February 16, 2012

Sectarianism in the Eye of the Beholder: Shehadi Responds to Landis

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Syria | Tags: , , , , , |
[59] Comments 

And the hits keep coming. Nadim Shehadi articulates much better than I do the fundamental point of contention with Josh Landis regarding the question of Lebanese and Syrian sectarianism. I’m hoping MESA can be persuaded to host an installment of this very interesting exchange in Denver later this year. See below.

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This is another attempt to divert the debate into a Lebanon vs Syria one and using Lebanon as a ‘bad example’ to in a way justify the situation in Syria. This is similar to the way Joshua uses Lebanon to say that Syria could descend into a civil war like Lebanon, or Iraq for that matter. I am not sure if this fulfils any purpose because we are all agreed now that the regime is in fact gone and there is no need to justify its behaviour.

But I think it is worth going back to Elias’s old theme of sectarianism, the meaning of the concept and the manner in which it is used. This demonstrates a huge gap in thinking between two modes which Joshua puts his finger on as being the process of transformation from dismantled empires to post-colonial states.

One of the most difficult questions in mathematics, economics, politics, electoral law etc… is the method of aggregating from an individual preferences to group preference. In fact the issue is not resolvable. The best illustration of that is the multitudes of electoral systems and laws which are in fact attempts to aggregate from individual to groups. This is probably the bottom line in the debate on sectarianism.

Old Empires recognized groups at the expense of individuals and modern states systems are based on individual preferences or ‘citizen’ at the expense of groups. There are in fact two Turkish models: the Ottoman one and Ataturk’s modern ‘citizenship’ or ‘laicite’ model. The latter is no less oppressive to groups than the former was for individuals. In fact the debate over the relevance of the modern Turkish model to the region ignore the impact the development of this model had on group identities in Turkey: Armenians, Greeks, Arabs, Kurds etc… etc….

The Lebanese model adapts elements of the former Ottoman model to the state, the idea is to to defuse the group representation issue and take it out of the equation in order to allow the space for individuals to act as citizen and think beyond groups towards the state. This at least was the interpretation of Michel Chiha and one can argue till kingdom come about the merits of the system and the extent to which it was either a success or a failure and why.

The main point I would like to make is that crude sectarianism does not really exist on the ground and can be more often found in the eye of the beholder. This is both apparent in the analysis on Syria and the references to Lebanon. In statements like:

It took Lebanese Muslims 15 years to unseat Christian power and it still isn’t complete, seeing as Christians still have an undemocratic 50% of parliament preserved for them and refuse to push for a census.

Let us expand a bit on what this means: in pre-civilwar Lebanon the 99 member parliament was divided between 54 ‘Christians’ and 45 ‘Muslims’ both broadly defined. The post Taif parliament is 64 to 64. Is this how ‘Muslims’ unseated ‘Christian power’? And are Lebanese Muslims still trying to capture the rest of that percentage with Christians still clinging to power and refusing to have a census? Was the Lebanese ‘civil war’ between Muslims and Christians in that crude manner? Is Lebanon still ‘undemocratic’ until there is a census that fine-tunes parliamentary proportions with demographic data?

A statement like the above demonstrates the flaws in a ‘sectarian’ analysis much more than it illustrates the flaws of the power sharing system in Lebanon (and there are many). Joshua’s analysis of Syria suffers from the same flaws. The regime is not ‘Alawite’ etc.. etc… Such an analysis plays on the fears of minorities and as Joshua says manipulates them – and this is probably a good description of how the Syrian regime’s mentality sees Syria now and how it saw Lebanon.

I think a comparison between the Lebanese and Syrian models is useful for an analysis of the future of the region and how states would square the circle between individuals and groups. There is no such thing as a ‘natural’ state or a ‘cohesive’ one either in Europe or in the region and god forbid we should ever try to achieve any, this is what the great European civil war which some people call the 2nd World War was fought about.

In fact it is possible that the colonial powers (bless them), unintentionally did us a huge favour by jumping a step and creating these ‘artificial’ states rather than leaving it to us to follow their example and create them through 400 years of inter-European fighting. If the post-colonial system is being dismantled on the ground, it will probably also gradually wane as an analytical framework too.

QN you owe me a beer or two in Boston and I hope Josh can pass through sometime in April. [QN: Ahlan wa-sahlan. Looking forward to it.]

best

nadim
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February 10, 2012

Joshua Landis and Nadim Shehadi on Syria

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Syria | Tags: , , , |
[146] Comments 

Two very smart friends — Josh Landis and Nadim Shehadi — had interesting things to say in the comment section of the last post. I hope neither of them mind me bringing those comments up to the main page so that other readers can weigh in. The exchange was touched off by an interview that Josh recently gave on Charlie Rose, where he argued that Syria could be descending into civil war.

Nadim’s response:

Josh is right that Syria could turn into a Lebanon and Iraq but it can also be in the positive sense: in that it could develop a democratic system of power sharing – possibly with a senate but we have to wait till you finish your project before we say that.

It may also be that the logical conclusion of Josh’s argument is that both Lebanon and Iraq need Baath party rule to have stability and this is because of their sectarian divisions and diversity and this is a more worrying conclusion.

Josh was also right in saying from the very beginning back in January 2011 that the revolts would never happen in Syria because the army would stand by the regime and would not hesitate to shoot at the demonstrators, which is in fact what happened.

Violence has always been part of the argument and we have seen this in all the revolts be it Tunis, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen or Syria. The message there is that any alternative to the regime is much worse that the regime or even too horrible to even contemplate changing the regime. The regime’s power relies on maintaining that illusion and on us not being able to see beyond them.

This is the idea of power that I see Josh trying to maintain in many of his statements on Syria and this has become a genre echoed by others. Nick Noe’s piece is almost a prototype of that argument that many others also make. The aim is to maintain the idea of power, by showing that the regime is indispensable, irreplaceable and that whatever lies beyond it is too horrible to contemplate.

Below is my take on the maintenance of this ‘idea’:

Egypt Crisis: Re-evaluating Risk in the Middle East (Chatham House – Monday 31 January 2011)

Syria: Violence as a Communications Strategy (EUISS – 16 August 2011)

The Syrian ‘opposition’does not have to prove itself (The Guardian,1 October 2011)

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Joshua’s response:

Dear Nadim,

You write: “This is the idea of power that I see Josh trying to maintain in many of his statements on Syria and this has become a genre echoed by others.”

You are correct that I have since the beginning believed that there is “no soft landing” for the Assad regime and that it would fight the kind of war that it is now fighting. This is what I wrote in the first article I published about the uprising, and, in fact, in a book review of Nikolaos van Dam’s second edition of his book in the 1990s for the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, when I first used the phrase, “there is no soft landing for the Assad regime.” This is what I understood van Dam essentially argued in his book, which I concurred with at the time. Here is how I concluded the review:

Van Dam is not optimistic about the prospects for meaningful economic reform in Syria or the possibility of a Velvet Revolution in the future. He points out the Asad’s anti-corruption campaigns have been ineffectual because the President refuses to discipline his security chiefs, many of whom are the worst offenders. He doubts that the country can make a peaceful transition to a post-Asad government, because Asad has allowed his regime to become ossified. No purges have been carried out and few top personnel have been changed in the last 25 years. Consequently, no new generation has been groomed for power or schooled in the art of government. Only the President’s son, Bashar, seems to be in line to inherit authority from his father. Other members of Asad’s inner circle have likewise been grooming their sons to succeed them. He notes that the Sunni majority has not given up its “negative attitude towards Alawi religion and Alawis in general,” and adds that he finds it “very difficult to imagine a scenario in which the present narrowly based, totalitarian regime… can be peacefully transformed into a more widely based democracy.

The key to Asad’s success has been his ability to rule through his metaphorical village. Whether the dynastic principle that Asad and his men have been pushing will catch on in Syria is an open question. Van Dam gives us little reason to believe that Syria is developing either the political institutions or broader national identity that may someday replace the parochial loyalties and narrow prejudices which now define politics in Syria.

My bleak view of the situation in Syria has guided my analysis from the beginning. I suspect the war that is now beginning to grip Syria will last some years before it is over. So far, I believe my pessimistic view has unfortunately been justified.

Many have suggested that my analysis is motivated by some “idea of power” that I am trying to promote or belief in the regime’s goodness. I would argue the opposite. It is because of my understanding of the regime’s use of patrimonial loyalties that I have been frightened of the outcome. Others have suggested that my marriage to an Alawi (which was well after I wrote the book review quoted above) changed or guided my views. I would suggest that my ideas were well established before falling in love with Manar and that my subsequent intimate knowledge of the Alawi community only confirmed by belief that Syria’s sectarian problems were deep and not easily finessed. Of course living in Lebanon for years during the civil war as Christian and Muslim killed each other laid the foundation for my understanding of identity politics in the Levant. I was living in Damascus during the Hama uprising and brutal suppression of the revolt, which also colored my views.

At this point, there is no going back for the opposition and I do not believe that the regime can right itself, as I explained in my – “The Regime is Doomed” — article.

I have tried to explain from the beginning how I believed events will unfold. If they are scary, it is because I think they are scary and will be scary and unhappy for some time to come. You are right to point out that I misjudged Syrians when I argued that I thought the Arab Spring would not blossom or take root in Syria. I can only hope that in the end things will work out for the best. Syria needs a new form of government. You note that my faith is weak, and in that, I confess, without pride or smugness, you are correct.
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July 20, 2010

Property Ownership in Lebanon for Palestinian Refugees?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Israel, Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , |
[13] Comments 

I received the following note from Nadim Shehadi on the subject of property ownership by Palestinian refugees. Reports suggest that we seem to be nearing a deal on a limited overhaul of the legislation related to civil rights for refugees in Lebanon. There is consensus among the March 14th Christian parties and the Free Patriotic Movement that social and labor rights should be improved but property ownership should remain off-limits.

I asked Nadim to weigh in on whether he thought this was an acceptable compromise. (For previous discussions with Nadim and others about this legislation, see here.)

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Click to enlarge

I sent you a photo of the cover of a pamphlet from 1966 by the general secretariat of the heads of the Order of Monks in Lebanon about foreign property purchases. The quote in the bottom left hand corner translates as:

“There is no difference between land lost by the power of the gun and land lost by the power of money. In fact, land lost by purchase is more lasting and more serious.”

This is to illustrate that the question of foreign ownership of land in Lebanon is a long standing one, and partly to answer your question about the property ownership issue for the Palestinians.

There is no doubt that foreign property ownership is a controversial matter and one that will always remain an issue that raises anxieties and has to be borne in mind when discussing Palestinian rights to property ownership. It is not a trivial matter and I do not take it lightly.

But the question is certainly not all about Palestinians – it is mainly about Gulf money buying up all the land, which was facilitated by the amendment to the property law of 2001 (the same amendment that excludes Palestinians from buying property.) This again is a highly emotional issue and it is difficult to address it with rational arguments: they will simply not be listened to. When a subject is that sensitive the best course is not to raise it or approach it at all.

But in the case of Palestinians it is different because Palestinians used to be able to purchase property legally before 2001 like any other foreign national. Also, like any other foreign property purchase, it was subject to registration taxes of about 16 to 17 percent. Palestinians used to buy land in the name of Lebanese and then obtain a power of attorney giving them sole control over the property. This was common practice at the time not only with Palestinians but with many foreign buyers in general. It made sense because they could later sell it without having to pay the tax.

The problem we have now is that the amendment to the law in 2001 excluded Palestinians from the ability to purchase land and it also prevented them from inheriting land or passing it on to their children. This is land that was bought legally before 2001. What is required is to reverse that and allow Palestinians to own property like any other Arab and like they did for 53 out of the 62 years since they came to Lebanon. The larger issue of foreign property ownership is a separate and different problem and if there is an amendment to that law it should also apply to everybody. Once matters are under the law then the law will deal with any infringements or illegal occupation of land. I will not insult readers of Qifa Nabki by pretending to explain to them the benefits of the rule of law and the sanctitiy of private property.

What is certain is that the Lebanese state cannot expropriate private property; if it does, then it would be setting a precedent that would threaten more than just the Palestinians. There is a lot of scare-mongering about this and misrepresentation of figures. It’s as though 550,000 Palestinians will suddenly flood the property market and buy up the country and the Lebanese will not be able to buy even an apartment then. This is linked to the anxiety about foreign ownership which is deep rooted, as the pamphlet shows and is being awakened using the Palestinians.

This is the overall problem with this whole debate about Palestinian rights: it awakens all the ghosts and it is based on wrong and exaggerated facts. Maybe this is a necessary process and rationality will prevail in the end. If it does then we must hit the nail on the head and deal with all the rights issues once and for all to allow us to concentrate on much more important matters related to the Palestinian file.

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Update: Ghassan Karam provides some useful background information:

“A few facts/details that might be helpful to the readers that are not familiar with the specifics of this issue.

“Lebanon had restricted the rights of foreigners in owning land by the law passed in 1969. The restrictions used to be 500 square meters per foreign person (spouse and children do not represent separate persons for the purposes of this law) The 2001 amendment increased the restriction to only 300 square meters per person and it added that the foreign person must hold the citizenship of an internationally recognized country. That is how the Palestinian refugees came to be disallowed from land ownership.

“Nadim Shehadi is right when he says that foreign land ownership in Lebanon is an emotional issue and as such reason does not count for much. Yet it is instructive to look at what the official figures say. The 2001 law limits the aggregate foreign land ownership in Lebanon to 3% of the total area. That amounts to just over 312 million square meters. The records indicate that outside of Beirut foreign land ownership in Lebanon is way within the 3%. Actually besides Beirut , Baabda, Metn and Aley it is under 1%. If the figures are accurate then foreign land ownership under the current restrictions could probably triple before it is to bump against the current ceiling.

“But these figures are not very reliable since over 1/3 of Lebanon has not been surveyed yet and so sales activities of unsurveyed land is not reported. But a quick back of the envelope calculation regarding the potential land ownership by the Palestinian refugees would be revealing.

“Since there are 400,000 registered refugees both in the camps and outside the camps and since the demographic structure is young with above average size of houshold then it would be fair to assume that there are about 80,000 households. The financial resources available to these households are meager but even if 1-in-4 decides to purchase land then the potential number of such transactions would be 20,000. Land in Beirut is one of the most expensive in the world and in Baabda, Aley, Broumana, Baabdat goes for over $1200 per square meter and therefore is out of reach for these potential new buyers. But even if we are to assume that each of the 20,000 manage to find and purchase a parcel of land od 800 square meters then the total 16 million square meters would represent only 5 % of the aloted aggregate of 312 million square meters for foreign ownership.

“This whole issue is an emotional one and is fueled by unsubstantiated fears. Common sense , decency, international law combine to say that the Palestinian refugees are to be treated just like any other potential group of investors in the country.”

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June 30, 2010

Talking to Nadim Shehadi: Palestinian Civil Rights in Lebanon

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Interviews, Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , , |
[20] Comments 

Dr. Nadim Shehadi (bio) has very kindly agreed to answer some questions about the issue of improving the civil rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This blog hosted two very interesting discussions on this topic a couple of weeks ago, and so I’m grateful to Nadim for agreeing to discuss the policy dimensions of the issue.

Please feel free to leave any additional questions you may have in the comment section.

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QN: How likely do you think it is that this Lebanese government will pass some kind of legislation aimed at improving the civil rights of Palestinian refugees?

NS: My view is that the likelihood is quite high, I feel that the debate has evolved a lot in the past four years and that the mood in the country is to discuss things in the open. It is normal for all the skeletons to come out of the cupboards on such a sensitive subject. I think that if a positive outcome is reached it would mean that Lebanon has really recovered from the civil war.

QN: If legislation is passed, what do you think its broad outlines are likely to be (as far as health, social security, labor, and property rights are concerned)?

NS: There are two options. One is that they resolve the issues gradually, one by one (i.e. employment, reciprocity, association law, property etc.) Two is that they do a whole package and resolve all the pending legal issues in one legislative move.

I am in favor of option two because the political cost of each gradual move is the same as for all the bundle together. They must hit it on the head and finish with this problem once and for all. If they do that then it will strengthen the government’s hand in discussing arms and security issues later. But to get to that stage they must also resolve the legal issues unilaterally without linking them to any quid-pro-quo over arms.

The danger with option one is that they would compromise at every stage and use up all the political credit leaving things unresolved. If this happens then the government’s position will be weakened when they come to discussing arms. If they use rights to leverage over arms they will get nowhere.

QN: Walid Jumblatt introduced the emergency laws at a plenary session of Parliament on June 15th, catching many of his allies and adversaries off guard. Why, in your opinion, has this issue come up at this moment in time?

NS: Jumblatt’s democratic gathering made a statement about Palestinian rights in 2005. At the time it was a demand to resolve outstanding issues away from the internal Lebanese political wrangling. This was partly a reaction to President Lahoud repeating over and over again that he wanted to renew his presidency and would never resign because he was there to protect Lebanon from the conspiracy of tawteen or permanent settlement. The issue of tawteen was exploited also by the Syrians who repeated that they were there to protect Lebanon from it.

Then there was the question of appointing Wael Boufaour of the PSP as minister of state for Palestinian Refugees. That mobilised the PSP into organizing a conference in January. After the conference it took them a long time to mobilize and produce the draft that was presented on the 15th of June. They took that long because they lost steam after the appointment of Boufaour did not materialize.

The laws were presented in a normal manner and they would have usually been automatically been sent to the parliamentary committees for discussion. But it seems that Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri tabulated them for discussion and a vote on that day and this is what took everybody by surprise.

QN: Do you believe that any such legislation is “a step towards naturalization”, as many politicians are claiming, or is this simply a scare tactic?

NS: The problem is that since there is no legal definition of what constitutes ‘naturalization’ or tawteen, potentially any step that facilitates or prepares the ground for permanent settlement could be interpreted as anti-constitutional.

A necessary step to break the deadlock is to agree on a legal definition of tawteen. The SSNP presented a draft law to that effect last week and if it is adopted it would be a very positive move.

In reality, the status of refugees is completely unrelated to naturalization. Their rights are the same whether they live in poverty in a camp or whether they live in luxury and even have acquired another citizenship. A Palestinian in Canada with Canadian nationality can still claim the right of return and compensation, it is theoretically an individual right that is not dependent on status. In any case, whatever the outcome of the negotiations over refugees, no refugee will be forced to do anything they do not want to do. The refugees will be presented with options that are clearly defined and each individual with exercise a choice between the different options. The implementation process will take at least 10-15 years after the agreement has been reached.

QN: Are fears about the impact of such legislation on the economy and on security justified?

This is the only really tangible question and a very important one. The problem is that we do not have proper data or impact analysis related to these legislations. The reason is that the debate so far has been more emotional than rational and touches on all the traumas and phobias that are the legacy of the civil war. This is true both for Palestinians and Lebanese.

It is very important to understand that the laws will not change things radically; this is because Palestinians in Lebanon work in most professions and do not obtain a work permit. The law is not really enforceable. The figures are really misleading too. In one of the speeches today, it was mentioned that there are 136,000 foreigners who were given work permits in 2007 and that only 261 Palestinians were given work permits and that this is discrimination. This is a false and very misleading image, it gives the impression that there are 422,000 Palestinians in Lebanon and that 421,739 of them are being ‘denied’ a work permit, denied is an often used word. The reason there are only 261 work permits is that only 261 were applied for.

In reality what you need in Lebanon is a residence permit and to obtain it you need to have a work permit. So if you are a resident already, like Palestinian refugees are, and do not need a resident permit then you do not need to bother getting one. The disadvantages are there, you do not get social security, and you can get exploited by your employer – and your employer exploiting you may even be another Palestinian refugee.

Doing away with the work permit requirement for the refugees will ease things and will probably not increase the Palestinian work-force by much. They are already here and they are already working they will just be happier and working legally. Many advocates insist on saying that Palestinians cannot work in 72 jobs and if you say no its 71.5 then you are treated worse than a holocaust denier.

The truth it that we do not really know the exact number of jobs they cannot legally do even if they wanted to. The Ministry of Labour lawyers identified 14 jobs that all foreigners are banned from if they do not belong to a country that has reciprocity agreements with Lebanon. A study of the various laws and agreements may reveal one or two more. But in the end what difference does it make? Palestinians have no incentives to apply for a work permit and you can neither force them nor stop them. Changing the law in a way adjust the texts to reality on the ground.

Advocates of Palestinian rights in Lebanon do a lot of harm by exaggerating the situation. Some of them are probably also still fighting the Lebanese civil war or the civil rights movement in the US.

I can give loads of examples. How many times have you read that Palestinians in Lebanon are denied the “right of association”? Whereas in reality there are in Lebanon more Palestinian associations, parties, NGOs, civil society organizations and clubs than anywhere else. The truth about this is that those who want to register their association have to have a board with a Lebanese citizen on it. If not they just don’t register and it does not make that big a difference. Allowing Palestinians to sit on the board of associations will only mean that more associations will register – it does not mean that you will create hundreds or thousands of new associations. The impact is minimal.

Property law is the worst; I do not see how the discrimination can be justified. It was only passed in 2001 and its application is even worse than the law itself. However, the amendment to the law that discriminates against the Palestinians will cancel itself out once a Palestinian state is recognized and since Lebanon accepts this through its affiliation to the Arab Peace Initiative then it is Lebanese policy to recognize the state. The impact of changing the property law to allow Palestinians the same quota as other non Lebanese citizens will initially mean that all those who own property already will be legalised. This is a complex issue and I am not sure about its impact. One thing is sure, the Lebanese state will never take away any Palestinian property in Lebanon on the grounds that it is illegally owned.

The big unknown is the issue of Social Security. Again numbers are not as frightening as it is assumed but we need to do a proper impact analysis on this to reassure those who are claiming that it will cost billions. Only Palestinians who are regularly employed and make social security contributions will benefit from it. Again the figures being thrown around are very inflated and alarmist. The entire Palestinian population in Lebanon is around 250,000 at most. Of these a maximum of 40-50, 000 are active and according to some studies up to 70 percent of them are in entrepreneurial businesses i.e are not employed in a job that would require social security registration.

QN: Any other thoughts?

NS: Khalass bikaffi :-)

Tayyib, one last thought if only to repeat the importance of not linking any solution to rights with any thinking about security.

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