thinking… people are already raising questions about the proportional distribution of governmental positions, and with good reason. The best estimates put the Shiites in Lebanon at around 40%, while they hold only 21% of parliament seats. Meanwhile, Christians probably represent around 30% of the population, while holding 50% of the seats. This leads us to our final problem, which derives from the first and the third. If 19′ers/0′ers accumulate enough numbers to the point where they can start making an argument from proportionality to be included in the government, what is to prevent anyone else from making the same argument?  In other words, if we’re going to start counting, then let’s count everybody.

The simple conclusion to be drawn from all of this — and I don’t doubt that Minister Baroud, like many others, has already thought dozens of steps beyond it — is that while such initiatives are good first steps, they will not suffice. Their chief virtue is to nudge the country in the direction of a precipice, but many more reforms and insititutional mechanisms will be needed in order to make the leap of faith. As we saw in the case of General Michel Aoun — who returned to Lebanon in 2005 as a champion of secularism, and then returned from Syria in 2008 as the leader of the Eastern Christians — sectarianism is so deeply ingrained our society that even the most fervent secularists have to wear their sectarian affiliations on their sleeves to survive in Lebanese politics.

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