Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

As I waited in line for my zaatar man’oushe this morning, a passerby waved to Ali, the baker, and wished him a good morning.

“What’s so good about it?” Ali muttered back, staring down at his bucket of chopped tomatoes.

The supporters of March 14th are not loving life today, despite Saad al-Hariri’s efforts to spin the news of the four generals’ release as a confirmation of the tribunal’s transparency. The political talk shows last night were the scene of undisguised schadenfreude by opposition figures from Wi’am Wahhab to Michel Samaha to Sleiman Frangieh, who twisted the knife by feigning sympathy for the Hariri family, and vowing to continue the fight for “real” justice.

From interview to interview, channel to channel, the exquisite blend of platitudes and recriminations was too similar to be a deliberately orchestrated cross-coalition messaging strategy.  It was simply pure instinct.

There are three prisms through which to read this development.

1. The fate of the Special Tribunal and the Hariri investigation

As The Daily Star‘s editorial notes today, “the decision to release the four does not represent the entire judicial process of the Special Tribunal; it’s not even the indictment. We do not and will not know anything about the truth, or lack thereof, of accusations made against any side before the indictments are issued, the final verdict is handed down, and the appeals process is concluded.”

While this may be true, it is looking increasingly unlikely that a finger will be pointed anywhere near the Syrian regime. Daniel Bellemare, whose deliberate manner and aversion to grandstanding endeared him to the opposition (even as it frustrated March 14th stalwarts), has apparently assembled a huge dossier of evidence on somebody or some group. There will be an answer at some point, but probably not the answer that March 14th is looking for.

Interestingly, under the unlikely circumstances that Bellemare does have evidence that ties the murder to Syria via some other channel (a plausible scenario, when you think about it, given that such a political crime would not have been contracted out to high-profile security chiefs who were themselves the subjects of surveillance by Western intelligence agencies), then the opposition will find itself in a bind, having already certified the tribunal as unpoliticized and transparent. However, this seems extremely unlikely.

2. The changing regional situation

Most M14ers are reading this development, like Robert Fisk, as the first true sign of a grand bargain between the United States and Syria, perhaps auguring the return of a Syrian-Saudi condominium in Lebanon. When confronted with this theory on Maggie Farah’s OTV show last night, Sleiman Frangieh replied (and I paraphrase): “When the regional situation was to their advantage, why didn’t they charge the generals with a crime? It’s not as though they were charged, and when the regional situation changed the charges were dropped. They were never charged, because there was never enough evidence.”

Frangieh doesn’t tell the whole story, but his point is relevant to a broader issue, namely March 14th’s mismanagement of its dominant position in Lebanese politics between 2005-08. With the entire world on its side, a majority in parliament, a fragmented opposition, and no checks on its power in cabinet, March 14th squandered its clout on a politics of revenge that outlasted its utility. As I wrote here three weeks ago, I seem to meet a lot of disgruntled M14ers these days, folks who feel that the movement lost its momentum a long time ago and that its leaders (to quote The West Wing’s Joey Lucas) are “like the French radical saying, ‘There go my people. I should find out where they’re going so I can lead them.’“

3. The upcoming elections

Will the generals’ release have any bearing on the elections? It depends on a few different factors. I don’t believe that too many people are going to change their vote. On the other hand, many more may be less inclined to vote at all, which is almost the same thing.

In order to get a sense for just how good the opposition feels right now, electorally speaking, think about how different the picture would look had Bellemare announced that there was strong evidence linking the four generals to the assassination, and that they were going to be transferred to The Hague where they would be charged with murder. March 14th’s prospects would have gone through the roof.

March 8th is capitalizing on this series of events by focusing their criticism less on Saad Hariri himself (who remains the grieving son) than on his conniving lieutenants: Marwan Hamade, Walid Jumblatt, Samir Geagea, etc. The point of this strategy is to help facilitate the transformation of March 14th — in the minds of its partisans — from a national movement into just another clannish affair.

By paying homage to Rafiq Hariri while disparaging those who sought to benefit from his assassination, the opposition is angling to turn his cause into yet another tribal grievance — like the murders of Kamal Jumblatt, Tony Frangieh, Rashid Karami, Bashir Gemayel, and many others — even as we speak. Kind of brilliant, when you think about it.

At the end of the day, there is something so fittingly Lebanese about the fact that the pronouncement of a foreign magistrate regarding the culpability of a foreign power should have a significant bearing on a local election. As a good friend would say in this situation: “You want it bad, you get it bad.”

BREAKING NEWS: All Four Generals Released… (see below for update)

We are hours away from a potentially groundbreaking decision, vis-à-vis the detention of the four generals held in connection with Rafiq Hariri’s murder, the fate of the International Tribunal, and (further down the road) the outcome of the parliamentary elections.

Daniel Bellemare, prosecutor to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, handed over the investigation’s files to the pre-trial judge, Daniel Fransen, who must make a decision today regarding the detention of all suspects. As you may recall, Lebanese authorities released three of the seven suspects two months ago, but the generals (who have been held without charge for four years) are the high-profile figures that many in Lebanon’s ruling coalition were hoping would be implicated in the conspiracy. Nailing the generals, so the thinking went, would have established with virtual certainty Syria’s involvement in the crime, especially if the prosecutors were able to compel a confession along these lines from the generals themselves (“rolling them up”, in The Wire‘s lingo…)

There is a possibility that not all will be released; some may be sent to the Hague while others are freed. Should they be released however, it will be hard to escape the conclusion that Syria is off the hook. Almost four years to the day when the last Syrian soldier trudged ignominiously over the Lebanese border, Syria may have finally wiped its hands of the entire Hariri debacle.

Update: Celebratory gunfire and fireworks, it turns out, are even more effective in communicating breaking news than Twitter. The generals are free. What this means for the future of the Hariri tribunal is unclear, but one can probably safely conclude that Syria is off the hook, barring any major surprises in Bellemare’s investigation. More on this soon enough…

View from a ’72 Benz C250 series, no. 5

It took all of thirty seconds to determine that Abu Georges, the driver of the white ’78 Peugeot with the immaculate interior, was a perfect candidate for a piece in this series. We were rumbling down the hill in Achrafieh on a cool spring night, and Abu Georges was already chattering away about his four kids, his cousins in America, the traffic problems, and his plans to trade in his car, so I figured I’d get him going on the subject of the elections.

QN: So, are you from Achrafieh?

AG: Born and raised.

QN: Who do you think is going to win the district?

AG: Ya sidi, I think Sheikh Nadim has got it sewn up.

QN: Really? Seems like it’s going to be a close race.

AG: Maybe for the others, but there is no real competition for the Maronite spot. I mean, come on, the other guy thinks he’s actually going to take Sheikh Nadim’s seat? He served his father! The people who supported the father will support the son.

QN: So I take it that you are with the Kata’eb?

AG: Lebanese Forces. But we’re one family. We’re committed to the same principles, unlike Abu Laymouneh’s gang. Ya habibi, explain to me how this son of a dog thinks that he is going to fool the Christians yet another time.

QN: Umm, who is Abu Laymouneh?

AG: Michel Aoun. That’s my nickname for him.

QN: Oh, ok. I get it. But you’ve gotta admit that he has a very significant following. I mean, he’s got more MP’s in Parliament than the Kata’eb and the LF combined.

AG: Watch what happens this time around. He’s going to be cut down to size. When he came back and visited Hakim, we thought he had learned something, but it turns out that the Syrians got to him first. By the way, who are you with?

QN: Abu Laymouneh.

AG: Aha… I mean, what do I know, right? Everybody sees things in their own way…

QN: I’m just kidding. I’m non-aligned.

AG: Me too. That’s the best way to be.

Hillary Clinton popped over to Beirut yesterday to say hello to old friends, snap a few pictures, visit Rafiq Hariri’s tomb, and grab a quick falafel sandwich at Sahyoun’s. The aim of her visit was to reassure everyone that the United States is not planning to sell Lebanon down the river:

“There is nothing that we would do in any way that would undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty,” Clinton told a press conference in Baabda after meeting Lebanese President Michel Suleiman.

“So I want to reassure any Lebanese citizen that the United States will never make any deal with Syria that sells out Lebanon or the Lebanese people.”

Elbowing aside the dozing reporter from an-Nahar, I managed to catch Mrs. Clinton’s attention.

Hillary: Yes, you there. The tall dark and handsome fellow with the hand raised…

QN: Ahh, yes thank you Madame Secretary. Qifa Nabki, from qifanabki.com. I just had a question about what you mean when you say “never make any deal with Syria that sells out Lebanon…”

Hillary: I’m glad you asked that, Qifa. Because I feel like this point really needs to be underlined.

QN: So there’s no chance of any kind of a return to the situation that obtained in the 90′s…

Hillary: Ancient history, my dear Qifa. Look, what could Syria possibly offer us that would make us give up Lebanon? Some kind of “grand bargain” which fundamentally changes the strategic balance in the region in Israel’s favor  by flipping Syria away from Iran and disarming Hizbullah? Pshaaww… They’re going to have to do a lot better than that…

QN: Umm, ok. Thanks!

Hillary gets a load of Mutassim Qaddafi

Isn’t it funny how the job of Secretary of State is often indistinguishable from that of a motivational speaker. Joshua Landis has a great post over at Syria Comment in which he addresses the paranoid complaints of some Syrians who were hoping for a little more love from the top U.S. diplomat. One friend reportedly wrote to him: “Clinton has finally made her move, and how predictable it is? Forget it. They will never give Syria what it wants. The status quo is back. Obama is no different from any previous president.”

I mean, grow up already. What did they expect Hillary to do, desecrate Hariri’s tomb and french kiss Wiam Wahhab on Syrian national television? I think it’s pretty clear that the U.S. posture toward Syria has already begun to change drastically, and things under Obama are a heck of a lot better than they were under Bush. If Bashar keeps playing his cards right, I believe that some sanctions will begin to be peeled away within the year.

But the broader point should be addressed, namely: what is likely to be the U.S. reaction to a March 8 victory in the Lebanese elections? I think that this is a complicated issue, and its very premise is flawed, as I’ve written here before. In general, I think Joshua is right when he argues:

Michel Sleiman gets a load of Hillary.

“if the Lebanese defy the US and vote for March 8 anyway, the US can cut aid but continue to finesse the situation by allowing the French and British to step forward and engage the new Lebanese government. Britain has begun a direct dialogue with Hizbullah. France has stated that it can live with any outcome of the elections so long as powersharing is respected in the new government. Both Britain and France have made it clear that they are willing to accept Lebanon’s democratic results without a major tantrum if their prefered party doesn’t win.

The US manages to shut its eyes to Hizbullah’s presence in Lebanon’s government today. What is to stop it from doing this even if March 8 wins? Eye shutting will admittedly be harder to do if March 8 forms the next government; but March 8 has already made a number of suggestions about how pro-American elements can play a big role in any new government. This compromise could be used as a basis to assuage US anger and mollify any desire on the part of Washington to pick up its marbles and go home.”

Couldn’t agree more. As discussed recently, a March 8th win is really going to be all about the Free Patriotic Movement. No matter how Fox News spins it, the reality is that the onus has been placed entirely upon Michel Aoun’s Change & Reform bloc to pony up the seats to push the opposition over the top. And while there may be a congressional effort to introduce something like a Lebanon Accountability Act, I just can’t see a politically expedient reason to do it if the Syrians are adding value to Obama’s Mideast efforts.

Is Walid Jumblatt brilliant, senile, or both?

While seated amongst a klatsch of shriveled Druze elders, the PSP leader launched into a diatribe against his Christian and Sunni allies, which was captured on a camera phone and posted on YouTube. (Who knew that shriveled Druze elders were YouTube savvy?)

I don’t know about you, but I find these kind of ‘keyhole’ moments exhilarating, as they give the humble citizen a peek behind the curtain to see the Wizard at work. Here are some impressions:

Revelation #1: The zu’ama are exactly as petty and backbiting as we thought; we’re not just imagining it!

Revelation #2: They really can’t stand each other; we’re not just imagining it!

Revelation #3: (And this one never gets old…) There is no plan! We’re not just imagining it!

Friday-Lunch-Club has an English translation of the juicier bits of the video, in which Jumblatt referred to Samir Geagea as “shoo esmo hayda” (“what’s-his-name”) and to the Maronites as “jins `atel” (a bad breed). Michael Young reads the whole incident as a plot engineered by Jumblatt himself, which will eventually bite him in the ass.

And finally, coming full circle, +961 has a great post on the Lebanese Forces’ response to the FPM “Soit Belle” campaign, and the Aounists’ counter-response, which references the whole Jumblatt debacle.

I tell you, I’m going to be sad when the campaign is over, but probably not as sad as all of these fresh-from-the-Gulf, out-of-work graphic designers who’ll finally have to go out and find real jobs.

We here at qifanabki.com are completely befuddled over the question of what all of these brilliant political ad designers are going to do when the electoral campaign is over.

What do you see as the subtext here? No, no, no, I refuse to believe that there is no subtext… we may be a superficial people with surgically-altered noses and silicone-enhanced lips, but we’ve also got plenty of cheek, which is where the Aounists’ tongues are firmly implanted, as far as this ad is concerned.

What’s the target? The beautiful people, the so-called valentinos of March 14th? The candidacy of Nayla Tueni? Or is it all just fun and games?

Speaking of fun and games, is anyone having more fun these days than General Michel Aoun? He was positively jovial in a recent press conference he gave, where he heralded the demise of the March 14th alliance. On the subject of Jumblatt’s notorious camera-phone moment (in which he took a big old dump on his own Christian allies), the General had this to say:

“We watch comfortably as March 14 ranks grow weaker,” Aoun said following the weekly meeting of his Change and Reform bloc.

“The only common factor that brought together the March 14 forces is external. This factor is starting to break up leaving them without a national strategy to follow,” he said.

“In the meantime, they are still stuck in power struggle,” Aoun added.

Aoun said “he expected noting better” from Jumblat, who described the Maronites as being “useless.”

“It is only natural that he says that,” Aoun said, adding he was not waiting for an apology from the Druze MP.

“Jumblat’s allies are the ones who should ask for an apology, not me,” he added.

I rarely say this, I know… but the General seems to have a point. Are the wheels finally starting to come off the wagon?

I was putting the finishing touches on a piece about the post-election situation when good old Walid “Weather Vane” Jumblatt gave me a nice quote to lead with. On Easter Sunday’s “Beirut-Shweifat-Dahiyeh-Mountains reconciliation” (where old alliances, like Christ, rose up after being left for dead), Jumblatt declared:  “Elections are an important phase, but more important is the post-election phase.” The Weather Vane is right, as usual. Let’s read the tea leaves…

1) If March 14 wins and does not grant the opposition a blocking veto in the cabinet, we may be in for a replay of November 2006 – May 2008. A well-connected journalist in Beirut recently told me: “If March 14th wins and they don’t give Hizbullah a veto in the cabinet, there’s going to be trouble. I know this from talking to Hizbullah’s rank and file, on the streets. There’s just no way that they are going to accept having no veto. And March 14th knows that, so I think it’s a bit pointless of them to claim that they’re not going to give it to them, because who are they kidding? Hizbullah can take over the entire country and Hariri knows it.”

2) On the other hand, if M14 does give the opposition a blocking veto, one would assume a return to the jittery status quo, whereby big-ticket issues like Hizbullah’s weapons are off the table in exchange for record tourist seasons.

3) Similarly, this is probably what could be expected in the case of a March 8th majority with Hariri joining the cabinet, possibly even as Prime Minister (if we are to believe ex-Hizbullah MPs). This would be the clearest signal, to my mind, that the Saudis and Syrians have reestablished a condominium in Lebanon and have decided to play nice for Obama.

4) If M8 wins and Hariri boycotts the cabinet, this could only mean that the Saudi-Syrian reconciliation is not all that it’s been touted up to be, and that Lebanon is headed for instability, once again.

5) The final eventuality to consider is that neither side wins 65 seats, and that the various “independents” running on the lists of different coalitions would settle the question of who becomes Prime Minister.

So much for reading the dregs. Jumblatt probably had more on his mind than the question of veto politics when he hinted at the importance of the post-election phase. There has been a lot of talk about the possibility that the Druze chieftain (I love calling him that) would pull out of March 14th after the elections. Indeed, one wonders how soon the centripetal forces within both coalitions will begin showing signs of weakness. More on this, soon enough.

I was thinking yesterday about the likely makeup of the next parliament, in the event of an opposition win.  The question that came to mind was: “How many seats does the Change & Reform bloc need to win in order to push the opposition over the 64-seat mark?”

For the past several months, polls published by both sides have predicted a swing of less than ten seats, and occasionally less than  five. When I did the numbers on the blog two months ago, I tentatively forecasted a very slim win for the opposition (66-62). Of course,  it could easily go the other way depending on how things play out in the swing districts of Beirut I, Zahle, and the Metn.

But assuming that this situation obtains, what would Lebanon’s new majority look like, in terms of its constituent blocs? Due to the built-in confessional quotas of the Lebanese political system, and the fact that Hizbullah has pointedly refrained from seeking more parliament seats than it won in 2005, a March 8th majority would — by necessity — have to be dominated by the Michel Aoun-led Change & Reform bloc.

In 2005, Hizbullah, AMAL, and their allies (SSNP, Baath, and a couple of independents) won 35 seats, while the FPM and its allies in the Change & Reform bloc won 21 seats, producing an opposition of 56 seats (out of 128). Assuming that Hizbullah/AMAL/& friends can win 35 again (a safe bet), Aoun’s bloc will have to come up with at least 30 seats to get to 65. If Hizbullah and Berri offer Aoun their three seats in the Christian district of Jezzine (which they swept in 2005), this will mean that the Change & Reform Bloc (which will include the Free Patriotic Movement, Suleiman Frangieh’s Marada, Elias Skaff’s Zahle list, Tashnaq, and some independents) will be 33-strong. And this is under the condition that the opposition wins only the slimmest of majorities, at 65. If they bump it to 68, C&R could have as many as 36 seats, which is the number that the Future Movement won in 2005.

The point: if March 8 wins, Aoun will be the big man on campus as he will preside over a bloc that is larger than all of Hizbullah, AMAL, etc. combined, and this is surely by design. To those who scoff, saying that while Aoun may look like he is in charge, everybody will know who wears the pants in the coalition, I would simply advise you to spend half an hour with the General. You’ll be disabused of that notion (and your pants too, for that matter) rather quickly.

I’ve been reading Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s The Black Swan lately, and so I feel slightly sheepish prognosticating about the elections. Let me offer a couple of caveats, then: (1) I’m wearing pajamas as I write this, not a suit and tie; (2) If anything highly unexpected happens like war breaking out or someone getting assassinated — ok, maybe not that unexpected — all bets are off.

I’d like to introduce a project that I’m involved in, called “The Lebanese Campaign for a Senate”. The campaign’s website serves as a hub for relevant policy news on the subject of bicameralism, as well as a discussion forum on the merits and challenges of establishing a Lebanese senate. Content is being added to the site on a daily basis, so please feel free to visit regularly and explore the various resources.

Why a Senate?

Most Lebanese agree that the current political framework in Lebanon — with its confessional quotas in parliament, gerrymandered districts, and archaic electoral law –  is in urgent need of reform. The call to eradicate political sectarianism is an oft-heard refrain in the rhetoric of Lebanon’s political elite, yet few concrete steps have been taken in the service of this goal since the end of the Lebanese Civil War.

The establishment of a senate in Lebanon would represent an important step towards dismantling the structures of political sectarianism. This, in and of itself, is hardly a radical idea. Both the Lebanese Constitution and the Ta’if Agreement (which ended the civil war) call for the establishment of a senate. Article 22 of the Constitution stipulates:

“With the election of the first Parliament on a national, non-confessional basis, a Senate is established in which all the religious communities are represented. Its authority is limited to major national issues.”

What the Constitution envisages is a legislature with two chambers, as is found in the vast majority of countries in Europe, North America, South America, and Asia. The parliament would be elected on a non-confessional basis (i.e. with no predetermined quotas for the representation of different sects), while the senate would serve as the representative body for Lebanon’s eighteen confessional communities. The goal of parliament, therefore, would be to express the will of the majority, while the role of the senate would be to protect the rights of the minority. By decoupling sectarian representation from the parliament and transferring it to the senate, so the theory goes, a space would be opened up for the vital expression of a politically-defined majority.

From Theory to Practice

While the notion of a senate has been kicking around for a long time, there has never been a full-fledged government- or civil society-sponsored initiative to explore the idea in depth… until now. In recent weeks, President Michel Suleiman has called for the creation of a National Commission to Abolish Political Sectarianism, and one of the principal strategies under discussion would be the creation of a senate.

One of the goals of this campaign is to help put this issue on the map, and to encourage a public conversation on the subject. Spread the word!

Thirty or forty years from now, a Lebanese child will ask his grandparents what it was like to live during the age of Nasrallah. The myths and symbolism that swirl around the man have already begun to coalesce into a hagiography of sorts; one can only imagine that his shadow will grow longer in the twilight of memory.

Consider the seemingly cosmic congruences at hand, ripe for the picking by a fertile imagination. Nasrallah, he of the portentous name, addresses the stronghold of al-Dahiya (derived from the same root which gives the Arabic word for “sacrifice”), issuing communiques to his flock while in hiding. The allegorical reading of his occultation is impossible to avoid, as is the relevance of Ali b. Abi Talib’s famous dictum, uttered at the Battle of Siffin: baqiyyatu l-sayfi anmaa `adadan (“The persistence of the sword is more productive of numbers…”).

To return to the present… There have been several articles in the mainstream press of late, dealing with the Hizb’s changing image in Lebanon and abroad. Mohanad Hage Ali, writing in The Guardian (“Hezbollah’s Political Evolution“) argues that “political engagement has seen Hezbollah change from a revolutionary party that once believed in establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon, into a political group involved in daily governmental politics, unions, and concerned with its supporters’ demands.” Borzou Daragahi of the LA Times (“Hezbollah savors increasing legitimacy“) reports on an interview with Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem, in which the Hizb’s no. 2 explains: “The more we clarify our image to the people of the West, the more pressure they will put on their governments to stop supporting Israel.”

Everything suggests a shift of strategy by the Hizb towards emphasizing the themes of good governance, national unity, gradual reformism, and fighting corruption, while placing the military resistance on the back burner. In this context, one wonders whether the oft-asked question regarding the price for Hizbullah’s “integration” into Lebanese politics is a stale and irrelevant one, as it seems increasingly as though the Hizb is not waiting for anyone to make them an offer. Take a look at the campaign posters (above and left). The party’s famous Kalashnikov logo has been deliberately faded to contrast it with a bold-faced LEBANON, beneath three scratched-out titles: “your Lebanon,” “our Lebanon,” “their Lebanon.” It’s a strong message, and one which immediately brings to mind Saad al-Hariri’s promise to refuse joining a government of national unity after the elections.

Unlike the other big Lebanese parties, Hizbullah is the only one which seems to be taking the whole notion of an electoral program seriously. March 14th and the FPM have issued vague bullet points (which I suppose are better than PowerPoint presentations, but still…) while the Hizb published a nine-page document (see here for English) detailing all of the issues to which it is committed. What’s more, Nasrallah himself is planning to give a weekly address explaining different parts of the platform, which will be highly worth watching, given that Nasrallah (a.k.a. “the Bill Clinton of the Shiite Crescent“) is one of the most gifted orators of his generation. I can point to no hard numbers, but my sense is that a half hour-long speech by Nasrallah is worth several million dollars worth of silly billboard slogans, as far as winning over new adherents is concerned or at least changing people’s minds about the party.

Then again, maybe the Future Movement’s sectarian and just plain bizarro media counter-strategy (see especially “Christians Celebrate Holy Easter Within Uptight Hezbollah Speeches“) is working, but my sense is that they’re just embarrassing themselves.