December 14, 2011

Hizbullah, Ashura, and the Art of the Political Parable

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , |
[149] Comments 

I’ve written something for the NY Times Global’s Latitude blog about one of Nasrallah’s Ashura speeches last month. In the interest of space, I couldn’t include extensive translations from the speech, so I thought I’d make them available here. For context and the broader argument, check out the original post here.

I’ve been criticized before for my admiration of Nasrallah’s rhetorical skills, but I found the speech in question deeply disturbing (and unfortunately, so did Saida’s Salafists).  This is an aspect of Hizbullah that its liberal admirers like to ignore, imagining that the Party of God is far more progressive and non-confessional than its “feudal,” “fascist,” “right-wing,” “clientelist” opponents. I’m always puzzled by this notion, because it seems fairly straightforward that Hizbullah is just as adept at anyone at deploying sectarianism in the service of politics.

I challenge you seasoned Lebanon-watchers to listen to the final segment of the speech (I’ve cued it to the right spot) and tell me that it is not one of the most blatant and unashamed examples of sectarian incitement they’ve heard coming out of the mouth of a Lebanese politician in recent memory. (The relevant section is translated below for English speakers, along with time stamps).

I leave you with this thought. If Samir Geagea were to give a speech calling Nasrallah a modern-day Judas Iscariot, or if Saad Hariri wrote a tweet accusing the Shi`a of being heretical Uthman-killers and Aisha-slanderers, how quickly do you think the March 8th media outlets would be down their throats, calling them bloody-minded sectarian feudal warlords? I’m no fan of any of the individuals attached to the proper names cited in this post, but let’s be serious for a moment and recognize demagoguery when we see it.

*

[1:06:38] “When we speak about al-Husayn, we are speaking about his suffering but also his steadfastness. We begin with his abandonment by the people despite the fact that he was the son of the daughter of the Prophet of God… This would cause any human being to suffer.

[1:06:58] For example, you felt, during the July War, that you were on the side of righteousness, and yet you were being killed and shot and [your homes] destroyed, and many people in the world left you, abandoned you, and even blamed you and insulted you. Did this not cause great pain in you?

[1:07:23] Al-Husayn’s abandonment is the first [cause of his suffering]. The second is the treachery of those who swore their allegiance to him and then abandoned him. This is even more painful. There were people who abandoned us and did not aid us [during the July War] but there were others who promised us help and pledged their allegiance to us and committed to us, then defamed us and attacked us… this was also the case of Husayn. At the very least, they could have sat on the sidelines and been neutral, but no: they attacked and killed him. This added to his suffering.

[1:07:51] The constant threat of being killed from Medina, to Mecca, to Karbala: this caused suffering. A severe siege, severe thirst… al-Husayn and his wives and his children and companions were prevented from drinking water for several days before they were martyred… You go to speak to [your tormentors] and they don’t listen to you; this causes suffering. Imagine if you were the grandson of the Prophet… Sometimes one goes through such an experience. Even if you speak for a hundred years or two hundred, it doesn’t matter. Some people are not interested in listening.

[1:09:00] The third thing [that causes suffering] is fighting with few supporters. This choice is also difficult. And finally, the arrival at the stage of martyrdom. Martyrs were falling right in front of al-Husayn. His loved ones, his brethren. Who were these martyrs?

[1:09:18] Some of you are the fathers, mothers, siblings of martyrs. Everyone knows that when one’s son or brother is martyred, one suffers. What if your son is killed in front of your eyes? Your feelings would be different. If people came and told you that your son was hit during the battle, he was killed, he was martyred, etc., you would suffer.

[1:09:51] But when we speak of Karbala, we are always speaking about the highest ceiling [of emotions]. Al-Husayn’s son was killed in his arms, Ali al-Akbar [Ed: I think he meant Ali al-Asghar here]. Imagine if your son was a young man who exceled and fought and was martyred… you would suffer. But this is completely different from one whose son is an infant, a baby, a few months old. You hold him in your arms, and ask for some water for him, and he is slaughtered in your arms. And his blood runs upon you. How much more painful is this?

[1:10:35] We have families who have lost one, or two, or three martyrs over the course of years; their brothers, their children. Those who were killed with al-Husayn at Karbala were his children, in his arms and in front of him. His brothers, all of whom were young. Al-Husayn was himself young, only 57. His brothers were all younger than him. They were killed, along with their children, their cousins; this is all painful. Then the weeping of the women; mothers bereaved of children, widows. When you go into the home of a martyr’s family, with the mother or the wife crying, your heart breaks. Al-Husayn looked all around him and saw these eyes full of tears; the weeping of orphans, from hunger, thirst, and pain. And on top of all that were the wounds inflicted upon him. And in the final moments, on top of the wounds, the screams of women and children, as the warriors attacked the tents and the fires were lit.

[1:11:58] How much pain did this one heart endure? And how much can a human heart endure? And yet, al-Husayn was not shaken, he did not retreat, he did not weaken, he did not stumble, he did not submit, and nor did his companions…

[1:12:41] This is our leader. This is Karbala, from which we learn the lessons of steadfastness, and honesty, and the loyal pledge [Ed: repeated in mid-stride to correct the case from accusative to genitive... amazing]. This is the school in which we sit these days and nights, learning, suffering, crying. You and I are the ones who pledged our allegiance to al-Husayn in our Resistance in Lebanon. We are the ones who went out to fight the occupiers, even though were only a small minority. And we are a minority that is accused of insanity, accused of committing ourselves to ruin, accused of not understanding balances of power, accused of acting with the zeal of immature young men…

[1:14:00] My brethren, on this night… we say to al-Husayn: “If only we were with you at Karbala, so that we could have won a great victory!” As one, we say to al-Husayn on this night, and repeat it on every night, and on the tenth day: “Oh great leader and martyr, we, men and women, in these difficult times, despite all the challenges, dangers, threats, insults, and the determination and trickery of the enemy, and despite the scarcity of our supporters, oh Abu Abdallah, we will not abandon you, or your religion, or your flock, or your Karbala, or your goals, even if we are killed and burned, and our wives and children are captured as yours were. We say to you that we – men, women, children, elderly, young – who were steadfast and withstood the July War, are not frightened by their war, their weapons, threats, and trickery. Just as we were steadfast before, we shall continue, as long as there runs in our veins a drop of your blood, and a breath of your breath is in our bodies, and your strength is in us, and your will, we will remain Husayns and Zaynabs, and we repeat with you until the end of time: “Hayhat minna ‘l-dhilla!”

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July 2, 2011

Nasrallah Comments on the STL Indictments

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon | Tags: , |
[313] Comments 

Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah is scheduled to give an address this evening about the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s (STL) indictments against members of his party. I will attempt to live-blog it, pending the quality of the internet connection. Refresh this page to follow the translation, once the address begins.

**

8:30: Nasrallah begins speaking.

8:34: Le Figaro said a long time ago that Hizbullah members would be targeted, and we already commented on that. We have already explained what the objectives of this project are.

8:35: We know that it is impossible to annul the STL, because this is an American project anyway. Its goal is to tarnish the image of the Resistance, and even to create civil strife in Lebanon.

8:36: I’m going to speak about 3 subjects. I am in the habit, as you know, of giving you a table of contents for my speeches. The first subject is the investigation. The second subject is the Tribunal. And the third subject is our position on the indictments.

8:39: Over the past year, we have suggested to the various authorities that they investigate the Israeli hypothesis [that Israel killed Hariri]. We held a major press conference and presented all kinds of evidence, involving drone footage, witness testimony, etc. We presented all this evidence and said: “Here you go. This constitutes a lead for you to pursue.” Did they follow it? No.

8:40: The evidence we presented is circumstantial, and it is enough to suspect Israel of the crime. But they didn’t even bother looking into it, let alone taking it seriously and building a case on it.

8:42: It’s not my job or the job of Hizbullah to launch an investigation and present evidence to Mr. Bellemare. But we did, and we found once again that there was no interest because this Tribunal is completely politicized.

8:43: In 2005, Mehlis admitted to Le Figaro that he was getting information from Israel. Rather than investigating Israel, this investigation has cooperated with Israel.

8:44: I have a question with regard to the investigation. When the UNIIIC was annulled and the offices in Lebanon were transferred to the Netherlands, everything was taken out via Beirut International Airport, with the exception of the computers. There were 97 computers that were not taken out via the airport, but rather via Israel. So the question to Mr. Bellemare is: Why didn’t you take them out via the airport or the seaport? Why did you take them out of Lebanon via Israel?

8:47: [Shows a video presentation presenting information about the transfer of computer equipment to The Hague via Israel. Shows multiple documents allegedly showing transfer of computer equipment to Israel. Name on the document: Miho Hirose. (Someone please Google this...)]

8:49: This shows that the investigators are hardly objective. As you will see, one of Bellemare’s top officers is from the CIA.

8:51: [Shows another video presentation]. Nick Kaldas was involved with the CIA in Iraq. Michael Taylor, a British officer in the investigation since 2010, and former anti-terrorism officer in New Scotland Yard. Darryl Mendes, an American officer who served in the CIA and FBI and continues to coordinate with these agencies. Was also a general prosecutor for the US Navy. Durayd Bsharawi, a Lebanese officer, known to have bad relations with Syria and Hizbullah. Robert Baer, an American former CIA official who was in charge of hunting Imad Mughniyyeh. (Shows a clip from an interview with Baer, where he talks about hunting and failing to catch Mughniyyeh). In 2010, Baer turned up as an advisor to the STL. [QN: So what?]

8:59: Nasrallah: What’s the point of showing this montage? It’s simply to make the point that this team of advisors is hardly capable of investigating the Israel hypothesis, given its experience of fighting the Resistance.

9:01: Gerhard Lehmann was Mehlis’s deputy. I believe that the time they spent in Lebanon was the golden age of their life. We’re going to show you evidence of Lehmann’s complete corruption.

9:03: [Shows another video presentation] Gerhard Lehmann worked for German intelligence and was Mehlis’s deputy. During his tenure in German intelligence, he worked with Israel. He tried to make a deal with Jamil al-Sayyid. We’re showing you a video capture of Lehmann receiving payment in 2006 from someone. [Hidden camera].

9:05: We have previously talked about corruption in the STL. Did anyone investigate them? We are happy to present Mr. Bellemare with more evidence.

9:06: You have all seen, via New TV’s series “Haqiqa Leaks” how the various investigators were sitting around with the false witnesses. We have even more to say on this score, which we will save til later.

[Internet connection is acting up...stay tuned]

9:09: The worst instances of leaking happened a couple of days ago. The STL delegation meets with the Lebanese delegation. While they were sitting and talking, the Lebanese TV stations were already talking about the names, which are supposed to be secret! So who leaked them? Where is the investigational secrecy?

9:11: The indictments are being used for a political side, not for the cause of finding the truth. There were names that appeared in Der Spiegel and CBC that the indictments did not name but Bellemare said that there would be more indictments.

9:12: Do you remember when Der Spiegel came out with its report? It was just before the 2009 elections. The elections in which hundreds of millions of dollars were spent by March 14? The Der Spiegel leak was part of the electoral campaign against the Resistance.

9:13: All of the leaks and actions by the STL have coincided with key events in Lebanese politics. They want to bring down PM Miqati’s government by any means possible. The indictments were confirmed and announced to give a weapon to the other side (i.e. March 14) to bring down this government. This is the end of the first subject.

9:15: The second subject is the Tribunal. People are saying that these men who are accused should present themselves to the STL and defend themselves.

9:16: Did this Tribunal treat the four generals with any fairness or justice? Jamil al-Sayyid has been pleading his case with the STL tirelessly after being imprisoned for 4 years. Did anything come of it? No. So how do you expect this Tribunal to treat people who have fought against Israel??

9:17: Who is in charge of the STL? Mr. Antonio Cassesse. This man is a dear friend of Israel. [Shows a video presentation]. At a conference in Herzliya (in Israel), Professor George Fletcher apologized to the attendees: “One of the great heroes of our field is not able to be here today… his name is Antonio Cassesse… He is a great friend of Israel.”

9:21: Nasrallah: Cassesse believes that the Resistance is a terrorist organization. So this man is supposed to bring about justice? This man is supposed to be impartial?

9:22: [Video presentation] In 2006 Cassesse sent a letter to Israel which says things like “Israel is a democratic state, etc.” [QN: Yes, but the point of the letter was actually to criticize Israel for its acts that violate humanitarian law, if you look closely at the letter. That was a mistake by Nasrallah... someone should have caught that.]

9:26: Is it possible for a Tribunal like this, with such a president and officers and track record, to actually find out the truth?

9:27: To the final subject: the current situation. To the Lebanese people, I say to them the following: don’t worry about civil strife. Those who talk about civil strife in Lebanon actually want that to come about. There will be no Sunni-Shiite strife, and no civil war in Lebanon. Everyone should be assured that we have a responsible government and trustworthy that will confront this situation effectively. So, to the Lebanese people, don’t worry. Everything is fine.

9:29: To the March 14 forces, I say the following. You consider yourself an opposition to PM Miqati’s government, and that is your right. If you think that the international game is aiding your fortunes, that’s also your right. I have, however, two pieces of advice for you, or let us say two thoughts (since you don’t like to be advised). (1) Don’t ask PM Miqati’s government to try to arrest the indicted individuals, because you wouldn’t be able to do it yourself even if you had a 100% March 14 government. Even if you held every single portfolio, you wouldn’t be able to arrest these individuals, so don’t expect PM Miqati to do it. (2) My second piece of advice is: Don’t demand that PM Miqati be less flexible than PM Hariri was with respect to the STL. The Foreign Ministers of Qatar and Turkey gave me a document that stated that Prime Minister Saad Hariri was ready to accept a certain set of demands (with respect to the STL). I can show you this document. So don’t expect PM Miqati to refuse demands about the STL that Saad al-Hariri accepted. That document was signed by the Qataris, Turks, Syrians, Saudis, and Saad al-Hariri, and we were told that Ms. Clinton was ready to bless the agreement as well.

9:37: To the supporters of the Resistance: there has been a war waged upon us for years. This is no surprise. We have always been prepared for it. Whether the war takes the form of military conflict or media wars or psychological war or whatever, we are prepared. The path of resistance has succeeded in liberating land, and defending our country. So we will confront this issue of the Tribunal just as we have confronted other issues.

9:42: There are people in Lebanon who want to see Sunni-Shiite strife, particularly some Christians in March 14. We will not succumb to this.

9:43: Presents a summary of his speech and some concluding comments. The Resistance has never been stronger.

*

Well, there you have it folks. I’ll have some thoughts about the speech either later today or tomorrow, but right now I have to go prepare for a BBQ. Tfaddalo!

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May 26, 2011

Nasrallah on Syria: More Equal Than Others?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Syria | Tags: , , |
[82] Comments 

The following is a list of Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s comments on the various Arab uprisings. First one to spot the odd one out wins a plate of Syrian baklawa. (Source: almanar.com.lb)

Tunis: “We must congratulate the Tunisian people on their historic revolution, their struggle, and their uprising.”

Egypt: “In Tunis and Egypt, tyrants have gone away…We call on the people of Egypt and the people of Tunis to unite, because division could be a prelude to the resurrection of the ruling regimes…”

Libya: “A group of young men and women rose and they were faced with bullets; war was imposed on the popular revolution. What is taking place in Libya is war imposed by the regime on a people that was peacefully demanding change; this people was forced to defend itself and war broke out in the east and the west, with warplanes, rocket launchers, and artillery and brought back to our memory the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and all of Israel’s wars. Such serious crimes should be condemned and the revolutionary people of Libya should be helped so as to persevere.”

Yemen: “It is not possible to keep silent about killing and oppressing the demonstrators [in Yemen]. We praise the steadfastness of the Yemeni people and their commitment to their peaceful movement, although we know that Yemen is full of weapons.”

Bahrain: “Why is the movement [in Bahrain] condemned and the injured accused? Just because they are Shiites? If most of the opposition in Bahrain are Shiites, does this outlaw them and make them subject to fatwas? We’ve always been with the Palestinian people, but the sect of the Palestinian people was never an issue for us. Nobody asked about the confession and sect of the Tunisian and Egyptian peoples; we have an obligation to stand by the downtrodden. Iran stood by the people of Palestine, Tunis, Egypt, and Libya; was this based on secular considerations? I find it very weird to hear some people calling on Egyptians to take to the streets, Libyans to kill Gaddafi, but when Bahrain is involved, their ink dries out, and their voices dampen.”

Syria: “First, we should be committed to Syria’s stability, security and safety. Second, we call upon the Syrian people to maintain their regime of resistance, as well as to give way to the Syrian leadership to implement the required reforms and to choose the course of dialogue. Third, we as Lebanese shouldn’t interfere in what is going on in Syria, but let the Syrians themselves to deal with the issue. Fourth, we should reject any sanctions led by US and the West asking Lebanon to abide by them against Syria, which is the most important goal of Feltman’s recent visit to Lebanon.”
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March 23, 2011

Who Needs Hizbullah? (According to Wikileaks, Not Nabih Berri)

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , , |
[68] Comments 

Over the past several weeks, as Wikileaks has released its reams of US government cables full of politically damaging statements by the leaders of Lebanon’s March 14th coalition, many have remarked on the fact that Hizbullah and its allies have not exploited the documents as purposefully as they could have.

Sure, there has been the odd snide remark in a press conference, and Hizbullah is now making noises about suing March 14th figures for inviting Israel to invade Lebanon, but one gets the sense that much more could have been made of the scandal. So why the  silence?

The obvious reason is that no one really knows what else Wikileaks has in the way of embarrassing transcripts. By allowing ministers like Elias al-Murr to claim that Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman was putting words in his mouth (when it was revealed by Wikileaks that he was coordinating the Lebanese Army’s response in a future hypothetical encounter with the IDF), Hizbullah was ensuring that its own allies would have the same space to maneuver, in case they were caught saying similarly damaging things.

Which brings us to the latest revelations, made possible by al-Akhbar’s serialized Wikileaks bonanza. There are four new cables available on the newspaper’s website that provide a glimpse into several meetings that Speaker of Parliament (and staunch Hizbullah ally) Nabih Berri held with American officials (including Ambassador Feltman and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch) during the July 2006 War.

(Update: There’s also a cable about a meeting between Minister of Health Mohammed Jawad Khalifeh and Ambassador Feltman, which I pasted at the bottom of the lot below).

Nothing Berri says is nearly as egregious as what a vodka-swilling Walid Jumblatt was whispering in the Americans’ ears around the same time, but it is telling nonetheless. Most notable is a statement that Berri allegedly made regarding the future of the Lebanese resistance:

If Shebaa Farms are not turned over to Lebanon, Berri said that he personally would oppose disarming Hizballah. But if the Shebaa Farms are “”liberated,”" then “”who needs”" Hizballah?

Now, this obviously doesn’t make Berri look so good, and one can imagine that there will be a letter to the editor from Berri’s office published in al-Akhbar tomorrow decrying the statement attributed to him in the cable. He probably won’t take much of a political hit, and all will be forgiven and forgotten in due course.

However, I think it’s still worth pointing out that a very significant majority of Lebanon’s political leaders (across ideological and confessional lines) were basically in agreement on the need to “deal with” Hizbullah, in some way or another. March 14th’s leaders obviously wanted the party’s military apparatus to be crushed by Israel, while Aoun wanted it to be reined in through the framework of his February 6th agreement with Nasrallah.

Meanwhile, although Berri insisted that the resistance had a legitimate right to exist as long as Israel remained on Lebanese territory, he also made it clear that Hizbullah would have to give up that right if Israel withdrew from Shebaa. Most strikingly, the cables show that even the Americans were beginning to be convinced that this broad consensus among Lebanon’s leaders on Shebaa might actually provide a solution to the Israel-Lebanon conflict.

Of course, we all know what happened. Tzipi Livni rejected the idea that Shebaa be dealt with at all, and the issue was put to bed. On the other hand, who knows how serious Berri and Aoun would have been about advocating Hizbullah’s disarmament when push came to shove? It’s not hard to imagine any of a wide range of potential pretexts to replace Shebaa. The links to the various cables are below; check them out and discuss amongst yourselves…

PS: For those of you waiting for some big pronouncement on my part about the events going on in Syria, I’m waiting for some expert commentary to come through. In the meantime, check out Syria Comment. (For Arabic speakers, there’s also Kafa Samtan, which I haven’t checked out yet, but Mustapha over at Beirut Spring vouches for them.)

**

06BEIRUT2440 (July 22, 2006) | Subject: SPEAKER BERRI SAYS HE IS WAITING FOR ISRAEL’S FINAL OFFER

06BEIRUT2464 (July 25, 2006) | Subject: BERRI SAYS ISRAEL WON’T WIN

“The Ambassador argued that Israel will not accept a return to the status quo ante. At the same time, Lebanon has an opportunity now that the USG is considering ideas that might resolve the Shebaa Farms issue. Berri noted that the Shebaa Farms are crucial. If Shebaa Farms are not turned over to Lebanon, Berri said that he personally would oppose disarming Hizballah. But if the Shebaa Farms are “”liberated,”" then “”who needs”" Hizballah? Berri concluded that he understood that inclusion of the Shebaa Farms issue this was a positive step, and agreed to keep looking for a solution to the current crisis. (Comment: Berri stuck to the same line he had used with the Secretary — cease-fire and prisoner exchanges — which the Ambassador said would lead to a quick dead end. But, today, Berri seemed to offer a hint of support for a different approach, if he was assured that Shebaa Farms would be part of the package. Berri seems to have moved ever so slightly overnight. End comment.)”

*

06BEIRUT2541 (August 6, 2006) | Subject: A/S WELCH MEETS WITH SPEAKER BERRI

“Berri believed that if the Israelis do not withdraw from Shebaa, he cannot pressure Hizballah to relinquish their arms. He told A/S Welch that the resistance will have a right to remain as long as Israel is present in Lebanon.”

“Berri recommended that in the first phase, Israeli soldiers should withdraw and 10,000 soldiers from the Lebanese Army would deploy to the south. In what was an unprecedented statement for a Lebanese Shia leader, Berri vowed that he would lead the army to the south, driving a jeep in front of the tanks.”

“Berri stated that he will rebuild the south again, but could not do so with Israeli forces there. “”What I built in 22 years they have destroyed in 22 days,”" helamented. However, he stated that he is adamant to lead the Shia back to the south when Israeli troops leave, just as he claimed to do after previous times of strife. A/S Welch assured Berri that the U.S. would be a partner in rebuilding Lebanon with emphasis on the south.”

*

06BEIRUT2600 (August 11, 2006) | Subject: LEBANON: FOR BERRI RESOLUTION COMES DOWN TO ONE THING

“Berri admitted that the events of 1983 set a bad example for multinational forces in Lebanon under Chapter 7. Berri told A/S Welch that perhaps he is afraid of Chapter 7, and the U.S. friendship with Israel makes him even more afraid. He recognized that Israel wants the right to protect itself and said that “”this will be included.”" He reminded A/S Welch that Resolution 426 establishes precedent for Chapter 6 with a clause for self-defense.”

“Berri informed A/S Welch that Shebaa Farms will always be the pretext for Hizballah to remain armed. He warned that the language in the current draft of the resolution on Shebaa farms is not sufficient.”

“Berri accused the U.S. of not wanting to engage on the Shebaa Farm issue because it does not want to give Hizballah a victory. A/S Welch agreed. Berri declared that it is his right to state for the record that problems will continue with Israel until Shebaa Farms is resolved.”

“Berri reluctantly accepted the reality that if Israeli troops are fired on they have the right to defend themselves on the ground at the point of attack. However he added that defending themselves does not mean air bombings on civilian areas.”

“A/S Welch offered that when the U.S. votes on the resolution, it could say that civilian areas should not be used as launching areas and should not be attacked. Berri cautioned that the wording should be precise and clear. Winking (and implying he was thinking of his “”Hizballah partners”"), he fears that the time between the cessation of hostilities and the deployment of an enhanced UNIFIL could be used by people who “”do not want peace”" to ignite the conflict again. Berri stressed the importance of assurances from the U.S. and UN that Hizballah fire on Israeli soldiers inside Lebanon will not start the conflict again because he doesn’t “”trust Hizballah.”"


*

06BEIRUT2699 (August 19, 2006) | Subject: SHIA MINISTER CLAIMS BERRI TRICKED HIZBALLAH, NOW AT ODDS WITH NASRALLAHwordpress stats

QN Comment: This cable, which details a meeting between Feltman and the Berri-allied Minister of Health, Mohammed Jawad Khalifeh, is perhaps the most damning and mind-blowing of the lot. I’m not going to excerpt it because I’d just end up quoting the whole thing. Read it all.

 

March 21, 2011

Wikileaks Cables on the July 2006 War

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, March 14, Syria | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , |
[82] Comments 


Apologies for the brief absence, folks. Things have been busy, but not busy enough to keep me from devouring all of the Wikileaks cables about the July 2006 War that al-Akhbar has been publishing. Mesmerizing stuff…

For English speakers who may have trouble navigating the newspaper’s website, I’ve posted links to all of the relevant cables below along with their dates, subject headings, and the occasional excerpt. If I have some time later this week, I’ll share some thoughts about the content of the cables.

If anyone’s interested and in the area, I’ll be giving a talk at the University of Oklahoma two weeks from today, where I look forward to seeing my friends Yaron Ayalon (an Ottoman historian who teaches there) and Joshua Landis, author of the indispensable Syria Comment (which is a must-read these days, given all that’s going on in Syria).

Without further ado, I give you…

AL-AKHBAR’S WIKILEAKS CABLES

06BEIRUT2351 (July 13, 2006) | Subject: INITIAL REACTION TO NASRALLAH’S SPEECH JUSTIFYING HIZBALLAH’S ABDUCTION OF IDF SOLDIERS

06BEIRUT2353 (July 13, 2006) |Subject: LEBANESE PM SINIORA: “WE NEED HELP.”

06BEIRUT2390 (July 14, 2006) |Subject: HIZBALLAH’S RECKLESSNESS SPLITS AOUN’S ADVISORS

“Aounist advisor MP Ibrahim Kanaan expressed frustration and deep concern over the present course of events in Lebanon and said he has advised his party leader General Michel Aoun to put distance between himself and Hassan Nasrallah. Kanaan is convinced that Hizballah, with “its extreme overconfidence,” will soon lose control over the rapidly escalating hostilities. In his view, the resulting loss of life and stability will produce a severe backlash in Christian, and possibly Sunni, communities that could destroy Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, since it is currently viewed as a Hizballah ally. Kanaan suggested, however, that the current crisis may offer an opportunity for Aoun and PM Siniora to form a pro-reform “partnership.” Senior Aoun advisor Gebran Bassil, on the other hand, defended Hizballah’s actions and said Siniora’s government was merely reaping the whirlwind created by its passivity and refusal to share power. Moderate Aounist MP Farid el-Khazen, meanwhile, split the difference: strongly criticizing Hizballah’s duplicity and recklessness, while recommending aloofness from the star-crossed Siniora government.”

“In a July 13 discussion with poloff, MP Ibrahim Kanaan, who is frequently used as an intermediary and spokesperson by Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun, said that FPM’s association with Hizballah has been a mistake. Declaring that Michel Aoun did not have the slightest idea that Hizballah was planning such a provocative act, Kanaan professed deep concern that Hizballah was now effectively steering the ship of state. When asked if he thought Hassan Nasrallah was acting like a Minister of Defense, Kanaan retorted, “no, no, much more than that.”

“Kanaan half-heartedly defended the troublesome February 6 compact between the FPM and Hizballah, saying it originally held the promise of bringing Hizballah into Lebanon’s political mainstream. But he conceded that the previous day’s “reckless” ambush in Israeli territory is threatening to completely undo Lebanon’s struggling democracy and threatens to deliver the country back into the tender mercies of Syria.”

*

06BEIRUT2403 (July 17, 2006) | Subject: LARSEN TO PROPOSE HANDOVER OF ISRAELI SOLIDIERS TO GOL…

“Mid-way through the meeting three visitors arrived at Larsen’s room unannounced. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, and Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi entered the room in good humor and indulged in generous orders to room service with the others present. The three Lebanese politicians reacted positively to Larsen’s proposal to call for a transfer of the Israeli soldiers to the GOL…”

“Over a glass of red wine, a large bottle of vodka (the quality of which sparked a long exchange between Jumblatt and the startled room service waiter), and three bottles of Corona beer, Jumblatt gave a briefing on the thinking of the March 14 coalition which had met that evening. Jumblatt noted the heavy destruction of Lebanese infrastructure but bemoaned the irony that Hizballah’s military infrastructure had not been seriously touched. Jumblatt explained that although March 14 must call for a cease-fire in public, it is hoping that Israel continues its military operations until it destroys Hizballah’s military capabilities.”

“Responding to Jumblatt’s complain that Israel is hitting targets that hurt the GOL while leaving Hizballah strategically strong, the Ambassador asked Jumblatt what Israel should do to cause serious damage to Hizballah. Jumblatt replied that Israel is still in the mindset of fighting classic battles with Arab armies. “You can’t win this kind of war with zero dead,” he said. Jumblatt finally said what he meant; Israel will have to invade southern Lebanon. Israel must be careful to avoid massacres, but it should clear Hizballah out of southern Lebanon. Then the LAF can replace the IDF once a cease-fire is reached. A defeat of Hizballah by Israel would be a defeat of Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, Hamadeh added. For emphasis, Jumblatt said that the only two outcomes are total defeat or total success for Hizballah.”

*

06BEIRUT2413 (July 18, 2006) | Subject: [FRENCH AMBASSADOR] INCENSED BY ISRAELI TARGETING OF LAF…

06BEIRUT2437 (July 21, 2006) | Subject: MINISTER MOUAWAD URGES HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE…

“In closing, Minister Mouawad re-emphasized two issues: the urgent necessity of starting humanitarian operations now and the advantages of using that effort to strengthen the standing of the GOL with the Lebanese people. She stated the first step is the immediate establishment of
humanitarian corridors inside Lebanon to the villages of the south. Finally, she urged that USG support and protect three critical figures: Fouad Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, and unexpectedly, Nabih Berri — who in her opinion may be the best available Shia alternative to Nasrallah.”

*

06BEIRUT2443 (July 23, 2006) | Subject: AMINE GEMAYEL SAYS CEASE-FIRE SHOULD SECURE BORDER FIRST…

“Gemayel said Aoun had cooperated with Mossad through the duration of Lebanon’s civil war, and said he allied himself with Syria and Hizballah now because he believed they offered him the best chance at winning his long coveted seat in Baabda Palace.”

*

06BEIRUT2471 (July 25, 2006) | Subject: SAMIR JA`JA` SUPPORTS PROPOSED PATH TO CEASEFIRE…WITH A SUGGESTION

06BEIRUT2490 (July 29, 2006) Subject: MARWAN HAMADEH DISCUSSES CEASE-FIRE POSSIBILITIES

“On the night of July 28, the Ambassador and econoff met with Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh at his apartment. “An Nahar” General Manager Ghassan Tueni was also there for much of the meeting, his main contribution filling us in with breaking press reports (almost all of which later proved to be erroneous).” [QN: That explains Naharnet...]

*

06BEIRUT2504 (August 1, 2006) Subject: SINIORA BELIEVES HE HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS PEOPLE…

“When asked about his inexplicable confidence that Hizballah would either move north of the Litani with its heavy weapons, or allow itself to be disarmed by the LAF, Siniora said he wasn’t certain, but his on-going communication with Hizballah through Nabih Berri and other Shia interlocutors led him to believe they were “considering” and close to such action.”

*

06BEIRUT2508 (August 1, 2006) Subject: AOUN PARROTS PIAF: “JE NE REGRETTE RIEN”

“In an awkward attempt to straddle the fence, Aoun insisted he was not really in an alliance with Hizballah, but then proceeded to tear down the “inconstant” leaders of March 14 — Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri — who in his view did not deserve the “confidence” of the Lebanese people. The implication (although never stated explicitly) was that Nasrallah is a more trustworthy partner…”

“For those who hoped the tragedy of the current crisis might be the catalyst to inject some sanity in Michel Aoun’s relationship with Hizballah, this meeting proved a disappointment. In what was essentially a disjointed, repetitive, and often contradictory performance, Aoun displayed the qualities that engender so much antipathy and distrust among Lebanon’s political class. He rarely admits a mistake or miscalculation and through exquisite twists of logic, always manages to replay his diplomatic/political “triumphs” and interpret other leaders’ efforts as feckless and ill-conceived…We have noticed developing fissures in the FPM movement and strong disagreement with Aoun’s policies in his second-tier of advisors, but Aoun’s lack of movement toward the country’s other pro-reform leaders implies that the post-conflict political scene may be as contentious as it was on July 11. We agree with him that the Shia community in Lebanon cannot be ignored and cannot be made to feel defeat as a community. But, unlike Jumblatt and Hariri, Aoun has not yet awakened to the fact that Nasrallah has used him.”

*

06BEIRUT2511 (August 1, 2006) |Subject: HAMADEH SEES RESOLUTION OF SHEBAA FARMS AS MEANS TO NEUTRALIZE HIZBALLAH IDEOLOGICALLY

“Hamadeh described a significant change in Minister of Defense Elias El-Murr’s demeanor, characterizing him as playing both sides. Hamadeh said that El-Murr believes the Hizballah will “win” in the current conflict and is trying to save himself politically for the post-conflict sorting-out of the political scene here. Hamadeh recounted that Siniora was furious at El-Murr at a recent cabinet meeting for his comments to the media to the effect that, “the 7 points (of Siniora’s paper) do not exist”. Other ostensibly “pro-Syrian” members of the cabinet have been surprisingly quiet, Hamadeh said. Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, an erstwhile ally of President Emile Lahoud, has been, “playing it better than Elias (El-Murr),” offered Hamadeh. Rizk has even been pushing forward the Cabinet’s work on the establishment of an international tribunal to try suspects in the crimes under the purview of Serge Brammertz’s UNIIIC. According to Hamadeh, Rizk has made great progress, appointing “two good judges.” Hamadeh stressed that they should take advantage of Rizk’s openness to work on this issue. For Hamadeh, now is the time to pass a resolution to establish the tribunal, as this would serve to “keep Syria quiet” on the current Lebanese-Israeli conflict as well as further contain the Syrians in the long run.”

*

06BEIRUT2513 (August 1, 2006) | Subject: MP BOUTROS HARB: NASRALLAH CANNOT BECOME REGION’S RAMBO

Quote: “[Harb] recommended that a strong Israeli advance that completely controls the Hizballah strongholds of Maroun El Ras and Bint Jbeil would provide a chance for the U.S. impose a ceasefire while showing that Hizballah has been overpowered… He also stressed that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a reluctant Hizballah ally, will become the political victim of Hizballah.”

*

06BEIRUT2540 (August 6, 2006) | Subject: JUMBLATT AND HAMADE ON TWO-PHASE SOLUTION

“Jumblatt expressed regret that, in his view, Israel failed to assess Hizballah’s operations on the ground. He questioned how Israel was completely taken by surprise on July 12. He concluded that today the tables have turned to Hizballah’s advantage as the organization is founded on a “culture of death.” Hizballah fighters want to die as martyrs and will not hesitate to blow themselves up to kill Israelis. In addition, there is a new generation of Israeli soldiers that are not as driven and motivated as their predecessors. He thinks this was illustrated in the past weeks of fighting and warns that it is dangerous for Israel and the region for this to be revealed.”

*

06BEIRUT2544 (August 7, 2006) | Subject: CHRISTIAN POLITICAL LEADERS SAY SHEBAA IS KEY

“On August 5, A/S Welch and Ambassador Feltman met with Christian leaders from the anti- Syria March 14 movement, including former President Amin Gemayel, his son and Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, Dory Chamoun, Carlos Edde, Fares Souaid, George Adwan, and presidential hopefuls Nayla Moawad (Minister of Social Affairs), Nassib Lahoud, and MP Boutros Harb. While claiming to be fully supportive of Prime Minister Siniora’s call for a ceasefire, they are troubled that the current conflict might leave Hizballah in a stronger position within Lebanon than at the beginning. The Lebanese government will need to be in a position of strength to deal with Hizballah once the conflict is over, the leaders argued. To this end, they would support a continuation of the Israeli bombing campaign for a week or two if this were to diminish seriously Hizballah’s strength on the ground.”

“Claiming to reflect PM Siniora’s private thoughts, several of the assembled leaders urged that Hizballah be given a “real pounding” by the Israelis to the point that the group would be “soft enough to listen to reason.” According to Boutros Harb, “if we are convinced that Israel can finish the job, then we can allow a few more weeks,” though the consensus seemed to rest between seven to ten days. If on the other hand Hizballah were to emerge emboldened with a perceived sense of victory, “that would be a disaster.”

*

06BEIRUT2553 (August 8, 2006) | Subject: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID LAF DEPLOYMENT

“Murr stated clearly that the LAF was prepared to hit back at Hizballah if they attempted to fire at Israel or tried to draw Israeli fire by placing launchers near to LAF positions.”

“In contrast to his earlier dismissals that Israel had significantly harmed Hizballah, Murr claimed that Hizballah had suffered losses of 50 percent of its equipment as well as 400 fighters during the conflict. While he estimates that Hizballah has fired off 3000 of its rockets, he believes that the Syrians were able to resupply Hizballah with 2500 before the Israelis took out the road links.”

*

06TELAVIV3079 (August 8, 2006) | Subject: ISRAEL FM LIVNI SAYS ISRAEL DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT DRAFT OF UN RESOLUTION

06BEIRUT2602 (August 12, 2006) | Subject: SAAD HARIRI WANTS LAHOUD OUT

“According to Hariri, “Nabih Berri is furious with Hizballah.” While Berri will maintain a united Shi’a front for some months following the conflict, Berri will put pressure on Hizballah to keep in line and, ultimately, “Berri’s dream is to finish off Hizballah” and reclaim Amal’s primacy among the Shi’a. Hariri said that Berri had compelled Hizballah to accept the LAF deployment plan, and that this spells “the beginning of the end” for HIzballah.”If we play our cards right,” Hariri added.”

“Asking that his comments be kept close-hold, Hariri whispered that, “We need to remove Lahoud, (LAF commander Michel) Sleiman, and (Head of the G2 army intelligence) George Khoury. They are in bed with Syria. They are in bed with Hizballah.” While Hariri hopes to eventually recruit Nabih Berri’s critical support to achieve this, he asked that international pressure on Iran and Syria continue unabated.”

“On a positive note, Hariri praised with seeming sincerity the performance of PM Fouad Siniora during this crisis.”If I had picked Bahije (Tabbarah, former Minister of Justice) a year ago,” he said, his voice trailing off as he shook his head. We think that this was a tacit acknowledgement, Saad-style, that the strong advice we and the French gave him to pick Siniora over his initial choice of Tabbarah was the right one. But what was encouraging in Saad’s praise for Siniora was the suggestion that the two of them will now be able to cooperate without the internal rivalries and jealousies that had plagued their relationship earlier this year. In general, we think Siniora has done a better job when he hasn’t had to worry about the less experienced but politicaly more powerful Saad second-guessing him. But we also believe that it’s good Saad is home: the image of Saad Hariri staying at the Plaza Athenee in Paris and globe-trotting with an sizable entourage, while hundreds of thousands of Lebanese felt forced to leave their homes, was not good for the future of the March 14 movement.”
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January 25, 2011

Day of Hypocrisy

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, March 14, Reform | Tags: , , , |
[178] Comments 

The political story in Lebanon is changing so quickly that I’m loathe to forecast how things are going to play out over the next couple of weeks. A few quick thoughts, though, on the calculations of the various players and the choices they face:

1. Tables are turned

Lebanon’s Sunnis are calling for a “day of rage”, but  it’s more apt to call it a day of deep hypocrisy and cynicism. Consider the following:

  • In 2005, after winning a majority in the elections, the March 14th coalition wanted to nominate a Shiite Speaker of Parliament other than Nabih Berri. The main Shiite parties, Hizbullah and Amal, made a big fuss over this and claimed that such a move would violate that infamously vague clause of the Lebanese Constitution (Preamble, j), which states that “there shall be no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which contradicts the pact of communal existence.” March 14th acquiesced and appointed Berri.
  • In 2006, Hizbullah and Amal withdrew from the Siniora government and then called it illegal and unconstitutional because of the lack of Shiite participation. Speaker Berri then refused to allow Parliament to convene for over a year and a half, so as to prevent the body from ratifying the Lebanese government’s cooperation agreement with the UN Special Tribunal (later passed via Chapter VII), and voting on Emile Lahoud’s presidential successor. (I recommend reading Gary Gambill’s superb discussion of the 2006 constitutional crisis for more background on this issue.)

So, these two parties — Hizbullah and Amal — have played the “consensual democracy” card to the hilt over the past six years, using its logic to demand executive appointments, block legislation, and, eventually, bring down Hariri’s government. And yet, today, these same parties are the ones acting like the fish-out-of-water majoritarians whom they accused March 14′s leaders of being between 2005-09.

Meanwhile, March 14th supporters are calling for a day of Sunni rage, burning cars, and rioting in the streets, while the West threatens Hizbullah to respect Lebanon’s pact of communal coexistence. How d’ya like them apples?

2. Consensual vs. majoritarian democracy

While I sympathize with those who chafe at the hypocrisy of March 8th’s newfound majoritarian impulses, I strongly support the democratic principle that legitimizes Hizbullah’s current move. The March 8th coalition is now Lebanon’s parliamentary majority. They should have the right to bring down this government and form their own. Governments fall all the time, all around the world. This should be able to happen in Lebanon without sparking sectarian protests.

On a slightly more abstract note, I found myself wondering today (as I did back during the 2006-08 constitutional crisis), what effect the majority coalition’s pro-democracy rhetoric would have on Lebanon’s political culture in the long term. The fact that we’ve seen both sides of the political divide appealing to a majoritarian logic within the space of six years seems significant to me. No?

Obviously, what I would like to see happen is for this new method of choosing prime ministers (and speakers) to be enshrined in the Constitution, such that we don’t keep flip-flopping between consensual and majoritarian procedures every other year. A precedent has been set. Let’s stick with it. But you can bet that won’t happen.

3. Another desperate move?

Setting aside the cynicism of Hizbullah’s political strategy, I continue to think that it’s somewhat desperate and uncharacteristically short-sighted. What has Hizbullah really achieved by replacing Hariri with Miqati? The Daily Star (now owned by Hariri, fyi), argues vociferously against Miqati’s candidacy today in its editorial, on the basis that he is not a consensus candidate and that he would have had to agree to March 8th’s conditions with regard to the Tribunal before being nominated.

But even if Miqati did agree to doing the opposition’s (excuse me, “the new majority’s”) bidding, isn’t it obvious that he can’t end Lebanon’s cooperation with the STL on his own? He needs the cabinet to vote on it. And since both he and Nasrallah are currently calling for a national unity government, the Miqati government would effectively be hamstrung by the same conditions that Hariri’s was, and so any move to withdraw the Lebanese judges from the court, stop financing, and abrogate the cooperation agreement could be torpedoed by Hariri’s coalition. The only way that Hizbullah and its allies could ram through their agenda on the STL would be by either:

  1. denying March 14th a blocking third in the cabinet, which would be the biggest act of chutzpah I’ve seen since… well, since Hizbullah appointed a Sunni PM other than Hariri;
  2. counting on the fact that Hariri would refuse to join their government, thus giving March 8th leeway to do whatever they wanted.

The first option is highly unlikely; the second is deeply unsatisfactory, as it will simply re-energize Hariri’s base in Lebanon, and make Hizbullah look like it is willing to contravene every principle, custom, and precedent of Lebanese consociationalism in order to suffocate the STL. And it wouldn’t work! That’s what so desperate and puzzling about this whole strategy. The court has been set in motion. The evidence is going to be made public sooner or later. It’s just that it will now come out with an angry Sunni audience in Lebanon led by a politician who has less to gain than ever from playing by Hizbullah’s rules. Had they tried to find a way to put Humpty-Dumpty back together again, they could have at least made Hariri do the talking when Lebanon got around to formally denouncing the STL indictments. Now it will have to be Miqati, who has already been branded as a Hizbullah puppet. (That’s too bad, because I think he’s actually light years more competent and a better fit to be PM than Hariri will ever be.)

What would you do if you were in Hariri’s shoes? Join the government and play the role of spoiler (as Hizbullah/FPM have done since 2008)? Or stay out of the government, hoping that March 8th will fall on its sword before the 2013 elections? The floor is open.

PS: Andrew Exum has a very interesting piece on where Israel fits into this picture.

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January 19, 2011

Saving Lebanon’s Syrian-Saudi-Qatari-Turkish Initiative

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , , , , , , |
[38] Comments 

It’s been another marathon day for political deal-making in Lebanon. As recently as this morning, the Syrian-Saudi initiative remained dead and buried, only to be resurrected under Qatari-Turkish stewardship (and French oversight) by the afternoon.  Tomorrow, we may see the Brazilians and the Russians tossing their hats in the ring, and before you know it, the Tasmanians will be elbowing their way to the bar as well.

Lebanon’s speaker of parliament Nabih Berri was quoted in a story in An-Nahar today confirming the terms of the Syrian-Saudi initiative, which were first discussed by Hizbullah Secretary-General Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah in his speech on Sunday evening. These terms, as you will recall, were based upon the following three demands by the opposition:

  1. that Lebanon end its financial support of the U.N. Special Tribunal (STL);
  2. that the Lebanese judges be withdrawn from the court;
  3. and that the treaty of cooperation between Lebanon and the court be annulled.

According to Berri, there was a last-ditch effort on Sunday to reach an agreement with Saad al-Hariri on this deal (before the UN Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare could file his indictment to the pre-trial judge on Monday), but it fell through. Had Hariri accepted, he would have presumably been re-nominated prime minister by the opposition. Instead, he turned it down, which led to a flurry of diplomatic activity meant to prevent the security situation in Lebanon from spinning out of control.

The Daily Star is reporting that the Turks and Qataris have stepped in where the Syrians and Saudis failed, and are apparently close to hammering out an agreement which is based on the earlier initiative. While we wait to hear how this pans out, I thought it would be worth reflecting on the opposition’s demands, and what they tell us about how Hizbullah and Hariri view the consequences of the Tribunal.

First of all, as Nasrallah himself noted in his speech, even if Hariri were to accept the three-point plan, this would not bring an end to the STL’s proceedings. This morning, I interviewed the STL Registrar, Herman von Hebel, and he had this to say about the issue of financing:

I’m very confident that we will be able to get the financial support for the budget. Lebanon continues to be obliged to cooperate with the Tribunal and provide financial support – regardless of the state of the government. There remains strong support for the Tribunal in the international community: 20-25 countries around the world are supporting us financially. Following the issuance of the indictment, we have only seen increased attention and support. So, I am confident that even if Lebanon’s share (49% of the budget) were not provided, we would be able to continue our work with contributions from other states.

Similarly, I imagine that withdrawing the Lebanese judges would not represent an insurmountable obstacle for the STL, nor would the annulment of the agreement between the STL and the Lebanese government be anything more than a symbolic move, since the agreement was never ratified by Parliament anyway (it was imposed by Chapter VII).

So, if these three steps make no practical difference to the functioning of the STL, why are they so important to Hizbullah? No one in Lebanon would believe that Hariri and March 14th had changed their true position on the STL even if they did agree to “distance” themselves from it using these measures. So why insist on the charade? On the other hand, because the indicted individuals will almost certainly have to be tried in absentia (since the Lebanese Army can’t be trusted to break up a street fight in Zoqaq al-Blat, let alone arrest a member of Hizbullah and put him on a plane to The Hague), does it really matter, practically speaking, what the Lebanese government’s official stance is on the STL? And if not, why didn’t Hariri accept the proposed settlement?

The obvious answer to these questions is that Hizbullah is seeking to put another dent in the STL’s public image, so as to mitigate any anticipated tarnishing of its own image. I say that this is the “obvious” answer only because it’s the one that people typically offer whenever talk of the Tribunal’s consequences comes up. But the truth is that no one really knows how (or if) the trial will impact Hizbullah’s image once the trial begins. In my opinion, that will depend entirely on the kind of evidence that is marshalled, and not on any transparent political games being played in Beirut.

More on this tomorrow…
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January 16, 2011

Some Post-Speech Thoughts

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , , |
[219] Comments 

Here are some quick thoughts on Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah’s speech this evening, which I live-blogged here (see here for another English translation).

Firstly, I found Nasrallah’s discussion of the terms of the Syrian-Saudi initiative to be quite interesting. If Saad al-Hariri really did agree to the opposition’s demands that they (a) withdraw the Lebanese judges; (b) stop funding; and (c) abrogate the cooperation agreement with the STL, then this is noteworthy. What were, I wonder, al-Hariri and the Saudis’ demands? It seems unlikely to me that al-Hariri and his allies would have agreed to these three demands, which amount to essentially torpedoing public trust in the STL, even if it would not have brought the actual Tribunal to a close (as Nasrallah pointed out).

Secondly, the fact that Nasrallah is able to make so much hay out of the false witness issue is entirely the fault of Hariri himself and his political advisors. As I’ve argued in the past, Hariri’s people have failed miserably in shaping the debate on the false witnesses, while the opposition has basically taken the issue and run with it. Even as we speak, the al-Jadid recording is changing minds in Lebanon, even though it more or less confirms what March 14 politicians have consistently (but poorly) articulated, namely that Siddiq was not fed information by Hariri’s people.

Thirdly, Nasrallah did an excellent job of framing the resignation of the opposition in terms of their dissatisfaction with the Hariri government on a number of fronts (corruption, lack of transparency, incompetence, false witnesses, vulnerability to foreign pressure, etc.) rather than just its commitment to the STL. Earlier in the day, Michel Aoun had similarly made a persuasive and typically belligerent case against Hariri’s government, articulating the reasons that the opposition had decided to abandon the national unity path. The question is: does Nasrallah know something that the rest of us don’t, with respect to Nabih Berri’s nomination decision? All of this will become clearer in the next couple of days.

Finally, allow me to reiterate a basic point that I’ve made several times before: can anyone doubt that the opposition has the big guns (rhetorically speaking) in Lebanon? Here we have Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of a conservative religious-political party and a militia stronger than the Lebanese army that is about to be accused by the United Nations of masterminding the assassination of a Sunni prime minister, and he sounds like the most reasonable, rational, straightforward politician in Lebanon. Note that I am not agreeing with the content of what he said (which was, let’s face it, just another shade of demagoguery like everyone else’s talking points), but simply pointing out the obvious: Hizbullah would be in a vastly different position in Lebanon today were it not for the leadership of Hasan Nasrallah. No one else would be capable of reconciling the manifold contradictions in Hizbullah’s projected identity and framing their program in as capacious and catholic a manner as Nasrallah. To understate his role is to misunderstand the rise of Hizbullah completely, in my opinion.

The floor is open.

UPDATE: Trella.org has the transcript of the second Al-Jadid recording. And here’s the actual recording on YouTube.
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January 16, 2011

Nasrallah to Address Lebanon on Eve of Indictments’ Release

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , , |
[39] Comments 

Hizbullah secretary-general Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah will give a live televised address this evening at 8:30 PM Beirut time (6:30 PM GMT). Arabic speakers outside Lebanon will almost certainly be able to watch the speech on this website. For non-speakers, I will be live-blogging and translating the speech here.

I expect Nasrallah to address the following topics:

  1. The reason for the opposition’s walk-out, and the failure of the Saudi-Syrian initiative.
  2. The formation of the next government: will Hizbullah agree to re-nominate Hariri if he agrees to their conditions, or are they committed to a different candidate altogether?
  3. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s indictments against Hizbullah, which are expected to be given to the pre-trial judge tomorrow.
  4. The tape released by al-Jadeed featuring Hariri discussing his father’s murder with Muhammad Zuhayr al-Siddiq.

Because Nasrallah’s speeches tend to run a little bit long, I imagine that al-Jadeed will release Part Two of their scoop before 8:30 PM. Will try to bring some commentary on that as well, but it may have to wait until tomorrow.

Stay tuned.

*

8:30 PM: Nasrallah begins speech by discussion the Syrian-Saudi initiative.

8:35: It was clear from the beginning that indictments were not going to be canceled. This was out of Saudi hands. It was in American and Israeli hands. What we were negotiating over was: (1) Postponing the emergence of the indictment; (2) Finding a way to preserve Lebanon from any strife resulting from the indictments.

8:37: How could we preserve Lebanon from problems? The government could: (a) withdraw the Lebanese judges from the STL; (b) stop Lebanese financing of the STL; (c) canceling the cooperation agreement between the Lebanese government and the STL. These three things would not abolish the STL! Far from it. Withdrawing judges, stopping funding, and ending official cooperation would not stop the STL. This was the basis of the agreement. And the other side had demands for our side as well that we were negotiating about.

8:40: The atmosphere was very positive. Then the Saudi king got sick and went to America, and the negotiations slowed down.

8:41: Then Saad al-Hariri said that he was waiting for the other side to take its steps. This was read as a positive development because it acknowledged the presence of an agreement about how to solve the crisis.

8:43: Then, without any forewarning, the Saudi side got in touch with the Syrian side and said that the deal was off. This was after Saad al-Hariri’s meeting with the Americans. This was when we decided to withdraw the government.

8:45: It is clear that the Americans and Israelis were opposed to the Syrian-Saudi initiative, from the beginning. They let it go for a while because they were betting that the two sides would not get to a solution. When they saw that it was actually leading to a solution, they came in to disrupt it. Can you give me another explanation?

8:47: Saad Hariri said that the initiative succeeded but that some parties in Lebanon did not fulfill their obligations. This is wrong. But let me go along with him for a bit. Let’s say this is true. Since there was a strong possibility that this initiative would succeed, why would he go to America and accept to be told that the deal was off?

8:49: What happened to sovereignty and independence and freedom? When America says no, then everything stops?

8:50: I will not reveal what Hariri’s side was asking from us. But one day, if someone else does reveal this, then the Lebanese will have to judge whether or not his demands were really in the national interest. Some of the things that they were requesting may have been in the national interest. But others were purely in the political interest of Hariri’s party.

8:52: The false witnesses were responsible for destroying the Lebanese-Syrian relationship and led to the worst sectarian atmosphere. They were responsible for the political climate that led to parliamentary election results.

8:54: One of the things that was being requested from us as part of the S-S initiative was closing the file on the false witnesses. You (i.e. Hariri’s people) should have been the most interested in discovering the truth about the false witnesses and prosecuting them. And yet, you wanted them to be part of the negotiated settlement.

8:55: Now we are starting to understand why the country ground to a halt in order to prevent a vote on the false witness issue.

8:56: What is comical is that some people in Lebanon are saying that the Al-Jadid recording was fabricated. These are the same people who refuse the idea that the STL’s evidence is fabricated.

8:57: Future TV has promised to publish the entire recording, since Al-Jadid’s recording was apparently taken out of context. How is that you have this secret recording? Where did you get it? It’s supposed to be secret.

9:00: We’ve been asking where the $11 billion disappeared to. When we ask about this, they start talking about how this is raising sectarian strife, etc.

9:02: This government has left this country vulnerable. This government is completely powerless before the decisions of the STL.

9:04: In view of this situation, we had to resign from this powerless government.

9:05: We did not bring down the government in the streets, and we did not demonstrate, nor did we use any weapons. We came in a very democratic way and said: here is our resignation. And what happened? America, and France, and various Arab countries were up in arms, and released statements, and applied pressure, and protested. What does this tell you?

9:07: We are not afraid of their armies or their navies or their airplanes, so how could we be afraid of their press releases? We acted in a democratic way, and yet all of the world’s capitals came to criticize us for this democratic action. What does this tell you? It tells you that the world does not want anyone in Lebanon to criticize or oppose [March 14].

9:09: The opposition is united in its determination in not naming Saad Hariri as prime minister. I will not reveal who our choice is tonight. In this domestic issue, why is the world getting involved? Why is Hillary Clinton making phone calls?

9:11: This is supposed to be a democratic process. Let the parliament vote on its choice. Why should it come under pressure from various corners of the world? Is this democracy?

9:12: Imagine that the American ambassador went today to visit Nicola Fattoush in Zahleh. Does she really care about what Zahleh wants? No, she visited him because he’s working on the issue of the next prime minister.

9:14: The STL was called upon to hasten its release of the indictments. They moved to release them on Monday so that it would happen before the next prime minister was nominated.

9:16: What’s next? I want to be very clear and honest. Tomorrow or the day after, there will be two tracks taking place at the same time. One is the track that will lead to the nomination of a new prime minister. The second is the track that will lead Bellemare to present his indictments to pre-trial judge Fransen.

9:17: These two tracks are independent. On the first track: we consider this to be a democratic, constitutional track. We demanded it. We resigned and requested that consultations would lead to a new government. All of the political blocs have a responsibility, a historic responsibility, over the next couple of days. What kind of government do they want to present to the Lebanese people? I leave all of these individuals to their conscience.

9:19: We lived the experience of this government and the previous one. This was a new experience for us, because we had not participated in governments before. I would like it to be clear that whatever government is formed, that government has to assume its responsibilities. From now on, we will not accept any government to be silent on the question of false witnesses. Any government that protects the false witnesses, especially if it is composed of those who fabricated the false witnesses, we will not be silent about it. Any government that protects financial corruption, we will not be silent about it. Any government that does not assume its responsibilities in a serious way, we will not be silent about it. Any government that conspires against the Resistance, we will not be silent about it.

9:23: We hope that the Lebanese form a government with the priorities of the people. I’d like to say that what happened in Tunisia over the past couple of days should be a lesson to us. What is the lesson? The lesson is that the Tunisian regime always had relations with France, America, and even secret channels to Israel. What happened to him? Those government would not even let his plane land in their capitals. This is the lesson.

9:25: We as Lebanese can sit down and solve our problems. But the other side does not want us to solve our problems as Lebanese. It wants the intervention of other countries.

9:26: Finally, with respect to the indictments. We’ve described it as an American-Israeli tribunal, based on facts. We are going to defend our own dignity and presence. This second track is completely independent from the first track. We will not accept our reputation or our dignity to be touched by this tribunal or even by any accusation. My conviction is that the Israelis assassinated Rafiq al-Hariri. George Bush was a crazy man; now they’re saying that the current guy [i.e. Obama] is a bit better.

9:30: The consultations may indeed lead to the re-nomination of Prime Minister Hariri. That’s fine, but it will still be a new era.

9:31: End of broadcast.

 

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January 6, 2011

Justice in the Bazaar

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Arab Politics, Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14, Syria | Tags: , , , , |
[176] Comments 

The Syrian-Saudi negotiations over the fate of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) are a persistent topic in the Arab press these days. According to an interview with Saad al-Hariri which will appear tomorrow in al-Hayat, an agreement about how to mitigate the STL’s repercussions has already been reached, and is just waiting implementation on the Lebanese scene. For background on this issue, I recommend reading the International Crisis Group report, as well as a recent opinion piece by Michael Young.

It will be interesting to see how the Syrian-Saudi agreement is unveiled and presented to the Lebanese public. The gist of the “concessions” expected of Hariri is straightforward: he will be required to help distance Lebanon from the Tribunal in some fashion. Whether this involves going so far as to end Lebanon’s cooperation with and recognition of the STL is uncertain, but we can assume that he will, at the very least, cast doubt on the legitimacy of the STL’s proceedings, and categorically reject the validity of any indictments against members of Hizbullah.

On the other hand, the question of what concessions (if any) will be extracted from Hizbullah is much more perplexing. Unlike Hariri — who has already made some initial concessions  — Hizbullah has not indicated that it will budge from its maximalist position of rejecting the STL as a Zionist plot targeting the resistance. In the International Crisis Group’s discussion of the “contours of a possible deal” (see pp. 28-29) there is no hint at what price Hizbullah and its allies might pay to make the STL become a distant memory. The formulas presented are all essentially March 14 concessions.

The current situation reminds me of an encounter I had several years ago when I was living in Morocco, studying the music of the great chaabi ensemble, Nass el-Ghiwane. I spent the first couple months of my stay in Fes, where I befriended a rug merchant named Ahmad who owned a small shop deep in the old medina.

Over the course of the year, I bought several rugs from Ahmad, which I gave as gifts to friends and family members. As one might expect, each purchase was preceded by a long bargaining process, accompanied by cups of mint tea and endless amusing discussions about history, religion, and politics.

As I neared the end of my stay in Morocco, I set off to visit Ahmad with the intention of buying one last rug from him. It was a beautiful piece: a large, hand-knotted crimson rug with faint tracings in an eggshell color, hanging on a wall in the shop. I had been eyeing it covetously throughout my time in Morocco, but the asking price was well above my budget: $400, which was at least four times more than my piteous, penniless self had previously spent on any other rug in his shop.

When I came to him and expressed my interest, he smiled knowingly and replied: “Of course, ya habibi. Name your price.”

I gritted my teeth and said, almost apologetically, “I’ve got a hundred dollars. Can we make a deal?”

As it turns out, I was telling the truth. I had no more than one hundred dollars left in my savings, but Ahmad didn’t know that, and so he assumed that my offer was  part of a routine bargaining strategy. He thereupon settled into his familiar protestations about the value of the rug, the craftsmanship, and the great loss he would incur by giving it away for such an insultingly low sum.

Over the next two hours, Ahmad’s asking price fell steadily as we chatted in our usual meandering way. My offer, however, remained the same: “One hundred dollars. Take it or leave it.”

As afternoon turned to evening, a group of Ahmad’s friends assembled in his shop, watching this negotiation with amusement. Finally, Ahmad gave up. “Ok. One hundred dollars,” he said. “But you have to buy me a pack of cigarettes.”

I started to insist that I didn’t even have the money to buy him a pack of cigarettes, when his brother leapt to his feet, grabbed me by the arm, and led me outside.

“You will go buy him a pack of cigarettes,” he hissed at me, pressing some of his own money into my hand.

I was baffled. “Why? What does it matter?”

His brother shook his head and left me in the street holding a couple of coins for cigarette money.

It took me a while to understand this strange exchange, but it eventually became clear. The symbolic value of the pack of cigarettes was more important to Ahmad, in the context of our bargaining process, than the $100 I paid him at the end. Why? Because it represented something above my original offer. It was more than what I had originally offered to pay. Even if it was only a paltry amount, and even if the whole bargaining process was an elaborate charade, the fact that he had extracted something from me that I hadn’t been willing to pay was a necessary condition of a successful transaction.

This is not so different, I would suggest, than the position that Hariri finds himself in today. He has already brought his “price” down by exonerating Syria and recognizing the existence of “false witnesses”. He has also exonerated Hizbullah’s leadership from any connection with the crime and offered to help sell the narrative that the perpetrators were rogue elements. All that’s left is for him to join his opponents in claiming that the STL was infiltrated by Israel and that his father was the victim of a Zionist plot.

That he can probably do. But I would argue that he needs something in return — the proverbial “pack of cigarettes” — or else, I believe, he will not be able to contain the fallout of Sunni humiliation and frustration that will result from the lopsided transaction.

This doesn’t mean that any paltry concession by Hizbullah will be enough to enable Hariri and his government to sweep the STL under the rug. Depending on the nature of the evidence in support of the indictments, selling at such a low price — with or without a pack of cigarettes from Hizbullah — may be more politically damaging for Hariri than simply resigning from his post. But in the absence of some kind of meaningful concession from Hizbullah, it is hard to see what kind of solution Syria and Saudi Arabia could possibly have in store.

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