Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

I’ve written an opinion piece on the senselessness of consensual politics for The National. It will be out in print this Friday, but the editors at The Review have agreed to put it up a couple of days early on the website, given the timeliness of the subject matter.

The first few paragraphs are below. Finish reading it on The National’s website, and then come on back to comment.

All for None

What’s wrong with Lebanon? Nearly four months after a landmark election handed the western-backed March 14 coalition a victory over the opposition alliance of Hizbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, all efforts to form a government have failed. Rather than taking advantage of his coalition’s victory by putting together a cabinet composed exclusively of his own allies, prime minister-designate Saad Hariri has spent weeks coaxing and cajoling the opposition to join him in a national unity government, in which they would wield significant power.

His reasons for doing so are manifold. On the one hand, his coalition no longer commands a clear majority in parliament, due to the recent defection of the mercurial Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. At the same time, there are the wishes of an important regional ally to consider: Saudi Arabia, which is believed to be courting Syrian co-operation in Iraq in exchange for prodding its Lebanese dependants, the March 14 coalition, into a power-sharing arrangement with Hizbollah. Most importantly, Hariri seems determined to avoid a return to the polarisation of the previous parliamentary term, during which the opposition, demanding more power, quit the government and went on to paralyse the country with massive demonstrations, strikes and an 18-month downtown sit-in.

The opposition’s objective then, as it is now, was to replace the majority cabinet with a national unity government in which it would have veto power over important legislation. Appealing to the timeworn argument that Lebanon cannot be ruled by simple majorities because of its diverse sectarian make-up, leaders like Hassan Nasrallah and Michel Aoun have insisted on transforming the principle of consensual decision-making from an abstract desideratum into a practical necessity.

While March 14 figures have publicly insisted on upholding their prerogative to form a majority cabinet, they too have quietly accepted the idea of sharing power by virtue of a face-saving compromise, the so-called “15-10-5 formula”. Under this arrangement, March 14 would control half the seats of a 30-member cabinet; the opposition would control 10 seats (one short of the votes required to veto major legislation); and the President, Michel Suleiman, would appoint the last five ministers, with the understanding that one of them would be free to vote with the opposition on major, “life-and-death” issues (such as the matter of Hezbollah’s weapons).

The fact that even the majority parties have been more interested in trying to get the best deal they can under this framework, rather than questioning its legitimacy in the first place, betrays their belief – to paraphrase Churchill – that while consensual democracy may be the worst form of government, it is better than all the others.

(Keep reading)

My friend Sean over at The Human Province sent me an email this morning speculating about whether there was anything to the rumor about the excellent Lebanese daily newspaper al-Akhbar launching an English version. The paper, while following a mostly pro-opposition line, is the only widely-read publication that regularly goes after parties on both sides of the political divide.

It is also, as As`ad Abu-Khalil has noted, one of the only papers in the Middle East that has openly supported gay rights.

Sean pointed out that the tag /ar/ has begun to appear in all of al-Akhbar’s URL’s, so he tried navigating over to http://www.al-akhbar.com/en/ only to find that the site is “Under Construction”.

Promising…

Update: While we’re on the subject of the media, I just read this interesting piece about the reported firing of 50 editors and employees at an-Nahar, a venerable Lebanese newspaper.

You can have any color...

Hizbullah MP Nawwaf Moussawi offered a rare explanation of his party’s position on majoritarianism and what the Constitution has to say about how cabinets should be formed. Here’s the relevant bit:

“Yesterday, [Samir Geagea] asked whether or not a majority government was a constitutional government. We say that the Lebanese Constitution considers that if the government enjoys a majority in the parliamentary council, it can earn the vote of confidence.

However, the Lebanese Constitution also says that no power enjoys legitimacy if it goes against the Pact of Coexistence [Preamble, clause J]…  A majority government in Lebanon is one which includes the [parties representing] sectarian majorities and not the majority of a sect or two, since that is against the Pact of Coexistence. Whoever wishes to form a majority government should see that the majority is that featured in the Pact and is not a majority of numbers.” (Translation by NOW Lebanon, with some modifications…)

This is very interesting. Moussawi is basically saying that there is a contradiction in the Constitution. On the one hand, a government can be formed on the basis of a simple majority vote in Parliament. However, unless that government is composed of the parties that command the most support among their own sects, the result is unconstitutional.

In other words, a “majority cabinet” is not one that can earn the confidence of the parliamentary majority, but rather one that can earn the confidence of the most popular sectarian parties. This is the meaning, apparently, of coexistence.

I have an article coming out in The National this Friday that deals with some of these issues, so stay tuned.

As things have been too slow in Lebanon to warrant serious commentary and too depressing to warrant satire, I’d like to direct your attention to one of the best publications on Lebanese affairs, The Monthly. It’s published in English and Arabic by Information International, a research and consultancy firm based in Beirut and headed by Mr. Jawad Adra, one of Lebanon’s leading pollsters (and the one whose election predictions were closest, out of the big four).

This magazine is unique because it examines major political, economic, and social issues from a quantitative perspective: crack open a copy and you’ll be amazed at the data that is marshaled in the service of thoughtful analysis and commentary, from opinion surveys to consumer price and real estate indexes. There is nothing quite like it.

I highly recommend those of you in Beirut to pick up this month’s issue at your local bookstore. For readers abroad, you can subscribe to the electronic or print edition on the magazine’s website (link is above), and I encourage university-based readers to get their libraries to subscribe as well.

PS: Be sure to also check out their publications and reports which contain valuable historical data made available in convenient formats. And their blog, Lebanon Issues, is here.

Some notable links:

• Here is `Uqab Saqr doing battle with Joseph Abu Fadel on the superb al-Jazeera talk show, “al-Ittijaah al-Mu`aakis” (h/t Nathan Field)
• Here is an exclusive report from as-Safir on the minutes of last week’s Hariri-Aoun meeting. I was rather stunned at the progressive nature of Hariri’s questions — he asked Aoun for his opinion on how to dismantle political sectarianism, on whether we should establish a senate, on electoral matters, and other things. Aoun’s answers were a little disappointing. (h/t Nick Noe)

BEIRUT, Lebanon — The leader of the Free Patriotic Movement, General Michel Aoun, has announced that he is dropping what many believed to be the principal obstacle to the Lebanese cabinet formation: the demand that his son-in-law Gebran Bassil be appointed Telecommunications Minister.

Anticipation was high in Beirut today that this development would pave the way for the formation of a new cabinet after three months of fruitless negotiations between the majority March 14 coalition and the Lebanese opposition.

Hopes of a breakthrough have fizzled, however, as a new complicating factor emerged within a few hours of Aoun’s announcement. The opposition has reportedly added a new member to its ranks, an obscure figure who goes by the name of Abu Tanjara the Oracle of Mashmoushi, and who claims to be the last living adherent of an ancient sect that worshipped the Phoenician god Baal.

Abu Tanjara

At a crowded press conference organized by the FPM at a posh Beirut hotel, reporters were surprised to see an unusual-looking person taking the podium, instead of the FPM spokesman or an executive committee member.

Abu Tanjara read a lengthy statement to the assembled audience, recounting the history of his community’s travails at the hands of the ancient Persians, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, and “the barbarians who followed them.” This was followed by a diatribe against monotheism and a fifteen-minute rain dance. Finally, the Oracle announced his decision to join the Lebanese opposition, rejecting the majority’s “arrogant monopolization of the country’s decision-making.”

When asked by a reporter if he had any specific demands of Prime Minister-designate Saad al-Hariri, Abu Tanjara replied: “I’m glad you asked. The following are my demands, which are not really even demands, to be perfectly frank — they are my natural rights as a full member of the confessional mosaic that is Lebanon.”

Abu Tanjara continued: “I am demanding the Defense and Foreign Policy ministries, so that Lebanon may finally shed its parochial standing in the region and grow to its natural boundaries, which encompass all of Greater Phoenicia. I am also demanding one hundred and seventy virgins — ten from each of Lebanon’s seventeen official sects — to be delivered to the entrance of my cave, at the top of Mount Sannine. The virgins will serve as the Mothers of the Rebirth of the Baalist Church. Finally, I am demanding two hundred and fifty million dollars. Any questions?”

In response to a question from the an-Nahar reporter about the consequences of the majority rebuffing his demands, Abu Tanjara had this to say: “Well, if they want to try to rule this country all alone, let them go ahead. But I warn them: my pet dragon Lulu doesn’t like majority cabinets, and if she wakes up and goes on one of her rampages, not even I will be able to stop her,” he said, pulling out a picture of a fearsome-looking dragon and passing it around the room.

Lulu, the fire-breathing dragon pet of Abu Tanjara, Oracle of Mashmoushi

Representatives of the FPM, Hizbullah, and Amal have declined to comment on Abu Tanjara’s specific demands, only saying that “the opposition welcomes the Oracle with brotherly affection, and will adopt a unified stance.”

Meanwhile, Prime Minister-designate Saad al-Hariri has promised to review the Oracle’s remarks carefully, expressing hope that “a cabinet representing all of Lebanon will soon see the light of day.”

By Qifa Nabki

Not really the Lebanese Constitution...

We hear a lot of rhetoric these days from FPM leaders about Saad al-Hariri’s arrogant unilateralism in his cabinet-formation dealings, a unilateralism that they say violates the constitutional principle of “communal coexistence” (Preamble, clause j). Accompanying this argument is the occasional complaint about the Ta’if Accord, which (so the Aounists say) stripped the Maronite President of his powers and vested them in the Sunni Prime Minister.

I’ve heard this argument so many times that I think it’s worth dedicating a post and a debate to it.  In my opinion, the Aounist position grossly oversimplies matters. Although the Ta’if Accord did give the Prime Minister the authority to form the government – free from binding parliamentary consultations – it did not turn him into an executive colossus, like the pre-Ta’if Maronite president.

Before Ta’if, the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, and even the Chamber of Deputies served at the pleasure of the President. He had the authority to appoint, fire, and dissolve at whim. The current powers of the Prime Minister are much more limited.

In particular, the Prime Minister’s ability to appoint a government is constitutionally checked in two ways:

1. The President must sign off on the cabinet (Article 53.4);
2. The Chamber of Deputies (i.e. parliament) must give the cabinet its vote of confidence before it can act (Article 64). This means that the premier cannot simply form the cabinet of his choice, as the Free Patriotic Movement leaders allege; he is bound by the demands of (at least half) the parliament, as well as those of the President.

As we saw last week, a Prime Minister’s cabinet proposal can easily be derailed by the Parliament if it fails to satisfy certain bloc leaders. Even though the Lebanese opposition did not have the votes in Parliament to block Hariri’s lineup, two of his own key allies – the Lebanese Forces and the Kata’eb – opposed it, thereby condemning his efforts to failure. What seems to frustrate the FPM is that their wishes don’t hold as much weight as the wishes of Hariri’s own allies, but this is surely not the fault of the Lebanese Constitution.

As easy as it is to be cynical about the standoff, however, it has brought many important questions about the architecture of Lebanon’s political system to the surface. With no Syrian hegemon around to herd cats and crack heads, we are finally seeing the Ta’if Accord put to the test, as Lebanese politicians try to exploit every ambiguity and apparent loophole in the Constitution to maximize their political gains.

This is a good thing. Under the best circumstances, it has the potential to force Lebanon to address structural problems of representation and democratic process, and to perhaps arrive at a better framework. However, this will only happen if the current crisis is framed as a debate about constitutional amendments — like Ta’if — rather than about one-time political deals — like the Doha Agreement.

The only person who can do this is the President of the Republic, who is the sole figure tasked with acting as the guarantor of the Constitution. If I were one of his advisors, I would tell him to insist upon the following principle: he should not sign the decree forming any cabinet unless the principle used to form that cabinet is enshrined in the Constitution as an amendment.

In other words, if the cabinet is formed using the principle of proportional representation (which is what the FPM is demanding) – where each bloc gets a share equivalent to its weight in parliament – then this should be the model used from now on. If blocs are given the right to choose their own ministers, then that’s what should happen from now on. And so on and so forth.

This will have the effect of forcing all sides to consider the long-term potential effects of their short-term demands. Does the FPM really want to strip the Prime Minister of the authority to form a government, thereby condemning every government from now on to be a national unity government, with all the deadlock and inefficiency that this entails?

If so, then what powers should be reserved for the Prime Minister to mediate effectively between all the different groups guaranteed seats in the cabinet? What principle should govern the distribution of portfolios? Who is the final arbiter?

As long as the Lebanese opposition continues to call into question the legitimacy of the Prime Minister’s powers — on the basis that they violate a constitutional principle of communal coexistence — they should be asked to present an alternative, in the form of a constitutional amendment. That way, we won’t have to watch this movie again four years from now.

He's making like a tree and walking away...

[We managed to get yesterday's poll up just in the nick of time, but the results are now moot. So, here's another poll for you. (Those of you reading on RSS, you'll probably need to click over to the blog itself to vote).]

Seventy-three days, countless meetings, and one cabinet proposal later, Saad al-Hariri has decided to resign as Prime Minister-designate. Everybody expects him to be reappointed.

I’m quite pleased with this move and I think Hariri should have resigned over a month ago rather than haggling over Gebran Bassil’s eyes and Sami Gemayel’s sun tan. The past three months have been farcical, even by Lebanese standards.

As we’ve discussed many times before, one really wonders what the point of a national unity government is, under these circumstances. If it has taken them this long to fail to form a goverment, how is it even imaginable that a national unity cabinet is going to get anything done? Does Hariri think that Aoun is going to become easier to deal with once he joins the cabinet and that the FPM is going to stop behaving like an aggrieved opposition party? I venture to say that the opposite will be true.

As long as “national unity” remains the non-negotiable principle undergirding any governing effort, then it is going to be far too easy for any single bloc to play spoiler.

Here’s how the system is supposed to work. If the PM does not have the votes within their own bloc to create the cabinet of their choice, then they need to go fishing for the coalition ally who is going to give them the best “deal”. Eventually some smaller blocs agree to join the PM’s bloc via a governing agreement, e.g. “We agree to pursue these policies, and any deviation from these policies will result in the breaking of the cabinet agreement and the dissolution of this government.”

Under this system, the smaller blocs get to punch above their weight because they know that the big bloc needs them to govern, while the big bloc benefits by allowing the smaller blocs to compete amongst each other.

The problem with the current process in Lebanon is that the smaller blocs have no need to “sell themselves” to the big bloc because they know that the big bloc is already committed to including them in some way in the government. With no fear of being left out in the cold, they can continue to make one demand after another.

Saad al-Hariri should take a page from Hasan Nasrallah’s play book. Back in the spring, when everybody was forecasting a win for March 8th, Nasrallah went on television and repeated the offer that he had been making for months (paraphrased):

“If we win, we will form a national unity government and give the other side a blocking third share.  However,” Nasrallah added, “if you refuse to accept our generous offer, we will not hesitate to rule this country alone.”

You see how he did that? So simple, so straightforward, so rational. Nasrallah was completely unperturbed about violating some vague principle of “common living” should the Future Movement not join his cabinet. And this is the same strategy that Hariri should follow. He should go on TV and say: “I am extending a hand of partnership to you. If you refuse it, we will not hesitate to rule this country alone.”

End of story.

This Daily Star editorial means well, it really does. But who could resist pointing out the little Freudian slip…

“The only long-term solution to Lebanon’s perineal political woes is to completely overhaul the system. That means drafting a new electoral law that provides a basis for genuine representation in the government and creating mechanisms for actually implementing the long-ignored clauses of the Taif Accord.”

I do like an editorial with gumption, one that calls a spade a spade and a perineum a perineum. Here’s the Daily Star’s solution to the crisis:

“President Michel Sleiman can spare us the agony of watching this freak-show of attempted governance any longer by proposing a three-month unity cabinet that takes on the challenge of building a functional political system. Such a temporary government could then work on the urgent tasks of implementing the Taif Accord and drafting a new electoral law before being disbanded in preparation for the creation of a new cabinet. After this exercise, any newly created cabinet would be equipped with tools for actually governing the country, as opposed to merely embarrassing its citizens.”

While he’s at it, I think that President Sleiman should also task the three-month unity cabinet with coming up with a cure for cancer, building a nuclear fusion plant, and solving the Arab-Israeli crisis. You know, just to keep them busy. Implementing the Ta’if Accord isn’t going to take them a whole three months! They’ll have plenty of time to work on other projects too.

Cozily ensconced on the fifth floor of Widener Library, surrounded by musty tomes and post-it notes, I’ve finally found a moment to check on the old blog after a fortnight’s hiatus.

Luckily, there is actually something to talk about. Saad al-Hariri has finally put together a cabinet proposal and submitted it to President Suleiman for approval. The response from the Free Patriotic Movement has been predictably hostile, with General Aoun calling all FPM ministers-designate to boycott the new cabinet, which reportedly gives the party five seats including (sources say) the Industry, Social Affairs, Public Works, and Education portfolios.

Several questions come to mind.

1. Why has it taken Hariri sixty-nine days to put together a cabinet that spurns Aoun’s demands? In other words, if he was going to deny him the Telecommunications and Interior ministries, why didn’t he do it a lot earlier?
2. Hariri would have had to secure Jumblatt’s approval for this proposal before going forward with it. Does Jumblatt’s approval of a cabinet lineup that the opposition will almost certainly reject suggest that he is returning to the March 14 fold?
3. When the opposition does reject this proposal, what will Hariri’s next move be? Is he prepared to call the opposition’s bluff and say, “Well I tried to form a national unity government but you rejected it, so tough luck,” or will he return to the drawing board?

I’m hoping that one of the many excellent Beirut-based political journalists who read this blog will get on the phone to the various party offices and answer these questions for us. In the meantime, here are my own musings.

Over the past couple of months, I’ve found myself deeply puzzled by the behavior of Lebanon’s political elite. On the one hand, you have the leaders of the Free Patriotic Movement, who talk about being persecuted by Hariri and being denied their “rights.” What rights are these, exactly? I’ve scoured the Lebanese Constitution searching for a hint to what Aoun and Bassil are talking about, but my efforts have been fruitless.

As strange as the FPM’s rhetoric is, however, Hariri’s behavior has been all the more mystifying. Practically from the start, the PM-designate has behaved like his coalition lost the election, going from one meeting to another, listening to every demand, threat, and insult. Not to use a March 14 talking point, but what really is the point of winning an election if you can’t be the final arbiter of who gets what in the cabinet? (By the way, I would have felt the same way had the tables been turned and a March 8 PM-designate’s efforts were being blocked by the LF or the Kata’eb.)

At the end of the day, the question is: “What is Hariri afraid of?” Why is he committed to a national unity government? Is this a condition imposed upon him by the Saudis, or perhaps by the more independent, pro-Syrian wing of March 14 (like Jumblatt, Miqati, Safadi, Murr, etc)?

Or is Hariri worried about a return to the bad old days of 2006-08, with an opposition sit-in disguised as some kind of benign labor dispute, with the goal of bringing down the government?

I asked a well-connected political analyst these questions recently and he responded as follows:

Essentially, no one wanted to go back to the majority-opposition dichotomy of the years before, not the Saudis nor Saad or March 14. Yes, it’s too polarizing, and it doesn’t fit into regional alignments, with the Saudis and the Syrians still wanting to take advantage of their so-called (and uneasy) reconciliation. They disagree over Lebanon, but they don’t want to divorce because of this. So national unity was the catchword.

With Saad al-Hariri now saying that “there is one majority in Lebanon,” perhaps the Saudis have decided that they’re tired of being conciliatory.

Any thoughts?