On most days, Nabih Berri is pretty happy to be Nabih Berri. Sure, his political party is viewed as Hizbullah’s uncouth country cousin, and no, there isn’t really anyone in line to inherit the throne once the Estez adjourns his last parliamentary session. But for the time being, he’s Nabih Berri, and that’s pretty good.

These days, not so much. Many Lebanese politicians have gotten egg on their faces courtesy of Wikileaks, but the cables have made a veritable Quiche Lorraine out of Nabih’s mug. His conversations with US embassy personnel during the 2006 War are full of terribly embarrassing statements about Hizbullah. One day he claims that the resistance will no longer be needed if the Shebaa Farms are liberated; the next day, he promises to lead the Lebanese Army back to the South in lieu of Hizbullah; the following week he says that Israel has the right to defend itself when attacked.

Most scandalous of all was a comment to Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman in which Berri lauded Israel’s bombing campaign as a positive development that would help weaken Hizbullah, describing it as “like honey”:

“I like a little bit of honey, but if you eat the whole jar you get sick!” Berri exclaimed, and then threw his head back in riotous laughter.”

As if things couldn’t get any worse for the Speaker, our tireless cyber-sleuths at the Qnion have managed to get their hands on the transcript of yet another July War meeting between him and Feltman. We’re sure he’ll deny it, and we don’t blame him.

*

The scene: a formal living room at Nabih Berri’s residence in Ain al-Tineh.

Feltman: Mr. Speaker, thank you for seeing me on such short notice.

Berri: Ahlan wa-sahlan. Ahlan wa-sahlan. You are most welcome. Most welcome!

Feltman: I know that you must be extremely busy.

Berri: For Ambassador Jeffrey, I always have time. I am at your service. You know, there is an old Arabic proverb that says, “Don’t shed an eyelash for an enemy, but for a friend you must slaughter the sheep.”

Feltman: (has heard it a dozen times) How kind.

Berri: Welcome welcome to the American Ambassador. You know I lived in Detroit when I was a young man?

Feltman: (nodding wearily) Yes, I think you’ve mentioned that.

Berri: (reminiscing fondly) Ha hah…those were the days! The Motor City, Joe Louis, the Detroit Tigers…

Feltman: (stifling a yawn)… Pastrami.

Berri: Yes! Pastrami sandwiches! My God I miss those. You know, there is an old Arabic proverb that says: “Slaughter the sheep for a friend, but for your lover, serve a pastrami sandwich.”

Feltman: (puzzled) Really?

Berri: No. I’m just joking. Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha.

Feltman: (smiling weakly) Ha ha ha, yes… very droll.

Berri: Hah! I do love pastrami. And bagels! Oh my God, with cream cheese and lox? Divine. Did you know that I have a special shipment of bagels sent to me from Zabar’s in New York every month? Five dozen bagels. Every month.

Feltman: Oh my.

Berri: (suddenly seized by an idea) Would you like a bagel?

Feltman: No thank you.

Berri: Yes! Yes you must have a bagel. I just received a fresh shipment. (He whistles for an assistant) Abu Talal! Jeeb el-bagels 3as-saree3. Yalla t7arrak!

Feltman: Mr. Speaker.

Berri: So, Mr. Ambassador. What can I do for you?

Feltman: I thought we could discuss the latest developments in the conflict. Last time we met, you said that the bombing campaign was like a jar of honey. Is that still your assessment?

Berri: A jar of honey? No. Today I would say it is like a bowl of soup.

Feltman: Soup?

Berri: Yes. A hot soup that is getting hotter by the minute.  And in the middle of this soup is a big delicious matzo ball. It’s a slippery matzo ball, you know? One of those big ones that you can’t cut into with a spoon. You try, but it just spins around and around. And it is too big to swallow whole, so you have to find a way to shrink it. So you turn up the heat, hoping that it will dissolve, but it doesn’t. Do you follow me?

Feltman: No.

Berri: (continuing unawares) Now, Ambassador Jeffrey, I love matzo ball soup, but even I will not eat this soup if it gets much hotter. And what is the point of matzo ball soup if you can’t eat the matzo ball?

Feltman: Hmm.

Berri: You know, there is an old Arabic proverb that says: “If your matzo ball is too slippery to cut with a spoon, try a fork.”

Feltman: (baffled) Try a fork?

Berri: A fork!

Feltman: (suddenly getting it) Ohhh…

Berri: (arching a sly eyebrow) Right?

Feltman: (pleased with himself) But, Mr. Speaker, where might we find a fork big enough to… (looks at Berri knowingly) … skewer such a big, slippery matzo ball?

Berri: (smiling) The Shebaa Farms.

Feltman: Shebaa? Impossible! The Israelis will never go for it. And you’ve said it yourself: Shebaa is just a pretext! Shebaa is an excuse! Shebaa is nothing!

Berri: Ahh, but Mr Ambassador, Shebaa is both nothing and everything.

Feltman: You’ve lost me again.

Berri: Let me explain. (He holds up a bagel.) What is this?

Feltman: Pardon?

Berri: What is this? Is it a roll? Is it a piece of bread?

Feltman: It’s, umm… it’s a bagel?

Berri: Correct. And what makes it a bagel?

Feltman: (completely lost) I have no idea.

Berri: The hole! The hole makes it a bagel.

Feltman: Okay…

Berri: Now, what is the hole? Is it something or nothing?

Feltman: Is it something or nothing? Hmmm, well… I suppose it’s both something and nothing?

Berri: Precisely. The hole is both something and nothing. In fact, the hole is everything and nothing! The hole is the absence of something, but without that absence, the bagel is not a bagel.

Feltman: Fascinating.

Berri: (leaning forward and whispering) Hizbullah is the bagel.

Feltman: (whispers back) I thought Hizbullah was the matzo ball.

Berri: (ignoring him) Hizbullah is the bagel because of the hole that is Shebaa. Without the hole, Hizbullah ceases to be the bagel, and turns into a common piece of bread. Do you follow?

Feltman: (in a hypnotic trance) Hizbullah is the bagel…

Berri: (pleased) Exactly…

Feltman: …and without the hole, Hizbullah is no longer a bagel.

Berri: Precisely…

Feltman: I think I’m beginning to understand.

Berri: Good.

Feltman: (in a daze) Shebaa is the bagel hole… It is everything and nothing… Hizbullah is the matzo ball. The soup is getting hotter. The bagel is Hizbullah. Israel is the spoon. Shebaa is the fork…

Berri: (Taking a big bite of the bagel). Mmmm, delicious.
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Several new embassy cables were released three days ago by Wikileaks. They are the same cables that al-Akhbar (which obtained advanced access to them) has been commenting on since July 13, so they’ll be old news for regular readers of the Arabic press. For the rest of you, here’s a basic summary of the most important revelations.

As early as May 5 2006, Serge Brammertz (the UN commissioner investigating the Hariri murder) had “expressed concern about the quality of the evidence that was used to recommend the arrest of four Lebanese senior security officials” and told American Embassy officials that Lebanese General Prosecutor Said Mirza was “growing increasingly uncomfortable with the extended incarceration of the officials.” In spite of the fact that Brammertz felt that there was not yet enough evidence to support “a strong case” against the generals, he assured the Americans that “he would not reverse the recommendation of his predecessor, Detlev Mehlis.”

Another cable dated June 20 2006 reveals that Brammertz was “deeply worried” about the “eroding basis for continued detentions” but was still not willing to order their release. Rather, he seemed more inclined to pass the hot potato to the Lebanese judiciary, arguing that such a decision fell under its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the judiciary was clearly looking to the UN for guidance on the matter. No one wanted the job of turning the generals loose. Ambassador Feltman, for his part, was well aware of the “seismic effect” that Jamil al-Sayyid’s release would have on the political situation, and judged that releasing him could greatly impact America’s position in Lebanon.

A year later, a fascinating cable recounted an exchange between Ambassador Feltman and Minister of Justice Charles Rizk about the optics of how and when the generals should be released. I highly recommend you read the entire thing, but this is one of the most interesting bits:

The Ambassador noted that an international prosecutor could very well order the release of one or more of the [four generals] for lack of evidence.  After all, all of us have heard from UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz that the detention of some if not all is “awkward,” given the dearth of credible evidence.  The four were arrested because of the testimony of witnesses who later recanted, their testimony now thoroughly discredited.  Yes, Rizk said, but a release from the UN would be different than a release from the GOL [government of Lebanon]. If the GOL releases them now, “it will be a scandal.”  People will say, “why did you hold them for two years?” If the UN releases them, however, the situation is different:  The GOL picked them up at the request of the UNIIIC and then held them until they could be transferred to the Special Tribunal.  So, in this case, the GOL merely acted on behalf of the UN. If [the Lebanese judiciary] releases them, by contrast, it appears as though the GOL had authority all along and chose to ignore it.

As it turned out, the generals would not be released for another two years after the date of this cable, and the reasons were entirely political. Ambassador Feltman says as much in the above cable, when he comments: “whatever the merits of their initial arrests and however awkward the continued detention of one or all is, we agree with Rizk that Syria’s Lebanese allies would score an enormous victory, should the four generals be released now.”

Comment

These cables represent yet another blow to the public image of the UN Tribunal. More seriously, they are a significant indictment of the integrity of the UNIIIC Commissioner and the various Lebanese officials involved in the Hariri investigation, to say nothing of the evidentiary standards in place and the UNIIIC’s judicial independence. Of course, many critics of the Tribunal have been making this case for years (and none so stridently as al-Akhbar‘s justice editor, Omar Nashabe), and the publication of these cables vindicates their position in certain ways.

March 14 partisans would counter that no investigation is perfect, and while some regrettable mistakes were made, these leaks are more of a public relations embarrassment than a reason to denounce the investigation as a whole. While this may be true, the problem is that the Tribunal’s public image has arguably become as important as its ability to indict suspects and prosecute them. When a UN Tribunal is seen as having no more independence and credibility than a judge appointed by an authoritarian regime, then is it safe to say that it has (to use an au courant phrase) “lost its legitimacy”?

Ambassador Feltman clearly understood the significance of a messenger’s credibility when he argued in 2007: “If [Judge Eid] would release any of the four generals, March 14 leaders would suspect Syria’s hand at play, further deepening the distrust and divisions in this country. But if an international prosecutor makes the same decision, it will be viewed as one based on the legal merits of the case.

Perhaps this was still true when he wrote it. How true is it today?

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Over the past several weeks, as Wikileaks has released its reams of US government cables full of politically damaging statements by the leaders of Lebanon’s March 14th coalition, many have remarked on the fact that Hizbullah and its allies have not exploited the documents as purposefully as they could have.

Sure, there has been the odd snide remark in a press conference, and Hizbullah is now making noises about suing March 14th figures for inviting Israel to invade Lebanon, but one gets the sense that much more could have been made of the scandal. So why the  silence?

The obvious reason is that no one really knows what else Wikileaks has in the way of embarrassing transcripts. By allowing ministers like Elias al-Murr to claim that Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman was putting words in his mouth (when it was revealed by Wikileaks that he was coordinating the Lebanese Army’s response in a future hypothetical encounter with the IDF), Hizbullah was ensuring that its own allies would have the same space to maneuver, in case they were caught saying similarly damaging things.

Which brings us to the latest revelations, made possible by al-Akhbar’s serialized Wikileaks bonanza. There are four new cables available on the newspaper’s website that provide a glimpse into several meetings that Speaker of Parliament (and staunch Hizbullah ally) Nabih Berri held with American officials (including Ambassador Feltman and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch) during the July 2006 War.

(Update: There’s also a cable about a meeting between Minister of Health Mohammed Jawad Khalifeh and Ambassador Feltman, which I pasted at the bottom of the lot below).

Nothing Berri says is nearly as egregious as what a vodka-swilling Walid Jumblatt was whispering in the Americans’ ears around the same time, but it is telling nonetheless. Most notable is a statement that Berri allegedly made regarding the future of the Lebanese resistance:

If Shebaa Farms are not turned over to Lebanon, Berri said that he personally would oppose disarming Hizballah. But if the Shebaa Farms are “”liberated,”" then “”who needs”" Hizballah?

Now, this obviously doesn’t make Berri look so good, and one can imagine that there will be a letter to the editor from Berri’s office published in al-Akhbar tomorrow decrying the statement attributed to him in the cable. He probably won’t take much of a political hit, and all will be forgiven and forgotten in due course.

However, I think it’s still worth pointing out that a very significant majority of Lebanon’s political leaders (across ideological and confessional lines) were basically in agreement on the need to “deal with” Hizbullah, in some way or another. March 14th’s leaders obviously wanted the party’s military apparatus to be crushed by Israel, while Aoun wanted it to be reined in through the framework of his February 6th agreement with Nasrallah.

Meanwhile, although Berri insisted that the resistance had a legitimate right to exist as long as Israel remained on Lebanese territory, he also made it clear that Hizbullah would have to give up that right if Israel withdrew from Shebaa. Most strikingly, the cables show that even the Americans were beginning to be convinced that this broad consensus among Lebanon’s leaders on Shebaa might actually provide a solution to the Israel-Lebanon conflict.

Of course, we all know what happened. Tzipi Livni rejected the idea that Shebaa be dealt with at all, and the issue was put to bed. On the other hand, who knows how serious Berri and Aoun would have been about advocating Hizbullah’s disarmament when push came to shove? It’s not hard to imagine any of a wide range of potential pretexts to replace Shebaa. The links to the various cables are below; check them out and discuss amongst yourselves…

PS: For those of you waiting for some big pronouncement on my part about the events going on in Syria, I’m waiting for some expert commentary to come through. In the meantime, check out Syria Comment. (For Arabic speakers, there’s also Kafa Samtan, which I haven’t checked out yet, but Mustapha over at Beirut Spring vouches for them.)

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06BEIRUT2440 (July 22, 2006) | Subject: SPEAKER BERRI SAYS HE IS WAITING FOR ISRAEL’S FINAL OFFER

06BEIRUT2464 (July 25, 2006) | Subject: BERRI SAYS ISRAEL WON’T WIN

“The Ambassador argued that Israel will not accept a return to the status quo ante. At the same time, Lebanon has an opportunity now that the USG is considering ideas that might resolve the Shebaa Farms issue. Berri noted that the Shebaa Farms are crucial. If Shebaa Farms are not turned over to Lebanon, Berri said that he personally would oppose disarming Hizballah. But if the Shebaa Farms are “”liberated,”" then “”who needs”" Hizballah? Berri concluded that he understood that inclusion of the Shebaa Farms issue this was a positive step, and agreed to keep looking for a solution to the current crisis. (Comment: Berri stuck to the same line he had used with the Secretary — cease-fire and prisoner exchanges — which the Ambassador said would lead to a quick dead end. But, today, Berri seemed to offer a hint of support for a different approach, if he was assured that Shebaa Farms would be part of the package. Berri seems to have moved ever so slightly overnight. End comment.)”

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06BEIRUT2541 (August 6, 2006) | Subject: A/S WELCH MEETS WITH SPEAKER BERRI

“Berri believed that if the Israelis do not withdraw from Shebaa, he cannot pressure Hizballah to relinquish their arms. He told A/S Welch that the resistance will have a right to remain as long as Israel is present in Lebanon.”

“Berri recommended that in the first phase, Israeli soldiers should withdraw and 10,000 soldiers from the Lebanese Army would deploy to the south. In what was an unprecedented statement for a Lebanese Shia leader, Berri vowed that he would lead the army to the south, driving a jeep in front of the tanks.”

“Berri stated that he will rebuild the south again, but could not do so with Israeli forces there. “”What I built in 22 years they have destroyed in 22 days,”" helamented. However, he stated that he is adamant to lead the Shia back to the south when Israeli troops leave, just as he claimed to do after previous times of strife. A/S Welch assured Berri that the U.S. would be a partner in rebuilding Lebanon with emphasis on the south.”

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06BEIRUT2600 (August 11, 2006) | Subject: LEBANON: FOR BERRI RESOLUTION COMES DOWN TO ONE THING

“Berri admitted that the events of 1983 set a bad example for multinational forces in Lebanon under Chapter 7. Berri told A/S Welch that perhaps he is afraid of Chapter 7, and the U.S. friendship with Israel makes him even more afraid. He recognized that Israel wants the right to protect itself and said that “”this will be included.”" He reminded A/S Welch that Resolution 426 establishes precedent for Chapter 6 with a clause for self-defense.”

“Berri informed A/S Welch that Shebaa Farms will always be the pretext for Hizballah to remain armed. He warned that the language in the current draft of the resolution on Shebaa farms is not sufficient.”

“Berri accused the U.S. of not wanting to engage on the Shebaa Farm issue because it does not want to give Hizballah a victory. A/S Welch agreed. Berri declared that it is his right to state for the record that problems will continue with Israel until Shebaa Farms is resolved.”

Berri reluctantly accepted the reality that if Israeli troops are fired on they have the right to defend themselves on the ground at the point of attack. However he added that defending themselves does not mean air bombings on civilian areas.”

“A/S Welch offered that when the U.S. votes on the resolution, it could say that civilian areas should not be used as launching areas and should not be attacked. Berri cautioned that the wording should be precise and clear. Winking (and implying he was thinking of his “”Hizballah partners”"), he fears that the time between the cessation of hostilities and the deployment of an enhanced UNIFIL could be used by people who “”do not want peace”" to ignite the conflict again. Berri stressed the importance of assurances from the U.S. and UN that Hizballah fire on Israeli soldiers inside Lebanon will not start the conflict again because he doesn’t “”trust Hizballah.”"


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06BEIRUT2699 (August 19, 2006) | Subject: SHIA MINISTER CLAIMS BERRI TRICKED HIZBALLAH, NOW AT ODDS WITH NASRALLAHwordpress stats

QN Comment: This cable, which details a meeting between Feltman and the Berri-allied Minister of Health, Mohammed Jawad Khalifeh, is perhaps the most damning and mind-blowing of the lot. I’m not going to excerpt it because I’d just end up quoting the whole thing. Read it all.


Apologies for the brief absence, folks. Things have been busy, but not busy enough to keep me from devouring all of the Wikileaks cables about the July 2006 War that al-Akhbar has been publishing. Mesmerizing stuff…

For English speakers who may have trouble navigating the newspaper’s website, I’ve posted links to all of the relevant cables below along with their dates, subject headings, and the occasional excerpt. If I have some time later this week, I’ll share some thoughts about the content of the cables.

If anyone’s interested and in the area, I’ll be giving a talk at the University of Oklahoma two weeks from today, where I look forward to seeing my friends Yaron Ayalon (an Ottoman historian who teaches there) and Joshua Landis, author of the indispensable Syria Comment (which is a must-read these days, given all that’s going on in Syria).

Without further ado, I give you…

AL-AKHBAR’S WIKILEAKS CABLES

06BEIRUT2351 (July 13, 2006) | Subject: INITIAL REACTION TO NASRALLAH’S SPEECH JUSTIFYING HIZBALLAH’S ABDUCTION OF IDF SOLDIERS

06BEIRUT2353 (July 13, 2006) |Subject: LEBANESE PM SINIORA: “WE NEED HELP.”

06BEIRUT2390 (July 14, 2006) |Subject: HIZBALLAH’S RECKLESSNESS SPLITS AOUN’S ADVISORS

“Aounist advisor MP Ibrahim Kanaan expressed frustration and deep concern over the present course of events in Lebanon and said he has advised his party leader General Michel Aoun to put distance between himself and Hassan Nasrallah. Kanaan is convinced that Hizballah, with “its extreme overconfidence,” will soon lose control over the rapidly escalating hostilities. In his view, the resulting loss of life and stability will produce a severe backlash in Christian, and possibly Sunni, communities that could destroy Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, since it is currently viewed as a Hizballah ally. Kanaan suggested, however, that the current crisis may offer an opportunity for Aoun and PM Siniora to form a pro-reform “partnership.” Senior Aoun advisor Gebran Bassil, on the other hand, defended Hizballah’s actions and said Siniora’s government was merely reaping the whirlwind created by its passivity and refusal to share power. Moderate Aounist MP Farid el-Khazen, meanwhile, split the difference: strongly criticizing Hizballah’s duplicity and recklessness, while recommending aloofness from the star-crossed Siniora government.”

“In a July 13 discussion with poloff, MP Ibrahim Kanaan, who is frequently used as an intermediary and spokesperson by Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun, said that FPM’s association with Hizballah has been a mistake. Declaring that Michel Aoun did not have the slightest idea that Hizballah was planning such a provocative act, Kanaan professed deep concern that Hizballah was now effectively steering the ship of state. When asked if he thought Hassan Nasrallah was acting like a Minister of Defense, Kanaan retorted, “no, no, much more than that.”

“Kanaan half-heartedly defended the troublesome February 6 compact between the FPM and Hizballah, saying it originally held the promise of bringing Hizballah into Lebanon’s political mainstream. But he conceded that the previous day’s “reckless” ambush in Israeli territory is threatening to completely undo Lebanon’s struggling democracy and threatens to deliver the country back into the tender mercies of Syria.”

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06BEIRUT2403 (July 17, 2006) | Subject: LARSEN TO PROPOSE HANDOVER OF ISRAELI SOLIDIERS TO GOL…

“Mid-way through the meeting three visitors arrived at Larsen’s room unannounced. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, and Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi entered the room in good humor and indulged in generous orders to room service with the others present. The three Lebanese politicians reacted positively to Larsen’s proposal to call for a transfer of the Israeli soldiers to the GOL…”

“Over a glass of red wine, a large bottle of vodka (the quality of which sparked a long exchange between Jumblatt and the startled room service waiter), and three bottles of Corona beer, Jumblatt gave a briefing on the thinking of the March 14 coalition which had met that evening. Jumblatt noted the heavy destruction of Lebanese infrastructure but bemoaned the irony that Hizballah’s military infrastructure had not been seriously touched. Jumblatt explained that although March 14 must call for a cease-fire in public, it is hoping that Israel continues its military operations until it destroys Hizballah’s military capabilities.”

“Responding to Jumblatt’s complain that Israel is hitting targets that hurt the GOL while leaving Hizballah strategically strong, the Ambassador asked Jumblatt what Israel should do to cause serious damage to Hizballah. Jumblatt replied that Israel is still in the mindset of fighting classic battles with Arab armies. “You can’t win this kind of war with zero dead,” he said. Jumblatt finally said what he meant; Israel will have to invade southern Lebanon. Israel must be careful to avoid massacres, but it should clear Hizballah out of southern Lebanon. Then the LAF can replace the IDF once a cease-fire is reached. A defeat of Hizballah by Israel would be a defeat of Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, Hamadeh added. For emphasis, Jumblatt said that the only two outcomes are total defeat or total success for Hizballah.”

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06BEIRUT2413 (July 18, 2006) | Subject: [FRENCH AMBASSADOR] INCENSED BY ISRAELI TARGETING OF LAF…

06BEIRUT2437 (July 21, 2006) | Subject: MINISTER MOUAWAD URGES HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE…

“In closing, Minister Mouawad re-emphasized two issues: the urgent necessity of starting humanitarian operations now and the advantages of using that effort to strengthen the standing of the GOL with the Lebanese people. She stated the first step is the immediate establishment of
humanitarian corridors inside Lebanon to the villages of the south. Finally, she urged that USG support and protect three critical figures: Fouad Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, and unexpectedly, Nabih Berri — who in her opinion may be the best available Shia alternative to Nasrallah.”

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06BEIRUT2443 (July 23, 2006) | Subject: AMINE GEMAYEL SAYS CEASE-FIRE SHOULD SECURE BORDER FIRST…

“Gemayel said Aoun had cooperated with Mossad through the duration of Lebanon’s civil war, and said he allied himself with Syria and Hizballah now because he believed they offered him the best chance at winning his long coveted seat in Baabda Palace.”

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06BEIRUT2471 (July 25, 2006) | Subject: SAMIR JA`JA` SUPPORTS PROPOSED PATH TO CEASEFIRE…WITH A SUGGESTION

06BEIRUT2490 (July 29, 2006) Subject: MARWAN HAMADEH DISCUSSES CEASE-FIRE POSSIBILITIES

“On the night of July 28, the Ambassador and econoff met with Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh at his apartment. “An Nahar” General Manager Ghassan Tueni was also there for much of the meeting, his main contribution filling us in with breaking press reports (almost all of which later proved to be erroneous).” [QN: That explains Naharnet...]

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06BEIRUT2504 (August 1, 2006) Subject: SINIORA BELIEVES HE HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS PEOPLE…

“When asked about his inexplicable confidence that Hizballah would either move north of the Litani with its heavy weapons, or allow itself to be disarmed by the LAF, Siniora said he wasn’t certain, but his on-going communication with Hizballah through Nabih Berri and other Shia interlocutors led him to believe they were “considering” and close to such action.”

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06BEIRUT2508 (August 1, 2006) Subject: AOUN PARROTS PIAF: “JE NE REGRETTE RIEN”

“In an awkward attempt to straddle the fence, Aoun insisted he was not really in an alliance with Hizballah, but then proceeded to tear down the “inconstant” leaders of March 14 — Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri — who in his view did not deserve the “confidence” of the Lebanese people. The implication (although never stated explicitly) was that Nasrallah is a more trustworthy partner…”

For those who hoped the tragedy of the current crisis might be the catalyst to inject some sanity in Michel Aoun’s relationship with Hizballah, this meeting proved a disappointment. In what was essentially a disjointed, repetitive, and often contradictory performance, Aoun displayed the qualities that engender so much antipathy and distrust among Lebanon’s political class. He rarely admits a mistake or miscalculation and through exquisite twists of logic, always manages to replay his diplomatic/political “triumphs” and interpret other leaders’ efforts as feckless and ill-conceived…We have noticed developing fissures in the FPM movement and strong disagreement with Aoun’s policies in his second-tier of advisors, but Aoun’s lack of movement toward the country’s other pro-reform leaders implies that the post-conflict political scene may be as contentious as it was on July 11. We agree with him that the Shia community in Lebanon cannot be ignored and cannot be made to feel defeat as a community. But, unlike Jumblatt and Hariri, Aoun has not yet awakened to the fact that Nasrallah has used him.”

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06BEIRUT2511 (August 1, 2006) |Subject: HAMADEH SEES RESOLUTION OF SHEBAA FARMS AS MEANS TO NEUTRALIZE HIZBALLAH IDEOLOGICALLY

“Hamadeh described a significant change in Minister of Defense Elias El-Murr’s demeanor, characterizing him as playing both sides. Hamadeh said that El-Murr believes the Hizballah will “win” in the current conflict and is trying to save himself politically for the post-conflict sorting-out of the political scene here. Hamadeh recounted that Siniora was furious at El-Murr at a recent cabinet meeting for his comments to the media to the effect that, “the 7 points (of Siniora’s paper) do not exist”. Other ostensibly “pro-Syrian” members of the cabinet have been surprisingly quiet, Hamadeh said. Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, an erstwhile ally of President Emile Lahoud, has been, “playing it better than Elias (El-Murr),” offered Hamadeh. Rizk has even been pushing forward the Cabinet’s work on the establishment of an international tribunal to try suspects in the crimes under the purview of Serge Brammertz’s UNIIIC. According to Hamadeh, Rizk has made great progress, appointing “two good judges.” Hamadeh stressed that they should take advantage of Rizk’s openness to work on this issue. For Hamadeh, now is the time to pass a resolution to establish the tribunal, as this would serve to “keep Syria quiet” on the current Lebanese-Israeli conflict as well as further contain the Syrians in the long run.”

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06BEIRUT2513 (August 1, 2006) | Subject: MP BOUTROS HARB: NASRALLAH CANNOT BECOME REGION’S RAMBO

Quote: “[Harb] recommended that a strong Israeli advance that completely controls the Hizballah strongholds of Maroun El Ras and Bint Jbeil would provide a chance for the U.S. impose a ceasefire while showing that Hizballah has been overpowered… He also stressed that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a reluctant Hizballah ally, will become the political victim of Hizballah.”

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06BEIRUT2540 (August 6, 2006) | Subject: JUMBLATT AND HAMADE ON TWO-PHASE SOLUTION

Jumblatt expressed regret that, in his view, Israel failed to assess Hizballah’s operations on the ground. He questioned how Israel was completely taken by surprise on July 12. He concluded that today the tables have turned to Hizballah’s advantage as the organization is founded on a “culture of death.” Hizballah fighters want to die as martyrs and will not hesitate to blow themselves up to kill Israelis. In addition, there is a new generation of Israeli soldiers that are not as driven and motivated as their predecessors. He thinks this was illustrated in the past weeks of fighting and warns that it is dangerous for Israel and the region for this to be revealed.”

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06BEIRUT2544 (August 7, 2006) | Subject: CHRISTIAN POLITICAL LEADERS SAY SHEBAA IS KEY

“On August 5, A/S Welch and Ambassador Feltman met with Christian leaders from the anti- Syria March 14 movement, including former President Amin Gemayel, his son and Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, Dory Chamoun, Carlos Edde, Fares Souaid, George Adwan, and presidential hopefuls Nayla Moawad (Minister of Social Affairs), Nassib Lahoud, and MP Boutros Harb. While claiming to be fully supportive of Prime Minister Siniora’s call for a ceasefire, they are troubled that the current conflict might leave Hizballah in a stronger position within Lebanon than at the beginning. The Lebanese government will need to be in a position of strength to deal with Hizballah once the conflict is over, the leaders argued. To this end, they would support a continuation of the Israeli bombing campaign for a week or two if this were to diminish seriously Hizballah’s strength on the ground.”

“Claiming to reflect PM Siniora’s private thoughts, several of the assembled leaders urged that Hizballah be given a “real pounding” by the Israelis to the point that the group would be “soft enough to listen to reason.” According to Boutros Harb, “if we are convinced that Israel can finish the job, then we can allow a few more weeks,” though the consensus seemed to rest between seven to ten days. If on the other hand Hizballah were to emerge emboldened with a perceived sense of victory, “that would be a disaster.”

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06BEIRUT2553 (August 8, 2006) | Subject: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID LAF DEPLOYMENT

“Murr stated clearly that the LAF was prepared to hit back at Hizballah if they attempted to fire at Israel or tried to draw Israeli fire by placing launchers near to LAF positions.”

“In contrast to his earlier dismissals that Israel had significantly harmed Hizballah, Murr claimed that Hizballah had suffered losses of 50 percent of its equipment as well as 400 fighters during the conflict. While he estimates that Hizballah has fired off 3000 of its rockets, he believes that the Syrians were able to resupply Hizballah with 2500 before the Israelis took out the road links.”

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06TELAVIV3079 (August 8, 2006) | Subject: ISRAEL FM LIVNI SAYS ISRAEL DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT DRAFT OF UN RESOLUTION

06BEIRUT2602 (August 12, 2006) | Subject: SAAD HARIRI WANTS LAHOUD OUT

“According to Hariri, “Nabih Berri is furious with Hizballah.” While Berri will maintain a united Shi’a front for some months following the conflict, Berri will put pressure on Hizballah to keep in line and, ultimately, “Berri’s dream is to finish off Hizballah” and reclaim Amal’s primacy among the Shi’a. Hariri said that Berri had compelled Hizballah to accept the LAF deployment plan, and that this spells “the beginning of the end” for HIzballah.”If we play our cards right,” Hariri added.”

“Asking that his comments be kept close-hold, Hariri whispered that, “We need to remove Lahoud, (LAF commander Michel) Sleiman, and (Head of the G2 army intelligence) George Khoury. They are in bed with Syria. They are in bed with Hizballah.” While Hariri hopes to eventually recruit Nabih Berri’s critical support to achieve this, he asked that international pressure on Iran and Syria continue unabated.”

“On a positive note, Hariri praised with seeming sincerity the performance of PM Fouad Siniora during this crisis.”If I had picked Bahije (Tabbarah, former Minister of Justice) a year ago,” he said, his voice trailing off as he shook his head. We think that this was a tacit acknowledgement, Saad-style, that the strong advice we and the French gave him to pick Siniora over his initial choice of Tabbarah was the right one. But what was encouraging in Saad’s praise for Siniora was the suggestion that the two of them will now be able to cooperate without the internal rivalries and jealousies that had plagued their relationship earlier this year. In general, we think Siniora has done a better job when he hasn’t had to worry about the less experienced but politicaly more powerful Saad second-guessing him. But we also believe that it’s good Saad is home: the image of Saad Hariri staying at the Plaza Athenee in Paris and globe-trotting with an sizable entourage, while hundreds of thousands of Lebanese felt forced to leave their homes, was not good for the future of the March 14 movement.”
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Apologies for the radio silence over the past week. I was in New Orleans attending the annual conference of the American Comparative Literature Association, and the lure of great music, great seafood, and great company proved more irresistible than Lebanese politics.

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon, Jeffrey Feltman, will be giving a talk at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs tomorrow evening. I plan to attend and, given the opportunity, I will ask him one question on behalf of a reader of this blog.

So let’s hear it. What should I ask Mr. Feltman? I’ll select what I think is the best question and then report back with his response.

Update: I did indeed attend the Feltman talk, but apparently all of the talks in this Middle East Initiative series are off-the-record, so I won’t be able to report back on what he had to say. Sorry guys.

Some links…

  • An excellent, thoughtful review of Lee Smith’s book by Andrew Exum.
  • On the Vero-Moda-fication of Hamra Street.
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lebanese piastreA few quick things:

1) The Safadi Foundation’s blog (which is good, you should read it) has a useful recap of yesterday’s House Foreign Affairs Middle East Central Asia Subcommittee’s hearing with Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman. Among the highlights, the following question from Chairman Gary Ackerman (who once coordinated with Michel Aoun to turn SALSRA from a dream into a reality… AIG, correct me if I’m wrong about that):

In the two areas we are trying to improve relations with Syria mainly bilateral relations and Middle East peace, are we going to be willing to pay in Lebanese coins?

You see, we’re not being paranoid. Politicians really do talk like that. Click the jump to read more.

2) Rob, of Arabic Media Shack fame, now has a new blog. Wasn’t it Cicero who said that you can take the man out of the blog, but you can’t teach him new tricks? Or something like that. Anyway, subscribe to his RSS feed, but not if you haven’t already subscribed to mine!

3) Listen to Philippe Skaff (president of Lebanon’s Green Party) and Ziad Baroud (Interior Minister/Superman) explain why Lebanon needs urgent billboard reform. (Hint: it has something to do with the panneau blocking the madame from walking along the trottoire with her poussette.)

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Green LightLike farm animals before an earthquake, the Lebanese daily newspapers are beginning to shift anxiously ahead of what they now believe to be, yes… I think we can confirm… yes, uh huh, there’s absolutely no question this time… it’s gonna… it’s, it’s… oh my God… it’s happening!

THE GOVERNMENT IS COMING, THE GOVERNMENT IS COMING!

Or so they say.

Al-Akhbar predictably claims that America’s evil Vice-Regent (Jeffrey Feltman) has given the green light, while Naharnet predictably claims that Syria’s evil Vice-Regent (Bashar al-Assad) has given the green light. Michel Aoun, in the meantime, is insisting that the light remains decidedly orange.

I remember speaking to Joshua Landis a few months ago about the cabinet crisis, and he suggested to me that while Bashar would love to see Saad Hariri come over the mountains and make the humiliating visit to Damascus, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. had made it clear that no such gesture was in the cards. Meanwhile, as much as America and Saudi would love to see Saad stick it to Aoun and Hizbullah (by assembling a majority cabinet), that is clearly a red line for Syria.

Moral of the story: I personally don’t think that Lebanon’s problem is one evil foreign Vice-Regent but several of them, not to mention all the little local wannabe evil Vice-Regents.

Update (comment from Joshua Landis):

“The word on the street about the Syrians and Saudis is that they have agreed to tell their friends in Lebanon to fix things as they see fit, but that Syria and Saudi Arabia are not going to let their relationship be held hostage by paralysis in Lebanon… Interpret that as you wish.”
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