I’ve written an opinion piece on the senselessness of consensual politics for The National. It will be out in print this Friday, but the editors at The Review have agreed to put it up a couple of days early on the website, given the timeliness of the subject matter.

The first few paragraphs are below. Finish reading it on The National’s website, and then come on back to comment.

All for None

All For NoneWhat’s wrong with Lebanon? Nearly four months after a landmark election handed the western-backed March 14 coalition a victory over the opposition alliance of Hizbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, all efforts to form a government have failed. Rather than taking advantage of his coalition’s victory by putting together a cabinet composed exclusively of his own allies, prime minister-designate Saad Hariri has spent weeks coaxing and cajoling the opposition to join him in a national unity government, in which they would wield significant power.

His reasons for doing so are manifold. On the one hand, his coalition no longer commands a clear majority in parliament, due to the recent defection of the mercurial Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. At the same time, there are the wishes of an important regional ally to consider: Saudi Arabia, which is believed to be courting Syrian co-operation in Iraq in exchange for prodding its Lebanese dependants, the March 14 coalition, into a power-sharing arrangement with Hizbollah. Most importantly, Hariri seems determined to avoid a return to the polarisation of the previous parliamentary term, during which the opposition, demanding more power, quit the government and went on to paralyse the country with massive demonstrations, strikes and an 18-month downtown sit-in.

The opposition’s objective then, as it is now, was to replace the majority cabinet with a national unity government in which it would have veto power over important legislation. Appealing to the timeworn argument that Lebanon cannot be ruled by simple majorities because of its diverse sectarian make-up, leaders like Hassan Nasrallah and Michel Aoun have insisted on transforming the principle of consensual decision-making from an abstract desideratum into a practical necessity.

While March 14 figures have publicly insisted on upholding their prerogative to form a majority cabinet, they too have quietly accepted the idea of sharing power by virtue of a face-saving compromise, the so-called “15-10-5 formula”. Under this arrangement, March 14 would control half the seats of a 30-member cabinet; the opposition would control 10 seats (one short of the votes required to veto major legislation); and the President, Michel Suleiman, would appoint the last five ministers, with the understanding that one of them would be free to vote with the opposition on major, “life-and-death” issues (such as the matter of Hezbollah’s weapons).

The fact that even the majority parties have been more interested in trying to get the best deal they can under this framework, rather than questioning its legitimacy in the first place, betrays their belief – to paraphrase Churchill – that while consensual democracy may be the worst form of government, it is better than all the others.

(Keep reading)

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Not really the Lebanese Constitution...

Not really the Lebanese Constitution...

We hear a lot of rhetoric these days from FPM leaders about Saad al-Hariri’s arrogant unilateralism in his cabinet-formation dealings, a unilateralism that they say violates the constitutional principle of “communal coexistence” (Preamble, clause j). Accompanying this argument is the occasional complaint about the Ta’if Accord, which (so the Aounists say) stripped the Maronite President of his powers and vested them in the Sunni Prime Minister.

I’ve heard this argument so many times that I think it’s worth dedicating a post and a debate to it.  In my opinion, the Aounist position grossly oversimplies matters. Although the Ta’if Accord did give the Prime Minister the authority to form the government – free from binding parliamentary consultations – it did not turn him into an executive colossus, like the pre-Ta’if Maronite president.

Before Ta’if, the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, and even the Chamber of Deputies served at the pleasure of the President. He had the authority to appoint, fire, and dissolve at whim. The current powers of the Prime Minister are much more limited.

In particular, the Prime Minister’s ability to appoint a government is constitutionally checked in two ways:

  1. The President must sign off on the cabinet (Article 53.4);
  2. The Chamber of Deputies (i.e. parliament) must give the cabinet its vote of confidence before it can act (Article 64). This means that the premier cannot simply form the cabinet of his choice, as the Free Patriotic Movement leaders allege; he is bound by the demands of (at least half) the parliament, as well as those of the President.

As we saw last week, a Prime Minister’s cabinet proposal can easily be derailed by the Parliament if it fails to satisfy certain bloc leaders. Even though the Lebanese opposition did not have the votes in Parliament to block Hariri’s lineup, two of his own key allies – the Lebanese Forces and the Kata’eb – opposed it, thereby condemning his efforts to failure. What seems to frustrate the FPM is that their wishes don’t hold as much weight as the wishes of Hariri’s own allies, but this is surely not the fault of the Lebanese Constitution.

As easy as it is to be cynical about the standoff, however, it has brought many important questions about the architecture of Lebanon’s political system to the surface. With no Syrian hegemon around to herd cats and crack heads, we are finally seeing the Ta’if Accord put to the test, as Lebanese politicians try to exploit every ambiguity and apparent loophole in the Constitution to maximize their political gains.

This is a good thing. Under the best circumstances, it has the potential to force Lebanon to address structural problems of representation and democratic process, and to perhaps arrive at a better framework. However, this will only happen if the current crisis is framed as a debate about constitutional amendments — like Ta’if — rather than about one-time political deals — like the Doha Agreement.

The only person who can do this is the President of the Republic, who is the sole figure tasked with acting as the guarantor of the Constitution. If I were one of his advisors, I would tell him to insist upon the following principle: he should not sign the decree forming any cabinet unless the principle used to form that cabinet is enshrined in the Constitution as an amendment.

In other words, if the cabinet is formed using the principle of proportional representation (which is what the FPM is demanding) – where each bloc gets a share equivalent to its weight in parliament – then this should be the model used from now on. If blocs are given the right to choose their own ministers, then that’s what should happen from now on. And so on and so forth.

This will have the effect of forcing all sides to consider the long-term potential effects of their short-term demands. Does the FPM really want to strip the Prime Minister of the authority to form a government, thereby condemning every government from now on to be a national unity government, with all the deadlock and inefficiency that this entails?

If so, then what powers should be reserved for the Prime Minister to mediate effectively between all the different groups guaranteed seats in the cabinet? What principle should govern the distribution of portfolios? Who is the final arbiter?

As long as the Lebanese opposition continues to call into question the legitimacy of the Prime Minister’s powers — on the basis that they violate a constitutional principle of communal coexistence — they should be asked to present an alternative, in the form of a constitutional amendment. That way, we won’t have to watch this movie again four years from now.
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saad-hariri-bye

He's making like a tree and walking away...

[We managed to get yesterday's poll up just in the nick of time, but the results are now moot. So, here's another poll for you. (Those of you reading on RSS, you'll probably need to click over to the blog itself to vote).]

Seventy-three days, countless meetings, and one cabinet proposal later, Saad al-Hariri has decided to resign as Prime Minister-designate. Everybody expects him to be reappointed.

I’m quite pleased with this move and I think Hariri should have resigned over a month ago rather than haggling over Gebran Bassil’s eyes and Sami Gemayel’s sun tan. The past three months have been farcical, even by Lebanese standards.

As we’ve discussed many times before, one really wonders what the point of a national unity government is, under these circumstances. If it has taken them this long to fail to form a goverment, how is it even imaginable that a national unity cabinet is going to get anything done? Does Hariri think that Aoun is going to become easier to deal with once he joins the cabinet and that the FPM is going to stop behaving like an aggrieved opposition party? I venture to say that the opposite will be true.

As long as “national unity” remains the non-negotiable principle undergirding any governing effort, then it is going to be far too easy for any single bloc to play spoiler.

Here’s how the system is supposed to work. If the PM does not have the votes within their own bloc to create the cabinet of their choice, then they need to go fishing for the coalition ally who is going to give them the best “deal”. Eventually some smaller blocs agree to join the PM’s bloc via a governing agreement, e.g. “We agree to pursue these policies, and any deviation from these policies will result in the breaking of the cabinet agreement and the dissolution of this government.”

Under this system, the smaller blocs get to punch above their weight because they know that the big bloc needs them to govern, while the big bloc benefits by allowing the smaller blocs to compete amongst each other.

The problem with the current process in Lebanon is that the smaller blocs have no need to “sell themselves” to the big bloc because they know that the big bloc is already committed to including them in some way in the government. With no fear of being left out in the cold, they can continue to make one demand after another.

Saad al-Hariri should take a page from Hasan Nasrallah’s play book. Back in the spring, when everybody was forecasting a win for March 8th, Nasrallah went on television and repeated the offer that he had been making for months (paraphrased):

“If we win, we will form a national unity government and give the other side a blocking third share.  However,” Nasrallah added, “if you refuse to accept our generous offer, we will not hesitate to rule this country alone.”

You see how he did that? So simple, so straightforward, so rational. Nasrallah was completely unperturbed about violating some vague principle of “common living” should the Future Movement not join his cabinet. And this is the same strategy that Hariri should follow. He should go on TV and say: “I am extending a hand of partnership to you. If you refuse it, we will not hesitate to rule this country alone.”

End of story.
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electoralmathWe’ve entered the third week of deliberations over Lebanon’s next cabinet lineup, and there is no end in sight. Hariri has paid more house calls than a 19th century doctor in typhoid season, and yet for all we know, there isn’t even agreement on the most basic issues, like the number of ministers accorded to each side.

This is not entirely the  fault of one man or one party or one coalition. Consider the various matrices that Hariri is operating with. In most parliamentary democracies, the goal of the ruling party is typically to form a government with the smallest possible coalition that can gain the confidence of the legislative chamber.

In Lebanon’s case, the goal is to form a government with the largest possible coalition without completely crippling the executive branch through perpetual veto-enforced gridlock. It’s not pretty, but this is the solution that everyone is committed to this time around.

Add to this opening principle a variety of other distributional conventions and you have  a recipe for a very complicated process indeed. For example, the cabinet is typically supposed to be split equally between Christians and Muslims. Furthermore, Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites are usually given the same share each. In a thirty-member cabinet, this would mean that there would have to be 15 Christians (e.g., 6 Maronites and 9 non-Maronites) and 15 Muslims (e.g., 6 Sunnis, 6 Shiites, and 3 Druzes).

Before you can go about parceling out seats, however, you need to know how many each coalition is going to get. Here we run into the old veto issue. Hariri is negotiating different opposition demands, ranging from Aoun and Frangieh’s request for full proportional representation (which would amount to 45% of the cabinet or 13 ministers), to a simple veto share (11 seats), to Hizbullah and Amal’s constructive ambiguity (which is presumably open to a 10 seat share along with certain “guarantees” in the cabinet declaration.)

Finally, there is the issue of foreign interests. Syria would like its allies to have a veto share and would like it even better if Hariri came to Damascus before announcing the cabinet (highly unlikely indeed). The Saudis would like to reserve as much power for M14, but there have been rumblings about a possible opening to Damascus as a means of drawing it back into the Arab fold. Given the number of square pegs awaiting insertion into round holes, where does a novice PM-designate even begin?

The formula most talked about is the so-called 15-10-5 split (for M14, M8, and the President, respectively), which has a certain elegance about it. For legislation on ordinary issues, M14 would not be able to push through its agenda without help from the President’s ministers, a fact that would seem to strengthen the President’s role as a true consensual figure, and not just a symbolic one.

At the same time, the opposition would not be able to block legislation on the “issues of national importance” that require a cabinet supermajority, without the help of the president as well. His ministers would represent the crucial swing vote.

If Hariri were to pursue this option, how would he parcel out the opposition’s share of 10 seats? My guess is that he’s planning to split them equally between Aoun’s Change & Reform Bloc and Hizbullah/Amal. Why? Let’s look at the numbers.

March 14 won 71 seats in the 128-seat parliament, which translates to 55%. March 8 won the remaining 45%. If we were to adopt General Aoun’s proposal that the cabinet lineup reflect the parliamentary balance, this would mean that M14 would get 17 seats in a 30 member cabinet and M8 would get 13. Of course, such an alignment would give the opposition its desired one-third-plus-one cabinet veto, which Hariri and co. would like to avoid, so full proportional represetation is out of the question for them. However, partial proportional representation may be the silver bullet.

According to the most generous calculation, Aoun’s Change & Reform Bloc won 28 seats in parliament (if you count Marada, Tashnaq, and the Wahdet al-Jabal Bloc [Talal Arslan, Bilal Farhat, Fadi A`war, and Naji Gharios]) or 21.9%. This share would represent 7 cabinet seats (6.56 to be exact) under a proportional scheme. Given that Hizbullah has routinely expressed its inclination to give up its own cabinet share to its electoral allies, this would permit Hariri to satisfy Aoun and Frangieh’s proportional demand without giving the opposition as a whole a blocking veto. Six or seven seats for Change & Reform plus three seats for Berri would seem to do the trick. No veto, but a face-saving exit for Aoun and Frangieh, and perhaps also a way for Hariri to begin mending fences with the FPM. Of course, it’s unlikely that Berri will agree to having only 3 seats compared to Aoun’s 7, but that’s their problem, not Hariri’s.

Aoun’s lieutenants have been uncharacteristically supportive of Hariri in recent days (Bassil: “We have an interest in the success of Saad Hariri”) and so this is perhaps what they are angling for with the insistence on proportional representation.

One way or the other, we should know in, oh… maybe another six months.
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bashar-abdullah

Prominent members of Lebanon’s parliamentary majority and opposition have expressed displeasure at the prospect of a Syrian-Saudi effort to determine the composition of Lebanon’s next government. Everyone from Michel Aoun to Walid Jumblatt to Naim Qassem to Amin Gemayel have spoken out against the idea of Saad al-Hariri handing over the reins of power to the Syrians and the Saudis, arguing that the formation of the cabinet should be up to the Lebanese alone.

A noble idea perhaps, but how realistic is the dream of Lebanese sovereignty? Not very, says the latest evidence unearthed by the muckraking masterminds here at The Qnion. Loyal readers, I give you the transcript of a top secret meeting held in Riyadh between PM-designate Saad al-Hariri, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, and President Bashar al-Asad of Syria.

Remember, you read it here first!

**

[Scene: The royal reception room at one of King Abdullah's palaces; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia]

Hariri: Your Excellency!

King Abdullah: Saad!

Hariri: I’ve missed you so much! How is everything?

King Abdullah: Splendid, my boy! We’ve missed you around here too. It’s been, what… ten days since your last visit?

Hariri: Has it really been that long? God, it felt like an absolute eternity

King Abdullah: Well, the important thing is that you’re home. I mean, ahh, well, what I meant to say was…

Hariri: (uncomfortable) Ahem, yes… ummm

King Abdullah: … Make yourself at home! That’s what I meant.

Hariri: Yes of course.

King Abdullah: Saad, come over here, I’d like to introduce you to President Bashar al-Asad of Syria.

Bashar: Greetings Sheikh Saad. Congratulations on your appointment! I’m sure your father would have been very proud.

Hariri: (gritting his teeth) Yes. Thank you. Pleased to meet you. Finally.

Bashar: Wow, is it me or is it unbearably hot in here?

King Abdullah: We have the royal air conditioners on at full blast, but this is Riyadh you know, heh heh. Not quite as balmy and breezy as lovely Syria, that’s for sure.

Bashar: No kidding. I suppose it’s also perhaps a bit worse for me as I am slightly taller than both of you.

King Abdullah & Hariri: (nodding uncomfortably)

Bashar: You know, they say that heat rises, and given that I’m… what? A good foot and a half taller? It probably makes a difference.

King Abdullah: (annoyed) I don’t think you’re that much taller, Mr. President. Maybe a few inches.

Bashar: No, I do think that my shoulders are taller than your head, Your Highness. That is to say, I’m head and shoulders above you, ha ha. Physically speaking, of course.

King Abdullah: (straining to smile) Ok ok, I get it…

Bashar: I mean, I’m not saying that you’re half as tall as me, or anything, ha ha ha…

King Abdullah: No, no, I understand…

bashar-tableBashar: Maybe if you stood on this little brown table with the mother-of-pearl inlay, you’d be as tall as me. Wait a minute… I have a table just like this in my reception room too!

King Abdullah: No way!

Bashar: I’m serious! Exactly like it.

Hariri: Me too! Come to think of it, so does every other Arab leader that I’ve ever visited. Huh.

Bashar: Well, they’re so useful, you know? Like, when you’re meeting with other world leaders, and stuff. Ideal place to put your coffee.

Hariri: Exactly. It’s like the perfect size. Not too big…

Bashar: (finishing his sentence) …but not too small! Exactly! Plus they’re just tasteful. Not too showy, and the craftsmanship is just fabulous.

King Abdullah: Totally. Oh my God, what a crazy coincidence! Anyway, where were we?

Hariri: We were about to discuss the Lebanese cabinet formation.

King Abdullah: Right.

Hariri: Now, in view of the fact that March 14 won the election fair and square, and that there is absolutely no constitutional basis for anything like a cabinet veto for the opposition, I believe that it is more than fair that…

King Abdullah: Ah, Saad?

Hariri: … we give the opposition absolutely no more than…

King Abdullah: Saad?

Hariri: … which is already more than one could expect under the…

King Abdullah: Saad!!!

Hariri: Yes sir! Sorry, you were saying?

King Abdullah: President Bashar has a proposal.

Bashar: Thanks, Your Excellency. Saad, this folder contains a list of helpful suggestions that King Abdullah and I came up with, just as a way to… you know, help you complete the cabinet formation process as easily as possible. Give it a read on your way home to Beirut tonight. You might find it useful.

Hariri: (opening the folder) Umm…

King Abdullah: That’s right, Saad. We just want the best for Lebanon, and given that this is your first time as Prime Minister…

Bashar: (smiling) And hopefully not your last.

King Abdullah: Ahem…

Bashar: That came out all wrong. What I meant was…

King Abdullah: Never mind. Just read what’s in that folder, Saad, and brainstorm it. By yourself.

Hariri: (incredulous) But… these aren’t suggestions. (Pulling out a single sheet of paper from the folder.) There’s just a list of ministerial portfolios with names attached to them!

Bashar: Like I said,these are some suggestions designed to help grease the wheels, so to speak.

Hariri: (frantic) And if I refuse? This is unacceptable! It’s blackmail! Lebanon is an independent country!

King Abdullah: There, there. No need to get upset. Sleep on it and call me in the morning.

Bashar: We’re sure you’ll come to the right decision.

Hariri: (steaming) Alright. I’ll be in touch. (Storms out)

King Abdullah: (To Bashar) Don’t worry. He’ll be fine.

Bashar: Do I look worried? God damn it, it’s hot up here.

King Abdullah: Just shut the hell up, ok?

Bashar: Sorry. Couldn’t resist.

King Abdullah: Freak of nature… What do they grow in Damascus, magic beans?

Bashar: (snickers) Something like that…Qnion-small

By QIFA NABKI

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bestfriends4everI have a short piece over at ForeignPolicy.com‘s “The Argument” blog about the cabinet formation. Here are the first couple of paragraphs, with a link to the rest. Come on back and comment, if you’re so inclined.

Coalition of the Unwilling

By Elias Muhanna

When the March 14 coalition won a parliamentary majority in Lebanon’s national election two weeks ago, there was much crowing and backslapping heard the world over. The United States, Europe, and the Sunni Arab regimes hailed the result as a victory for Lebanon’s “moderates” and a defeat for the allies of Syria and Iran — foremost among them Hezbollah. After a campaign season full of bleak predictions about March 14′s electoral prospects and indeed its political future, the result gave the coalition a much-needed shot in the arm and put to rest, if only temporarily, any doubts about its governing mandate.

Now comes the hard part. Consultations to choose a prime minister and form a cabinet have run aground on a shoal of familiar disputes. Although Saad Hariri (son of slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri) has widespread support to become the next premier, the parceling out of ministerial portfolios is a much trickier task, due largely to the opposition’s demand for a veto-wielding share of the cabinet. Without a “one-third-plus-one” proportion of cabinet seats, Hezbollah and its allies have said that they might simply boycott the government altogether, leaving March 14 to govern alone.

In a country other than Lebanon, such a state of affairs wouldn’t necessarily be cause for concern in the eyes of the ruling coalition. However, the nature of the Lebanese political system mandates that all of the country’s sectarian communities be represented within government, and so the absence of parties like Hezbollah and Amal — who command overwhelming support among Lebanese Shiites — would seem to be a contravention of the spirit of consociationalism embodied by the Lebanese Constitution.

(Read the rest)
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back_to_the_future2We’re hearing more and more about the possibility of a “Doha II” agreement, a negotiated settlement to the anticipated standoff about the composition of Lebanon’s next cabinet. With Michel Aoun demanding a cabinet share proportional to his bloc’s strength in parliament, it’s clear that March 14 will not be able to assemble the cabinet simply by giving Hizbullah guarantees on the inviolability of its resistance. It will also have to deal with Aoun.

The original Doha Agreement produced a 30 member cabinet with 16 ministers for the majority, 11 for the opposition, and 3 ministers loyal to President Suleiman. This arrangement gave the opposition just over one third of the cabinet’s seats, the proportion needed to block legislation on “basic national issues”. The one-third-plus-one share also has a “nuclear option”, whereby the government can be brought down if the entire cabinet minority resigns. Here’s what the Lebanese Constitution says about the functioning of the cabinet (or Council of Ministers):

Article 65.5: “The Council of Ministers meets in a locale specifically set aside for it, and the President chairs its meetings when he attends. The legal quorum for a Council meeting is a majority of two thirds of its members. It makes its decisions by consensus. If that is not possible, it makes its decisions by vote of the majority of attending members. Basic national issues require the approval of two thirds of the members of the Council named in the Decree forming the Cabinet. Basic national issues are considered the following:

The amendment of the constitution, the declaration of a state of emergency and its termination, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the annual government budget, comprehensive and longterm development projects, the appointment of Grade One government employees and their equivalents, the review of the administrative map, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, electoral laws, nationality laws, personal status laws, and the dismissal of Ministers.”

I am personally uncomfortable with the idea of a Doha II Agreement, and not because I’m opposed to the idea of a national unity government. The problem with a Doha II is that it runs the risk of serving as a band-aid remedy, an antidote whose utility lies only in satisfying immediate political demands rather than addressing the larger underlying issues. Let us ask ourselves, honestly: would anyone be talking about cabinet vetoes if it weren’t for the issue of Hizbullah’s weapons? The fact that Hizbullah itself is theoretically willing to drop its demand in exchange for suitable “guarantees” weakens the opposition’s case that the current system violates the consensual logic of Lebanese governance.

What I would prefer to see is a full-fledged debate on the issues that puts everything on the table, eschews closed-door deal-making in favor of constitutional amendments, and works within the existing framework of the Ta’if Accord. Virtually all of Lebanon’s political parties are in agreement on the fact that Ta’if provides the blueprint for a viable political future. Even the Aounists, who complain loudly about the weakening of presidential powers as a result of Ta’if, cleave to its recommendations regarding a non-confessional electoral law and the creation of a senate.  If we’re going to go to the trouble of coming up with a Doha II, why not at least harmonize its features with the prescriptions of the Ta’if Accord?

The obvious answer to this question is that none of the political players are actually that interested in implementing Ta’if, despite what their voluminous electoral platforms indicate. This is where Lebanon’s civil society needs to swing into action. Rather than sitting back and complaining about the horsetrading conducted over the next several weeks, civil society organizations should be engaged in a public campaign to raise expectations for the kind of deal that should eventually be made. After all, we’ve just spent several months listening to political leaders talking about second independences, third republics, and building the state. Now is just as good a time as any to hold them to their word.

PS: Check out Jimmy Carter’s opinion of Jeffrey Feltman. It’s amusing.
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