Several new embassy cables were released three days ago by Wikileaks. They are the same cables that al-Akhbar (which obtained advanced access to them) has been commenting on since July 13, so they’ll be old news for regular readers of the Arabic press. For the rest of you, here’s a basic summary of the most important revelations.

As early as May 5 2006, Serge Brammertz (the UN commissioner investigating the Hariri murder) had “expressed concern about the quality of the evidence that was used to recommend the arrest of four Lebanese senior security officials” and told American Embassy officials that Lebanese General Prosecutor Said Mirza was “growing increasingly uncomfortable with the extended incarceration of the officials.” In spite of the fact that Brammertz felt that there was not yet enough evidence to support “a strong case” against the generals, he assured the Americans that “he would not reverse the recommendation of his predecessor, Detlev Mehlis.”

Another cable dated June 20 2006 reveals that Brammertz was “deeply worried” about the “eroding basis for continued detentions” but was still not willing to order their release. Rather, he seemed more inclined to pass the hot potato to the Lebanese judiciary, arguing that such a decision fell under its jurisdiction. Meanwhile, the judiciary was clearly looking to the UN for guidance on the matter. No one wanted the job of turning the generals loose. Ambassador Feltman, for his part, was well aware of the “seismic effect” that Jamil al-Sayyid’s release would have on the political situation, and judged that releasing him could greatly impact America’s position in Lebanon.

A year later, a fascinating cable recounted an exchange between Ambassador Feltman and Minister of Justice Charles Rizk about the optics of how and when the generals should be released. I highly recommend you read the entire thing, but this is one of the most interesting bits:

The Ambassador noted that an international prosecutor could very well order the release of one or more of the [four generals] for lack of evidence.  After all, all of us have heard from UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz that the detention of some if not all is “awkward,” given the dearth of credible evidence.  The four were arrested because of the testimony of witnesses who later recanted, their testimony now thoroughly discredited.  Yes, Rizk said, but a release from the UN would be different than a release from the GOL [government of Lebanon]. If the GOL releases them now, “it will be a scandal.”  People will say, “why did you hold them for two years?” If the UN releases them, however, the situation is different:  The GOL picked them up at the request of the UNIIIC and then held them until they could be transferred to the Special Tribunal.  So, in this case, the GOL merely acted on behalf of the UN. If [the Lebanese judiciary] releases them, by contrast, it appears as though the GOL had authority all along and chose to ignore it.

As it turned out, the generals would not be released for another two years after the date of this cable, and the reasons were entirely political. Ambassador Feltman says as much in the above cable, when he comments: “whatever the merits of their initial arrests and however awkward the continued detention of one or all is, we agree with Rizk that Syria’s Lebanese allies would score an enormous victory, should the four generals be released now.”

Comment

These cables represent yet another blow to the public image of the UN Tribunal. More seriously, they are a significant indictment of the integrity of the UNIIIC Commissioner and the various Lebanese officials involved in the Hariri investigation, to say nothing of the evidentiary standards in place and the UNIIIC’s judicial independence. Of course, many critics of the Tribunal have been making this case for years (and none so stridently as al-Akhbar‘s justice editor, Omar Nashabe), and the publication of these cables vindicates their position in certain ways.

March 14 partisans would counter that no investigation is perfect, and while some regrettable mistakes were made, these leaks are more of a public relations embarrassment than a reason to denounce the investigation as a whole. While this may be true, the problem is that the Tribunal’s public image has arguably become as important as its ability to indict suspects and prosecute them. When a UN Tribunal is seen as having no more independence and credibility than a judge appointed by an authoritarian regime, then is it safe to say that it has (to use an au courant phrase) “lost its legitimacy”?

Ambassador Feltman clearly understood the significance of a messenger’s credibility when he argued in 2007: “If [Judge Eid] would release any of the four generals, March 14 leaders would suspect Syria’s hand at play, further deepening the distrust and divisions in this country. But if an international prosecutor makes the same decision, it will be viewed as one based on the legal merits of the case.

Perhaps this was still true when he wrote it. How true is it today?

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The latest Wikileaks dump by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar extends the series of intriguing and record-changing insights into the tumultuous 2006-08 period, which witnessed the July War between Hizbullah and Israel, an 18 month-long downtown sit-in, and a takeover of Beirut by Hizbullah forces on May 7, 2008.

Two cables are especially worth reading in their entirety. I link to them below, along with relevant excerpts and some commentary.

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08BEIRUT490 (April 8, 2008) | Subject: JUMBLATT CONCERNED ABOUT UNIIIC DELAYS, SUNNI MILITIAS, AND HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC NETWORK

5. (S) Jumblatt revealed what he deemed a “very serious blow” to the UN Commission investigating the assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri and others. According to information he received from Internal Security Forces (ISF) Intelligence Director Wissam Hassan the previous evening, Wissam Eid, who worked for Hassan and was assassinated January 25, had discovered a year and a half ago a link between Abd al-Majid Qasim Ghamlush and a network of 17 other cell phone numbers. Former UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz reportedly did not act upon this information.

6. (S) In January 2008, however, after Daniel Bellemare took over as Commissioner, Eid met with Bellemare, and was killed one week later. (Note: UNIIIC contacts have confirmed to us that Eid had met with Bellemare exactly one week prior to his death. End note.) The assassination of Hizballah leader Imad Mougnieh followed two weeks later, leading Jumblatt to believe there was a link between Ramloush [sic]and Mougnieh, “assuming Ramloush [sic]was still alive.”

8. (S) The second issue Jumblatt raised was Saad’s reported training of Sunni militias in Lebanon (allegedly 15,000 members in Beirut and more in Tripoli). In establishing his own “security agencies” in Beirut and Tripoli, Saad was being badly advised by “some people,” Jumblatt said, such as ISF General Ashraf Rifi. In his meeting with Jumblatt, Hassan admitted having knowledge that members of Saad’s Future Movement were being trained. Hassan reportedly opposed such training, but “people around Saad” (i.e., Rifi) were telling him to go ahead. (Note: The Jordanians have refused to train Internal Security Forces (ISF) members hand-picked and vetted by the Embassy to participate in a DA/ATA-funded Terrorism Crime Scene Investigation program, reportedly because they don’t want to be involved in training “Saad’s militia.” End note.) Jumblatt said Saad’s militia would cause significant damage to March 14, especially because Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and Suleiman Franjieh’s Marada were in line to train their own forces.

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08BEIRUT642 (May 9, 2008) | Subject: GEAGEA PROPOSES ARAB PEACEKEEPERS; A STRONG SINIORA IS PLANNING A TELEVISED ADDRESS SATURDAY

5. (C) Geagea then asked to speak privately to the Charge. It was important for everyone to push the LAF to do its job, said Geagea. However, he wasn’t sure that the army would succeed. If the army failed to protect Christian areas, Geagea said he wanted to make sure Washington knows he has between 7,000 and 10,000 well-trained Lebanese Forces fighters who could be mobilized. “We can fight against Hizballah,” he stated with confidence, adding, “We just need your support to get arms for these fighters. If the airport is still closed, amphibious deliveries could be facilitated.”

The Charge assured Geagea that the U.S. was encouraging Sleiman and the LAF to protect state institutions and the citizens of Lebanon. (Note: At 2315, Geagea telephoned the Charge to relay that his morale had been boosted by a telephone call from NEA A/S Welch. End note.)

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QN Comment

There’s a lot to discuss here, but I’ll just point out the following tidbits:

1. Brammertz, Wissam Eid, and the CBC Report:

Some of you will recall the famous CBC report on the Hariri investigation, which came out several months ago. (See my commentary on it here, here, here, and here.) In that report, Neil Macdonald revealed that the UN investigating team (led by Serge Brammertz) did not begin doing any telecommunications analysis until late 2007. As I pointed out, Macdonald’s assertion simply did not tally with the UNIIIC record, which mentioned telecommunications analysis in eight different reports from 2005-07.

Now, in the first cable posted above, Jumblatt makes the same point that Macdonald does in his article, and cites his source as Wissam al-Hassan (the ISF intelligence chief). This, then, seems to bolster the points made in the CBC article, except it still does not explain why the UNIIIC claimed to be performing telecommunications analysis for three years when it actually wasn’t. Another possible explanation for this discrepancy is that Macdonald’s source for the information about Brammertz was also Jumblatt’s source: Wissam al-Hassan. Thoughts?

2. Saad al-Hariri and the Mustaqbal Militia

After the events of May 7 2008 (when Hizbullah’s fighters took over Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon as a response to the Siniora government’s attempted crackdown on the party’s fiber optic network), there were rumors circulating about a “Sunni militia” sponsored by Saad al-Hariri that had been training in Jordan. No real evidence of any such militia ever emerged, and March 14th has always insisted that it never entertained a military option against  the Shiite party.

The Jumblatt cable is the first indication that these rumors may indeed have been true. Of course, we have no idea how far along al-Hariri’s militia-building plans had gotten. Hizbullah’s 2008 strike was remarkably efficient… practically surgical, which leads one to believe that Saad’s fighters were either: (a) nonexistent; (b) poorly trained; (c) or ordered to give up their weapons without a fight.

3. Geagea’s 10,000 LF Fighters

The Lebanese Forces released a statement today saying that the May 9 2008 cable which quotes Samir Geagea as requesting weapons from the Americans for his fighters is actually a vindication, because it shows that the LF is not armed after all, but rather merely “well-trained”. I’m not sure I buy that… what Geagea was probably asking for was heavier weapons — mortars, grenade launchers, field guns, etc. — to complement the machine guns that every self-respecting Civil War vet still has tucked away in the cellar.

But maybe not. What do you think?
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I spent an hour or so this morning going through previous reports by the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), in order to see how the historical record tallies with Neil Macdonald’s report about the Hariri investigation for CBC.

As you’ll recall, Macdonald makes the following basic points in his piece:

  • The UNIIIC did not begin analyzing telecommunications data until late 2007, because Serge Brammertz (the successor to Detlev Mehlis) refused to authorize this kind of work.
  • When they finally got around to looking at phone records, the investigators happened upon the “earth-shattering” discovery of the so-called “red network”: the group of phones carried by Hariri’s hit squad.
  • As they soon discovered, however, a young Lebanese police captain named Wissam Eid had already discovered this network and the networks behind it as early as the spring of 2006, and submitted a report to the UNIIIC that detailed his findings. Eid’s work pointed to Hizbullah’s complicity in the crime.
  • This report was put into a drawer and did not resurface until the end of 2007, at which point the UNIIIC established contact with Eid. A month later, Eid was dead.

So far so good?

Now, let’s go back to the reports that were issued by the UNIIIC between 2005 and 2007 (a period during which, according to Macdonald’s sources, no telecommunications analysis was carried out by the investigating commission). What we find is a drastically different account of the work that was taking place, and not just under Detlev Mehlis (generally portrayed as an effective investigator) but also under his successor Serge Brammertz (who comes off as timid and incompetent in Macdonald’s account).

The following excerpts are taken from the first eight UNIIIC reports, which cover the tenures of Mehlis and Brammertz. Have a look and let me know what you think:

UNIIIC Report #1 (Mehlis, 22 Oct 2005)

144. Investigations by both the ISF and Military Intelligence have led to six pre-paid calling cards, which telephone records demonstrate were instrumental in the planning of the assassination. Beginning at approximately 1100 hrs on 14 February 2005, cell site records show that cellular telephones utilizing these six calling cards were located in the area stretching from the Nejmeh Square to the St. George Hotel, within a few-block radius and made numerous calls with each other and only with each other. The phones were situated so that they covered every route linking the Parliament to Kuraytem Palace: that is, cellsite records demonstrate that these telephones were placed to cover any route that Hariri would have taken that day. One of the cellphones located near the Parliament made four calls with the other telephone lines at 1253 hrs — the time that Mr. Hariri’s convoy left the Nejmeh Square . The calls — and all usage on the cards — terminated at 1253 hrs on 14 February, a few minutes before the blast. The lines have all been inactive since.

145. Further investigation has revealed that these six lines — along with two others — were put into circulation on the 4 January 2005, after calling number 1456 activated them. They were all activated at the same location in northern Lebanon between Terbol and Menyeh. Since they were first purchased in early January 2005, until the time of the explosion, the lines only had calls with each other. In that time period, until the assassination, there appears to be a correlation between their location and Hariri’s movements, suggesting that they might have been used to follow Hariri’s movements in that time period.

UNIIIC Report #2 (Mehlis, 12 Dec 2005)

65. As previously noted (see S/2005/662, para. 192), telephone analysis has been a central aspect of the present investigation. Since October 2005, the Commission has concentrated on organizing the telephone data received into manageable databases so that it can be more easily accessible for future analysis. That process has involved compiling over 400,000 records from 195 different files (based on requests for telecommunications data) into one central database. Another database contains over 97 million telecommunications records of all the calls in Lebanon between 7 and 21 February 2005. Those two databases will permit a standardized search of any relevant telephone number and its contacts in an efficient manner which will facilitate future telephone analysis projects.

73. The Commission has not had time, in the short period available since the end of October 2005, to investigate meaningfully the following issues that were raised in the previous report: … Identification, location and further contacts related to the ring of prepaid telephone cards, including eight significant telephone numbers and 10 mobile telephones, which are believed to have been used to organize surveillance of Mr. Hariri and carry out the assassination (see S/2005/662, paras. 121 and 148-152).

UNIIIC Report #4 (Brammertz, 10 June 2006)

51. Communications analysis is a major task, with the collection of up to 5 billion records by the Commission currently under way. All must be sifted, sorted, collated and analysed. This work is painstaking in its depth, with any linkage established almost exponentially generating further linkages. The Commission has devoted a project team of analysts and investigators to this task and is acquiring specialized software and hardware to accommodate the project requirements. Such traffic analysis work requires focus. Hence, the Commission is concentrating on the immediacy of the Hariri case and closely associated links with the operation and other relevant issues, and the results of this work are continuously integrated into the broader case components.

52. The traffic and intercept analysis has expanded beyond the immediate utilization of the six subscriber identity module (SIM) cards, referred to in the Commission’s previous reports, on the day of the attack. Complex linkages, associated calls and geographic locations of a broader time period are being scrutinized and added to the overall investigation findings. The communications currently under analysis also have an international dimension, although the Commission is not in a position to make final conclusions about the significance of such calls at this stage.

UNIIIC Report #5: (Brammertz, 25 Sept 2006)

39. The Commission has devoted considerable resources to the analysis and investigation of the communications traffic aspects of the case. This topic has yielded important results, and enables the Commission to establish links that otherwise would not be evident. Much of the work is reactive in nature. However, some of the analytical work is also proactive and speculative, and builds upon known facts and develops investigation themes. It has elicited a number of leads and continues to provide the Commission with better understanding of the communications linkages relevant to the crimes.

40. The links that are being established through the communications work demonstrate a complex network of telecommunications traffic between a large number of relevant individuals, sometimes through intermediary telephone numbers or locations and sometimes directly. A series of investigation leads has been developed as a result of these analyses, which the Commission regards as a priority. Much painstaking work is required to track down each individual connection or link and exempt it from the enquiries or continue with it as a working lead. Similarly, the Commission understands better the preparatory aspects of the attack through its communications analysis; this work remains ongoing in conjunction with timeline analyses, and is one of a number of areas where comparative analysis with the 14 other cases is being pursued. For example, knowledge of the activities of the six subscriber identity module (SIM) card holders who are alleged to have been part of the bombing team, both geographically and in communications terms, has become clearer and more detailed.

41. The Commission has also developed direct and indirect linkages between significant individuals in disparate groups that are relevant from an investigative perspective. Explanations for these linkages are in some cases not immediately apparent, and the Commission is working to understand their relevance to the crime itself, to those potentially linked to it and to other individuals.

42. The international dimension of the communications analysis continues to provide investigative leads, as the Commission develops its knowledge of the complexities of international call routing and receives responses to its requests from States where telephone call traffic has been traced. To date the Commission has engaged 17 States in this aspect of its work, and has received considerable assistance and responses from a number of them.

43. The relevant communications links emanating from within Lebanon or outside the country of those individuals whom the Commission wishes to interview and/or continues to investigate are being systematically reviewed, and the results are providing further investigative leads.

UNIIIC Report #6 (Brammertz, 12 Dec 2006)

43. The Commission has conducted seven interviews in connection with the alleged bombing team and their use of six telephones to communicate on the day of the attack and in the days leading up to it. These interviews have provided new leads that are currently being pursued and will lead to more interviews in the next reporting period. Analysis of the use of other associated subscriber identity module (SIM) cards is also ongoing.

44. The location of the telephones when used and the purposes for which some of the linking numbers were used have revealed the high degree of security-aware behaviour exhibited by the individuals under investigation. Some persons used multiple mobile cellular telephones during a short period of time or registered telephones using aliases. While such compartmentalization of telephone usage makes analysis more complex, it helps to provide an understanding of the modus operandi of the perpetrators.

45. During the reporting period, communications traffic analysis has continued in support of the other investigative projects. This work consists of preparation for interviews of key persons and preparing specific reports on communications between selected individuals. For the purpose of preparation of interviews, data relating to the different telephones used by the interviewee during a certain period of interest are gathered and organized into an exploitable electronic format. The analysis then focuses on the personal contacts and communications links of the interviewee, the use of intermediaries and the frequency, timing, type, duration and location of the calls, as well as international call activity.

UNIIIC Report #7 (Brammertz, 15 Mar 2007)

34. The Commission’s analysis of communications traffic continues in order to support and validate different points arising from the investigations. Much work has been done to support the interviews conducted, in order that respective communications contact with other persons of interest to the case can be discussed with witnesses. Patterns of communications traffic, including frequencies and timings of calls, and linkages and clear associations to others, are all developed and elicit investigation leads.

35. In relation to the six mobile cellular telephone SIM cards allegedly used by the team that executed the operation on the day of 14 February 2005, the Commission has developed further information of interest relating to associated earlier operations, including possible surveillance and reconnaissance activity, possible practice-runs or earlier attempts to kill Rafik Hariri, and other actions undertaken by the team. New areas of interest have emerged from this analysis and are currently being examined.

36. The Commission has also undertaken an investigative project examining the role of the persons using the six SIM cards and activities that can be inferred from their use. This exercise is supported by the Commission’s existing communications traffic analysis projects in relation to the cards. The objective is fourfold: first, to reaffirm the validity of the hypothesis that the cards could indeed have been used by the bomb team to execute its task; second, to establish whether other modes of communication must have been used between the members of the team, and also perhaps with other individuals, in order for the attack to take place; third, to allow the Commission to establish a better understanding of how the crime was committed on 14 February; and finally, to understand further what other activity the bomb team undertook, and what locations it travelled to and why, in the days leading up to the attack.

37. Such extensive analysis enables the Commission to reach a better understanding of the bomb team, its role in the crime and its other activities. This in turn creates further investigative leads geographically and temporally, and pointing to the activities of individuals outside the immediate bombing team the Commission believes were using the six SIM cards.

38. This detailed examination of the activities of the six SIM cards has resulted in a number of significant elements for ongoing investigation. These include, but are not limited to: potential identification of the role of each participant in the preparation, planning, surveillance and actual attack; the bombing team’s anticipation of Hariri’s activities and movements; and possible earlier attempts on Hariri’s life.

39. One working hypothesis is that the bomb team had to ensure that Hariri was indeed dead after the explosion in order for the video claim of responsibility to be delivered and to have resonance with its intended audience. It is possible that the team, and those commissioning the crime, could not afford to deliver a claim of responsibility to the global media if Hariri had survived the attack. Thus, the Commission is exploring the hypothesis that one member of the team, or an associate, was tasked with confirming the death of the principal target as soon as possible and may have contacted someone waiting for the news. Based on existing information, the time frame for this activity would have been within approximately 45 minutes of the explosion.

40. This in turn led to the series of events related to the taped claim of responsibility and the subsequent telephone calls made to media outlets. The Commission is examining the hypothesis that one or more members of the bomb team was responsible for delivering the tape and making the subsequent telephone calls to the media. Other variations on this hypothesis are being explored to establish the numbers of perpetrators who may have been involved on the day of the attack.

UNIIIC Report #8 (Brammertz, 12 Jul 2007)

41. The Commission has consolidated its sizeable holdings of call records, communications data and analyses related to specific time periods, institutions and individuals of relevance to the Hariri investigation. Since its inception, the Commission has acquired more than 5 billion records of telephone calls and text messages sent through cellular phones in Lebanon, as well as communications data from a number of other countries. The Commission has also acquired a very large number of detailed subscriber call records. Since 2005, the Commission has issued more than 300 requests for assistance to support its communications analysis related to the Hariri investigation.

42. The Commission’s communications analysis provides valuable input to the investigations in establishing links between individuals, analysing the behaviour and activity of a number of persons of interest to the investigations and analysing call patterns for specific numbers, times and locations. It is also a very valuable resource in preparing for witness interviews. Given the proven investigative value and potential of communications analysis, the Commission has recently sought outside expertise to help exploit its communications data holdings and analysis. The Commission has also recently acquired new hardware and software, which will allow it to conduct more comprehensive data searches.

43. On the basis of the consolidation exercise, the Commission has confirmed and advanced its earlier conclusions that individuals using six mobile cellular telephone SIM cards acted in a coordinated manner to conduct surveillance on Rafik Hariri in the weeks prior to his assassination. A detailed analysis of the use of these cards on the day of the assassination indicates that these individuals played a critical role in the planning and execution of the attack itself, as demonstrated by their movements and call patterns. The Commission has established the origins of the SIM cards and is finalizing its understanding of the circumstances around the sale of the cards and a number of handsets to the individuals who made use of them in the surveillance of Rafik Hariri. A number of interviews were held during the reporting period to advance this line of inquiry.

46. The Commission has also been focusing on establishing horizontal and vertical links between individuals linked to the crime scene and those who may have been involved in the preparation of the attack or may have had prior knowledge of the attack through the analysis of telephone communications. Several telephone numbers have been identified and scrutinized as a result of this line of inquiry.

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So, what do you think? Does this look like the work of an investigating commission that was not engaged in telecommunications analysis? When I asked Mr. Macdonald about the discrepancies between the statements of his sources and the first Mehlis report, he insisted that all of the telecommunications work done before late 2007 was performed by the Lebanese police and not by the UN Commission. He added that the UNIIIC was “generally aware” of the work being done by the Lebanese, but that “actual telecomms analysis by the commission itself, as I reported, was not authorized until late 2007.”

As others have already noted, this simply does not add up, and the above survey of the UNIIIC reports confirms the contradictions in the CBC account. Even if we accept the testimony of Mr. Macdonald’s sources and assume for a moment that all of the discussions in the UNIIIC reports about communications analysis prior to late 2007 were just made up, how does this explain the suggestion that the discovery of the red network by the UNIIIC was “earth-shattering”? After all, they had already discussed this network in eight different reports from 2005-2007! And the network was not just discussed under Mehlis. Brammertz devotes pages to the discussion of how the UNIIIC was trying to develop its lead vis-à-vis the red network.

But let’s also assume, just to give Mr. Macdonald’s sources the benefit of the doubt, that it was not the UNIIIC that was investigating the communications traffic, but rather the Lebanese police. How does one then explain how the UNIIIC became privy to the work that the Lebanese were doing (so as to be able to mention it in the eight reports between 2005-07), unless of course the UN was working in close cooperation with the Lebanese and not, as Mr. Macdonald’s sources suggest, in isolation from them?

I will endeavor to get a response from CBC about these questions. Stay tuned.

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Update 1: Buried in the comment section of the last post is this gem from RedLeb, who basically says exactly what I said in this post (and much more), but more succinctly. I reproduce his comment in full below:

“It is not enough for Macdonald to say that ‘Mehlis was aware of the ISF’s early telecomms work’. Macdonald’s report, especially the video, emphatically makes the claim that the commission only identified the Red team late in Brammertz’s tenure, and only after much prodding.

However, the commission’s reports are clear that the Red team was identified at the initial stages of the investigation and that signal analysis was a key technique used by the commission.

This contradiction with the documented historical record undercuts the report’s credibility. It is obviously trying to sell you something. And what I think what it is selling is the linkage between the Red team and HA.

The Red team stands out in any signal analysis. It is a closed network, located at the scene of the crime, and ceased to exist immediately after the assassination. By focusing on the slam dunk part of the Eid’s analysis, we are asked to adopt the further linkage of the Red Team to HA.

What is that linkage? Did someone on the Yellow team call the Hospital and then someone at the Hospital call a government issued HA phone line?

How about if an Israeli agent calls someone at AUH, and then someone at AUH calls AUB? Can I then claim the Dean of AUB is an Israeli spy?

And this whole ‘mathematical genius’ spin. It just sounds like a way to cater to the Leb ego so as to distract our suspicions. Tell me Eid used some special software. Tell me he set up a database. Hell, tell me wrote a computer algorithm to do signal analysis. I will believe you. But a super-mathematical genius who could ‘intuit mathematical patterns’? No. Just… no.

I speculate that the attack on Wissam Hassan is to undermine the ISF’s work on Israeli spies and Israel’s penetration of the Lebanese telecom network. At Nahass’s conference this week, Wissam Hassan was specifically named as helping out in the investigation of Israel compromising HA phone lines. By labelling him an HA accomplice, the whole Israel angle can be explained away.

The attack on Bellemare and Brammertz are interesting. Whoever fed Macdonald his information must have felt the indictments are not going to come out, or will fail to name HA members. Thus the report serves to indict HA in the media, regardless of the path the STL takes. The whole ‘Getting Away with Murder’ angle is that HA did it, we know they did it, but here’s why the STL won’t indict them. Is someone nervous?

I think the only factual we get out of the whole report was from Bellemare’s press release in which he stated he is working on the draft of the indictment. So we know that’s coming sooner than later.”

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I wrote to Neil Macdonald (author of the CBC report about the UN investigation into Rafiq al-Hariri’s murder) asking him if he would respond to some of the questions published on this blog earlier today about the timeline presented in his account of the investigation’s proceedings.

Mr. Macdonald had argued in his piece that “Brammertz could not be persuaded to authorize the one technique that those investigators wanted above all to deploy: telecommunications analysis,” and that “the UN commission in Lebanon did no telecom analysis at all for most of its first three years of existence.”

As some of our fearless readers have pointed out, the Mehlis report itself clearly indicates that the Commission was using telecoms data in its investigation to track Hariri’s killers. So why, I asked Mr. Macdonald, would Brammertz have had to authorize telecommunications analysis if the Commission was already using it in 2005? Or was that earlier work done under Mehlis a different kind of telecoms analysis from the stuff performed by Wissam Eid?

Mr. Macdonald responded to my query with the following note, which I quote with permission:

“The question we addressed in the documentary was when the commission began carrying out actual telecomms analysis of phone records. My sources — and they were there  — are absolutely firm. The commission did none until late 2007. The Lebanese police did. Capt. Eid was the first to discover the red network, and the first to identify the co-location phones. The commission under Mehlis was aware of the ISF’s early telecomms work. Brammertz referred to the commission’s collection of phone records (I refer to that in my piece; they obtained the entire 2005 phone database for Lebanon). But actual telecomms analysis by the commission itself, as I reported, was not authorized until late 2007, at which time FTS, the British firm, was brought in.

The floor is yours, armchair investigators…
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The ink has hardly dried on the CBC report about the Hariri investigation, and I’ve already heard at least two substantive critiques of it, which I thought I’d share with you.

The first comes from T_DESCO, a smart commenter at Joshua Landis’s Syria Comment blog, who has been following the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) very closely since 2005 and can recite passages from its reports in his sleep. He points out that both the fourth and fifth STL reports expressly state that they are relying upon telecommunications data in their investigation:

STL Report #4:

51. Communications analysis is a major task, with the collection of up to 5 billion records by the Commission currently under way. All must be sifted, sorted, collated and analysed. This work is painstaking in its depth, with any linkage established almost exponentially generating further linkages. The Commission has devoted a project team of analysts and investigators to this task and is acquiring specialized software and hardware to accommodate the project requirements. (…)

52. The traffic and intercept analysis has expanded beyond the immediate utilization of the six subscriber identity module (SIM) cards, referred to in the Commission’s previous reports, on the day of the attack. Complex linkages, associated calls and geographic locations of a broader time period are being scrutinized and added to the overall investigation findings.

STL Report #5

39. The Commission has devoted considerable resources to the analysis and investigation of the communications traffic aspects of the case. This topic has yielded important results, and enables the Commission to establish links that otherwise would not be evident. Much of the work is reactive in nature. However, some of the analytical work is also proactive and speculative, and builds upon known facts and develops investigation themes. It has elicited a number of leads and continues to provide the Commission with better understanding of the communications linkages relevant to the crimes.

40. The links that are being established through the communications work demonstrate a complex network of telecommunications traffic between a large number of relevant individuals, sometimes through intermediary telephone numbers or locations and sometimes directly. A series of investigation leads has been developed as a result of these analyses, which the Commission regards as a priority.

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The second critique comes from an eagle-eyed friend and long-time reader of this blog, Ben Ryan, who sent me this commentary (which I post with his permission).

“Great post on this “new” report – as usual, one of the best analyses/round-ups I’ve seen. I think there may be a couple things that need extra highlighting. This didn’t fit nicely into a blog comment, but if you think that’s better I can try to re-tool and comment that way:

1) From Erich Follath’s October 2005 Der Spiegel report: “Unknown men bought ten mobile telephones in December. As the Mehlis team discovered, the phones were activated in northern Lebanon on Jan. 4, 2005 and used almost daily in the weeks before the attack, frequently in places where Hariri also happened to be located. [...] According to the UN team’s investigation, six of the mobile phones logged in at Beirut’s Place de l’Etoile and along the motorcade route on February 14… At 12:53 p.m., a member of the assassination team made four calls, apparently reporting that Hariri was leaving the café. The bomb was detonated minutes later, and the mobile phones were never used again. The analysis of the mobile phone records, one of Mehlis’ most important pieces of evidence, led to a group of five high-ranking intelligence officials the UN investigator believes made up the core of the conspiracy group.”

  • Phone records of the “red” team are reported about in detail. Ten of them, six at the site on the February 14, 2005, all activated 1/4/2005.

2)  Le Figaro, August 21, 2006 (trans from French): “Everything starts with the identification by the Internal Security Forces (ISF) of a group of mobile phones, which has been used before and just after the crime. [...] But one of them has committed a mistake by calling a friend, who was not part of the network of accomplices. Through phone records, police have recorded the number of this friend, then interrogated him. He gave them the name of his correspondent. The individual has since been found. … According to a source close to Saad Hariri, he is a Lebanese, operating in the movement Hezbollah and its intelligence services.”

  • Phone records of the “red” team and a reference to Ghamloush and his girlfriend. “A dozen” phones “at most”

3) Der Spiegel, May 23, 2009: “Captain Eid’s team eventually identified eight mobile phones, all of which had been purchased on the same day in the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli. They were activated six weeks before the assassination, and they were used exclusively for communication among their users and — with the exception of one case — were no longer used after the attack. … But there was also a “second circle of hell,” a network of about 20 mobile phones that were identified as being in proximity to the first eight phones noticeably often. … sometimes located near the site of the attack. The romantic attachment of one of the terrorists led the cyber-detectives directly to one of the main suspects. He committed the unbelievable indiscretion of calling his girlfriend from one of the “hot” phones. It only happened once, but it was enough to identify the man. He is believed to be Abd al-Majid Ghamlush…”

  • Eight “red” team phones, 20 “blue” team phones reported, sounds like the same time for activation reported before, and now the details on Ghamloush.

4) CBC, November 19, 2010: “UN commission in Lebanon did no telecom analysis at all for most of its first three years of existence. At that point, in October of 2007, things began moving fast… in December, a specialist from FTS began examining what the computer was spitting out. … He had identified a small network of mobile phones, eight in all, that had been shadowing Hariri in the weeks prior to his death. … when the investigators began their due diligence, double-checking their work, there was another revelation, this one even more earth-shattering. Someone digging though the commission’s records turned up a report from a mid-ranking Lebanese policeman that had been sent over to the UN offices nearly a year and a half earlier, in the first months of 2006. …”

This tracks with the previous stories and appears to explain why all this is finally coming out now, and possibly why leaks of it surfaced back in 2006. But it doesn’t explain the 2005 report, and it doesn’t explain why the 2006 report claimed that the Brammertz investigation was handling the phone records.

Daniel Bellemare's personal coat of arms. The motto reads, in Latin: "To devote one's life to the truth". Source: The Public Register of Arms, Flags, and Badges of Canada. Click to enlarge.

These points are important because 1) the phone records were on the radar as of October 2005, and rather than getting shoved in some drawer and forgotten they were being reported on in the international media. And 2) they were reportedly a key part of the Brammertz-era investigation too, if Le Figaro is accurate (and again, they were being reported in the international media so were hardly gathering dust in a filing cabinet somewhere). The timeline for these records as laid out in the CBC report just doesn’t make sense. Also, I find it very convenient that so much of the plot in this story is being driven by one super-human mathematical genius dead man who can neither confirm nor deny any of it.

What’s more, someone at the UN seems to rediscover these phone records and leak them to the international press every time the suspect du jour needs a public relations wupping. They got buried in the scandal of the 2005 UN report actually (accidentally..) naming names and pointing at Syria, but the timing of the 2006 report, right after the “Divine Victory,” and the 2009 report right before the elections, and now this one as things appear to be ratcheting towards a confrontation, both target Hezbollah. I’ve seen no attempt at an explanation of how these magical phone records could point to the Syrians in October 2005 and then Hezbollah in 2006, 2009, and 2010.

Basically, I smell a rat. Maybe these are real and maybe they say exactly what MacDonald says they do. But this story is being peddled, not investigated. An investigative reporter capable of discovering all this would also be capable of the 15 minutes of Googling and Google Translating that I did to compile these discrepancies, and either explain them in the new report or at least start asking these questions.

**

I think  that both of these commentaries deserve a response from CBC. Anyone have a connection to Neil Macdonald? Actually, come to think of it, I do. I’ll try to get him to comment on this.

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