Lebanon’s Prime Minister Najib Mikati was expected to make a major address today concerning the stalemate over the funding of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which was threatening to bring down his government.

Mikati did speak to the media, but it was only to say that he had transferred Lebanon’s share of the funding (around $33 million) earlier this morning. The STL confirmed receipt of the funds, so it seems that Lebanon has dodged another bullet.

As of this moment, here’s what we don’t know:

  1. We don’t know what kind of deal Mr. Mikati cut with his cabinet partners in order to prevent their resignation;
  2. We don’t know if funding the STL in exchange for valuable concessions was the hidden agenda of the Aounist bloc and Hizbullah all along, or if they decided on this path as a result of more recent developments (like Jumblatt’s defection, the situation in Syria, etc.);
  3. We don’t know if a vote will be required in the cabinet or in parliament to “approve” the funding. Apparently, Mikati transferred the money from the premiership’s own budget, so maybe there will be no need for a vote. This strikes me as a very dicey precedent.

A few minutes of Internet research turned up the 2011-2012 budget for the Prime Minister’s office, which is around a billion US dollars per year (click here to see the spreadsheet, to which I’ve added an extra column converting the figures from [thousands of] liras to dollars).

I have no idea how accurate these figures are, or which pot Mr. Mikati pulled the STL funding from. There are line items in there that are extremely vague (see for example #32, which is devoted to “foreign funding” to the tune of one third of a billion dollars). One would have to assume that there are more detailed figures elsewhere.

At any rate, I’m no expert on government budgets, but it seems odd to me that a Prime Minister of a country like Lebanon should have discretionary spending powers on over one billion dollars. The President’s budget, by contrast, is around $11 million, and the budget for the entire Parliament is $45 million. If anyone has more information on this issue, please feel free to leave it in the comment section. In the meantime, I will try to get an answer from Mr. Mikati’s advisors about where the money for the STL is coming from.

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Today has been a very silly day in Lebanese politics. A cabinet session scheduled to address various issues unrelated to the funding of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) had to be canceled because ministers belonging to General  Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement decided not to turn up.

The reason? According to various sources, it was to send a signal that the FPM is prepared to resign and “turn the tables on the opposition”, with respect to the STL funding issue, which must be brought to a vote at next Wednesday’s cabinet meeting. Minister of Energy Gebran Bassil told the AFP that the signal had to do with the FPM’s unhappiness with the government’s performance, not necessarily on the issue of the STL.

Come again?

Let’s remind ourselves that the FPM is the majority partner in the Mikati government. In other words, they are the government. There is no meaningful opposition to their policies. So how can they be disappointed in the government’s performance?

Even by the cynical standards we’ve grown accustomed to, this latest move by the FPM takes the cake. Between 2005 and 2009, they complained because they weren’t given the Presidency. Between 2009 and 2011, they complained because they didn’t have enough seats in government. And now that they are the single largest bloc in the cabinet, they are threatening to bring down their own government because of its poor performance?

In an Arab world where tyrants are struggling to hold on to their seats, Lebanon’s leaders are trying to find ways to get out of theirs as quickly as possible.

No one is fooled that this move doesn’t have everything to do with Najib Mikati’s own vow to resign if the STL’s funding is not approved at next week’s meeting. But the FPM’s counter-threat to resign first is an escalation typical of the blustering and irrational theatrics of Michel Aoun. “You think you can scare us with your resignation, Najib? Well then, we’ll resign first! Ha!

Amateur psychological analysis aside, what does this puzzling strategy tell us about what the STL funding issue means to the March 8 coalition? Obviously, there’s no way that Hizbullah can support the STL since they are being targeted by it. Nor can one expect AMAL to break with Hizbullah on any issue. But the FPM surely could have elected to play some kind of conciliatory or mediating role rather than walking such a hard line. Why be more Catholic than the Pope?

My own conversations with a few FPM insiders over the past couple days suggest that there is considerable befuddlement and frustration with the position that the party finds itself in.

And let’s not forget that resigning and bringing down the current government would only make matters worse — for Aoun, for Hizbullah, and ultimately for Syria. By pushing the magic button and sending Lebanon into its familiar tailspin, Aoun can dodge the STL funding bullet. But this measure will certainly not bring the STL’s activities to a halt. All it will do is create chaos in the near term and possible sanctions in the long term.

Maybe Aoun and Hizbullah would prefer that kind of combative atmosphere to the current situation, where they look worse and worse each day as the Arabs, the Turks, the Europeans, and the Americans keep heaping more pressure on Damascus. Or maybe Aoun is just bluffing. We’ll know sooner rather than later.

At the end of the day, March 8 needs to wake up and face the fact that they’re not going to get away from the Tribunal issue by changing prime ministers every few months.
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Ever since Najib Mikati took over as Prime Minister of Lebanon earlier this year, things have gone relatively smoothly. With no opposition in the cabinet, there have been few opportunities for conflict (with the exception of the odd squabble between Michel Aoun and his disgruntled allies).

All that could change next week. The cabinet must finally take up the ticking time bomb that they’ve been avoiding for months (and which was the downfall of Saad Hariri’s government), namely the issue of funding the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).

For obvious reasons, Hizbullah is opposed to funding the court, as is AMAL. And Michel Aoun, per his usual custom, has played the role of the intransigent rejectionist to the hilt, going so far as to declare: “Even if Hizbullah approves the funding, we’ll vote against it.”

The problem is that it’s not in Hizbullah’s interests, at this stage, to create an international incident over the STL, and this is what may well happen if Lebanon reneges on its obligation to the court. The Americans and Europeans have made it abundantly clear over the past several weeks that there would be dire consequences if Lebanon severs its ties to the STL.

What this means is still  unclear. However, when one combines Lebanon’s recent stance at the Arab League on the Syrian uprising with the prospect of ending its cooperation with the Tribunal, it seems straightforward to assume that Hizbullah’s opponents (in Lebanon and abroad) will seize the opportunity to argue that the Mikati government is nothing more than an extension of the Syrian regime, and should be treated as such by the international community.

Hizbullah would prefer to avoid such a scenario, as they understand that their position on Syria has not done them many favors in Lebanon or the rest of the region. The problem is, even if they wanted to find a solution that would keep the hounds at bay while allowing them to save face by voting against the funding, it’s not clear how they would do so.

As far as I have been able to ascertain from my conversations in Beirut this week, approving the funding requires a simple majority vote in the thirty-member cabinet. At present, Hizbullah and its allies hold eighteen seats, while the remaining twelve are divided between ministers loyal to Mikati, President Sleiman, and Walid Jumblatt. In other words, there is no way to compose the necessary majority to approve the funding without using ministers from the shares of Hizbullah, Amal, or the FPM.

So we’re faced with a situation whereby either one of those three parties has to reverse its policy on the funding, or they all hold a firm line and Lebanon drops the STL like a bad habit. Neither scenario is  ideal, from the current majority’s perspective.

One possible solution that has been floated is that the cabinet passes the hot potato to the Parliament, where  a majority in favor of the funding can be assembled by having Walid Jumblatt vote with his old allies. I’m not sure this is a constitutionally legitimate move, but I’ve been told that it could be the basis for a typically Lebanese fudge.

Whatever happens, we’re sure to see Saad Hariri make a serious push next week at the Tripoli gathering to put as much pressure as possible on Najib Mikati to resign. My sense is that Hizbullah would prefer to keep this government afloat and out of the Syrian cross-fire, but not at the expense of voting for the tribunal themselves. If the parliamentary solution doesn’t work and the cabinet can’t muster the votes, Mikati will probably walk and Hizbullah will let him do so.

In that scenario, we’ll be back to treading water with no government, and things will be… interesting, yet again.

[An earlier version of this post stated that a two-thirds super-majority was required to approve the funding. I'm now being told that a simple majority will do, as there are no new international treaties being signed.]
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Now that the mystery of Moussa al-Sadr’s disappearance has been solved, Lebanon needs a new vanished imam to contemplate.

Why not Saad al-Hariri? Even by his own peripatetic standards, al-Hariri’s absence from the political scene over the past several months has been something to behold. The man has well and truly left the building, and the situation is so bad that even NOW Lebanon has noticed. Michael Young recently had this to say about Hariri’s Houdini act:

Hariri has been abroad for months, an affront to those who elected him. His money problems are genuine and have not yet been resolved, taking a toll on his patronage network and political authority. The former prime minister is not out yet, however if his occultation lasts much longer, his leadership will melt. Many sympathizers wonder what Hariri actually stands for. Who did they mobilize to elect in the 2009 elections? No answer has come from the Future Movement, which has morphed into something of an annoying jack-in-the-box—popping its head up episodically to deliver some statement or barb against Prime Minister Najib Mikati.

In my view, Saad is trying to pull a page from from his father’s playbook. In 1998, after Emile Lahoud was installed as Syria’s man in Baabda, Rafiq al-Hariri resigned. He told a reporter from al-Hayat the reasons behind his calculations in a revealing interview.

Hariri excused himself from forming the first government in the Lahoud era, after a dispute about the delegation of MPs’ votes, which left Lahoud with the freedom to name the prime minister-designate. In fact, some of his friends advised him to leave office, and one of them was then-Syrian Vice President Abdel-Halim Khaddam. Khaddam told him that Lahoud was beginning his mandate in a Buick that was fresh from the dealer, while “you’re driving an Opel that has been ground down by exercising power.” Khaddam suggested that Hariri let Lahoud use up some of the power of his car, and then they would see. This is what happened when Hariri returned to power in 2000 after a clear election victory, a victory that did not anger some Syrian parties that had not been enthusiastic about Lahoud in the first place.

Saad probably hopes that by the time the 2013 elections roll around, the Lebanese will have had enough of Najib Miqati and his Buick — to say nothing of Michel Aoun’s Batmobile and Nasrallah’s STL getaway car — and will welcome Hariri back to town with open arms. It is, in other words, a policy of “offshore balancing,” whereby a once-dominant power sits back and lets its enemies destroy each other before swooping in to tilt the balance in its own favor. (In this case, Hariri is the one who is perpetually offshore, trying to manage the affairs back home…)

My sense is that this gambit will fail. Miqati’s government — just by dint of being in the right place at the right time — will be able to take credit for solving the electricity problem, giving Lebanon high-speed internet, maintaining relative peace and stability while not compromising on the STL issue or crossing any Syrian red lines, and perhaps even introducing proportional representation. Furthermore, depending on how things play out in Syria, the Saudis may  find it more  advantageous to try to  co-opt Lebanon’s new quadripartite alliance (Hizbullah, Aoun, Jumblatt, and Miqati) rather than supporting an electoral “war of elimination” against March 8th in 2013.

Whatever the case may be, the near future doesn’t look so great for al-Mustaqbal.

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I recently read an interesting profile of ex-Minister of the Interior Ziad Baroud in Al-Akhbar English (which, by the way, you should all be reading on a daily basis). The last two paragraphs, in particular, caught my eye:

As part of his interest in electoral law, Baroud is in contact with Bahij Tabbara, a former Lebanese minister. Together they are preparing a proposal on proportional representation, an electoral system many believe would undermine the current sectarian structure governing Lebanon. Baroud says their proposal “is not about a political party, tendency, movement or coalition,” but simply a campaign calling for proportional representation and hoping to raise awareness about the issue. Baroud confirms that they have not gone into the project’s details, but he feels that Tabbara is an intelligent person who will help move the project forward.

Although Baroud hopes to see proportional representation implemented in Lebanon, he is pessimistic about its acceptance among Lebanon’s political elite. He predicts that the prevailing political groups will never agree to such electoral reforms, because their direct or indirect interest are heavily vested in the status quo.

Is this true? Baroud is right that many of the bigger parties have no interest in changing the existing majoritarian system, but I think that a few important players would be far better served by proportional representation (PR), while at least one major party is probably agnostic on the issue.

In particular, Prime Minister Mikati would stand a much better chance of increasing the size of his legislative bloc if majoritarianism were to be replaced by a proportional scheme for the 2013 elections. With Hariri’s political relevance being depleted by the day, in fact, all of Lebanon’s “independent” Sunni politicians (particularly Mikati and Safadi) would seem to have a good shot at making inroads into Mustaqbal’s share of Parliament under a PR system.

On the other hand, any party that anticipates winning its seats by a margin short of a landslide is probably going to be against PR. This applies not only to Hariri’s Future Movement but also to Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and the rest of the Christian parties. All of these groups (as I argued in an article from a couple years ago) won their seats in the 2009 elections by decent margins (in the 55%-65% range) but not by total landslides. This means that under a PR system, they would likely lose seats in those same districts to their opponents. (See also this post for more reading on electoral districting in Lebanon and PR).

Meanwhile, if Hizbullah’s support in 2013 is anything like it was in 2009, they would have very little to lose from a PR system. In fact, they might even gain seats under this scheme, by running resistance-friendly candidates against Hariri’s people in the districts that the latter won by a narrow margin.

(Note: the same could be said of Aoun. While losing seats in districts like Jbeil and Kisrawan, the FPM might pick up seats in Beirut and elsewhere, particularly given all the new political capital that has accrued to the party as a result of its visible successes in the areas of telecommunications and energy.)

In sum, I’m not particularly optimistic that PR will be implemented in time for 2013, but my lack of optimism has less to do with the fact of entrenched political interests as it does with political inertia. Still, it would be nice if it happened.
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“Prime Minister Najib Miqati on Sunday confirmed remarks attributed to him by a WikiLeaks document about describing Hizbullah as a “tumor,” but stressed that his words were taken out of context and that he had described the Shiite party as a “non-malignant tumor.”  (Naharnet)

Here follows the transcript of Mr. Miqati’s televised address to the nation, in which he addressed the scandal arising from his comments.

*

My fellow Lebanese, good evening. I am addressing you tonight to clarify some comments attributed to me by a US official in a confidential diplomatic cable, which was recently released to the public by Wikileaks. I’m not going to deny what I said (unlike certain people who shall remain nameless!) but I would like a chance to explain myself.

In the cable, I was quoted as describing Hizbullah as a “tumor needing removal.” That sounds pretty bad, I admit. It’s not the kind of thing you should call someone behind their back, especially not a dear friend. And I’m really the nicest person in the world — ask anyone — so let me begin by apologizing to Hizbullah from the bottom of my heart.

Hizbullah, I’m sorry.

For what it’s worth, I didn’t mean you were a tumor tumor, like one of those “you’ve-got-six-months-to-live” tumors. I really did mean that you were a non-malignant tumor, and there’s a big difference between the two. You see, non-malignant tumors are totally not a big deal. I personally have no problem with them, whatsoever. They are absolutely fine in my book. Fact, some of my best friends are non-malignant tumors. Ha ha! I kid.

That’s really not very funny so I apologize. Again.

And hey, the same goes for a comment I made about Hizbullah being “a state within a non-state.” Once again… context! Context is key, people. Hizbullah is a state within a state… of mind. Do you see what I mean? It’s a state of mind, Hizbullah is, and one that I personally think is very, very healthy for Lebanon, which is itself a state of mind, except not quite as powerful as Hizbullah’s state of mind.

While I’m here, I’d like to apologize in advance for a few other untoward comments I may or may not have made in the past about some of my good friends and colleagues.

For example! I might have said something at one stage about Syria being a “client of Iran.”  Well, obviously what’s missing is the rest of the sentence. I recall saying “Syria is a client of Iran, and a very powerful and important and prestigious client that Iran is very proud to have.” Look at it this way. When I send one of my assistants to have my shoes shined by Abu Tariq, the local neighborhood shoe shine boy, I’m clearly acting as Abu Tariq’s client, right? But who’s more important, wealthy, and powerful? Me, or Abu Tariq? There’s no shame in being a client, nosiree. You get the idea.

Ok, what else? (shuffles some papers) Oh! It may be pointed out, for example, that I might have called General Michel Aoun “a joke and a laughingstock” on one occasion, and perhaps even a “crazy guy,” but I absolutely meant that in the best way, honest to God. If you’ve ever had a few drinks with the General, you’d know that the man is totally hilarious, just crazy. He’s crazy funny, and crazy smart, and just an all-around crazy awesome guy. Would have made a crazy good president. Too bad. Anyway.

Along similar lines, I may have referred to Saad Hariri at one point as “naive and easy to fool,” but it’s clear that what I really meant here was that Saad finds it “easy to fool others into thinking that he is naive.” Easily misunderstood. Saad Hariri is absolutely not naive and easy to fool. The man has a mind like a steel trap! He’s the total opposite of naive and easy to fool, and I’m sure he’ll agree with me.

I could go on, but I think I’ll just end here by saying that I really do feel awful about any offense taken to my comments. Just awful. Awful awful awful. Next time, I will try to be more discreet.

Good night.

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While previous Lebanese governments have expressed their strong support for the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the new government is expected to take a more equivocal stance in its ministerial policy statement. The committee in charge of drafting the statement has kept the language under tight wraps for the past two weeks, but our muckraking magicians here at The Qnion have managed to secure an advance copy of the Tribunal clause. Don’t forget where you saw it first!

*

“The Government of Lebanon, which is commited to seeking justice — here construed according to the Rawlsian acceptation of an impartial distribution system of social goods and opportunities — will spare no effort to cultivate the ideals of legality, transparency, and moral rectitude in all cases of crimes committed against Lebanese citizens, and, to this end, will deploy a broad-based array of strategies (such as statements of righteous indignation, 24-hour anonymous tip hotlines, municipal police investigations [pending budget constraints], and candlelight vigils) to ensure that the nation’s sacrifices will not have been in vain.

“As regards the U.N. Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), this government puts itself and its security services entirely at the disposal of the Special Prosecutor’s Office and will diligently respond to its every request, a responsibility clearly outlined in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757. Furthermore, recalling that all United Nations resolutions carry the force of authoritative (if not binding) statements of international law with respect to their member-states, this government will — as a gesture of moral support for the sanctity of this most hallowed institution — make its compliance with UNSCR 1757 contingent upon the fulfillment of all heretofore neglected U.N. resolutions (with particular reference to U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 and U.N. Security Council Resolution 242).

“Failing the implementation of the aforementioned UN resolutions in a timely manner, the Lebanese goverment will, nevertheless, continue to honor its obligations to the international community by cooperating with the Special Tribunal on all matters with the exception of a few issues which will require, on a case-by-case basis, a standard internal consultative review process before they can be approved. These issues include: material evidence inquiries; arrest warrants; extradition requests; expert witness subpoenas; telecommunications data requests; immigration reports; administrative support (including but not limited to photocopying, translation services, word-processing, collating, stapling, envelope stuffing and courier services, coffee orders, late night Barbar runs, and taxi fares). Tribunal officials are kindly advised that the standard internal consultative review for each request requires 6-10 weeks for approval and is subject to an administrative processing fee, following which a decision may be appealed (subject to another 6-10 week review and processing fee). Requests not pertaining to the above list will be responded to promptly.”

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