Hizbullah’s secretary-general Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah gave a press conference this evening, in which he addressed the issue of forthcoming indictments from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).

You can watch the entire thing on YouTube (see here for parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). For those who don’t speak Arabic, a summary in English is available here. The salient points are the following:

  1. Saad al-Hariri visited Nasrallah before the former’s recent trip to Washington DC, and informed him that the STL would soon issue indictments against members of Hizbullah for the murder of former Premier Rafiq al-Hariri. Saad assured him that when these indictments were announced, he would absolve the party of any responsibility, and insist that these accused figures were “undisciplined” members and not connected with the leadership in any way.
  2. For his part, Nasrallah categorically refused any connection between the party and the crime whatsoever, and insisted that the most likely culprit was Israel.
  3. Nasrallah demanded that the leadership of March 14th engage in an honest and thorough review of all the “mistakes” it had made over the past four years (with its accusations against Syria and its allies).

Perhaps the most important point that Nasrallah made was that this press conference was only Part I of a two-part series. The second installment, he promised, would present all kinds of highly sensitive information dealing with the Tribunal itself and its proceedings.

It will be interesting to hear how Saad al-Hariri and his allies respond to the press conference tomorrow. I must say that the fact that Nasrallah disclosed the details of a private conversation between him and Hariri is highly unusual. It makes it impossible for the latter to climb down from it in a graceful way, which leads one to wonder whether Hariri knew what Nasrallah would say tonight, or whether he was just snookered.

Judging from all of the cozying up to Syria in the past several months, my suspicion is that Saad Hariri and his advisors would like nothing more than to put the entire STL episode behind them, and are looking for a way to save face while doing so.

If everything that was said tonight is true, then Nasrallah’s strategy (familiar to any West Wing devotees out there) was a shrewd one: break the story yourself so as to control it as best you can. By the time that the STL gets around to indicting Hizbullah members a few months from now, the development will be old news, already dissected, analyzed, and picked over by Beirut’s punditocracy. No one will be surprised, and (if Nasrallah, Jumblatt, and increasing numbers of former M14ers get their way), no one will really care.

Some further reading…

  • On the rumors of Hizbullah being infiltrated by Israeli spies, click here to see Nasrallah’s response. It’s a classic…

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Maybe you all can help me understand an idea that I’ve repeatedly encountered among various neoconservative Mideast watchers, with regard to the question of whether or not to engage Syria.

In a nutshell, the idea is that the best way for Washington to get what it wants–namely a Syrian regime that doesn’t threaten American or Israeli interests in the region–is to isolate Damascus, instead of engaging it with the aim of facilitating a peace agreement between Syria and Israel.

There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it is out of touch with recent historical experience. With the exception of the first few months after the Hariri assassination–which witnessed a Syrian withdrawal of troops, etc.–the tough isolationist policy toward Syria did not seem to reap many lasting benefits. As tough as things got for Damascus during the dark days of 2005-08, the regime never showed any signs of buckling and Bashar al-Assad eventually emerged more popular than ever (just as Hezbollah did after the 2006 war).

The second problem with this idea is its odd shortsightedness. Here’s an excerpt from a Hudson Institute event featuring Lee Smith, Jeffrey Feltman, and Elliott Abrams, in which the latter expresses this idea very directly:

MR. ABRAMS: The Bush administration did not favor, at the time it began, Syrian-Israeli negotiations because they let Syria out of the box we had carefully constructed for Syria. Syria was – in that period, if you go back to, for example, the number of European foreign minister visits over a 12-month period, very, very, very small. Syria was quite isolated. And the price it paid for the break in this isolation was zero.

Now that’s mostly a criticism of the government of Israel; much less so a criticism of the government of Turkey in the sense that if two governments want to negotiate and they ask you to facilitate, I think your culpability is a great deal less than if you are the author of this engagement. There was no point – there was nothing to be gained by criticizing the Turkish role and I don’t believe the United States ever did criticize the Turkish role. The problem, I would say, was trying to figure out what Israel or the cause of peace or the Syrian population or the Lebanese population or the Iraqi population gained from this. And I think the answer is nothing. (Download the entire transcript here)

Andrew Tabler also recently made a similar argument (i.e. with respect to Israel letting Syria out of the box) in an event hosted by the Middle East Institute, saying:

“I think it’s also quite ironic that… for all the talk about regime change during the Bush administration, it was actually Israel that saved Syria in that debate.” [NB: Tabler does not actually argue in favor of isolating Syria.]

Am I missing something here? Do these folks really believe, with the benefit of hindsight, that a few more years of uninterrupted isolation would have brought the Syrians to their knees, and that had it not been for the Turkish-brokered peace talks, the Bush policy would have been a success? This strikes me as a very peculiar position.

In my opinion, if you’re going to be against an engagement policy, you need a better reason than: “It lets Syria out of the box.”  You can argue that the Syrians aren’t democratic enough to be friends of the United States, or that they shouldn’t be “rewarded” for working against American interests, etc., but these are not particularly convincing reasons either.

At the end of the day, if the goal of the U.S. policy toward the Assad regime is to end the state of war between Syria and Israel, problematize the Syrian-Iranian relationship, and create lasting stability in Lebanon, how would this goal not be best achieved by directly pursuing a Syrian-Israeli peace deal? Tell me what I’m missing, people.

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I know several foreigners who are traveling to Lebanon this summer, and so I’m routinely asked about the chances of “something happening” while they are there.

I usually adopt a thoughtful expression, pause for a moment, and tell them not to worry. This seems to work.

Sometimes, if I am feeling mischievous, I adopt a thoughtful expression, cock an eyebrow and say: “Do you want me to be honest?” After the color drains from their face, I squint into the distance, furrow my brow, and scratch my head as though I am preparing to break some tough news. And then I say, not very convincingly: “You probably don’t have to worry about anything. Have fun!”

All of this travel advice has gotten me thinking, though. Is there any other country in the region that is vulnerable to so many (apparently) existential threats? We Lebanese seem to cultivate them. Rather than a single sword of Damocles, we seem to have acquired an entire armory’s worth, a flashing chandelier of watered-steel blades suspended over our heads.

Here are some of my favorites:

1. The War — You know, the Big One. The one that’s coming soon, maybe as soon as next week. It’s just a matter of time before Israel decides to launch another war against Hizbullah, and this time there won’t be anything left once the dust settles. It’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

2. The Hariri Tribunal — Once indictments are issued, we can expect the country to descend into chaos, particularly if Syria’s allies are implicated in any way. The mini-era of reconciliation will be over and it’ll be back to the street riots, but this time things will escalate into a full blown civil war. It’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

3. The Debt — Now over $52 billion USD (or around 150% of GDP), Lebanon’s public debt threatens to capsize the country’s fragile economy and send it the way of Greece and California. If that it happens, it’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

4. The Emigrants — Lebanon’s youth are emigrating in record numbers to the Gulf, Europe, Canada, Africa, Australia, etc. because they can’t find decent jobs in their own country. Pretty soon, Beirut will be populated entirely by wealthy foreign expats (and their exploited housekeepers). It’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

5. Pollution — Lebanon’s famously green forests and picturesque mountains are being chopped down and detonated into rubble by fat-cat oligarchs and their wasta-obtained rukhsas. Meanwhile, the Mountain of Trash in Saida is turning our coastline into a disease-ridden Petri dish. Pretty soon, there will be no reason for wealthy foreign expats (and their exploited housekeepers) to buy property here at all, which means that it’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

6. The Earthquake – An undersea earthquake off the coast creates a massive tsunami that washes us all away. As we all know, the country is crisscrossed by fault lines. One big quake, and it’ll be the end of Lebanon as we know it…

What am I missing?

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The SCUD-D (above) vs. the Fateh-110 (below).

The Syria-Hizbullah-SCUD crisis has generated an incredible amount of press in the last week. Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman was dressed down yesterday before Congress for defending Obama’s engagement policy with Syria, and Foreign Policy alone has carried something like three opinion pieces about the issue just in the past couple of days.  (For an up-to-date survey of all the most recent stories, I suggest checking Syria Comment.)

What nobody seems to be asking, though, is why these hypothetical SCUDs are so much more “game-changing” than all of the other armaments that have apparently flowed to Hizbullah from Syria since 2006, and in particular the Fateh 110 missile. The two rockets, when you compare them, are not hugely different, at least when one considers the geographical and strategic context that we’re dealing with. Let’s compare the specifications:

Ok, so the SCUD-D can travel farther than the Fateh 110, and it can carry a heavier payload. But how important are these differences, strategically speaking? The Fateh 110′s range is around 200-250 km, which is far enough to strike Tel Aviv from as far north as Beirut. Sure, a SCUD-D could hit Be’er Sheva from Tripoli, but is that really the definition of “game-changing”?

Plus, the SCUD is more difficult to hide, harder to maneuver, and probably easier to shoot down than the Fateh 110. If you were an Israeli, what would you rather face? A dozen SCUDs or a thousand Fateh 110′s?

I can’t help but wonder if all of the hullabaloo in the Western press isn’t stemming from the Soviet mystique of the SCUD, one of the most famous missiles in history, and the weapon used by Saddam against Israel in 1991. To put it in medieval terms, it would be like raising the threat level to DEFCON 1 because the enemy’s army (previously equipped with standard issue longswords) had just recently received a shipment of scimitars. Whoooooo, scimitars! They’re… umm, sharper.

Or am I being obtuse?

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DAMASCUS, Syria — U.S. and Israeli officials have reacted negatively to reports that Syria has transferred Scud missiles to the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.

Israel has called the development a “game-changing” move by Syria which has the potential to tip the region into a military conflagration.

“Syria claims it wants peace while at the same time it delivers Scuds to Hezbollah, whose only goal is to threaten the state of Israel,” said Israeli President Shimon Peres recently to an Israeli radio station.

Meanwhile, both Syria and Hezbollah are denying that any such transfer of armaments has taken place. However, high-level officials within the Syrian regime spoke to Qnion senior correspondent Jacob Tafnis yesterday evening, quietly confirming that Syria had been considering the move.

“We will not say that any Scuds have gone into Lebanon… yet,” said one official, asking to remain anonymous. “But we reserve the right to assist our neighbor whether or not they are interested in our assistance.”

When asked what the effect of such a move might be on Syrian engagement with the U.S. and the upcoming appointment of Robert Ford as ambassador to Damascus, the official responded: “We are confident that nothing is going to stop President Obama from engaging with us,” citing a recent article in Haaretz that alluded to Obama administration officials saying that “the Scud transfer made a U.S. diplomatic presence in Syria all the more necessary.”

“You see?” the official said. “The more we send weapons to Lebanon, the more they want to engage us,” he chortled happily. “I can tell you that we also have plans to establish a nuclear weapons facility in Gemmayzeh, a chemical weapons plant in Burj al-Barajneh, and a dedicated airstrip for unmanned drones right at the Beirut International Airport,” adding with a conspiratorial wink, “but you didn’t hear that from me.”

Meanwhile, in Gemmayzeh (Beirut’s popular nightlife district), rents are reported to be rising in anticipation of the new nuclear weapons plant, while local residents are hoping that the radiation will convince revelers to take their boisterous partying across town.

Qnion-small

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What is it with Bashar al-Assad? One minute, he’s clinking champagne glasses in celebration of Syria’s return to America’s good graces, and the next minute he’s raising a toast with Ahmadinejad and Nasrallah at a Resistance Reunion. The don’t-trust-Syria crowd is having a field day.

There’s something deeply puzzling about this man. Until recently, I was perfectly willing to call him shrewd, but I can’t help but wonder if he isn’t perhaps too clever by half. In 2008, immediately after the signing of the Doha Accord (which was widely portrayed in the international media as an unambiguous victory for Syria’s allies in Lebanon), al-Assad announced that Syria was engaged in peace negotiations with Israel. The timing of the announcement seemed deliberately calculated to restore a kind of balance: it was a signal to the U.S. and Europe that Syria was willing to play ball as long as its interests were protected.

Over the weekend, al-Assad executed another one of his signature swerves when, shortly after meeting with the American envoy, he hosted both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Nasrallah for a dinner at his palace in Damascus (which, you can bet, probably serves the most delicious food in the Levant). Again, the event seemed designed to keep everybody guessing, although Abdul-Bari Atwan has suggested that the whole purpose of the meeting was to secure Syria’s support to join in a war against Israel, should Iran’s nuclear facilities be bombed.

One wonders how long this balancing act can be sustained, or whether it is likely to yield any strategic returns. I can appreciate Bashar’s desire to accumulate as many cards as he can, but at some point, surely he has to start playing those cards. What happens then? Will he be on a conference call to Ahmadinejad and Mash`al whispering sweet nothings even as he signs a peace deal on the White House lawn?

Certainly Walid al-Mu`allim (Syria’s Foreign Minister) sees no contradictions in his country’s tightrope policy and has no problem envisioning a Syrian embassy in Tel Aviv. Meanwhile, some partisans of the Free Patriotic Movement were disturbed by the sight of Hassan Nasrallah representing Lebanon at a meeting of presidents.

In other news, my buddy Sean has written an excellent piece about Martin Kramer’s proposal to force Palestinians to stop having babies.

Finally, I’ll be in Washington this Friday, speaking at a briefing on Capitol Hill along with Jared Cohen (State Department) and Mona Yacoubian (U.S. Institute of Peace), co-sponsored by the Safadi Foundation and the Project on Middle East Democracy. My stats tell me that a fair number of you people are based in the seat of empire, so if you are in the neighborhood and free at 11am, come on down.

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Hezbollah secretary-general Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah announced today that his party had adopted a new program, the first time this has happened since Hezbollah’s inaugural “Open Letter” was published in 1985 (an English translation can be found here).

One should be advised that there is very little in it that is going to surprise you. In my opinion, this program merely formalizes the shift in Hezbollah’s orientation that we’ve witnessed over the past two decades, from a guerilla outfit to a full-fledged political movement. Still, this is a significant development, and I welcome your thoughts on it.

Tune in tonight for the next post in our series on reform in Lebanon: abolishing political sectarianism. A propos of this subject, here’s the section from the new Hezbollah program that addresses it (in uncommonly strong language: “the fundamental problem in the Lebanese political system, which prevents its reform, development, and renewal, is the problem of political sectarianism…”)

**

إنّ المشكلة الأساسية في النظام السياسي اللبناني، والتي تمنع إصلاحه وتطويره وتحديثه بشكل مستمر هي الطائفية السياسية. كما أنّ قيام النظام على أسس طائفية يشكّل عائقاً قوياً أمام تحقيق ديمقراطية صحيحة يمكن على ضوئها أن تحكم الأكثرية المنتخَبة وتعارض الأقلية المنتخَبة، ويُفتح فيها الباب لتداول سليم للسلطة بين الموالاة والمعارضة أو الإئتلافات السياسية المختلفة. ولذلك فإنّ الشرط الأساس لتطبيق ديمقراطية حقيقية من هذا النوع هو إلغاء الطائفية السياسية من النظام، وهو ما نص “اتفاق الطائف” على وجوب تشكيل هيئة وطنية عليا لإنجازه.
وإلى أن يتمكن اللبنانيون ومن خلال حوارهم الوطني من تحقيق هذا الإنجاز التاريخي والحساس – نعني إلغاء الطائفية السياسية – وطالما أنّ النظام السياسي يقوم على أسس طائفية فإنّ الديمقراطية التوافقية تبقى القاعدة الأساس للحكم في لبنان، لأنها التجسيد الفعلي لروح الدستور ولجوهر ميثاق العيش المشترك.
من هنا فإنّ أي مقاربة للمسائل الوطنية وفق معادلة الأكثرية والأقلية تبقى رهن تحقق الشروط التاريخية والإجتماعية لممارسة الديمقراطية الفعلية التي يصبح فيها المواطن قيمةً بحد ذاته.
إنّ إرادة اللبنانيين في العيش معاً موفوري الكرامة ومتساوي الحقوق والواجبات، تحتّم التعاون البنّاء من أجل تكريس المشاركة الحقيقية والتي تشكّل الصيغة الأنسب لحماية تنوعهم واستقرارهم الكامل بعد حقبة من اللاإستقرار سببتها السياسات المختلفة القائمة على النزوع نحو الإستئثار والإلغاء والإقصاء.
إنّ الديمقراطية التوافقية تشكّل صيغةً سياسيةً ملائمةً لمشاركة حقيقية من قِبَل الجميع، وعامل ثقة مطَمْئِن لمكونات الوطن، وهي تُسهم بشكل كبير في فتح الأبواب للدخول في مرحلة بناء الدولة المطَمْئِنة التي يشعر كل مواطنيها أنها قائمة من أجلهم.
إنّ الدولة التي نتطلع الى المشاركة في بنائها مع بقية اللبنانيين هي:
1-      الدولة التي تصون الحريات العامة، وتوفر كل الأجواء الملائمة لممارستها.
2-      الدولة التي تحرص على الوحدة الوطنية والتماسك الوطني.
3-      الدولة القادرة التي تحمي الأرض والشعب والسيادة والإستقلال، ويكون لها جيش وطني قوي ومقتدر ومجهَّز، ومؤسساتٌ أمنيةٌ فاعلةٌ وحريصةٌ على أمن الناس ومصالحهم.
4-      الدولة القائمة في بنيتها على قاعدة المؤسسات الحديثة والفاعلة والمتعاونة، والتي تستند الى صلاحيات ووظائف ومهام واضحة ومحددة.
5-      الدولة التي تلتزم تطبيق القوانين على الجميع في إطار احترام الحريات العامة والعدالة في حقوق وواجبات المواطنين، على اختلاف مذاهبهم ومناطقهم واتجاهاتهم.
6-      الدولة التي يتوافر فيها تمثيل نيابي سليم وصحيح لا يمكن تحقيقه إلاّ من خلال قانون انتخابات عصري يتيح للناخب اللبناني أن يختار ممثليه بعيداً عن سيطرة المال والعصبيات والضغوط المختلفة، ويحقق أوسع تمثيل ممكن لمختلف شرائح الشعب اللبناني.
7-      الدولة التي تعتمد على أصحاب الكفاءات العلمية والمهارات العملية وأهل النزاهة بغض النظر عن انتماءاتهم الطائفية، والتي تضع آليات فاعلةً وقويةً لتطهير الإدارة من الفساد والفاسدين دون مساومة.
8-      الدولة التي تتوافر فيها سلطة قضائية عليا ومستقلة وبعيدة عن تحكّم السياسيين، يمارس فيها قضاة كَفُؤون ونزيهون وأحرارٌ مسؤولياتِهم الخطيرة في إقامة العدل بين الناس.
9-      الدولة التي تُقِيْم اقتصادها بشكل رئيس على قاعدة القطاعات المنتِجة، وتعمل على استنهاضها وتعزيزها، وخصوصاً قطاعات الزراعة والصناعة، وإعطائها الحيّز المناسب من الخطط والبرامج والدعم بما يؤدي الى تحسين الإنتاج وتصريفه، وما يوفر فرص العمل الكافية والمناسبة وخاصةً في الأرياف.
10-    الدولة التي تعتمد وتطبق مبدأ الإنماء المتوازن بين المناطق، وتعمل على ردم الهوّة الإقتصادية والإجتماعية بينها.
11-    الدولة التي تهتم بمواطنيها، وتعمل على توفير الخدمات المناسبة لهم من التعليم والطبابة والسكن الى تأمين الحياة الكريمة، ومعالجة مشكلة الفقر، وتوفير فرص العمل وغير ذلك..
12-    الدولة التي تعتني بالأجيال الشابة والصاعدة، وتساعد على تنمية طاقاتِهم ومواهِبهم وتوجيههم نحو الغايات الإنسانية والوطنية، وحمايتهم من الإنحراف والرذيلة.
13-    الدولة التي تعمل على تعزيز دور المرأة وتطوير مشاركتها في المجالات كافةً، في إطار الإستفادة من خصوصيتها وتأثيرها واحترام مكانتِها.
14-    الدولة التي تُوْلي الوضع التربوي الأهمية المناسبة خصوصاً لجهة الإهتمام بالمدرسة الرسمية، وتعزيز الجامعة اللبنانية على كل صعيد، وتطبيق إلزامية التعليم الى جانب مجّانيته.
15-    الدولة التي تعتمد نظاماً إدارياً لا مركزياً يعطي سلطات إداريةً واسعةً للوحدات الإدارية المختلفة (محافظة/ قضاء/ بلدية)، بهدف تعزيز فرص التنمية وتسهيل شؤون ومعاملات المواطنين، دون السماح بتحوّل هذه اللامركزية الإدارية الى نوع من “الفدرلة” لاحقاً.
16-    الدولة التي تجهد لوقف الهجرة من الوطن، هجرة الشباب والعائلات وهجرة الكفاءات والأدمغة ضمن مخطط شامل وواقعي.
17-    الدولة التي ترعى مواطنيها المغتربين في كل أصقاع العالم، وتدافع عنهم وتحميهم، وتستفيد من انتشارهم ومكانتهم ومواقعهم لخدمة القضايا الوطنية.

إنّ قيام دولة بهذه المواصفات والشروط هدف لنا ولكل لبناني صادق ومخلص، ونحن في حزب الله سنبذل كل جهودنا وبالتعاون مع القوى السياسية والشعبية المختلفة التي تشاركنا هذه الرؤية من أجل تحقيق هذا الهدف الوطني النبيل.

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(The scene: a Beirut cafe)

Abu Michel: Says here in as-Safir that the next Israel-Lebanon war is gonna happen next April.

Abu Samir: You still read that rag? An-Nahar says that the war is gonna be sooner than that. January, February, maximum.

Abu Michel: Impossible.

Abu Samir: Suit yourself.

Abu Michel: The Israelis won’t attack in the winter. A winter campaign would be a nightmare for them. Low cloud cover makes flying conditions bad, and their soldiers will be disoriented in our valleys and mountains when they’re surrounded by fog.

Abu Samir: You think they’re going to care what they bomb, next time around? They’re going to bomb the entire country indiscriminately, from top to bottom, cloud cover or not. Once they’re done with that, they’ll send in their sissy soldiers.

Abu Michel: They wouldn’t dare bomb the entire country. Hezbollah will bomb Tel Aviv and Dimona.

Abu Samir: As per Iran’s instructions?

Abu Michel: Funny. What is March 14 doing about defending us from Israeli aggression?

Abu Samir: We just got Russia to donate 10 MiG 29′s.

Abu Michel: Ha! You think ten busted Russian jets are going to deter the Israelis?!

Abu Samir: You think a bunch of Katyushas are?!

(silence)

Abu Michel: (whispering conspiratorially) Look… at the end of the day, the resistance’s weapons are meant to prevent the worst possible scenario: naturalization of the Palestinians.

Abu Samir: Of course. What do you think the MiG’s are for?

Abu Michel: Of course, of course.

Abu Samir: Pass the sugar, will you?

**

Thanks are due to the talented Maya Zankoul, who agreed to illustrate what I hope will turn into a new series on this blog.

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Three developments in the past couple of days have signaled that we may indeed be nearing the end of Lebanon’s five-month stretch without a government.

1) As reported earlier, Suleiman Frangieh — the leader of the Marada party, and a member of the Change & Reform Bloc — expressed his annoyance with the fact that Aoun has kept changing his demands vis-à-vis which portfolios would be granted to C&R.

Originally, this story was only reported in the pro-March 14 media, but Aoun himself made a scornful comment about Frangieh in his press conference yesterday, so I think that rumors of a rift between the two men are probably accurate.

2) Staunchly pro-Syrian former minister Wi’am Wahhab was on TV yesterday, expressly calling for Aoun to quit messing the Lebanese people around and take the deal that Hariri was offering, namely that Aoun’s son-in-law Gebran Bassil would become Minister of Energy rather than Telecommunications. Usually, when Wi’am Wahhab speaks, you can assume the message is coming from Damascus.

[NB: I love the bit where Wahhab comments (indirectly to Aoun): "What's the big deal if Gebran Bassil is in charge of Energy rather than Telecommunications? If he's capable of achieving successes in the Telecommunications Ministry, then why can't he achieve successes in the Energy Ministry? Plus, the Energy Ministry is even more in need of successes..."

Note the complete absence of any discussion as to whether or not Gebran Bassil is even qualified to be Minister of Energy! Quite a consolation prize, don't you think? It kind of reminds me of my attempts to convince my three year-old daughter that the pair of pyjamas that I want her to put on is even prettier than the pair that she wants to wear...]

3) Nabih Berri is threatening to launch a one-man sit-in at the Parliament if the cabinet crisis is not resolved soon.

To sum up, then: Suleiman Bek, Wi’am Wahhab, and Nabih Berri are all getting fed up of the stalemate, and two of them have directed their ire at their own ally, Michel Aoun.

What’s it going to take for the General to get the message?
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An astute reader of this blog sent me the following commentary, which speculates about the significance of several curious little signals coming out of Egypt.

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Egypt and LebanonIn a sudden cloud burst of optimism, the Cabinet Alert Level was raised to orange Monday evening, only to come crashing down on the rocks of further demands by Michel Aoun on Tuesday morning. Signals now are about as mixed as the preceding metaphor but the question remains – after four months, what has finally happened to kick things into motion?

If Naharnet is right about the proposed deal (FPM retains the Telecommunicaitons Ministry but gives up Bassil as its head), this then sounds like a back-down by the Hariri camp.

Hadi Hobeich adds to that sense:

“Hobeich also said that the adopted cabinet formula suits all parties, adding that Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri has made concessions for the sake of forming a national-unity government.”

And you’ve got Naim Qassem boasting on Sunday that “external parties” have given up obstructing things, and I think we can assume he’s not talking about Syria or Iran.

So which external party is this? Might it be Egypt?

This theory is somewhat thinly sourced, but Jumblatt’s column from this weekend was oddly Cairo-centric:

“Jumblat urged the need to return to a minimum of Arab-Arab rapprochement after the Syrian-Saudi summit put its first pillar. Adding that “the Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian axis has to be the containing Arab vessel… “

Jumblatt continues to go on and on about Egypt and its regional role in the piece. Out of character for the Man from Moukhtara?

The real mystery clue though is this:

“Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Al Ghayt said that Hizbullah’s arms have nothing to do with the fact that Lebanon has failed so far to reach a Cabinet formation considering that “the Internal Lebanese balances on one side and the foreign visions on the other are what’s weighing heavily on this government and its formation.”

On the other hand, Abu Al Ghayt announced in a statement in Al-Siyasa newspaper that he has taken a look at the reports referred to the Security Council found in the court file regarding President Rafik Hariri’s assassination. “There are no indications or criticisms pointing at Syria; on the contrary, there’s an international confession of Syria’s cooperation in the matter,” he added. “

That’s quite a change of tone, considering Egypt is still in the middle of prosecuting (and allegedly torturing) a vast Hezbollah network for planning terrorist attacks on their soil.

Egypt has historically been a second-tier player in Lebanon, though they pop up in interesting ways here and there. In mid-October, Tripoli Alawi leader Rifaat Eid blamed an attack in his community on Egyptian intelligence, rather than his usual foes in the Sunni district. Sunni Sheikh Malek ash-Shaar blamed unnamed “foreign parties” for the attack, though he left it ambiguous as to exactly who he had in mind.

More directly relevant here, there were rumors in August about disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over Lebanon as the Saudis were gearing up for a rapprochement with Syria.

And as early as July, Hezbollah accused Egypt of holding up that rapprochement. Egypt was also reportedly in favor of keeping Saniora as prime minister, suspicious that the opposition had so readily agreed to Hariri in the role (Egypt denied the report, and in early June denied trying to influence the elections).

But now, kind words for Hezbollah’s weapons and Syria’s role in the Hariri assassination? If Egypt was possibly the last hold out pushing Hariri not to give Telecom to Aoun, did Egypt just “sell out Lebanon?” And if so, for what?

(Commentary for QifaNabki.com by Philippe Bou Rached)

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Further reading material:

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