December 22, 2011

The Orthodox-Maronite Gathering (OMG) Proposal: Proportional Representation Meets Sectarian Nomination

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14, Reform | Tags: , , , , , , |
[36] Comments 

Graphic courtesy of Election Guerilla. Click to enlarge.

Much has already been said about the very peculiar electoral law proposed  by the Orthodox Gathering and endorsed by all of Lebanon’s Maronite  leaders. Civil society groups say that it further entrenches sectarianism. Michael Young writes that it deepens Christian isolation. Meanwhile, Ziyad Baroud is hedging his bets.

My biggest problem with the proposal is very simple: it leads to enormous inequalities of suffrage. What does this mean?

Imagine a country with a parliament divided into quotas based on colors of hair. For example, 20% of the seats are devoted to blond-haired MPs, 35% to redheads, 20% to brown-haired people, 15% to salt-and-pepper, etc.

Once upon a time, this proportional arrangement of seats matched the actual hair-color demographics in the country, but over time, the blonds (who, as a rule, tend to have more fun) multiplied more vigorously than the redheads, while an unfortunate epidemic of male-pattern balding eviscerated the once healthy ranks of the brown-haired.

The redheads, however, are insistent upon maintaining the old quotas, even though demographics have changed. What’s more, they insist that districts should be drawn in such a way as to guarantee that redheaded representatives are elected by majorities of redheads. Why? Because, they argue, a blond MP surely would not advocate for a redhead’s rights in the way that a fellow redhead would.

This is where the troubles begin. If you draw districts in such a way as to maintain “chromatically pure” majorities, then certain districts will inevitably have a much higher ratio of MPs to voters than other districts. For example, redheaded districts might have 1 MP per 10,000 voters, while blond districts could have 40,000 voters to each MP.

The only way around this problem would be to draw much larger districts composed of voting populations with all kinds of hair color, but then you’d have redheaded MPs being elected by blond voters, which is a big problem for the redheaded politicians.

So small districts remain, for the time being…until, one day, the redheaded and brown-haired leaders get together and decide that the current system is still problematic. Even in their well-coiffed enclaves, there are odd pockets of blond and gray-haired voters who can help swing an election the wrong way.

And so they propose a different approach, a law that is the apotheosis of the principle of hair-color representation, and it goes something like this:

“Let’s dispense with the hassles of gerrymandering and turn the entire country into a single district. Let’s institute a system of proportional representation whereby each citizen is only allowed to vote for a list of candidates who have the same color hair as their own. So, for example, if there are 22 seats in Parliament reserved for redheads, then each redhead in the country would cast a vote for one of several different lists of 22 redheaded political candidates, and the seats would be divided up between the lists according to a proportional formula.”

Under this proposed system, the problem of unequal suffrage that we witness in the current system with the small districts would become even more drastic, because there would be no little pockets of blonds and black-haired voters to “dilute” the redheaded and brown-haired votes. Under the new law, the ratio of MPs to voters is no longer dictated by districting, but rather by the cold hard facts of hair color demographics. A redheaded voter would have more voting power than a blond, purely because of the color of their hair, and not because of the district they live in.

Graphic courtesy of Election Guerilla. Click to enlarge

This is, in a nutshell, the Ferzli proposal. (For more reading on inequality of suffrage, check out this post I wrote last year on the subject).

Let me just conclude by pointing out the obvious, namely that nobody but Najib Mikati and President Suleiman are actually interested in implementing proportional representation. When I met with several of Hariri’s allies, advisors, and representatives last month, they all basically regurgitated the same set of talking points: “If we adopt PR, Hizbullah will be able to win 10 Sunni seats, while we’ll only be able to take one Shiite seat. We can’t have PR until there’s a level playing field, and our Shiite candidates are not intimidated or threatened by Hizbullah.”

Naturally Walid Jumblatt is completely opposed to PR, as is Nabih Berri. The Christians don’t like it because it will require having larger voting districts (12-14 rather than the current 28 or so), which means that many Christian MPs will be elected by Muslim majorities. (This is what makes it particularly nauseating to listen to Amin Gemayel and Michel Aoun going on about restoring “Christian rights” when the system they are championing is so ludicrously out of step with democratic principles and demographic realities. See the second graphic above for a clear proof of just how good the 2009 law is for Christian representation…)

Therefore, the current proposal from Elie Ferzli is probably being supported by the Christian leadership only to guarantee that the end result of the bargaining process over the electoral law will be the 2009 law, warts and all.

Arabic speakers can read an introduction to the actual law here. I’d also like to thank my good friend Election Guerilla for the very helpful graphics above. As he suggested to me in an email: “The proposed system simply flaunts the inequality of confessional representation (and it is perhaps unsurprising that the most over-represented Christian group under the proposal would be … the Greek Orthodox!”

More on this as the story develops…

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June 6, 2011

The View From Mukhtara

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14, Syria | Tags: , |
[47] Comments 

Walid Jumblatt has long cultivated a reputation for spotting the angles before anyone else. As international pressure mounted on Syria in 2004, Jumblatt joined the vocal opposition to Lahoud’s rule in a move that broke with several years of close ties with Damascus.

In 2009, following the Lebanese parliamentary elections and the much-touted (but ultimately ill-fated) rapprochement between Damascus and Riyadh, he announced his return to sister Syria’s welcoming arms in a crass press conference at the Beau Rivage hotel.

The first move placed him in the vanguard of the burgeoning “Independence Intifada”; the second was what made it possible for Hizbullah and its allies to bring down the Hariri government earlier this year.

In light of his track record of political treachery prescience, what are we to make of Jumblatt’s recent statements about events in Syria and Lebanon? He has been very vocal of late in his calls upon the Assad regime to implement dramatic reforms, and recently criticized Hizbullah as the main obstacle to the Lebanese cabinet formation. I don’t think we should make too much of these moves, but they are certainly intriguing.

I spoke this weekend with a friend who is a political insider in Beirut, and he argued that Jumblatt’s statements suggest a belief that the Syrian regime is heading for another severe bout of isolation, no matter how things turn out in the short term. If the regime can turn the corner on the opposition, it will face a steady campaign of demonization from the West and possibly even certain key allies like Turkey. If it can’t stem the protests, the future will be even bleaker.

This isn’t to say that Jumblatt is contemplating a shift back to March 14th, which no longer exists in any meaningful form anyway. But it does make one suspect that his current allies’ confidence and sense of purpose has been deeply eroded by the events in Syria.

Thoughts?

(For a fun trip down memory lane with Jumbo, see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.)
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April 6, 2011

Return of the Militias?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , , , , , , , |
[246] Comments 

The latest Wikileaks dump by the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar extends the series of intriguing and record-changing insights into the tumultuous 2006-08 period, which witnessed the July War between Hizbullah and Israel, an 18 month-long downtown sit-in, and a takeover of Beirut by Hizbullah forces on May 7, 2008.

Two cables are especially worth reading in their entirety. I link to them below, along with relevant excerpts and some commentary.

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08BEIRUT490 (April 8, 2008) | Subject: JUMBLATT CONCERNED ABOUT UNIIIC DELAYS, SUNNI MILITIAS, AND HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC NETWORK

5. (S) Jumblatt revealed what he deemed a “very serious blow” to the UN Commission investigating the assassination of former PM Rafiq Hariri and others. According to information he received from Internal Security Forces (ISF) Intelligence Director Wissam Hassan the previous evening, Wissam Eid, who worked for Hassan and was assassinated January 25, had discovered a year and a half ago a link between Abd al-Majid Qasim Ghamlush and a network of 17 other cell phone numbers. Former UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz reportedly did not act upon this information.

6. (S) In January 2008, however, after Daniel Bellemare took over as Commissioner, Eid met with Bellemare, and was killed one week later. (Note: UNIIIC contacts have confirmed to us that Eid had met with Bellemare exactly one week prior to his death. End note.) The assassination of Hizballah leader Imad Mougnieh followed two weeks later, leading Jumblatt to believe there was a link between Ramloush [sic]and Mougnieh, “assuming Ramloush [sic]was still alive.”

8. (S) The second issue Jumblatt raised was Saad’s reported training of Sunni militias in Lebanon (allegedly 15,000 members in Beirut and more in Tripoli). In establishing his own “security agencies” in Beirut and Tripoli, Saad was being badly advised by “some people,” Jumblatt said, such as ISF General Ashraf Rifi. In his meeting with Jumblatt, Hassan admitted having knowledge that members of Saad’s Future Movement were being trained. Hassan reportedly opposed such training, but “people around Saad” (i.e., Rifi) were telling him to go ahead. (Note: The Jordanians have refused to train Internal Security Forces (ISF) members hand-picked and vetted by the Embassy to participate in a DA/ATA-funded Terrorism Crime Scene Investigation program, reportedly because they don’t want to be involved in training “Saad’s militia.” End note.) Jumblatt said Saad’s militia would cause significant damage to March 14, especially because Geagea’s Lebanese Forces and Suleiman Franjieh’s Marada were in line to train their own forces.

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08BEIRUT642 (May 9, 2008) | Subject: GEAGEA PROPOSES ARAB PEACEKEEPERS; A STRONG SINIORA IS PLANNING A TELEVISED ADDRESS SATURDAY

5. (C) Geagea then asked to speak privately to the Charge. It was important for everyone to push the LAF to do its job, said Geagea. However, he wasn’t sure that the army would succeed. If the army failed to protect Christian areas, Geagea said he wanted to make sure Washington knows he has between 7,000 and 10,000 well-trained Lebanese Forces fighters who could be mobilized. “We can fight against Hizballah,” he stated with confidence, adding, “We just need your support to get arms for these fighters. If the airport is still closed, amphibious deliveries could be facilitated.”

The Charge assured Geagea that the U.S. was encouraging Sleiman and the LAF to protect state institutions and the citizens of Lebanon. (Note: At 2315, Geagea telephoned the Charge to relay that his morale had been boosted by a telephone call from NEA A/S Welch. End note.)

*

QN Comment

There’s a lot to discuss here, but I’ll just point out the following tidbits:

1. Brammertz, Wissam Eid, and the CBC Report:

Some of you will recall the famous CBC report on the Hariri investigation, which came out several months ago. (See my commentary on it here, here, here, and here.) In that report, Neil Macdonald revealed that the UN investigating team (led by Serge Brammertz) did not begin doing any telecommunications analysis until late 2007. As I pointed out, Macdonald’s assertion simply did not tally with the UNIIIC record, which mentioned telecommunications analysis in eight different reports from 2005-07.

Now, in the first cable posted above, Jumblatt makes the same point that Macdonald does in his article, and cites his source as Wissam al-Hassan (the ISF intelligence chief). This, then, seems to bolster the points made in the CBC article, except it still does not explain why the UNIIIC claimed to be performing telecommunications analysis for three years when it actually wasn’t. Another possible explanation for this discrepancy is that Macdonald’s source for the information about Brammertz was also Jumblatt’s source: Wissam al-Hassan. Thoughts?

2. Saad al-Hariri and the Mustaqbal Militia

After the events of May 7 2008 (when Hizbullah’s fighters took over Beirut and parts of Mount Lebanon as a response to the Siniora government’s attempted crackdown on the party’s fiber optic network), there were rumors circulating about a “Sunni militia” sponsored by Saad al-Hariri that had been training in Jordan. No real evidence of any such militia ever emerged, and March 14th has always insisted that it never entertained a military option against  the Shiite party.

The Jumblatt cable is the first indication that these rumors may indeed have been true. Of course, we have no idea how far along al-Hariri’s militia-building plans had gotten. Hizbullah’s 2008 strike was remarkably efficient… practically surgical, which leads one to believe that Saad’s fighters were either: (a) nonexistent; (b) poorly trained; (c) or ordered to give up their weapons without a fight.

3. Geagea’s 10,000 LF Fighters

The Lebanese Forces released a statement today saying that the May 9 2008 cable which quotes Samir Geagea as requesting weapons from the Americans for his fighters is actually a vindication, because it shows that the LF is not armed after all, but rather merely “well-trained”. I’m not sure I buy that… what Geagea was probably asking for was heavier weapons — mortars, grenade launchers, field guns, etc. — to complement the machine guns that every self-respecting Civil War vet still has tucked away in the cellar.

But maybe not. What do you think?
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March 21, 2011

Wikileaks Cables on the July 2006 War

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Israel, Lebanon, March 14, Syria | Tags: , , , , , , , , , , |
[82] Comments 


Apologies for the brief absence, folks. Things have been busy, but not busy enough to keep me from devouring all of the Wikileaks cables about the July 2006 War that al-Akhbar has been publishing. Mesmerizing stuff…

For English speakers who may have trouble navigating the newspaper’s website, I’ve posted links to all of the relevant cables below along with their dates, subject headings, and the occasional excerpt. If I have some time later this week, I’ll share some thoughts about the content of the cables.

If anyone’s interested and in the area, I’ll be giving a talk at the University of Oklahoma two weeks from today, where I look forward to seeing my friends Yaron Ayalon (an Ottoman historian who teaches there) and Joshua Landis, author of the indispensable Syria Comment (which is a must-read these days, given all that’s going on in Syria).

Without further ado, I give you…

AL-AKHBAR’S WIKILEAKS CABLES

06BEIRUT2351 (July 13, 2006) | Subject: INITIAL REACTION TO NASRALLAH’S SPEECH JUSTIFYING HIZBALLAH’S ABDUCTION OF IDF SOLDIERS

06BEIRUT2353 (July 13, 2006) |Subject: LEBANESE PM SINIORA: “WE NEED HELP.”

06BEIRUT2390 (July 14, 2006) |Subject: HIZBALLAH’S RECKLESSNESS SPLITS AOUN’S ADVISORS

“Aounist advisor MP Ibrahim Kanaan expressed frustration and deep concern over the present course of events in Lebanon and said he has advised his party leader General Michel Aoun to put distance between himself and Hassan Nasrallah. Kanaan is convinced that Hizballah, with “its extreme overconfidence,” will soon lose control over the rapidly escalating hostilities. In his view, the resulting loss of life and stability will produce a severe backlash in Christian, and possibly Sunni, communities that could destroy Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, since it is currently viewed as a Hizballah ally. Kanaan suggested, however, that the current crisis may offer an opportunity for Aoun and PM Siniora to form a pro-reform “partnership.” Senior Aoun advisor Gebran Bassil, on the other hand, defended Hizballah’s actions and said Siniora’s government was merely reaping the whirlwind created by its passivity and refusal to share power. Moderate Aounist MP Farid el-Khazen, meanwhile, split the difference: strongly criticizing Hizballah’s duplicity and recklessness, while recommending aloofness from the star-crossed Siniora government.”

“In a July 13 discussion with poloff, MP Ibrahim Kanaan, who is frequently used as an intermediary and spokesperson by Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) leader Michel Aoun, said that FPM’s association with Hizballah has been a mistake. Declaring that Michel Aoun did not have the slightest idea that Hizballah was planning such a provocative act, Kanaan professed deep concern that Hizballah was now effectively steering the ship of state. When asked if he thought Hassan Nasrallah was acting like a Minister of Defense, Kanaan retorted, “no, no, much more than that.”

“Kanaan half-heartedly defended the troublesome February 6 compact between the FPM and Hizballah, saying it originally held the promise of bringing Hizballah into Lebanon’s political mainstream. But he conceded that the previous day’s “reckless” ambush in Israeli territory is threatening to completely undo Lebanon’s struggling democracy and threatens to deliver the country back into the tender mercies of Syria.”

*

06BEIRUT2403 (July 17, 2006) | Subject: LARSEN TO PROPOSE HANDOVER OF ISRAELI SOLIDIERS TO GOL…

“Mid-way through the meeting three visitors arrived at Larsen’s room unannounced. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh, and Minister of Information Ghazi Aridi entered the room in good humor and indulged in generous orders to room service with the others present. The three Lebanese politicians reacted positively to Larsen’s proposal to call for a transfer of the Israeli soldiers to the GOL…”

“Over a glass of red wine, a large bottle of vodka (the quality of which sparked a long exchange between Jumblatt and the startled room service waiter), and three bottles of Corona beer, Jumblatt gave a briefing on the thinking of the March 14 coalition which had met that evening. Jumblatt noted the heavy destruction of Lebanese infrastructure but bemoaned the irony that Hizballah’s military infrastructure had not been seriously touched. Jumblatt explained that although March 14 must call for a cease-fire in public, it is hoping that Israel continues its military operations until it destroys Hizballah’s military capabilities.”

“Responding to Jumblatt’s complain that Israel is hitting targets that hurt the GOL while leaving Hizballah strategically strong, the Ambassador asked Jumblatt what Israel should do to cause serious damage to Hizballah. Jumblatt replied that Israel is still in the mindset of fighting classic battles with Arab armies. “You can’t win this kind of war with zero dead,” he said. Jumblatt finally said what he meant; Israel will have to invade southern Lebanon. Israel must be careful to avoid massacres, but it should clear Hizballah out of southern Lebanon. Then the LAF can replace the IDF once a cease-fire is reached. A defeat of Hizballah by Israel would be a defeat of Syrian and Iranian influence in Lebanon, Hamadeh added. For emphasis, Jumblatt said that the only two outcomes are total defeat or total success for Hizballah.”

*

06BEIRUT2413 (July 18, 2006) | Subject: [FRENCH AMBASSADOR] INCENSED BY ISRAELI TARGETING OF LAF…

06BEIRUT2437 (July 21, 2006) | Subject: MINISTER MOUAWAD URGES HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE…

“In closing, Minister Mouawad re-emphasized two issues: the urgent necessity of starting humanitarian operations now and the advantages of using that effort to strengthen the standing of the GOL with the Lebanese people. She stated the first step is the immediate establishment of
humanitarian corridors inside Lebanon to the villages of the south. Finally, she urged that USG support and protect three critical figures: Fouad Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, and unexpectedly, Nabih Berri — who in her opinion may be the best available Shia alternative to Nasrallah.”

*

06BEIRUT2443 (July 23, 2006) | Subject: AMINE GEMAYEL SAYS CEASE-FIRE SHOULD SECURE BORDER FIRST…

“Gemayel said Aoun had cooperated with Mossad through the duration of Lebanon’s civil war, and said he allied himself with Syria and Hizballah now because he believed they offered him the best chance at winning his long coveted seat in Baabda Palace.”

*

06BEIRUT2471 (July 25, 2006) | Subject: SAMIR JA`JA` SUPPORTS PROPOSED PATH TO CEASEFIRE…WITH A SUGGESTION

06BEIRUT2490 (July 29, 2006) Subject: MARWAN HAMADEH DISCUSSES CEASE-FIRE POSSIBILITIES

“On the night of July 28, the Ambassador and econoff met with Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh at his apartment. “An Nahar” General Manager Ghassan Tueni was also there for much of the meeting, his main contribution filling us in with breaking press reports (almost all of which later proved to be erroneous).” [QN: That explains Naharnet...]

*

06BEIRUT2504 (August 1, 2006) Subject: SINIORA BELIEVES HE HAS THE CONFIDENCE OF HIS PEOPLE…

“When asked about his inexplicable confidence that Hizballah would either move north of the Litani with its heavy weapons, or allow itself to be disarmed by the LAF, Siniora said he wasn’t certain, but his on-going communication with Hizballah through Nabih Berri and other Shia interlocutors led him to believe they were “considering” and close to such action.”

*

06BEIRUT2508 (August 1, 2006) Subject: AOUN PARROTS PIAF: “JE NE REGRETTE RIEN”

“In an awkward attempt to straddle the fence, Aoun insisted he was not really in an alliance with Hizballah, but then proceeded to tear down the “inconstant” leaders of March 14 — Siniora, Walid Jumblatt, Saad Hariri — who in his view did not deserve the “confidence” of the Lebanese people. The implication (although never stated explicitly) was that Nasrallah is a more trustworthy partner…”

“For those who hoped the tragedy of the current crisis might be the catalyst to inject some sanity in Michel Aoun’s relationship with Hizballah, this meeting proved a disappointment. In what was essentially a disjointed, repetitive, and often contradictory performance, Aoun displayed the qualities that engender so much antipathy and distrust among Lebanon’s political class. He rarely admits a mistake or miscalculation and through exquisite twists of logic, always manages to replay his diplomatic/political “triumphs” and interpret other leaders’ efforts as feckless and ill-conceived…We have noticed developing fissures in the FPM movement and strong disagreement with Aoun’s policies in his second-tier of advisors, but Aoun’s lack of movement toward the country’s other pro-reform leaders implies that the post-conflict political scene may be as contentious as it was on July 11. We agree with him that the Shia community in Lebanon cannot be ignored and cannot be made to feel defeat as a community. But, unlike Jumblatt and Hariri, Aoun has not yet awakened to the fact that Nasrallah has used him.”

*

06BEIRUT2511 (August 1, 2006) |Subject: HAMADEH SEES RESOLUTION OF SHEBAA FARMS AS MEANS TO NEUTRALIZE HIZBALLAH IDEOLOGICALLY

“Hamadeh described a significant change in Minister of Defense Elias El-Murr’s demeanor, characterizing him as playing both sides. Hamadeh said that El-Murr believes the Hizballah will “win” in the current conflict and is trying to save himself politically for the post-conflict sorting-out of the political scene here. Hamadeh recounted that Siniora was furious at El-Murr at a recent cabinet meeting for his comments to the media to the effect that, “the 7 points (of Siniora’s paper) do not exist”. Other ostensibly “pro-Syrian” members of the cabinet have been surprisingly quiet, Hamadeh said. Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, an erstwhile ally of President Emile Lahoud, has been, “playing it better than Elias (El-Murr),” offered Hamadeh. Rizk has even been pushing forward the Cabinet’s work on the establishment of an international tribunal to try suspects in the crimes under the purview of Serge Brammertz’s UNIIIC. According to Hamadeh, Rizk has made great progress, appointing “two good judges.” Hamadeh stressed that they should take advantage of Rizk’s openness to work on this issue. For Hamadeh, now is the time to pass a resolution to establish the tribunal, as this would serve to “keep Syria quiet” on the current Lebanese-Israeli conflict as well as further contain the Syrians in the long run.”

*

06BEIRUT2513 (August 1, 2006) | Subject: MP BOUTROS HARB: NASRALLAH CANNOT BECOME REGION’S RAMBO

Quote: “[Harb] recommended that a strong Israeli advance that completely controls the Hizballah strongholds of Maroun El Ras and Bint Jbeil would provide a chance for the U.S. impose a ceasefire while showing that Hizballah has been overpowered… He also stressed that Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a reluctant Hizballah ally, will become the political victim of Hizballah.”

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06BEIRUT2540 (August 6, 2006) | Subject: JUMBLATT AND HAMADE ON TWO-PHASE SOLUTION

“Jumblatt expressed regret that, in his view, Israel failed to assess Hizballah’s operations on the ground. He questioned how Israel was completely taken by surprise on July 12. He concluded that today the tables have turned to Hizballah’s advantage as the organization is founded on a “culture of death.” Hizballah fighters want to die as martyrs and will not hesitate to blow themselves up to kill Israelis. In addition, there is a new generation of Israeli soldiers that are not as driven and motivated as their predecessors. He thinks this was illustrated in the past weeks of fighting and warns that it is dangerous for Israel and the region for this to be revealed.”

*

06BEIRUT2544 (August 7, 2006) | Subject: CHRISTIAN POLITICAL LEADERS SAY SHEBAA IS KEY

“On August 5, A/S Welch and Ambassador Feltman met with Christian leaders from the anti- Syria March 14 movement, including former President Amin Gemayel, his son and Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, Dory Chamoun, Carlos Edde, Fares Souaid, George Adwan, and presidential hopefuls Nayla Moawad (Minister of Social Affairs), Nassib Lahoud, and MP Boutros Harb. While claiming to be fully supportive of Prime Minister Siniora’s call for a ceasefire, they are troubled that the current conflict might leave Hizballah in a stronger position within Lebanon than at the beginning. The Lebanese government will need to be in a position of strength to deal with Hizballah once the conflict is over, the leaders argued. To this end, they would support a continuation of the Israeli bombing campaign for a week or two if this were to diminish seriously Hizballah’s strength on the ground.”

“Claiming to reflect PM Siniora’s private thoughts, several of the assembled leaders urged that Hizballah be given a “real pounding” by the Israelis to the point that the group would be “soft enough to listen to reason.” According to Boutros Harb, “if we are convinced that Israel can finish the job, then we can allow a few more weeks,” though the consensus seemed to rest between seven to ten days. If on the other hand Hizballah were to emerge emboldened with a perceived sense of victory, “that would be a disaster.”

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06BEIRUT2553 (August 8, 2006) | Subject: DEFENSE MINISTER MURR CONFIDENT IN RAPID LAF DEPLOYMENT

“Murr stated clearly that the LAF was prepared to hit back at Hizballah if they attempted to fire at Israel or tried to draw Israeli fire by placing launchers near to LAF positions.”

“In contrast to his earlier dismissals that Israel had significantly harmed Hizballah, Murr claimed that Hizballah had suffered losses of 50 percent of its equipment as well as 400 fighters during the conflict. While he estimates that Hizballah has fired off 3000 of its rockets, he believes that the Syrians were able to resupply Hizballah with 2500 before the Israelis took out the road links.”

*

06TELAVIV3079 (August 8, 2006) | Subject: ISRAEL FM LIVNI SAYS ISRAEL DISAPPROVES OF CURRENT DRAFT OF UN RESOLUTION

06BEIRUT2602 (August 12, 2006) | Subject: SAAD HARIRI WANTS LAHOUD OUT

“According to Hariri, “Nabih Berri is furious with Hizballah.” While Berri will maintain a united Shi’a front for some months following the conflict, Berri will put pressure on Hizballah to keep in line and, ultimately, “Berri’s dream is to finish off Hizballah” and reclaim Amal’s primacy among the Shi’a. Hariri said that Berri had compelled Hizballah to accept the LAF deployment plan, and that this spells “the beginning of the end” for HIzballah.”If we play our cards right,” Hariri added.”

“Asking that his comments be kept close-hold, Hariri whispered that, “We need to remove Lahoud, (LAF commander Michel) Sleiman, and (Head of the G2 army intelligence) George Khoury. They are in bed with Syria. They are in bed with Hizballah.” While Hariri hopes to eventually recruit Nabih Berri’s critical support to achieve this, he asked that international pressure on Iran and Syria continue unabated.”

“On a positive note, Hariri praised with seeming sincerity the performance of PM Fouad Siniora during this crisis.”If I had picked Bahije (Tabbarah, former Minister of Justice) a year ago,” he said, his voice trailing off as he shook his head. We think that this was a tacit acknowledgement, Saad-style, that the strong advice we and the French gave him to pick Siniora over his initial choice of Tabbarah was the right one. But what was encouraging in Saad’s praise for Siniora was the suggestion that the two of them will now be able to cooperate without the internal rivalries and jealousies that had plagued their relationship earlier this year. In general, we think Siniora has done a better job when he hasn’t had to worry about the less experienced but politicaly more powerful Saad second-guessing him. But we also believe that it’s good Saad is home: the image of Saad Hariri staying at the Plaza Athenee in Paris and globe-trotting with an sizable entourage, while hundreds of thousands of Lebanese felt forced to leave their homes, was not good for the future of the March 14 movement.”
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January 20, 2011

Who Will Be Lebanon’s Next Prime Minister: Doing the Parliamentary Math

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Elections, Free Patriotic Movement, Hezbollah, Lebanon, March 14 | Tags: , |
[352] Comments 

The above graph provides a visual representation of the current balance of power in the Lebanese Parliament. (Click for large PDF version)

Last Saturday, Lebanon’s As-Safir newspaper published an excellent analysis of the different possible scenarios that could lead to the nomination of a new Prime Minister. It sheds important light on the political math behind the question of who will lead Lebanon, now that Saad al-Hariri’s government has fallen. Download the As-Safir report here. (The above graph, produced by a friend of mine, puts the basic balance of power in visual context for all of you non-Arabic speakers.)

According to Article 53.2 of the Lebanese Constitution, the Prime Minister is appointed by the President of the Republic following binding consultations with Parliament. In other words, Parliament basically votes for the new Prime Minister, but does so via the back-room politicking of the “presidential consultations” ritual.

The solid parliamentary majority that March 14th won during the 2009 elections evaporated once Walid Jumblatt decided to forge his own path independent of his former allies. Today, Jumblatt is playing the role of kingmaker, which is one of the principal reasons he dropped out of March 14th in the first place. The question of who will be Lebanon’s next Prime Minister turns on Jumblatt’s decision to stick with Saad al-Hariri, betray him to the opposition, or abstain and let the MPs in his bloc make up their own minds about where to hang their hats.

Which brings us to the numbers game. As-Safir outlines four possible scenarios for how the various parliamentary blocs and independents might vote, once President Sleiman gets around to launching the consultation session:

  1. Status quo: March 14th’s 55 MPs are joined by Jumblatt’s bloc of 11 MPs plus 6 independents (Miqati, Safadi, Fattoush, etc.) leading to a majority of 71 to the opposition’s 57 votes. Result: Saad al-Hariri is re-appointed (71-57)
  2. Stalemate #1: Jumblatt’s bloc is split such that 4 MPs vote with March 14th, and 7 vote with March 8th, while the independents also vote for March 14th. Result: Deadlock in the Parliament (64-64).
  3. Stalemate #2: Two members of Jumblatt’s bloc vote with March 14th but the rest abstain along with all of the independents. Result: No majority for either side (57-57).
  4. March 8th prevails: Most of Jumblatt’s bloc and some of the independents vote with the opposition, while March 14th only attracts six additional votes. Result: March 8th names a new Prime Minister (67-61)

Hizbullah and the Free Patriotic Movement have already declared that Hariri will not be their candidate, while Berri and Jumblatt have been more circumspect, preferring to find a way to re-nominate Hariri as part of a larger deal on Lebanon’s response to the Special Tribunal indictments. When push comes to shove, Berri will line up with his allies in the opposition, but Jumblatt is still wavering. This explains the Druze leader’s recent meetings with Bashar al-Assad as well as U.S. Ambassador Maura Connelly’s meetings with MPs like Nicola Fattoush: both sides are trying to pressure the independents to break for their allies.

This may sound over-optimistic, but as bleak as things look these days, the fact that politics in Lebanon still comes down to a matter of counting votes and persuading (read: intimidating?) MPs to vote one way or another strikes me as something to feel good about. Sort of.

UPDATE: 7:45 PM (Beirut time)

Saad al-Hariri just gave a televised address to the nation from his residence in Beirut. Here are the basic points:

  • I will not sacrifice the dignity of my family and my father’s memory just for the sake of politics (read: I’m not going to cut a deal on the STL)
  • I was willing to look for some kind of compromise in order to safeguard Lebanon’s stability, but the various foreign initiatives to reach this compromise were met by the opposition’s refusal to re-nominate me as Prime Minister (read: I’m not going to cut a deal on the STL)
  • We (i.e. March 14th) will go to the parliamentary consultations when President Sleiman launches them, and we will accept their outcome because we support the Constitution and not the politics of the street.

I have to say that I thought this was a surprisingly decent performance by Hariri. He put a positive spin on the possibility that he will not be nominated PM, and he also sent the message to his followers to shy away from any acts of civil disobedience that may result from the transfer of power.

If the opposition does succeed in mustering the votes necessary to bring Omar Karami into office (as is being reported now), then I would hope that Hariri would sit that government out and leave March 8th to face the music. A cult of consensus has poisoned the well of Lebanese governance for far too long, and I’m tired of hearing excuses  from this side or that about why nothing seems to get done.

More later…
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June 30, 2010

Talking to Nadim Shehadi: Palestinian Civil Rights in Lebanon

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Interviews, Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , , |
[20] Comments 

Dr. Nadim Shehadi (bio) has very kindly agreed to answer some questions about the issue of improving the civil rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This blog hosted two very interesting discussions on this topic a couple of weeks ago, and so I’m grateful to Nadim for agreeing to discuss the policy dimensions of the issue.

Please feel free to leave any additional questions you may have in the comment section.

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QN: How likely do you think it is that this Lebanese government will pass some kind of legislation aimed at improving the civil rights of Palestinian refugees?

NS: My view is that the likelihood is quite high, I feel that the debate has evolved a lot in the past four years and that the mood in the country is to discuss things in the open. It is normal for all the skeletons to come out of the cupboards on such a sensitive subject. I think that if a positive outcome is reached it would mean that Lebanon has really recovered from the civil war.

QN: If legislation is passed, what do you think its broad outlines are likely to be (as far as health, social security, labor, and property rights are concerned)?

NS: There are two options. One is that they resolve the issues gradually, one by one (i.e. employment, reciprocity, association law, property etc.) Two is that they do a whole package and resolve all the pending legal issues in one legislative move.

I am in favor of option two because the political cost of each gradual move is the same as for all the bundle together. They must hit it on the head and finish with this problem once and for all. If they do that then it will strengthen the government’s hand in discussing arms and security issues later. But to get to that stage they must also resolve the legal issues unilaterally without linking them to any quid-pro-quo over arms.

The danger with option one is that they would compromise at every stage and use up all the political credit leaving things unresolved. If this happens then the government’s position will be weakened when they come to discussing arms. If they use rights to leverage over arms they will get nowhere.

QN: Walid Jumblatt introduced the emergency laws at a plenary session of Parliament on June 15th, catching many of his allies and adversaries off guard. Why, in your opinion, has this issue come up at this moment in time?

NS: Jumblatt’s democratic gathering made a statement about Palestinian rights in 2005. At the time it was a demand to resolve outstanding issues away from the internal Lebanese political wrangling. This was partly a reaction to President Lahoud repeating over and over again that he wanted to renew his presidency and would never resign because he was there to protect Lebanon from the conspiracy of tawteen or permanent settlement. The issue of tawteen was exploited also by the Syrians who repeated that they were there to protect Lebanon from it.

Then there was the question of appointing Wael Boufaour of the PSP as minister of state for Palestinian Refugees. That mobilised the PSP into organizing a conference in January. After the conference it took them a long time to mobilize and produce the draft that was presented on the 15th of June. They took that long because they lost steam after the appointment of Boufaour did not materialize.

The laws were presented in a normal manner and they would have usually been automatically been sent to the parliamentary committees for discussion. But it seems that Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri tabulated them for discussion and a vote on that day and this is what took everybody by surprise.

QN: Do you believe that any such legislation is “a step towards naturalization”, as many politicians are claiming, or is this simply a scare tactic?

NS: The problem is that since there is no legal definition of what constitutes ‘naturalization’ or tawteen, potentially any step that facilitates or prepares the ground for permanent settlement could be interpreted as anti-constitutional.

A necessary step to break the deadlock is to agree on a legal definition of tawteen. The SSNP presented a draft law to that effect last week and if it is adopted it would be a very positive move.

In reality, the status of refugees is completely unrelated to naturalization. Their rights are the same whether they live in poverty in a camp or whether they live in luxury and even have acquired another citizenship. A Palestinian in Canada with Canadian nationality can still claim the right of return and compensation, it is theoretically an individual right that is not dependent on status. In any case, whatever the outcome of the negotiations over refugees, no refugee will be forced to do anything they do not want to do. The refugees will be presented with options that are clearly defined and each individual with exercise a choice between the different options. The implementation process will take at least 10-15 years after the agreement has been reached.

QN: Are fears about the impact of such legislation on the economy and on security justified?

This is the only really tangible question and a very important one. The problem is that we do not have proper data or impact analysis related to these legislations. The reason is that the debate so far has been more emotional than rational and touches on all the traumas and phobias that are the legacy of the civil war. This is true both for Palestinians and Lebanese.

It is very important to understand that the laws will not change things radically; this is because Palestinians in Lebanon work in most professions and do not obtain a work permit. The law is not really enforceable. The figures are really misleading too. In one of the speeches today, it was mentioned that there are 136,000 foreigners who were given work permits in 2007 and that only 261 Palestinians were given work permits and that this is discrimination. This is a false and very misleading image, it gives the impression that there are 422,000 Palestinians in Lebanon and that 421,739 of them are being ‘denied’ a work permit, denied is an often used word. The reason there are only 261 work permits is that only 261 were applied for.

In reality what you need in Lebanon is a residence permit and to obtain it you need to have a work permit. So if you are a resident already, like Palestinian refugees are, and do not need a resident permit then you do not need to bother getting one. The disadvantages are there, you do not get social security, and you can get exploited by your employer – and your employer exploiting you may even be another Palestinian refugee.

Doing away with the work permit requirement for the refugees will ease things and will probably not increase the Palestinian work-force by much. They are already here and they are already working they will just be happier and working legally. Many advocates insist on saying that Palestinians cannot work in 72 jobs and if you say no its 71.5 then you are treated worse than a holocaust denier.

The truth it that we do not really know the exact number of jobs they cannot legally do even if they wanted to. The Ministry of Labour lawyers identified 14 jobs that all foreigners are banned from if they do not belong to a country that has reciprocity agreements with Lebanon. A study of the various laws and agreements may reveal one or two more. But in the end what difference does it make? Palestinians have no incentives to apply for a work permit and you can neither force them nor stop them. Changing the law in a way adjust the texts to reality on the ground.

Advocates of Palestinian rights in Lebanon do a lot of harm by exaggerating the situation. Some of them are probably also still fighting the Lebanese civil war or the civil rights movement in the US.

I can give loads of examples. How many times have you read that Palestinians in Lebanon are denied the “right of association”? Whereas in reality there are in Lebanon more Palestinian associations, parties, NGOs, civil society organizations and clubs than anywhere else. The truth about this is that those who want to register their association have to have a board with a Lebanese citizen on it. If not they just don’t register and it does not make that big a difference. Allowing Palestinians to sit on the board of associations will only mean that more associations will register – it does not mean that you will create hundreds or thousands of new associations. The impact is minimal.

Property law is the worst; I do not see how the discrimination can be justified. It was only passed in 2001 and its application is even worse than the law itself. However, the amendment to the law that discriminates against the Palestinians will cancel itself out once a Palestinian state is recognized and since Lebanon accepts this through its affiliation to the Arab Peace Initiative then it is Lebanese policy to recognize the state. The impact of changing the property law to allow Palestinians the same quota as other non Lebanese citizens will initially mean that all those who own property already will be legalised. This is a complex issue and I am not sure about its impact. One thing is sure, the Lebanese state will never take away any Palestinian property in Lebanon on the grounds that it is illegally owned.

The big unknown is the issue of Social Security. Again numbers are not as frightening as it is assumed but we need to do a proper impact analysis on this to reassure those who are claiming that it will cost billions. Only Palestinians who are regularly employed and make social security contributions will benefit from it. Again the figures being thrown around are very inflated and alarmist. The entire Palestinian population in Lebanon is around 250,000 at most. Of these a maximum of 40-50, 000 are active and according to some studies up to 70 percent of them are in entrepreneurial businesses i.e are not employed in a job that would require social security registration.

QN: Any other thoughts?

NS: Khalass bikaffi :-)

Tayyib, one last thought if only to repeat the importance of not linking any solution to rights with any thinking about security.

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June 16, 2010

Palestinian Rights in Lebanon: Reform on the Way?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , |
[88] Comments 

Contrary to what many reported immediately after the fact, the debate in the Lebanese Parliament last Tuesday over the issue of Palestinian rights did not slam the door on any potential future reforms.

True, no law was passed. But the outcome — a decision to send the draft laws to a review committee and bring them back to Parliament for a vote in one month — is not just acceptable; it was probably the right thing to do. As a friend on the inside recently wrote to me: “It is not acceptable for this or any other parliament to discuss laws that have not had the chance for proper review.  It’s about time someone started holding parliament to account for the job that they do.”

There’s an excellent article in today’s Daily Star that surveys the issue; apparently, several analysts are very optimistic that the law will be passed when it comes up again, thereby rolling back several decades’ worth of institutionalized discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon. And while I don’t want us to get ahead of ourselves, the fact that this government is actually tackling one of the stickiest issues in Lebanese political culture holds out hope that other similarly radioactive topics might somehow be raised as well in the near future.

Take, for example, the issue of deconfessionalizing the political system. Nabih Berri’s recent proposal to establish a national commission to explore the idea fell flat, largely because it was issued informally via the media. Let’s imagine, instead, that Berri and Jumblatt jointly sponsored a draft electoral law for the 2013 parliamentary elections, based on a non-confessional framework. No one could ignore such a law; they’d have to debate it in Parliament and then vote it down, justifying this decision to their constituents. At the very least, such a move would have the effect of putting the issue in the national spotlight once again.

In other words, both the Palestinian rights question and the deconfessionalism question suffer from similar problems of misinformation, messy thinking, and political fear-mongering. We saw last Tuesday that these problems can be mitigated by separating fact from fiction in the form of a concrete legislative proposal. Deconfessionalism can benefit from this approach as well.

Update: I’m grateful to Rex Brynen, professor of political science at McGill University and expert on the Palestinian refugee problem, for weighing in on this issue in the comment section:

Arguments can be made in favour of extending basic civil (not political rights) to Palestinians in Lebanon on a variety of humanitarian and human rights grounds. For me, frankly, those grounds are enough in and of themselves.

However, quite apart from humanitarian arguments in favour of Jumblat’s proposals, a strong argument can also be made on Lebanese national security grounds.

Can anyone seriously argue that the dangers of violent radicalism are somehow *reduced* by having 250,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon permanently poor, marginalized, and discriminated against? The Fateh al-Islams of this world thrive on the poverty of the camps. The impulse to improve Palestinian conditions (initially under the Siniora government, and now with Hariri supporting Jumblat’s proposed reforms) has been underpinned by the recognition that Lebanese security interests were better served by allowing the Palestinians more normal lives.

Of course, the scarecrow of tawteen always gets raised at this point. The naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon, however, has nothing to do with whether they can work or own property–it would require a political decision by a future Lebanese government to extend citizenship. That won’t happen, and in any case is constitutionally prohibited.

Should arms be retained inside the camps? I would prefer not– I think they do the refugees far more harm than good. However, given political realities (and, for that matter, the interests of some Lebanese parties) the camps aren’t going to be disarmed soon. Consequently, it is pointless holding human rights hostage to the arms issue. It provides no leverage at all, and only makes the situation worse.

Finally, it is not as if Palestinian refugees have anywhere else to go in the meantime. If and when a Palestinian state is established, then they’ll have the right and ability to repatriate, as well as whatever return might take place to Israel. In the meantime–tragic as it is–the Lebanese and Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are stuck with each other. They might as well make the best of it. That’s precisely what the recent proposals propose to do.

For those of you who support the current initiative, I’ll throw out a challenge: what can be done to move this forward? The PSP have been great on the issue, and Hizbullah will likely continue to be supportive provided they don’t decide to prioritize their alliance with the FPM. Support within Amal and Future is, I suspect, a little more uneven, despite the positions taken by Berri and Hariri in parliament. Finally, for this to really go forward, it is important that at least some of the concerns put forward by the Christian parties be addressed, and–if at all possible–the reformist coalition expanded. How? Does anyone have any concrete, actionable ideas?

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December 10, 2009

The Turnstile Executive

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon, Reform | Tags: , , , , , , , , |
[16] Comments 

Michael Young’s op-ed over at the Daily Star makes sense on the following point, I find:

But right after shattering the jar of complacency on Hizbullah, Sfeir was asked about the abolition of political confessionalism. And here the patriarch fell back into a disposition that showed why, for all his qualities, he is no innovator. He, quite correctly, stated, “What is the advantage of abolishing political confessionalism in [national] texts before doing so in [people’s] minds, if everyone says ‘I’m a Maronite, or a Druze?’” And when asked about Walid Jumblatt’s proposal for a communal rotation of the three presidencies, Sfeir responded that he did not understand it.

Jumblatt’s proposal was intentionally ambiguous. Did the Druze leader mean that all communities would benefit from being rotated into the three top posts in the state, or that the rotation would occur between the Maronites, Sunnis, and Shiites, who already hold those posts? The Taif Accord outlines the abolition of confessionalism, but it does so in parallel with the establishment of a Senate which would retain a sectarian breakdown, and which Jumblatt would like to see led by a Druze.

Sfeir is not a politician, so his evasiveness was defensible. However, his uneasy response showed he was still thinking, in a most conventional way, that the Maronites’ final protection remains the presidency. It’s true, confessionalism cannot be abolished in law before the outlook of the Lebanese is transformed. However, that line of reasoning is self-reinforcing. Unless you abolish confessionalism institutionally somewhere, unless you change laws somewhere, nothing will ever alter the confessional mindset. But what is needed is a gradual, self-sustaining process of change, where you modify texts to help modify minds, in a way that those who feel most threatened by such change find simultaneous compensations, institutional or otherwise, elsewhere.

Take the Senate. Regardless of whether it is headed by a Druze or not, such a body would be a valuable corresponding institution to a deconfessionalized Parliament, and according to Article 22 of the Constitution should address “major national issues.” The aim of a Senate would be to reassure those expected to lose most from deconfessionalization, namely the Christians, who continue to benefit from a 50-50 ratio in the legislature even though they make up less than that in the population. Sooner or later Christians will face challenges to the ratio. Better for them to negotiate a new formula from a position of strength than to obstinately defend a system that, if Sunnis and Shiites ever reach agreement, may be forcibly overturned in their disfavor.

What of Jumblatt’s rotation plan? Sfeir’s mistake, and that of many Christians, is to read too much into a Maronite presidency, whose powers have been depleted. In fact, the presidency has brought only woe to the community. Competition for the post has divided Maronites in a way the prime ministership and speakership of Parliament have not Sunnis and Shiites. The powers of the president are by and large less proactive than those of his Muslim partners. Therefore, why remain so unyielding toward a plan that would give Maronites a taste of political positions often more effective than the presidency, thereby offering them a chance to transcend their sense of communal decline; a plan, also, that might rejuvenate the political order by creating more frequent openings for fresh leaders?

The symbolism of being head of state is important to Maronites, but it is also an illusion. The presidency has power, but on a day-to-day basis, in the formulation of long-term policy, its latitude is more limited. Instead of resisting this, the patriarch, like all Christians, should consider new ways his community can reinvent itself in a Lebanon that is changing rapidly, where Christian irrelevance is, alas, becoming ever more flagrant.

I think Young is exactly right on this point, and frankly have never understood why the Christians are so attached to the Presidency and yet simultaneously so aware of its limited powers.

To my mind, rotating the three posts would not really amount to a legitimate confessional re-balancing act. It would simply represent a confidence-building measure, in advance of taking more dramatic steps. But confidence is surely what is most needed, no?
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November 12, 2009

Hail to the Chief

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon | Tags: |
[9] Comments 
Chief Jumblatt

Jumblatt: "The Maronites and Druzes have become Red Indians."

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November 4, 2009

Egypt Selling Lebanon Down the Nile?

Posted by Qifa Nabki under Lebanon | Tags: , , , , , , , , , |
[3] Comments 

An astute reader of this blog sent me the following commentary, which speculates about the significance of several curious little signals coming out of Egypt.

**

Egypt and LebanonIn a sudden cloud burst of optimism, the Cabinet Alert Level was raised to orange Monday evening, only to come crashing down on the rocks of further demands by Michel Aoun on Tuesday morning. Signals now are about as mixed as the preceding metaphor but the question remains – after four months, what has finally happened to kick things into motion?

If Naharnet is right about the proposed deal (FPM retains the Telecommunicaitons Ministry but gives up Bassil as its head), this then sounds like a back-down by the Hariri camp.

Hadi Hobeich adds to that sense:

“Hobeich also said that the adopted cabinet formula suits all parties, adding that Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri has made concessions for the sake of forming a national-unity government.”

And you’ve got Naim Qassem boasting on Sunday that “external parties” have given up obstructing things, and I think we can assume he’s not talking about Syria or Iran.

So which external party is this? Might it be Egypt?

This theory is somewhat thinly sourced, but Jumblatt’s column from this weekend was oddly Cairo-centric:

“Jumblat urged the need to return to a minimum of Arab-Arab rapprochement after the Syrian-Saudi summit put its first pillar. Adding that “the Syrian-Saudi-Egyptian axis has to be the containing Arab vessel… “

Jumblatt continues to go on and on about Egypt and its regional role in the piece. Out of character for the Man from Moukhtara?

The real mystery clue though is this:

“Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abu Al Ghayt said that Hizbullah’s arms have nothing to do with the fact that Lebanon has failed so far to reach a Cabinet formation considering that “the Internal Lebanese balances on one side and the foreign visions on the other are what’s weighing heavily on this government and its formation.”

On the other hand, Abu Al Ghayt announced in a statement in Al-Siyasa newspaper that he has taken a look at the reports referred to the Security Council found in the court file regarding President Rafik Hariri’s assassination. “There are no indications or criticisms pointing at Syria; on the contrary, there’s an international confession of Syria’s cooperation in the matter,” he added. “

That’s quite a change of tone, considering Egypt is still in the middle of prosecuting (and allegedly torturing) a vast Hezbollah network for planning terrorist attacks on their soil.

Egypt has historically been a second-tier player in Lebanon, though they pop up in interesting ways here and there. In mid-October, Tripoli Alawi leader Rifaat Eid blamed an attack in his community on Egyptian intelligence, rather than his usual foes in the Sunni district. Sunni Sheikh Malek ash-Shaar blamed unnamed “foreign parties” for the attack, though he left it ambiguous as to exactly who he had in mind.

More directly relevant here, there were rumors in August about disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Egypt over Lebanon as the Saudis were gearing up for a rapprochement with Syria.

And as early as July, Hezbollah accused Egypt of holding up that rapprochement. Egypt was also reportedly in favor of keeping Saniora as prime minister, suspicious that the opposition had so readily agreed to Hariri in the role (Egypt denied the report, and in early June denied trying to influence the elections).

But now, kind words for Hezbollah’s weapons and Syria’s role in the Hariri assassination? If Egypt was possibly the last hold out pushing Hariri not to give Telecom to Aoun, did Egypt just “sell out Lebanon?” And if so, for what?

(Commentary for QifaNabki.com by Philippe Bou Rached)

**

Further reading material:

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