July 20, 2010

Property Ownership in Lebanon for Palestinian Refugees?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Israel, Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , |
[13] Comments 

I received the following note from Nadim Shehadi on the subject of property ownership by Palestinian refugees. Reports suggest that we seem to be nearing a deal on a limited overhaul of the legislation related to civil rights for refugees in Lebanon. There is consensus among the March 14th Christian parties and the Free Patriotic Movement that social and labor rights should be improved but property ownership should remain off-limits.

I asked Nadim to weigh in on whether he thought this was an acceptable compromise. (For previous discussions with Nadim and others about this legislation, see here.)

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Click to enlarge

I sent you a photo of the cover of a pamphlet from 1966 by the general secretariat of the heads of the Order of Monks in Lebanon about foreign property purchases. The quote in the bottom left hand corner translates as:

“There is no difference between land lost by the power of the gun and land lost by the power of money. In fact, land lost by purchase is more lasting and more serious.”

This is to illustrate that the question of foreign ownership of land in Lebanon is a long standing one, and partly to answer your question about the property ownership issue for the Palestinians.

There is no doubt that foreign property ownership is a controversial matter and one that will always remain an issue that raises anxieties and has to be borne in mind when discussing Palestinian rights to property ownership. It is not a trivial matter and I do not take it lightly.

But the question is certainly not all about Palestinians – it is mainly about Gulf money buying up all the land, which was facilitated by the amendment to the property law of 2001 (the same amendment that excludes Palestinians from buying property.) This again is a highly emotional issue and it is difficult to address it with rational arguments: they will simply not be listened to. When a subject is that sensitive the best course is not to raise it or approach it at all.

But in the case of Palestinians it is different because Palestinians used to be able to purchase property legally before 2001 like any other foreign national. Also, like any other foreign property purchase, it was subject to registration taxes of about 16 to 17 percent. Palestinians used to buy land in the name of Lebanese and then obtain a power of attorney giving them sole control over the property. This was common practice at the time not only with Palestinians but with many foreign buyers in general. It made sense because they could later sell it without having to pay the tax.

The problem we have now is that the amendment to the law in 2001 excluded Palestinians from the ability to purchase land and it also prevented them from inheriting land or passing it on to their children. This is land that was bought legally before 2001. What is required is to reverse that and allow Palestinians to own property like any other Arab and like they did for 53 out of the 62 years since they came to Lebanon. The larger issue of foreign property ownership is a separate and different problem and if there is an amendment to that law it should also apply to everybody. Once matters are under the law then the law will deal with any infringements or illegal occupation of land. I will not insult readers of Qifa Nabki by pretending to explain to them the benefits of the rule of law and the sanctitiy of private property.

What is certain is that the Lebanese state cannot expropriate private property; if it does, then it would be setting a precedent that would threaten more than just the Palestinians. There is a lot of scare-mongering about this and misrepresentation of figures. It’s as though 550,000 Palestinians will suddenly flood the property market and buy up the country and the Lebanese will not be able to buy even an apartment then. This is linked to the anxiety about foreign ownership which is deep rooted, as the pamphlet shows and is being awakened using the Palestinians.

This is the overall problem with this whole debate about Palestinian rights: it awakens all the ghosts and it is based on wrong and exaggerated facts. Maybe this is a necessary process and rationality will prevail in the end. If it does then we must hit the nail on the head and deal with all the rights issues once and for all to allow us to concentrate on much more important matters related to the Palestinian file.

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Update: Ghassan Karam provides some useful background information:

“A few facts/details that might be helpful to the readers that are not familiar with the specifics of this issue.

“Lebanon had restricted the rights of foreigners in owning land by the law passed in 1969. The restrictions used to be 500 square meters per foreign person (spouse and children do not represent separate persons for the purposes of this law) The 2001 amendment increased the restriction to only 300 square meters per person and it added that the foreign person must hold the citizenship of an internationally recognized country. That is how the Palestinian refugees came to be disallowed from land ownership.

“Nadim Shehadi is right when he says that foreign land ownership in Lebanon is an emotional issue and as such reason does not count for much. Yet it is instructive to look at what the official figures say. The 2001 law limits the aggregate foreign land ownership in Lebanon to 3% of the total area. That amounts to just over 312 million square meters. The records indicate that outside of Beirut foreign land ownership in Lebanon is way within the 3%. Actually besides Beirut , Baabda, Metn and Aley it is under 1%. If the figures are accurate then foreign land ownership under the current restrictions could probably triple before it is to bump against the current ceiling.

“But these figures are not very reliable since over 1/3 of Lebanon has not been surveyed yet and so sales activities of unsurveyed land is not reported. But a quick back of the envelope calculation regarding the potential land ownership by the Palestinian refugees would be revealing.

“Since there are 400,000 registered refugees both in the camps and outside the camps and since the demographic structure is young with above average size of houshold then it would be fair to assume that there are about 80,000 households. The financial resources available to these households are meager but even if 1-in-4 decides to purchase land then the potential number of such transactions would be 20,000. Land in Beirut is one of the most expensive in the world and in Baabda, Aley, Broumana, Baabdat goes for over $1200 per square meter and therefore is out of reach for these potential new buyers. But even if we are to assume that each of the 20,000 manage to find and purchase a parcel of land od 800 square meters then the total 16 million square meters would represent only 5 % of the aloted aggregate of 312 million square meters for foreign ownership.

“This whole issue is an emotional one and is fueled by unsubstantiated fears. Common sense , decency, international law combine to say that the Palestinian refugees are to be treated just like any other potential group of investors in the country.”

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June 30, 2010

Talking to Nadim Shehadi: Palestinian Civil Rights in Lebanon

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Interviews, Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , , |
[20] Comments 

Dr. Nadim Shehadi (bio) has very kindly agreed to answer some questions about the issue of improving the civil rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This blog hosted two very interesting discussions on this topic a couple of weeks ago, and so I’m grateful to Nadim for agreeing to discuss the policy dimensions of the issue.

Please feel free to leave any additional questions you may have in the comment section.

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QN: How likely do you think it is that this Lebanese government will pass some kind of legislation aimed at improving the civil rights of Palestinian refugees?

NS: My view is that the likelihood is quite high, I feel that the debate has evolved a lot in the past four years and that the mood in the country is to discuss things in the open. It is normal for all the skeletons to come out of the cupboards on such a sensitive subject. I think that if a positive outcome is reached it would mean that Lebanon has really recovered from the civil war.

QN: If legislation is passed, what do you think its broad outlines are likely to be (as far as health, social security, labor, and property rights are concerned)?

NS: There are two options. One is that they resolve the issues gradually, one by one (i.e. employment, reciprocity, association law, property etc.) Two is that they do a whole package and resolve all the pending legal issues in one legislative move.

I am in favor of option two because the political cost of each gradual move is the same as for all the bundle together. They must hit it on the head and finish with this problem once and for all. If they do that then it will strengthen the government’s hand in discussing arms and security issues later. But to get to that stage they must also resolve the legal issues unilaterally without linking them to any quid-pro-quo over arms.

The danger with option one is that they would compromise at every stage and use up all the political credit leaving things unresolved. If this happens then the government’s position will be weakened when they come to discussing arms. If they use rights to leverage over arms they will get nowhere.

QN: Walid Jumblatt introduced the emergency laws at a plenary session of Parliament on June 15th, catching many of his allies and adversaries off guard. Why, in your opinion, has this issue come up at this moment in time?

NS: Jumblatt’s democratic gathering made a statement about Palestinian rights in 2005. At the time it was a demand to resolve outstanding issues away from the internal Lebanese political wrangling. This was partly a reaction to President Lahoud repeating over and over again that he wanted to renew his presidency and would never resign because he was there to protect Lebanon from the conspiracy of tawteen or permanent settlement. The issue of tawteen was exploited also by the Syrians who repeated that they were there to protect Lebanon from it.

Then there was the question of appointing Wael Boufaour of the PSP as minister of state for Palestinian Refugees. That mobilised the PSP into organizing a conference in January. After the conference it took them a long time to mobilize and produce the draft that was presented on the 15th of June. They took that long because they lost steam after the appointment of Boufaour did not materialize.

The laws were presented in a normal manner and they would have usually been automatically been sent to the parliamentary committees for discussion. But it seems that Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri tabulated them for discussion and a vote on that day and this is what took everybody by surprise.

QN: Do you believe that any such legislation is “a step towards naturalization”, as many politicians are claiming, or is this simply a scare tactic?

NS: The problem is that since there is no legal definition of what constitutes ‘naturalization’ or tawteen, potentially any step that facilitates or prepares the ground for permanent settlement could be interpreted as anti-constitutional.

A necessary step to break the deadlock is to agree on a legal definition of tawteen. The SSNP presented a draft law to that effect last week and if it is adopted it would be a very positive move.

In reality, the status of refugees is completely unrelated to naturalization. Their rights are the same whether they live in poverty in a camp or whether they live in luxury and even have acquired another citizenship. A Palestinian in Canada with Canadian nationality can still claim the right of return and compensation, it is theoretically an individual right that is not dependent on status. In any case, whatever the outcome of the negotiations over refugees, no refugee will be forced to do anything they do not want to do. The refugees will be presented with options that are clearly defined and each individual with exercise a choice between the different options. The implementation process will take at least 10-15 years after the agreement has been reached.

QN: Are fears about the impact of such legislation on the economy and on security justified?

This is the only really tangible question and a very important one. The problem is that we do not have proper data or impact analysis related to these legislations. The reason is that the debate so far has been more emotional than rational and touches on all the traumas and phobias that are the legacy of the civil war. This is true both for Palestinians and Lebanese.

It is very important to understand that the laws will not change things radically; this is because Palestinians in Lebanon work in most professions and do not obtain a work permit. The law is not really enforceable. The figures are really misleading too. In one of the speeches today, it was mentioned that there are 136,000 foreigners who were given work permits in 2007 and that only 261 Palestinians were given work permits and that this is discrimination. This is a false and very misleading image, it gives the impression that there are 422,000 Palestinians in Lebanon and that 421,739 of them are being ‘denied’ a work permit, denied is an often used word. The reason there are only 261 work permits is that only 261 were applied for.

In reality what you need in Lebanon is a residence permit and to obtain it you need to have a work permit. So if you are a resident already, like Palestinian refugees are, and do not need a resident permit then you do not need to bother getting one. The disadvantages are there, you do not get social security, and you can get exploited by your employer – and your employer exploiting you may even be another Palestinian refugee.

Doing away with the work permit requirement for the refugees will ease things and will probably not increase the Palestinian work-force by much. They are already here and they are already working they will just be happier and working legally. Many advocates insist on saying that Palestinians cannot work in 72 jobs and if you say no its 71.5 then you are treated worse than a holocaust denier.

The truth it that we do not really know the exact number of jobs they cannot legally do even if they wanted to. The Ministry of Labour lawyers identified 14 jobs that all foreigners are banned from if they do not belong to a country that has reciprocity agreements with Lebanon. A study of the various laws and agreements may reveal one or two more. But in the end what difference does it make? Palestinians have no incentives to apply for a work permit and you can neither force them nor stop them. Changing the law in a way adjust the texts to reality on the ground.

Advocates of Palestinian rights in Lebanon do a lot of harm by exaggerating the situation. Some of them are probably also still fighting the Lebanese civil war or the civil rights movement in the US.

I can give loads of examples. How many times have you read that Palestinians in Lebanon are denied the “right of association”? Whereas in reality there are in Lebanon more Palestinian associations, parties, NGOs, civil society organizations and clubs than anywhere else. The truth about this is that those who want to register their association have to have a board with a Lebanese citizen on it. If not they just don’t register and it does not make that big a difference. Allowing Palestinians to sit on the board of associations will only mean that more associations will register – it does not mean that you will create hundreds or thousands of new associations. The impact is minimal.

Property law is the worst; I do not see how the discrimination can be justified. It was only passed in 2001 and its application is even worse than the law itself. However, the amendment to the law that discriminates against the Palestinians will cancel itself out once a Palestinian state is recognized and since Lebanon accepts this through its affiliation to the Arab Peace Initiative then it is Lebanese policy to recognize the state. The impact of changing the property law to allow Palestinians the same quota as other non Lebanese citizens will initially mean that all those who own property already will be legalised. This is a complex issue and I am not sure about its impact. One thing is sure, the Lebanese state will never take away any Palestinian property in Lebanon on the grounds that it is illegally owned.

The big unknown is the issue of Social Security. Again numbers are not as frightening as it is assumed but we need to do a proper impact analysis on this to reassure those who are claiming that it will cost billions. Only Palestinians who are regularly employed and make social security contributions will benefit from it. Again the figures being thrown around are very inflated and alarmist. The entire Palestinian population in Lebanon is around 250,000 at most. Of these a maximum of 40-50, 000 are active and according to some studies up to 70 percent of them are in entrepreneurial businesses i.e are not employed in a job that would require social security registration.

QN: Any other thoughts?

NS: Khalass bikaffi :-)

Tayyib, one last thought if only to repeat the importance of not linking any solution to rights with any thinking about security.

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June 16, 2010

Palestinian Rights in Lebanon: Reform on the Way?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , |
[88] Comments 

Contrary to what many reported immediately after the fact, the debate in the Lebanese Parliament last Tuesday over the issue of Palestinian rights did not slam the door on any potential future reforms.

True, no law was passed. But the outcome — a decision to send the draft laws to a review committee and bring them back to Parliament for a vote in one month — is not just acceptable; it was probably the right thing to do. As a friend on the inside recently wrote to me: “It is not acceptable for this or any other parliament to discuss laws that have not had the chance for proper review.  It’s about time someone started holding parliament to account for the job that they do.”

There’s an excellent article in today’s Daily Star that surveys the issue; apparently, several analysts are very optimistic that the law will be passed when it comes up again, thereby rolling back several decades’ worth of institutionalized discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon. And while I don’t want us to get ahead of ourselves, the fact that this government is actually tackling one of the stickiest issues in Lebanese political culture holds out hope that other similarly radioactive topics might somehow be raised as well in the near future.

Take, for example, the issue of deconfessionalizing the political system. Nabih Berri’s recent proposal to establish a national commission to explore the idea fell flat, largely because it was issued informally via the media. Let’s imagine, instead, that Berri and Jumblatt jointly sponsored a draft electoral law for the 2013 parliamentary elections, based on a non-confessional framework. No one could ignore such a law; they’d have to debate it in Parliament and then vote it down, justifying this decision to their constituents. At the very least, such a move would have the effect of putting the issue in the national spotlight once again.

In other words, both the Palestinian rights question and the deconfessionalism question suffer from similar problems of misinformation, messy thinking, and political fear-mongering. We saw last Tuesday that these problems can be mitigated by separating fact from fiction in the form of a concrete legislative proposal. Deconfessionalism can benefit from this approach as well.

Update: I’m grateful to Rex Brynen, professor of political science at McGill University and expert on the Palestinian refugee problem, for weighing in on this issue in the comment section:

Arguments can be made in favour of extending basic civil (not political rights) to Palestinians in Lebanon on a variety of humanitarian and human rights grounds. For me, frankly, those grounds are enough in and of themselves.

However, quite apart from humanitarian arguments in favour of Jumblat’s proposals, a strong argument can also be made on Lebanese national security grounds.

Can anyone seriously argue that the dangers of violent radicalism are somehow *reduced* by having 250,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon permanently poor, marginalized, and discriminated against? The Fateh al-Islams of this world thrive on the poverty of the camps. The impulse to improve Palestinian conditions (initially under the Siniora government, and now with Hariri supporting Jumblat’s proposed reforms) has been underpinned by the recognition that Lebanese security interests were better served by allowing the Palestinians more normal lives.

Of course, the scarecrow of tawteen always gets raised at this point. The naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon, however, has nothing to do with whether they can work or own property–it would require a political decision by a future Lebanese government to extend citizenship. That won’t happen, and in any case is constitutionally prohibited.

Should arms be retained inside the camps? I would prefer not– I think they do the refugees far more harm than good. However, given political realities (and, for that matter, the interests of some Lebanese parties) the camps aren’t going to be disarmed soon. Consequently, it is pointless holding human rights hostage to the arms issue. It provides no leverage at all, and only makes the situation worse.

Finally, it is not as if Palestinian refugees have anywhere else to go in the meantime. If and when a Palestinian state is established, then they’ll have the right and ability to repatriate, as well as whatever return might take place to Israel. In the meantime–tragic as it is–the Lebanese and Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are stuck with each other. They might as well make the best of it. That’s precisely what the recent proposals propose to do.

For those of you who support the current initiative, I’ll throw out a challenge: what can be done to move this forward? The PSP have been great on the issue, and Hizbullah will likely continue to be supportive provided they don’t decide to prioritize their alliance with the FPM. Support within Amal and Future is, I suspect, a little more uneven, despite the positions taken by Berri and Hariri in parliament. Finally, for this to really go forward, it is important that at least some of the concerns put forward by the Christian parties be addressed, and–if at all possible–the reformist coalition expanded. How? Does anyone have any concrete, actionable ideas?

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June 7, 2010

The Future of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Israel, Lebanon | Tags: , , |
[99] Comments 

I just spent the last hour and a half watching a fascinating webcast of a seminar on the Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon. It was organized by the Aspen Institute, and featured Nadim Shehadi (former director of the Centre for Lebanese Studies at Oxford, current Associate Fellow at Chatham House, and friend of the blog) and Ghaith al-Omari (lead Palestinian drafter of the Geneva Initiative, former senior advisor to Mahmoud Abbas, and participant at the Camp David summit and Taba talks, etc.)

For those of you interested in both the situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon (see my thoughts here) as well as the refugee issue and the right of return, I highly recommend that you watch the entire thing. Here, though, are some interesting bits:

13:00 – Nadim discusses the complexity of any issue involving Palestinians in Lebanon, even something as trivial as “the width of a staircase…”

41:00 – Ghaith discusses “the bitter pill that the Palestinians will have to swallow when it comes to accepting a deal” on the right of return, which he says that the PLO has not prepared the refugees adequately to accept.

49:00 – Nadim explains that the bottom line for any final deal on the refugees is that it cannot make their situation worse than it is now, which is a very real threat.

59:50 – Ghaith discusses the various mechanisms (compensation, settlement in host countries, etc.)

62:45 – Firas Maksad asks about how the situation of the refugees might be improved, considering that this issue is seen by many in Lebanon (and manipulated by political actors) as the first step towards naturalization.

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November 19, 2009

Naturalizing the Palestinians

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Arab Politics, Israel, Lebanon | Tags: , , , , |
[185] Comments 

There are few issues that provoke such a strong response among the Lebanese as the question of the Palestinian refugees’ future in Lebanon. Interestingly enough, unlike most other controversial issues, there is a remarkable degree of consensus about this one. I have met very few Lebanese who do not strongly believe that the Palestinians must never, under any circumstances, be settled permanently in Lebanon as citizens.

The reasons advanced for this view are many, and I will consider the most prominent of them below, in the hopes of generating a good discussion. But first, a few background remarks.

There are over 400,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The actual number is unknown, and estimates vary between 250,000 to upwards of half a million. The living conditions of these refugees — most of whom were born in Lebanon — is dismal. They have few civil rights; they are banned from working in over seventy trades; they are dependent almost entirely on the welfare of UNRWA for basic social services like education, water, food, etc. Of all the Palestinian communities in the diaspora, the Lebanese one is surely the worst off.

It seems to me that while most Lebanese are solidly against the naturalization of the Palestinians, most also believe that their conditions should be improved. The question is: how can this be achieved without risking the integration of the communities into Lebanese society, which — as people will tell you — is the thin end of the wedge.

Now, I’ve had the so-called “tawteen” (naturalization) conversation so many times that I can practically rehearse in my sleep the arguments that are commonly advanced. They break down into the following four genres:

I. The Sectarian Argument

“Lebanon’s political system, which is based upon a delicate sectarian balance, cannot handle the influx of several hundred thousand new citizens, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims.”

I can’t tell you how many times I’ve heard this argument. It’s usually the opening gambit, particularly when listening to either a Shiite or Christian politician, whose communities will (allegedly) be politically disenfranchised by the swelling of Sunni ranks.

There are several problems with this argument, as I see it.

  1. First of all, it implies that the current system of political confessionalism is actually functional and worth preserving.
  2. Second of all, it assumes that the current system is an accurate and just reflection of demographic realities, when it is not. Given the fact that the quotas accorded to each sect in Parliament are already out of sync with the actual sectarian balance in the country (and yet, nobody is making a big deal out of this), and given the fact that (for example) there are nine thousand voters per MP in Bsharre and twenty thousand voters per MP in Sur, isn’t it intellectually dishonest to pretend that the sectarian system mirrors the sectarian reality?
  3. Thirdly, if Lebanon moves to abolish its system of political confessionalism, as called for in the Ta’if Accord, then why is the influx of additional Sunnis an insurmountable problem? Often enough, even the most fervent Lebanese proponents of secularism will continue to argue against naturalization on sectarian grounds. “Yes, of course I am for abolishing sectarianism. But this will take generations, and this is why we cannot naturalize the Palestinians,” is a common refrain. I find this deeply unconvincing.

II. The Socio-Economic Argument

“Lebanon is barely big enough for its own people. We don’t have room for anyone else. “

The Maronite Patriarch made a comment along these lines last week. I find this to be a very strange objection. Don’t these politicians realize that the refugees are already in Lebanon? They’re not arriving by the shipful, Moldovan-bouncer-style. They already live here. Obviously, they’re disconnected from the services of the state (such as they are), but is integration really going to cause mass shortages of kibbe nayyeh for everyone else?

This argument sounds especially disingenuous when it is advanced by people who simultaneously argue that the Palestinians’ conditions must be improved. Where do they think the improvements are going to come from? UNRWA? Obviously, they want the Lebanese state to step in and play a stronger role, but when it comes to integrating the Palestinians into that state as full legal citizens, the charity ends.

III. The Moral Argument

“We did not create the refugee problem — Israel did. Therefore, Israel should be responsible for solving it either through the right of return, or through compensation. Naturalizing the Palestinians deprives them of their right to restitution.”

This is usually the argument that people whip out to browbeat you when the previous two run aground on the shoals of common sense. In its basic outline — the idea of a right of return or compensation — it is not that problematic. But let’s say we accept its premise. What happens then?

In other words, what if we imagine a hypothetical scenario where Israel signs a peace deal with Lebanon and Syria, accepting a certain number of returning refugees and compensating the rest? Should those compensated refugees be entitled to naturalization in Lebanon?

“No!” insist the anti-tawteen crusaders, reverting back to either the sectarian or socio-economic argument. “We can’t accept them! Lebanon is too fragile! Lebanon is too small! Why can’t another Arab country take them?!”

Which brings us to the final argument, one of my favorites…

IV. The “Why-Can’t-Someone-Else-Take-Them?” Argument

“Why can’t they go to Saudi Arabia or Jordan? In a larger country, four hundred thousand new citizens would be nothing. It’s the size of a small city in Syria!”

So let me get this straight. When politicians in a certain country to the south start advocating the mass transfer of Palestinians to other Middle Eastern nations, we refer to this with terms like “the destruction of a nation,” “the persecution of a people,” etc.

But it’s ok for us to insist that these same people be uprooted again and transplanted in a foreign country, despite the fact that they’ve been living in Lebanon for three generations? Why is it acceptable for us to deport a few hundred thousand Palestinians to a specially-constructed Refugeeville, built for them in the middle of the Saudi desert, but it’s not ok for Israel to do it? (Note that I’m NOT arguing that Israel should be able to do it either.)

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This post might anger and frustrate some readers. Please be assured that my objective is not to diminish or make light of the bitter experiences of the Lebanese Civil War; I understand where the distrust between many Lebanese and Palestinians comes from. However, I also feel that there is a poverty of rational thinking around this issue, and I’d like to see that change.

Finally, please note that this entire discussion is predicated on the idea that a peace deal is reached which provides a solution to the refugee crisis that does not involve a massive return of Palestinians to their homeland. If Israel agrees to take them back, then this discussion is moot. Furthermore, I am not advocating that the refugees be naturalized prior to a peace deal, only that their living conditions be dramatically improved.

The floor is yours…
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