November 5, 2009

Is the Opposition Losing Patience With Aoun?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Free Patriotic Movement, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , , , , , |
[10] Comments 

Three developments in the past couple of days have signaled that we may indeed be nearing the end of Lebanon’s five-month stretch without a government.

1) As reported earlier, Suleiman Frangieh — the leader of the Marada party, and a member of the Change & Reform Bloc — expressed his annoyance with the fact that Aoun has kept changing his demands vis-à-vis which portfolios would be granted to C&R.

Originally, this story was only reported in the pro-March 14 media, but Aoun himself made a scornful comment about Frangieh in his press conference yesterday, so I think that rumors of a rift between the two men are probably accurate.

2) Staunchly pro-Syrian former minister Wi’am Wahhab was on TV yesterday, expressly calling for Aoun to quit messing the Lebanese people around and take the deal that Hariri was offering, namely that Aoun’s son-in-law Gebran Bassil would become Minister of Energy rather than Telecommunications. Usually, when Wi’am Wahhab speaks, you can assume the message is coming from Damascus.

[NB: I love the bit where Wahhab comments (indirectly to Aoun): "What's the big deal if Gebran Bassil is in charge of Energy rather than Telecommunications? If he's capable of achieving successes in the Telecommunications Ministry, then why can't he achieve successes in the Energy Ministry? Plus, the Energy Ministry is even more in need of successes..."

Note the complete absence of any discussion as to whether or not Gebran Bassil is even qualified to be Minister of Energy! Quite a consolation prize, don't you think? It kind of reminds me of my attempts to convince my three year-old daughter that the pair of pyjamas that I want her to put on is even prettier than the pair that she wants to wear...]

3) Nabih Berri is threatening to launch a one-man sit-in at the Parliament if the cabinet crisis is not resolved soon.

To sum up, then: Suleiman Bek, Wi’am Wahhab, and Nabih Berri are all getting fed up of the stalemate, and two of them have directed their ire at their own ally, Michel Aoun.

What’s it going to take for the General to get the message?
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November 4, 2009

Egypt Selling Lebanon Down the Nile?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon | Tags: , , , , , , , , , |
[3] Comments 

An astute reader of this blog sent me the following commentary, which speculates about the significance of several curious little signals coming out of Egypt.

**

Egypt and LebanonIn a sudden cloud burst of optimism, the Cabinet Alert Level was raised to orange Monday evening, only to come crashing down on the rocks of further demands by Michel Aoun on Tuesday morning. Signals now are about as mixed as the preceding metaphor but the question remains – after four months, what has finally happened to kick things into motion?

If Naharnet is right about the proposed deal (FPM retains the Telecommunicaitons Ministry but gives up Bassil as its head), this then sounds like a back-down by the Hariri camp.

Hadi Hobeich adds to that sense:

“Hobeich also said that the adopted cabinet formula suits all parties, adding that Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri has made concessions for the sake of forming a national-unity government.”

And you’ve got Naim Qassem boasting on Sunday that “external parties” have given up obstructing things, and I think we can assume he’s not talking about Syria or Iran.

So which external party is this? Might it be Egypt?

This theory is somewhat thinly sourced, but Jumblatt’s column from this weekend was oddly Cairo-centric:

“Jumblat urged the need to return to a minimum of Arab-Arab rapprochement after the Syrian-Saudi summit put its first pillar. Adding that “the Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian axis has to be the containing Arab vessel… “

Jumblatt continues to go on and on about Egypt and its regional role in the piece. Out of character for the Man from Moukhtara?

The real mystery clue though is this:

“Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Al Ghayt said that Hizbullah’s arms have nothing to do with the fact that Lebanon has failed so far to reach a Cabinet formation considering that “the Internal Lebanese balances on one side and the foreign visions on the other are what’s weighing heavily on this government and its formation.”

On the other hand, Abu Al Ghayt announced in a statement in Al-Siyasa newspaper that he has taken a look at the reports referred to the Security Council found in the court file regarding President Rafik Hariri’s assassination. “There are no indications or criticisms pointing at Syria; on the contrary, there’s an international confession of Syria’s cooperation in the matter,” he added. “

That’s quite a change of tone, considering Egypt is still in the middle of prosecuting (and allegedly torturing) a vast Hezbollah network for planning terrorist attacks on their soil.

Egypt has historically been a second-tier player in Lebanon, though they pop up in interesting ways here and there. In mid-October, Tripoli Alawi leader Rifaat Eid blamed an attack in his community on Egyptian intelligence, rather than his usual foes in the Sunni district. Sunni Sheikh Malek ash-Shaar blamed unnamed “foreign parties” for the attack, though he left it ambiguous as to exactly who he had in mind.

More directly relevant here, there were rumors in August about disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over Lebanon as the Saudis were gearing up for a rapprochement with Syria.

And as early as July, Hezbollah accused Egypt of holding up that rapprochement. Egypt was also reportedly in favor of keeping Saniora as prime minister, suspicious that the opposition had so readily agreed to Hariri in the role (Egypt denied the report, and in early June denied trying to influence the elections).

But now, kind words for Hezbollah’s weapons and Syria’s role in the Hariri assassination? If Egypt was possibly the last hold out pushing Hariri not to give Telecom to Aoun, did Egypt just “sell out Lebanon?” And if so, for what?

(Commentary for QifaNabki.com by Philippe Bou Rached)

**

Further reading material:

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October 22, 2009

Put On a Happy Face

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon | Tags: , |
[14] Comments 

greyskiesThe past twenty-four hours have been bewildering, even by Lebanese standards, for all of the mixed signals coming out of Beirut about the cabinet formation. Yesterday, there were widespread reports of “optimism” and a “positive atmosphere” regarding the talks. Today, however, all this exuberance has evaporated in the wake of what The Daily Star is calling a “bombshell” (yawn) from Michel Aoun:

Government formation suffered a heavy setback Wednesday as demands made by Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader MP Michel Aoun pulled the rug from beneath earlier progress.

Deliberations over the cabinet formation appear as if they would have to be resumed from scratch as Aoun, in a defiant tone, demanded that his party be granted six portfolios and be allowed to maintain the five ministries – including the Telecommunications Ministry – being handled by his Reform and Change bloc in the current caretaker cabinet.

Naturally, March 14 officials (and even a few ex-March 14 officials) have expressed “shock at Aoun’ s stance given the relatively optimistic mood.”

I love these kinds of statements from Lebanese politicians. They belong to what I’ve come to think of as the meteorological school of political commentary. Politics, in other words, is like the weather. You can’t control it; you just have to hope for the best, taking advantage of the sunny days and riding out the rainy ones.

Some mornings, I wake up to read that everyone is feeling great about the “positive atmosphere”, and that this bodes well for the prospects of forming a government. On other mornings, I open the newspaper to find that this positive atmosphere has been replaced by a “negative mood”, and that all progress towards the goal has been erased.

You can almost hear the frustration in the M14 pols’ voices when they complain about Aoun’s behavior: “Why did you have to go and spoil a perfectly sunny day with this cloudburst?”

What’s the lowly citizen to do but put on their parka and go out into the drizzle, whistling a hopeful tune to distract themselves from the unfortunate turn of events?

Grey skies are gonna clear up…

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September 21, 2009

Aoun Drops Demands, Opposition Adds New Member

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, The Qnion | Tags: , , , , |
[45] Comments 

Aoun and BassilBEIRUT, Lebanon — The leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, General Michel Aoun, has announced that he is dropping what many believed to be the principal obstacle to the Lebanese cabinet formation: the demand that his son-in-law Gebran Bassil be appointed Telecommunications Minister.

Anticipation was high in Beirut today that this development would pave the way for the formation of a new cabinet after three months of fruitless negotiations between the majority March 14 coalition and the Lebanese opposition.

Hopes of a breakthrough have fizzled, however, as a new complicating factor emerged within a few hours of Aoun’s announcement. The opposition has reportedly added a new member to its ranks, an obscure figure who goes by the name of Abu Tanjara the Oracle of Mashmoushi, and who claims to be the last living adherent of an ancient sect that worshipped the Phoenician god Baal.

abu tanjara

Abu Tanjara

At a crowded press conference organized by the FPM at a posh Beirut hotel, reporters were surprised to see an unusual-looking person taking the podium, instead of the FPM spokesman or an executive committee member.

Abu Tanjara read a lengthy statement to the assembled audience, recounting the history of his community’s travails at the hands of the ancient Persians, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, and “the barbarians who followed them.” This was followed by a diatribe against monotheism and a fifteen-minute rain dance. Finally, the Oracle announced his decision to join the Lebanese opposition, rejecting the majority’s “arrogant monopolization of the country’s decision-making.”

When asked by a reporter if he had any specific demands of Prime Minister-designate Saad al-Hariri, Abu Tanjara replied: “I’m glad you asked. The following are my demands, which are not really even demands, to be perfectly frank — they are my natural rights as a full member of the confessional mosaic that is Lebanon.”

Abu Tanjara continued: “I am demanding the Defense and Foreign Policy ministries, so that Lebanon may finally shed its parochial standing in the region and grow to its natural boundaries, which encompass all of Greater Phoenicia. I am also demanding one hundred and seventy virgins — ten from each of Lebanon’s seventeen official sects — to be delivered to the entrance of my cave, at the top of Mount Sannine. The virgins will serve as the Mothers of the Rebirth of the Baalist Church. Finally, I am demanding two hundred and fifty million dollars. Any questions?”

In response to a question from the an-Nahar reporter about the consequences of the majority rebuffing his demands, Abu Tanjara had this to say: “Well, if they want to try to rule this country all alone, let them go ahead. But I warn them: my pet dragon Lulu doesn’t like majority cabinets, and if she wakes up and goes on one of her rampages, not even I will be able to stop her,” he said, pulling out a picture of a fearsome-looking dragon and passing it around the room.

Lulu, the fire-breathing dragon pet of Abu Tanjara, Oracle of Mashmoushi

Lulu, the fire-breathing dragon pet of Abu Tanjara, Oracle of Mashmoushi

Representatives of the FPM, Hizbullah, and Amal have declined to comment on Abu Tanjara’s specific demands, only saying that “the opposition welcomes the Oracle with brotherly affection, and will adopt a unified stance.”

Meanwhile, Prime Minister-designate Saad al-Hariri has promised to review the Oracle’s remarks carefully, expressing hope that “a cabinet representing all of Lebanon will soon see the light of day.”

Qnion-smallBy Qifa Nabki

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September 7, 2009

Saad Hariri Takes the Plunge

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Free Patriotic Movement, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , |
[53] Comments 

Cozily ensconced on the fifth floor of Widener Library, surrounded by musty tomes and post-it notes, I’ve finally found a moment to check on the old blog after a fortnight’s hiatus.

Saad_Hariri_180Luckily, there is actually something to talk about. Saad al-Hariri has finally put together a cabinet proposal and submitted it to President Suleiman for approval. The response from the Free Patriotic Movement has been predictably hostile, with General Aoun calling all FPM ministers-designate to boycott the new cabinet, which reportedly gives the party five seats including (sources say) the Industry, Social Affairs, Public Works, and Education portfolios.

Several questions come to mind.

  1. Why has it taken Hariri sixty-nine days to put together a cabinet that spurns Aoun’s demands? In other words, if he was going to deny him the Telecommunications and Interior ministries, why didn’t he do it a lot earlier?
  2. Hariri would have had to secure Jumblatt’s approval for this proposal before going forward with it. Does Jumblatt’s approval of a cabinet lineup that the opposition will almost certainly reject suggest that he is returning to the March 14 fold?
  3. When the opposition does reject this proposal, what will Hariri’s next move be? Is he prepared to call the opposition’s bluff and say, “Well I tried to form a national unity government but you rejected it, so tough luck,” or will he return to the drawing board?

I’m hoping that one of the many excellent Beirut-based political journalists who read this blog will get on the phone to the various party offices and answer these questions for us. In the meantime, here are my own musings.

Over the past couple of months, I’ve found myself deeply puzzled by the behavior of Lebanon’s political elite. On the one hand, you have the leaders of the Free Patriotic Movement, who talk about being persecuted by Hariri and being denied their “rights.” What rights are these, exactly? I’ve scoured the Lebanese Constitution searching for a hint to what Aoun and Bassil are talking about, but my efforts have been fruitless.

As strange as the FPM’s rhetoric is, however, Hariri’s behavior has been all the more mystifying. Practically from the start, the PM-designate has behaved like his coalition lost the election, going from one meeting to another, listening to every demand, threat, and insult. Not to use a March 14 talking point, but what really is the point of winning an election if you can’t be the final arbiter of who gets what in the cabinet? (By the way, I would have felt the same way had the tables been turned and a March 8 PM-designate’s efforts were being blocked by the LF or the Kata’eb.)

At the end of the day, the question is: “What is Hariri afraid of?” Why is he committed to a national unity government? Is this a condition imposed upon him by the Saudis, or perhaps by the more independent, pro-Syrian wing of March 14 (like Jumblatt, Miqati, Safadi, Murr, etc)?

Or is Hariri worried about a return to the bad old days of 2006-08, with an opposition sit-in disguised as some kind of benign labor dispute, with the goal of bringing down the government?

I asked a well-connected political analyst these questions recently and he responded as follows:

Essentially, no one wanted to go back to the majority-opposition dichotomy of the years before, not the Saudis nor Saad or March 14. Yes, it’s too polarizing, and it doesn’t fit into regional alignments, with the Saudis and the Syrians still wanting to take advantage of their so-called (and uneasy) reconciliation. They disagree over Lebanon, but they don’t want to divorce because of this. So national unity was the catchword.

With Saad al-Hariri now saying that “there is one majority in Lebanon,” perhaps the Saudis have decided that they’re tired of being conciliatory.

Any thoughts?

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August 7, 2009

March 14 Comes Undone

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , , , |
[63] Comments 

kamaljumblatt2It’s the end of an era. Don’t let anyone tell you otherwise.

I can’t quite recall who made this point a few months ago, but it seems certain that the era of high-stakes, zero-sum politics is over, having been replaced by the mundane triangulations of consociational compromise. Or something like that.

In other words, Lebanon has finally shaken loose its star-crossed two-party experiment and settled back into a more familiar arrangement of transient and politically expedient alliances unencumbered by rhetoric or ideology.

March 14 has kicked the bucket, and March 8 will inevitably follow, given that its centripetal force essentially amounted to little else beyond opposition to March 14. For all of Jumblatt’s promises that he will not abandon Saad Hariri, can anyone really deny that the political landscape that has existed for the past four years has finally been dynamited?

After all, with the departure of Jumblatt and his 11-MP “Democratic Gathering Bloc”, March 14 is left with 60 seats in the 128-seat parliament, 5 seats short of a majority. If anyone else drops out (Michel el-Murr comes to mind) the number will fall even lower. In order to hold on to his bid for the premiership, Saad Hariri and his coalition are going to have to make some very deep concessions to the opposition, via the intercession of Walid Bek.

jumblatt-exitBut wait! Those who are calling Jumblatt’s little surprise a “defection” do not appreciate the genius of his move. A defection would require him joining the opposition, at which point the tables would be turned, and March 8 would be handed a parliamentary majority. This is not Jumblatt’s style. By setting off on his own (and perhaps courting other like-minded opportunists… I mean, independents)  he will build a bloc that both sides — March 14 and March 8, or whatever is left of them — will need to court in order to govern effectively.

Hizbullah Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem has said that the opposition is not going to try any eleventh-hour monkey business vis-a-vis the cabinet formation. Once Hariri gets back from his trip to EuroDisney or wherever he is, a 15-10-5 cabinet will probably be formed in line with the consultations that have taken place over the past two months (yes, it’s been two months), and Hariri will probably get to follow his father’s footsteps to the Grand Serail.

But I won’t be surprised to see a new government in a lot sooner than four years.
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August 2, 2009

Walid Goes a-Courtin’

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Lebanon, March 14, The Qnion | Tags: , , |
[11] Comments 

jumblatt2

Twitter and the blogosphere are buzzing with news of Walid Jumblatt’s latest about-face, in which he announced at a PSP gathering that his alliance with March 14 “was driven by necessity and must not continue.” Jumblatt further stressed the need “to rethink a new formation that would provide a way out of bias and prevent being pulled toward the (political) right.”

Although Saad al-Hariri’s Future Movement issued a mild response to Jumblatt’s snub (stating that it “believes in the right of each political party to adopt the stance and slogans that it wants”), the Qnion managed to lay its hands on a top secret recording of a telephone conversation between Saad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt from earlier in the day, which puts a very different face on the true effect of Jumblatt’s betrayal.

**

(Ringing phone)

Female voice: Hello?

Saad al-Hariri: Uh, hi. May I please speak to Walid Bek?

Female voice: May I ask who’s calling?

Hariri: It’s Saad al-Hariri.

Female voice: Oh, hello Sheikh Saad. I’m afraid Walid Bek is taking a bath. Can he call you later?

Hariri: It’s kind of important.

Female voice: Ummm, well, he really prefers not to be disturbed when he’s taking a bath.

Hariri: (getting annoyed) It’s an emergency.

Female voice: Oh my. Well in that case, would you please hold?

Hariri: Sure.

(Ten minutes pass… Then, muffled voices are heard, accompanied by the sound of splashing water and background music.)

Jumblatt: Mmmm, yes?

Hariri: Walid Bek?

Jumblatt: Oh hello, Saad.

Hariri: Hi. Listen, I was hoping to have a word with you.

Jumblatt: (merrily) Can’t it wait? I’m having a bubble bath and listening to Barry Manilow’s latest compilation. Have you heard it? It’s really fabulous.

Hariri: (tense) Uh, no, this can’t wait.

Jumblatt: Oh I’m sure it can. Look, the electricity is going to go out in half an hour and I really want to listen to the rest of this album. So why don’t I give you a call in the… hee hee, stop it! Stop splashing!

(Female giggles are heard in the background and more splashing)

Hariri: Ahh, Walid Bek?

Jumblatt: (distracted) No, that’s my rubber duckie! Hee hee hee… Give it back or I’ll have to come and take it away from you! Hee hee hee hee…

Hariri: (snapping) Listen here you crazy freak!! Turn off the music and pay attention before I come over and shove that rubber duckie up your…

(There is a huge splash)

Jumblatt: It’s mine! You little tart, hee hee hee. Quack quack! Hee hee ha ha… Ahem… hello, Saad?

Hariri: (disgusted) Uh huh.

Jumblatt: Sorry about that. Ok. you have my full attention, hee hee. What’s up?

Hariri: (incredulous) What’s up? What’s UP? Why don’t you tell me what’s up, Walid?

Jumblatt: (feigning innocence) What do you mean?

Hariri: Oh. Yeah, right, sure, uh huh… Nothing’s up. Nothing at all, except that somebody has decided to LEAVE MARCH 14, that’s all!

Jumblatt: (bored) Oh, that…

Hariri: (furious) Yes, that. Yes, Walid… That! What the hell, man?! Did you, like, think I wasn’t going to find out about it? What am I, stupid or something?

Jumblatt: (aloof) Honestly, Saad, I didn’t really give it that much thought.

Hariri: (sarcastically) Oh, sure you didn’t give it that much thought. What EVER! Just like you haven’t given much thought to every single backstabbing word that’s come out of your mouth for the past three months!

Jumblatt: Look, I’m not having this conversation right now, ok?

Hariri: Oh yes you are. This little chat is long overdue. What, March 14 isn’t cool enough anymore for you? We’re not powerful or influential? Huh?

jumblattJumblatt: I  never said that.

Hariri: (with a tight voice) You didn’t have to say it… Actions speak louder than words, Walid, don’t you know that? Bastard! (crying openly now)

Jumblatt: (sounding apologetic) Hey man, listen…

Hariri: (sobbing uncontrollably) I mean…do the… last three years mean…nothing to you?!

Jumblatt: Of course they mean something, Saad,  it’s just…

Hariri: It’s just what?! What?! March 8 is more popular than us? (sniffles) Them and their stupid counter-culture baloney…

Jumblatt: Look, Saad. It’s complicated.

Hariri: (sarcastic and bitter) Of course it is. “Complicated.” How silly of me…

Jumblatt: It’s not what you think it is.

Hariri: Oh it’s not? Well please tell me what it it really is, Walid. Please explain your love-fest with Berri. Your sudden rediscovery of Arabism? And how about your phony anti-American diatribes. Please explain it because it sure looks a lot like a big fat betrayal to me!

Jumblatt: (coldly) I haven’t betrayed anyone, Saad. But you can call it whatever you want.

Hariri: You know what? It doesn’t matter what you say, because you’re out!

Jumblatt: Pardon me?

Hariri: You heard me! You’re out of March 14! I’m kicking you out.

Jumblatt: You can’t kick me out. I’m a co-founder, just like you.

Hariri: Puh-leaze. I’m in charge, and I say you’re out!

Jumblatt: (indignant) Fine!

Hariri: Fine!

Jumblatt: FINE!!!

Hariri: FINE!!!

Jumblatt: I don’t care. You think I care? I don’t. I was going to quit anyway!

Hariri: Whatever.

Jumblatt: Yeah, whatever.

Hariri: Whatever.

Jumblatt: Whatever.

(There is an awkward pause. The sound of water can be heard lapping softly at the side of Walid’s jacuzzi, and in the background, Barry Manilow is singing “I Should Care”.)

Hariri: So, umm, have a nice life. I guess.

Jumblatt: Look, it doesn’t have to be this way.

Hariri: (sniffling) I think it does. I’m glad I know how you really feel, and now we can both move on.

Jumblatt: Saad, come on.

Hariri: Goodbye Walid.

(a pause)

Jumblatt: Goodbye Saad.

(click… line goes dead)Qnion-small

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July 15, 2009

Is That a Silver Bullet In Your Pocket…

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , , , , , , |
[30] Comments 

electoralmathWe’ve entered the third week of deliberations over Lebanon’s next cabinet lineup, and there is no end in sight. Hariri has paid more house calls than a 19th century doctor in typhoid season, and yet for all we know, there isn’t even agreement on the most basic issues, like the number of ministers accorded to each side.

This is not entirely the  fault of one man or one party or one coalition. Consider the various matrices that Hariri is operating with. In most parliamentary democracies, the goal of the ruling party is typically to form a government with the smallest possible coalition that can gain the confidence of the legislative chamber.

In Lebanon’s case, the goal is to form a government with the largest possible coalition without completely crippling the executive branch through perpetual veto-enforced gridlock. It’s not pretty, but this is the solution that everyone is committed to this time around.

Add to this opening principle a variety of other distributional conventions and you have  a recipe for a very complicated process indeed. For example, the cabinet is typically supposed to be split equally between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites are usually given the same share each. In a thirty-member cabinet, this would mean that there would have to be 15 Christians (e.g., 6 Maronites and 9 non-Maronites) and 15 Muslims (e.g., 6 Sunnis, 6 Shiites, and 3 Druzes).

Before you can go about parceling out seats, however, you need to know how many each coalition is going to get. Here we run into the old veto issue. Hariri is negotiating different opposition demands, ranging from Aoun and Frangieh’s request for full proportional representation (which would amount to 45% of the cabinet or 13 ministers), to a simple veto share (11 seats), to Hizbullah and Amal’s constructive ambiguity (which is presumably open to a 10 seat share along with certain “guarantees” in the cabinet declaration.)

Finally, there is the issue of foreign interests. Syria would like its allies to have a veto share and would like it even better if Hariri came to Damascus before announcing the cabinet (highly unlikely indeed). The Saudis would like to reserve as much power for M14, but there have been rumblings about a possible opening to Damascus as a means of drawing it back into the Arab fold. Given the number of square pegs awaiting insertion into round holes, where does a novice PM-designate even begin?

The formula most talked about is the so-called 15-10-5 split (for M14, M8, and the President, respectively), which has a certain elegance about it. For legislation on ordinary issues, M14 would not be able to push through its agenda without help from the President’s ministers, a fact that would seem to strengthen the President’s role as a true consensual figure, and not just a symbolic one.

At the same time, the opposition would not be able to block legislation on the “issues of national importance” that require a cabinet supermajority, without the help of the president as well. His ministers would represent the crucial swing vote.

If Hariri were to pursue this option, how would he parcel out the opposition’s share of 10 seats? My guess is that he’s planning to split them equally between Aoun’s Change & Reform Bloc and Hizbullah/Amal. Why? Let’s look at the numbers.

March 14 won 71 seats in the 128-seat parliament, which translates to 55%. March 8 won the remaining 45%. If we were to adopt General Aoun’s proposal that the cabinet lineup reflect the parliamentary balance, this would mean that M14 would get 17 seats in a 30 member cabinet and M8 would get 13. Of course, such an alignment would give the opposition its desired one-third-plus-one cabinet veto, which Hariri and co. would like to avoid, so full proportional represetation is out of the question for them. However, partial proportional representation may be the silver bullet.

According to the most generous calculation, Aoun’s Change & Reform Bloc won 28 seats in parliament (if you count Marada, Tashnaq, and the Wahdet al-Jabal Bloc [Talal Arslan, Bilal Farhat, Fadi A`war, and Naji Gharios]) or 21.9%. This share would represent 7 cabinet seats (6.56 to be exact) under a proportional scheme. Given that Hizbullah has routinely expressed its inclination to give up its own cabinet share to its electoral allies, this would permit Hariri to satisfy Aoun and Frangieh’s proportional demand without giving the opposition as a whole a blocking veto. Six or seven seats for Change & Reform plus three seats for Berri would seem to do the trick. No veto, but a face-saving exit for Aoun and Frangieh, and perhaps also a way for Hariri to begin mending fences with the FPM. Of course, it’s unlikely that Berri will agree to having only 3 seats compared to Aoun’s 7, but that’s their problem, not Hariri’s.

Aoun’s lieutenants have been uncharacteristically supportive of Hariri in recent days (Bassil: “We have an interest in the success of Saad Hariri”) and so this is perhaps what they are angling for with the insistence on proportional representation.

One way or the other, we should know in, oh… maybe another six months.
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July 10, 2009

Thar’s Federalists in Them Thar Hills…

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Free Patriotic Movement, Lebanon, March 14, Reform | Tags: , , , , , |
[20] Comments 

circling the wagons

Michael Young had an excellent op-ed in yesterday’s Daily Star about the dangerous course charted by Lebanon’s Christian leaders, particularly the young Sami Gemayel. I’ve disagreed with some of Young’s writings before in these pages, but I think that he is consistently among the most astute observers of Christian politics in Lebanon. Those who airily dismiss his articles as M14 propaganda would do well to read this critique of Gemayel’s isolationist politics. Here are the key paragraphs:

“An alarming number of Maronites today appear to have lost any sense of the collective nature of the Lebanese state. The Aounists, Sami Gemayel, Nadim Gemayel, even Sleiman Franjieh, have shown an inability to come to grips with the sectarian contract of 1943, the National Pact, and its successor, the Taif Accord. Taif is the real culprit to them, documentary proof of Christian decline – a decline they have all received with bitterness, even if their responses have differed.

“For the Aounists, Taif handed Maronite power to the Sunnis, hence their effort to reverse this by allying themselves with another rural community, the Shiites, to regain what was lost. For people like Sami Gemayel, the solution lies in greater Christian unanimity against the outside, which when you peel away the layers is really just a strategy bound to enhance Christian isolation. For Franjieh and not a few Aounists, the way out is through an alliance of minorities, with the Alawites in Syria and the Shiites in Lebanon, against the Sunni majority in the Middle East. Each of these notions is foolish in itself, an avenue toward communal suicide, and all have one thing in common: antagonism toward the Sunni community.

“There is no small amount of historical irony, and hypocrisy, here. For decades the Maronites took pride in saying that they were the true defenders of “Lebanon first.” Now that the Sunnis have adopted the slogan as their own, too many Maronites have reacted as if this were a threat to the Lebanese entity because Sunnis are extensions of an Arab majority. Ultimately, the message this sends is that the Maronites only defended a “Lebanon first” option when the Lebanon in question was one they dominated. Now that the community feels it is losing ground, the preference is for Christians to envelope themselves in a tight defensive shell.

“When Sami Gemayel speaks about the Christians “being stepped upon,” what does he mean? This is the language of demagoguery, and in some respects of war. Who has stepped on the Christians? Judging by Gemayel’s actions and statements, the simple answer is “the Muslims” whoever that may be. Yet being stepped upon is a very different concept than accepting the reality of Christian numerical regression. It is very different than grasping that Taif, the hated Taif, hands Christians representation well beyond their real numbers. When one feels stepped upon, the world looks like the bottom of a shoe, and it becomes very difficult to follow a sensible path away from one’s resentments.”

samigemayelI agree with Young’s analysis. Listening to some of these Christian leaders — on both sides of the political divide — I often catch myself thinking: “What chutzpah!” Is it arrogance or naïveté (or a blend of both) that permits one to complain about the weakened powers of the presidency after Ta’if? In what sense is it reasonable to imagine that Lebanon could be governed today solely by a powerful Maronite president, when the Christians, as a whole, represent a minority of the population?

I recall meeting with Alain Aoun (Michel’s nephew) a few months ago, and discussing different potential electoral laws. He was a little bit cagey about what kind of law would be the FPM’s ideal formula, and when I pointed this out to him, he replied: “Well, obviously, we feel strongly about a law that maximizes the number of Christian politicans voted in by Christian voters.” I replied by asking him how this squared with the FPM’s purported desire to dismantle political confessionalism. His answer was revealing, particularly because of its subtle self-contradiction: “Yes of course the FPM’s goal is to bring about a nonconfessional state. By why not try to do this from a position of strength?”

Come again?

The notion of a “Third Republic” is not, in and of itself, a bad idea. But the problem with the FPM’s Third Republic was that it did not address the most crucial part of it — deconfessionalism — in a detailed enough fashion. March 14′s Christian leaders, on the other hand, have offered no meaningful discourse on this issue whatsoever, beyond support for administrative decentralization.

The current historical moment represents a rare window of opportunity for Lebanon. With the various foreign “sponsor” states seemingly recalibrating their relationships with the country as a result of a larger geopolitical reshuffling of power relations, a space has been opened up for a new grand bargain to be struck, or an old grand bargain to have its vows renewed (and fulfilled). However, the shared strategy of Lebanon’s Christian leaders — circling the wagons only to fight one another within a self-imposed confessional corral — does not inspire confidence in the future.

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June 22, 2009

Deconstructing the Popular Vote

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Lebanon | Tags: , , , |
[45] Comments 

wimbledon

Scarcely a day goes by without an opposition leader reminding the Lebanese public about which side won the popular vote in the last election. Interestingly, though, I have not yet read much analysis that attempts to explain exactly how the opposition managed to win as much as 10% more of the popular vote while still losing the election.

Kamal Feghali, a pollster said to be sympathetic to the opposition, has released a final report on the elections. On the second-to-last page, he provides a very helpful graph that shows how many votes the two coalitions received in each district, the winning percentages, and the margins of victory. I’ve reproduced the graph below as a JPEG for your convenience.

popularvote

Studying the results, it becomes clear that the winning percentages in opposition-won districts are, in general, much higher than those of loyalist-won districts. In particular, the winning percentages in Hizbullah/Amal-dominated districts are absolutely enormous, ranging from 77% (Marjeyoun) to 88.1% (al-Zahrani) to 93.2% (Bint Jbeil). By contrast, the March 14-won districts have far lower winning percentages, coming in at an average of 61.2% based on my calculations, versus 88% in Hizbullah/Amal districts.

Higher winning percentages — particularly in large districts — translate into higher margins of victory. The problem with high margins of victory, however, is that they don’t amount to any additional electoral gains; winning a district by a single vote is just as good as winning it by 100,000 votes, as far as getting elected is concerned.

To illustrate this problem, let’s imagine a tennis game between me and Roger Federer. For the first two sets, I dominate him, winning 6-0, 6-0. In the third set, I’m winning 5-0 and serving for match point when the tide suddenly turns and Roger roars back, eventually winning the set 7-5. The same thing happens in the fourth and fifth sets, and Roger, alas, wins the match.

Who do you think won more games in that match, Roger or QN? As it turns out, I did, winning 27 (6+6+5+5+5) to his 21 (0+0+7+7+7). And yet, I couldn’t win when it counted most.

The numbers in Feghali’s election graph tell a similar story. Let’s take a look at the six opposition-won districts with the highest margins of victory: Baalbek (94,841 votes), Sour (66,470), Nabatieh (56,112), Bint Jbeil (48,687), al-Zahrani (40,662), and Marjeyoun (37,000). All told, the opposition earned 343,782 more votes than its opponents in these districts. (Remember, these figures reflect margins of victory, not total votes. In other words, they are “surplus votes” earned beyond the 50% needed to win the district).

Now let’s look at the six loyalist-won districts with the highest margins of victory: Beirut III (51,619), Akkar (36,000), Shouf (35,453), Tripoli (25,366), Miniyeh/Dinniyeh (21,636), and Aley (13,053). All told, March 14 earned 183,127 more votes than its opponents in these districts.

If we subtract March 14′s surplus votes in its biggest districts from March 8′s surplus votes in its biggest districts, we are left with 160, 655 votes, which is nearly the difference in the popular vote results. In other words, had March 8 won its districts by the same margins of victory that March 14 won its districts, the difference in the popular vote would be practically negligible.

Conclusions: The reason that March 8 won 165,000 votes more than March 14 and yet still lost the election is essentially because Hizbullah and Amal trounced their opponents by an average of 88%, winning tens of thousands of votes more than they needed in their districts.  By comparison, March 14 won its districts by an average of 61.2%, with far more modest margins of victory. The difference in “surplus votes” between the top six districts for each coalition produces a net gain of 160,000 votes for the opposition.

Michel Aoun’s Change & Reform bloc, by contrast, won its districts by an average of around 56.5%, so it is a little bit disingenuous for Aoun and Frangieh to say that they reflect the popular will. The discrepancy in the popular vote was not generated by their own supporters but rather by Hizbullah’s and Amal’s.
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