Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

Christopher Hitchens has penned a riveting account of his drubbing in Hamra forVanity Fair. Previous articles sponsored by the Lebanon Renaissance Foundation were either rife with errors or somewhat off-message,  so Hitch’s piece comes right in the nick of time and proves that you really do get what you pay for. Here’s his opener:

“As Arab thoroughfares go, Hamra Street in the center of Beirut is probably the most chic of them all. International in flavor, cosmopolitan in character, it boasts the sort of smart little café where a Lebanese sophisticate can pause between water-skiing in the Mediterranean in the morning and snow-skiing in the mountains just above the city in the afternoon. “The Paris of the Middle East” used to be the cliché about Beirut: by that exacting standard, I suppose, Hamra Street would be the Boulevard Saint-Germain.”

A lesser journalist may have been able to work the old chestnuts about waterskiing and the “Paris of the Middle East” somewhere into the word count, but Hitch thrillingly pulls it off in the first paragraph! Can there be any doubt that we are witnessing a master at the height of his powers?

Here’s his description of the March 14th (2009) rally:

“Almost nobody displayed any religious emblem, and even the few who did were usually careful to put it next to the ubiquitous cedar-symbol flag of Lebanon itself. Women with head covering were few; women with face covering were nowhere to be seen. Designer jeans were the predominant fashion theme. Eclectic musical choices came over the loudspeakers. The average age was low. Nobody had been bused in, at least not by the state. Nobody had been told to leave work and demonstrate his or her loyalty. You get my drift.”

Indeed. It was Lebanonapalooza. My only critique of this paragraph is a stylistic one: I would have liked to see Hitchens make a stronger connection between his sartorial observations and the overall message of the demonstration. For example, he might have said: “Just as the luscious bosoms of Lebanon’s spritely maidens did spill out of their clingy tanktops — unconstrained by any cronish medieval garb — thus did the true spirit of Lebanon break free of its bonds and expose itself to me in all its naked glory, etc….” Something subtle like that.

By the way, has anyone else noticed that the name of the Lebanon Renaissance Foundation does not translate so felicitously in Arabic? I can imagine that the choice of the word “Renaissance” was probably meant to channel the “rising-from-the-ashes” trope, “Phoenix/Phoenician”, etc. but at the end of the day, the Arabic translation would have to be Mu’assasat al-Ba`th al-Lubnani (i.e. the Lebanese Baath Foundation). Whoops.

Lebanese daily As-Safir (which leans towards the opposition) has a very interesting analysis of the results of a poll conducted by Information International (the premier polling organization in Lebanon [see their blog here]). On the face of it, it seems to suggest that Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement and its allies are more popular than March 14th, but the numbers also reveal that Aoun’s support has in fact slipped in the majority-Christian region.

Of the 67.5% of respondents who said that they would vote for the entire list of candidates submitted by either side, 39.6% said that they would vote for the FPM, while 26.3% chose March 14. This, in and of itself, is of potential concern for the Aounists, who captured seven of eight seats in the 2005 election.

The 2005 Election Results in the Metn (source Yalibnan.com)

Among the 27.2% of respondents who said they would vote for an adjusted list of candidates, the two most popular politicians were Michel el-Murr (a newly anti-Aoun “independent”) and Sami Gemayel (son of M14 stalwart, former President Amin Gemayel), followed by Ibrahim Kanaan (a smart FPM lieutenant). Tellingly, of all Maronites polled, 34.5% support March 14 while 29.8% support the FPM.

The study concludes that if the election were held today, the FPM would win 5-6 seats while March 14th would win 2-3 (Sami Gemayel, Nassib Lahoud, and Sarkis Sarkis [depending on whether or not he allies with M14 this time around]). Of course, this does not take into account the “independent” Orthodox seat that is a lock for Michel el-Murr, who has left the FPM camp. All in all, therefore, as a result of alliance shifting and waning support, the Aounists may be looking at a loss of three seats in the Metn.

Not a great way to capture a parliamentary majority. On the other hand, if Aoun convinces Ghassan al-Rahbani to run, the Metn may be singing a different tune, come June.

Once upon a time there lived a legendary journalist named Sy Hersh, who wrote for The New Yorker, won five George Polk Awards and a Pulitzer Prize. His coverage of Lebanon, particularly in the period 2006-07, uncovered American complicity in Israel’s premeditated war on Hizbullah and American-Saudi-March 14 complicity in the Fatah al-Islam phenomenon. These were conclusions that many critics took issue with, lambasting Hersh for relying solely on opposition sources, while others applauded the veteran journo for speaking truth to power.

I have a feeling that Hersh’s latest piece is not going to have the same folks clapping. In a long article for The New Yorker entitled “Syria Calling“, Hersh makes the case that while the road ahead is difficult and there are several challenges facing all parties involved, there is absolutely no question about the seriousness of the Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations. You should read the entire article, but here are some select bits with comments:

“Nonetheless, a few days after the Israeli ceasefire in Gaza, Assad said in an e-mail to me that although Israel was “doing everything possible to undermine the prospects for peace,” he was still very interested in closing the deal.”

That’s right: Bashar emails. He’s the approachable, disarming kind of autocrat, not stentorian, ruthless, or crazy. He’s just like you and me, just with better job security.

“A major change in American policy toward Syria is clearly under way. “The return of the Golan Heights is part of a broader strategy for peace in the Middle East that includes countering Iran’s influence,” Martin Indyk, a former American Ambassador to Israel, who is now the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy, at the Brookings Institution, said. “Syria is a strategic linchpin for dealing with Iran and the Palestinian issue. Don’t forget, everything in the Middle East is connected, as Obama once said.””

Ahhh, vindication…

A former American diplomat who has been involved in the Middle East peace process said, “There are a lot of people going back and forth to Damascus from Washington saying there is low-hanging fruit waiting for someone to harvest.” A treaty between Syria and Israel “would be the start of a wide-reaching peace-implementation process that will unfold over time.”

This is what is so brilliant about Bashar. When Bush was in office, Syria was regarded as a “low-hanging fruit” by the neocons and their democratization agenda. When that agenda crashed and burned, Syria came to be regarded as a “low-hanging fruit” by the Obama realists. Amazing brand marketing! Now that we know Syria is a low-hanging fruit to everyone at all times, all that’s left to ask is what kind of low-hanging fruit it is. My bet is on the Syrian prickly pear, a fruit so evocative that I was once moved to write an allegorical poem about it on Syria Comment (see caption).

"Ode on a Syrian cactus-fruit," By Elliott Abrahms: Orb of rapturous, nettlesome pulp, how I long / To pluck you and make haste to yonder castle to devour you / In the shade of my noble cross-bearing forbears’ walls, / Making ribbons of my palm-flesh as I squeeze / A levantine elixir to quench, if only sparingly, / A thirst for higher, less yielding fruits. / You taunt me, hanging low like the bosom of an old mountain gypsy, / Or the testicles of a fat valley ox, / How I long for you! But do I dare pluck this pendulous orb, / This prickly, persnickety grenade of desert nectar? / Alas, I trudge by, my eyes scanning the lonely path, / For a yet less lofty repast.

Farouk al-Shara, the Vice-President of Syria, was, as Foreign Minister, his nation’s chief negotiator at Shepherdstown. When he was asked whether Syria’s relationship with Iran would change if the Golan Heights issue was resolved, he said, “Do you think a man only goes to bed with a woman he deeply loves?” Shara laughed, and added, “That’s my answer to your question about Iran.”

Indeed, indeed, ha ha, yes exactly…  Actually, wait, I don’t get it. Can someone explain Farouk al-Shara’s point? Never mind, here’s my point: if Seymour Hersh, Martin Indyk, Itamar Rabinovich, Alistair Crooke, and of course Bashar al-Assad agree that Syria is serious about a deal, then how silly do the rest of you look when you say the opposite? (Sorry for my slightly combative tone… March Madness has turned to March Sadness for me, as of last Thursday).

Marcel Ghanem interviewed Michel Aoun last night on his popular talk show, Kalam al-Nas. The general was his regular fiery self, but plain were the signs of campaign fatigue: bags under the eyes, thinning hair, and a sallow complexion.

Marcel, meanwhile, was  in rare form, tugging at every loose thread and goading the FPM chief into one overblown pronouncement after another. Gone was the commanding presence of the would-be Bonaparte of Baabda, who once wiped the Cheshire Cat grin off Marcel’s face (if only for a nanosecond, alas) with his famous warning: rou2 3a sabri. Indeed, Aoun seemed a shadow of his former self. Even as he tried to convey a sense of optimism regarding his standing among Lebanon’s Christians, the look in his eyes seemed to suggest a slightly more desperate sentiment: “Pourvu que ça dure!”

The General probably needn’t worry, however, because his Christian opponents are feckless and divided, and because he himself has donned the mantle of a sectarian za’im as though it were an old bathrobe. The topics under discussion last night? Let’s see… Christians, Achrafieh, Christians, Syria, Hizbullah, Hariri Inc., and Christians. The Pope of the East confirmed once again that he is just as willing to dabble in sectarian scaremongering, as he hinted darkly at the Saracenic threat lurking in the next municipal elections. And while I take comfort in the fact that there are people on both sides of the political divide who as disturbed by this posture as I am (see two recent editorials by the Daily Star’s Michael Young and al-Akhbar editor Khaled Saghieh), ultimately, it seems that complaining about sectarianism in Lebanon is even more naive than not taking advantage of it.

Update: (See below for insight on the source of the original billboards)

Those of you living in Lebanon have probably seen the strange billboards cropping up all over the place, picturing flags of various Middle Eastern countries with the title: al-arqaam ablagh min al-kalaam (more or less, “numbers speak louder than words”). Diamond had a post about the billboards several days ago in which she expressed her puzzlement about the message of the billboards, and about the fact that they don’t contain a statement of ownership or credit; each one is signed simply, “The Lebanese”.

Quoting Diamond: “The flags represent Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, Iraq, Egypt, and Bahrain. Jordan is not included, and neither is Syria. Next to each flag is a dollar amount, running from $734 million by KSA to $3 million for Bahrain, and a description of what the money was used for: housing units, development, and aid work.”

In the comment section of the post, somebody claimed credit for the campaign. It seems that it was the work of some kind of advertising agency, and the goal of the billboards was to draw attention to the millions of dollars given by certain [M14-friendly] Arab countries to the Higher Relief Commission following the 2006 War. The commenter writes:

“Glad that our campaign triggered your interest even if you found it “vague” although it wasn’t our intent:)
A3mal Al Ighathat and all the numbers you see and the countries mentioned in the ad, refer to the countries who sent their donations to the Higher Relief COmmission following the Israeli invasion back in June 06 and all the destructions that followed and subsequent money that went to the construction.
Hope we clarified the ad.”

Now, a campaign like this was bound to raise the hackles of March 8th’s equally media-savvy Aounists, for whom the Higher Relief Commission — one of the four large national funds used for (allegedly politically-motivated) reconstruction and tainted by accusations of corruption  (like the Nabih Berri-controlled Council of the South) — is just another front for Cedar Revolution-ism. And it didn’t take long for those cheeky Aounists to mastermind their own campaign, now making the email rounds:

Clockwise from top left: $47 billion in public debt, $17,000 on each one of us (Future Movement flag); 4 court sentences in murder crimes (Lebanese Forces flag); 63% of Lebanese elected the parliamentary minority (Kata'eb Party flag); 83% of (Lebanese) refugees are still refugees (PSP flag)

All of the images have the same priceless slogan at the bottom (“numbers speak louder than words”). There are a couple more images that I haven’t bothered posting with titles like “19 years of subordination and corruption”, “42% of the young have emigrated”, and “39% of the Lebanese elected the parliamentary majority”, but the pièce de résistance is the final image:

76 days until change (Free Patriotic Movement flag)

Who says Lebanon is not ready for party politics?

Update: Curious as to whether the Arqam/Kalam ads were designed by Saatchi & Saatchi (the alleged source of March 14′s advertising according to opposition critics, as discussed most recently in this article in al-Akhbar), I put in a call to S&S’s offices in Beirut, where nobody answered. I then tried calling the offices of Quantum, an agency with ties to M14 and the Lebanon Renaissance Foundation (and S&S too, of course), and the gentleman I spoke to explained to me that while Quantum was indeed responsible for the March 14 electoral campaign advertising, it had nothing to do with the flag billboards. Those, he said, were produced directly by the Higher Relief Commission. Furthermore, he denied that Saatchi & Saatchi had anything to do with any of this (which may suggest that M14′s media wing is trying to insulate the global brand from local politics… probably a smart move).

I remember hearing Thomas Friedman on NPR after the cease-fire that ended the July War in 2006. He was speaking to Terry Gross if I’m not mistaken, and he said something along the lines of: “Nasrallah is yet another Arab leader who repeats the same formulas as many before him. He’s just another leader who stands on the rubble and says “We won”. Why? Because “it doesn’t matter whether you win or lose, all that matters is if you fight the Jews.”

It seems that Friedman was wrong about Nasrallah, or at least about the ‘standing on the rubble’ bit. Hizbullah has apparently rebuilt 241 buildings and renovated hundreds more. Highly worth reading is this report by AFP about the progress of Hizbullah’s campaign to rebuild al-Dahiyeh. I will post the introduction below.

Salam Hassoun is thrilled by the new flat Hizbullah has built for her to replace the one Israeli bombs destroyed during the 2006 summer war. The war ravaged Beirut’s southern suburbs, a Hizbullah stronghold that includes the teeming neighborhood of Haret Hreik, where a mammoth Hizbullah-orchestrated reconstruction drive is under way.

The deafening explosions of Israeli bombs have been replaced by the grinding cacophony of earth-movers and cement mixers contracted to rebuild 241 of the 282 buildings destroyed in the bombing.

The project, dubbed Waad (pledge in Arabic), has won the heart of Hassoun but has also raised a storm of political dust between Hizbullah and the government, whose authority in the southern suburbs has lagged for decades.

“I used to dream of an apartment where the living room was separated from the dining area and where the kitchen would be much bigger, and Waad gave me that,” Hassoun told AFP during a Hizbullah-organized tour of Haret Hreik.

“May God protect [Hizbullah chief Sayyed Hassan] Nasrallah. He has kept his promise,” she said from her ninth-storey flat in one of several spanking new towers…

In the famous “let’s burst this boil” speech about the defense strategy, Nasrallah seemed to suggest that the best way to address the issue of Hizbullah’s resistance was not by attempting to dismantle it, but rather by transforming it from a private Shiite army into a national force that is capable of defending the homeland. In other words, rather than subtracting weapons from the resistance, the best solution would be to add people, especially members of other sects, in order to ‘nationalize’ what is inherently a sectarian militia and decouple it from a conservative theocratic social movement.

One can imagine a future speech in which Nasrallah makes the same point about the rest of Hizbullah’s growing social services empire. With the right spin (think “public-private” synergy), and given the high prices for housing, telephones, and everything else that one pays in West Beirut, I suppose anything is possible!

Nobel Prize, Shnobel Prize. Getting a YouTube hit song named after you means that you have arrived…

Okay, back to sobriety (or maybe not): Here’s a piece on Hizbullah’s “narco-Islamism” from the Middle East Strategy at Harvard blog. (What is narco-Islamism, by the way?) I believe that Jeffrey Goldberg had a two-piece article for The New Yorker on this subject three or four years ago. Here is my favorite part of the MESH article:

“So while there is no common understanding between the United States and the United Kingdom on whether or how to engage Hezbollah or even how to classify Hezbollah and its various component parts, there is no “gray area” as to whether drug trafficking is illegal. The United Kingdom and other European nations are no less eager than the United States to combat the flow of drugs into their countries and to prevent Hezbollah from operating criminal enterprises within their territory.”

I’m not sure why I find this statement so amusing. Maybe because it seems to say: “Ok, so the War on Terror is not working as well as we’d hoped, so let’s try to classify Hizbullah as a drug-smuggling kingpin, and nab them through the framework of the War on Drugs instead.” Yes, because the War on Drugs has been such a resounding success.

What can be read into Saad al-Hariri’s decision to not join a national unity government in the event that Hizbullah and its allies come to power in the June elections? Speaking to AFP on Tuesday, Hariri reiterated his earlier stance on the matter, saying: “It is my democratic right not to take part in such a government and to be in the opposition,” this despite the fact that Hizbullah has made it clear that they would give the minority a blocking veto (which translates into one third of the cabinet’s ministers plus one).

Is Hariri just being difficult, playing hard to get, or is there some other reason to stay out of a Hizbullah/Aounist government? Nasrallah seems to have his heart in the right place when he argues that “the era of domination” by one, or two, or even three sects, is over, and that Lebanon must be ruled by consensus. A guaranteed cabinet veto for the future opposition would help insulate the country from the big-ticket parliamentary conflicts that have the potential (with the right kind of political incitement, of course) to spill out into the streets. A veto would effectively cordon off these issues rendering them untouchable, thereby arming both coalitions with an enormous broom to sweep any unsightly legislation under the rug of consociational compromise.

On the other hand, a guaranteed veto for the opposition has the potential to put all substantive reform into a deep freeze, and this within the context of an already glacially-slow political process. With the exception of Ziad Baroud (who is unlikely to return as Interior Minister), the executive branch is already bogged down by a million petty crises, turf wars, and internal squabbles. Ministers don’t need to be given yet another tool with which to obstruct legislation.  Furthermore, a preordained veto would neuter the governing mandate of the majority, even before it is elected, just as it would send a signal to the voters that the outcome of the election is not really important since we are headed for an executive stalemate, no matter what. The veto is, above all, a weapon designed to protect the interests of the political class, and not the citizenry.

For all of these reasons (and I may come to rue the day that I said this), I’m increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of a national unity government after the June elections. While it may be true that coalition  governments are the norm in consociational democracies, the fact is that Lebanon’s political system does not possess any of the other major features that a consociational model should contain, like proportional representation, decentralized government, and assymetric bicameralism. In this context, therefore, a national unity government represents the worst of both worlds: a hamstrung cabinet presiding over a parliament in which only the most sectarian parties can prevail.

What’s more, there is a kind of circular logic at work in the argument for national unity: Lebanon is apparently too fragile and sectarian-minded to be ruled by majoritarian democracy, hence the need for consensual power-sharing schemes (which only serve to entrench the big sectarian parties). When Nasrallah calls for a national unity government in which all communities are represented and enfranchised, it sounds like he is being respectful of his co-nationalists, but to my mind he is also purposefully conflating religion and politics. Calling for a national unity government even before people have voted and promising a blocking veto even before we know the results of the elections is a strategy that can only help to maintain and institutionalize Lebanon’s corrupt system of horsetrading at the highest levels of government. It is, in fact, to say that the large political parties are identical with the confessional communities, and so excluding a party means that you are excluding the sect, which violates the constitution.

Of course, all of this theoretical mumbo-jumbo is very far from the calculations of both Nasrallah and Hariri, who are likely concerned with more mundane matters like building up some political cover from the West (in the former’s case), and jacking up the price of that cover (in the latter’s).

[Updated] See below for an extended analysis by Joshua Landis posted in the comment section of the last post.

Angry Arab has this report on his blog:

“I can report this: many in the Lebanese opposition are grumbling about Hizbullah and its stance in the upcoming parliamentary election. There is a suspicion (among the allies of Hizbullah, or some of them) that a strong trend in Hizbullah calls for…losing the election. Apparently, some in Hizbullah don’t want to win the election. (There is some evidence of that in the last speech by Hasan Nasrallah in which he said that it is not a big deal if the opposition loses the election). The logic is that Hizbullah feels that winning is too burdensome: that economically, the Hariri family has left a mess with a massive public debt, and politically, Lebanon may be forced into Arab-Israeli negotiations. Hizbullah does not want to be in a position to be pressured to “deliver” on both counts. Hizbullah argues, according to those allies who talked to me, that it would be better for it to stay in the opposition because they keep their weapons and they can block whatever they don’t like. Hizbullah didn’t interfer in the feud between Murr and `Awn and is giving Birri a room to negotiate with Jumblat, which upsets allies of Hizbullah in the opposition.”

I’d like to add my voice to As`ad’s and say that this is also an impression that I’ve gotten quite a few times over the past couple of months. A few weeks ago, al-Akhbar carried a piece about Nabih Berri’s electoral calculations in the South, and how they might impact Michel Aoun’s winnings (particularly in places like Jezzine), to the tune of five seats. There was also a discussion on the Aounist forum a couple of months back in which various participants were indeed grumbling about the deals that were being cut between AMAL/Hizbullah and the Future Movement/PSP in places like Saida and Beirut 2.

And there was the recent conversation that I had with my friend “Abbas” (the Hizbullah member whose views are much sought after by the Israeli readership on this blog).  I was talking to him about Hizbullah’s relationship with AMAL, particularly vis-a-vis the upcoming election, and this is what he had to say:

QN: “How is Hizbullah’s relationship with Amal these days?”

Abbas: “Our relationship is good enough. We have common interests. We are not going to jeapardize the relationship for the sake of a few seats.”

QN: (Noting that this was not what i asked him) “What do you mean?”

Abbas: “I mean that it’s not our style to make a big thing out of a seat here or a seat there. Berri will do that. He will contest every seat that he can. We don’t care… why should we make a big thing out of it?”

QN: “The two parties have had problems in the past.”

Abbas: “Yes, but that was the result of the Syrian policy in Lebanon. The Syrians would try to play AMAL and Hizbullah off each other. So, when they supported Berri, it was not out of love for Berri, it was out of an effort to weaken the muqawama.”

QN: “So you’d say the March 8 alliance is strong. There are no internal problems?”

Abbas: “We have no interest in making problems. They can go contest the seats all they want. That’s just not our style.”

***

Update: (Comment by Joshua Landis)

As AIG suggests in comment #9, Hizbullah and its allies are gaming out the US, Israeli and March 14 response to any attempt to form a government.

US officials are, no doubt, making it plain to both Syria and the March 8 members that they do not want to win elections and should not contemplate doing so.

Even without an LAA,

1. It would mean a cut off of aid to the Lebanese Military.

2. Worse, Group 8 commitments of financial aid would be retracted.

3. The US would have to boycott Hizb cabinet members.

4. Britain has tentatively begun talking to Hizb, perhaps to open the way for acceptance of a March 8 victory at the polls, but many in the US administration have let it be known that they will not be following the British and will fight this gambit to open Western lines of direct communication and eventual peace.

5. France is reiterating at every turn that it believes Doha is working and stands behind it, i.e. France wants the status quo to continue.

6. Syria too has taken a similar line, but insists that whatever the election outcome, there must be a unity government – theoretically this means that Syria wants Hariri to accept to play second fiddle in a Lebanese government led by the opposition, which would make an LAA much harder to push through congress (If Hariri lobbied against it.)

7. Hariri has publicly denounced such a possibility, claiming that he will play no part in an opposition led government. In fact, Hariri has begun denouncing Doha as well, suggesting that he may retract support for a “blocking third” mechanism if his group wins elections.

8. This brings us back to a continuation of Doha, which the French are supporting as the best option to avoid upsetting the Lebanese applecart and keeping any one faction from trying do do an end run around the others or trying to “exploit” elections to gain more power. (Certainly makes a mockery of elections but not of the Lebanese concept of sectarian power sharing.)

9. Syria has refused to name an ambassador to Lebanon and insulted the Lebanese when they opened theirs in Damascus the other day by pretending to get the day wrong. Some unnamed officials claimed that Syria would not name an ambassador until Lebanese politicians are more polite – meaning Geagea and Jumblat. Syria is letting March 14 and the US know that the normalization process between Syria and Lebanon that the French have set out will not go through unless the election process goes smoothly, Doha is respected, and Syria’s and Hizbullah’s opponents do not go back on the war path to try to disenfranchise it or disarm it. In other words, normalization is a two way street.

In conclusion, I suggest that Hizbullah will remain in the opposition but try to make clear that it is doing so out of magnanimity and forbearance. Thus, if Lebanon’s problems get worse, they can be blamed on March 14′s stubbornness and its loyalty to Israel and the West.

If Israel and America can deliver for the Lebanese under these conditions, March 14 will come out the winner and will grow in popularity.

If Lebanon stagnates and popular anger grows at the treatment of the Palestinians, America’s inability to improve conditions in the region, and continued fragmentation and paralysis in Lebanon, then the Lebanese will grow weary of the “Western-Israeli” solution and will swing further toward the opposition.

The following commentary was written by AIG, a reader of this blog. The post originated as a challenge from me to him, in the context of a discussion about the U.S. government’s likely response to a March 8th win in Lebanon’s upcoming elections. I told AIG that if he wanted to write a post arguing that a ‘Hizbullah-led’ government would prompt AIPAC to push the U.S. Congress to pass a Lebanese version of the Syria Accountability Act, I would publish his commentary. Needless to say, AIG’s views are not the views of the author of this blog.

A Lebanon Accountability Act?

by AIG for qifanabki.com

If the March 8 coalition wins the upcoming elections in Lebanon, what are the chances of a Lebanon Accountability Act (LAA) becoming law? (The LAA will be similar to the Syria Accountability Act but directed against Lebanon).

The main players to look at in order to answer these questions are:

1) March 14

2) The US administration

3) The US Congress

March 8th in general and Hizballah in particular will play no role at all since Nasrallah has cemented March 8th’s position with his latest proclamations. This leaves the other three players. March 14th may or may not join the government if March 8th wins. If they don’t, the chances of an LAA are greatly improved. If they do join the government, it will be slightly more difficult for the US to enact the LAA because the Lebanese government will have substantial international support and most importantly Saudi support.

However, the significant players are the US administration and the US Congress. Realistically, we must assume that if March 8th wins the election, and no matter which government is eventually formed, that the Republicans in Congress will float the LAA, putting the Democrats in Congress and the administration in a very uncomfortable position. To begin with, the Republicans will not float a full fledged LAA, but will challenge the financial and military aid given to Lebanon. Failing to understand that beyond the corner lurks the LAA, the Democrats in Congress and the administration will concede this battle. Politics in the US are not that nuanced and there is just no way any Congressperson will be able to explain why he would send American taxpayer’s hard earned money to “a country ruled by a terrorist organization” (that is how the Republicans will frame the discussion). So the financial and military aid to Lebanon will be stopped by an almost unanimous vote in both the House and the Senate.

With half the battle won, the next step would be for the Republicans to present the LAA. At its basis will be a demand for Lebanon to fully respect UN resolution 1701 just like the Syria Accountability Act demanded Syria respect 1559. Here is where things become interesting. Obama will be loathe to support such a resolution just as Bush was loathe at first to support the resolution against Syria. Why? Because these resolutions tie the hands of the administration and do not give it flexibility to pursue diplomacy as it sees fit. They may be seen as Congress “interfering” in the foreign policies the administration is trying to pursue. This will be an interesting battle of wills and all will depend on how much political capital Obama would be willing to expend on this issue.

My view is that since Obama has decided to proceed with several huge reforms at the beginning of his presidency including healthcare and energy, there is not a big chance that he will stand in the way of the LAA. He needs every ounce of goodwill that he can garner in Congress and the LAA would be a small price to pay in order to advance his ambitious domestic agenda. Let’s face it, the Midwest is much more important to Obama than the Mideast.

So all AIPAC has to do is persuade a majority in both houses to support the LAA. That will be a walk in the park as most members of Congress would be naturally inclined  to support the LAA anyway. The bottom line is that there is a good chance that the LAA will pass and that Obama will sign it into law.

Why should AIPAC support the LAA? The answer is quite simple. Because it makes the life of the US and Israel much easier. It highlights the fact that for all practical purposes, Lebanon is the same as Hizballah and that Lebanon as a whole is responsible for Hizballah’s actions. This in turn will severely limit what Hizballah can do against Israel without risking a melt-down of Lebanon. The main advantage of this is that it will reduce the chances of another war significantly. The secondary advantage is that Hizballah will become much less of a card in the hands of Iran and Syria and the negotiating stance of the US and Israel is improved.