Qifa Nabki | A Lebanese Political Blog

I’m personally not so interested in questions like: “Who is the most popular Christian leader in Lebanon, according to Christians themselves…?” But it seems that many others (including a few readers of this blog) are interested in precisely this question, so I’ve decided to look into it.

First, a methodological puzzle. How do you go about determining whom Christians (or Sunnis or Shiites or Druze, etc.) voted for in this election? After all, voting is conducted anonymously right? It’s not as though each sect gets its own specially color-coded ballot. So how do pollsters and analysts work out which votes came from which sect?

It turns out (according to two trusted experts I asked about this) that Lebanon’s polling stations are largely segregated by sect. This is not by design as much as it is by custom. People have historically voted in communal centers close to where they lived — schools, municipal buildings, and the reception areas of churches and mosques — and this is how it has remained, even as people have moved away from their ancestral villages. As a result, members of the same sect end up on the same registration lists in the same polling stations, and new voters are added to the lists where their parents or extended relatives are registered.

When the Interior Ministry publishes the voting data according to polling station, it is a simple step to re-sort it according to confession, and then to determine the number of Christian votes earned by each coalition. If the next election law mandates the reshuffling of ballots gathered from all the polling stations before they are counted (as Minister Ziad Baroud has demanded), then it will be impossible to link voting data to sects.

Now back to the original question: how did the Christians vote? Surprisingly, analysts on both sides of the political divide agree that Aoun’s support among Christians has fallen from its lofty perch. Kamal Feghali says that it dropped from 63% in 2005 to 53% in 2009, while a study commissioned by An-Nahar says that Aoun’s support now stands at 49%. In other words, he almost certainly remains the most popular Christian leader among Christians, but he’s not so popular as he once was. And there you have it. (Can we change the subject now?)

In other news, those of you who have expressed your admiration for the lovely header at the top of this blog will be pleased to learn that I had the chance to meet Alexander Gorlizki (the artist) today in his New York studio, and managed to convince him to sell me the painting. Alexander’s work is remarkable; if you Google him, you’ll find many beautiful samples.

Photo: adiamondinsunlight

Four years after his father’s assassination, Saad al-Hariri has been nominated to the premiership. He received the votes of all  71 March 14 MP’s, plus another 12 MP’s from opposition leader Nabih Berri’s bloc (presumably as a quid-pro-quo for Berri’s re-nomination as speaker). While Hizbullah did not lend its support to Hariri’s nomination, one has to imagine that the party is comfortable with Saad as the next PM.

The news is full of hints and allegations regarding a Syrian-Saudi deal on Lebanon. Meanwhile Angry Arab suggests that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon is going to absolve Syria and target its allies in Lebanon instead. It is also looking increasingly likely that the cabinet composition will hand President Suleiman the decisive votes to produce the “blocking third” veto.

How about a lively discussion in the comment section on Saad’s prospects as Lebanon’s next PM?

I have a short piece over at ForeignPolicy.com‘s “The Argument” blog about the cabinet formation. Here are the first couple of paragraphs, with a link to the rest. Come on back and comment, if you’re so inclined.

Coalition of the Unwilling

By Elias Muhanna

When the March 14 coalition won a parliamentary majority in Lebanon’s national election two weeks ago, there was much crowing and backslapping heard the world over. The United States, Europe, and the Sunni Arab regimes hailed the result as a victory for Lebanon’s “moderates” and a defeat for the allies of Syria and Iran — foremost among them Hezbollah. After a campaign season full of bleak predictions about March 14′s electoral prospects and indeed its political future, the result gave the coalition a much-needed shot in the arm and put to rest, if only temporarily, any doubts about its governing mandate.

Now comes the hard part. Consultations to choose a prime minister and form a cabinet have run aground on a shoal of familiar disputes. Although Saad Hariri (son of slain former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri) has widespread support to become the next premier, the parceling out of ministerial portfolios is a much trickier task, due largely to the opposition’s demand for a veto-wielding share of the cabinet. Without a “one-third-plus-one” proportion of cabinet seats, Hezbollah and its allies have said that they might simply boycott the government altogether, leaving March 14 to govern alone.

In a country other than Lebanon, such a state of affairs wouldn’t necessarily be cause for concern in the eyes of the ruling coalition. However, the nature of the Lebanese political system mandates that all of the country’s sectarian communities be represented within government, and so the absence of parties like Hezbollah and Amal — who command overwhelming support among Lebanese Shiites — would seem to be a contravention of the spirit of consociationalism embodied by the Lebanese Constitution.

(Read the rest)

Scarcely a day goes by without an opposition leader reminding the Lebanese public about which side won the popular vote in the last election. Interestingly, though, I have not yet read much analysis that attempts to explain exactly how the opposition managed to win as much as 10% more of the popular vote while still losing the election.

Kamal Feghali, a pollster said to be sympathetic to the opposition, has released a final report on the elections. On the second-to-last page, he provides a very helpful graph that shows how many votes the two coalitions received in each district, the winning percentages, and the margins of victory. I’ve reproduced the graph below as a JPEG for your convenience.

Studying the results, it becomes clear that the winning percentages in opposition-won districts are, in general, much higher than those of loyalist-won districts. In particular, the winning percentages in Hizbullah/Amal-dominated districts are absolutely enormous, ranging from 77% (Marjeyoun) to 88.1% (al-Zahrani) to 93.2% (Bint Jbeil). By contrast, the March 14-won districts have far lower winning percentages, coming in at an average of 61.2% based on my calculations, versus 88% in Hizbullah/Amal districts.

Higher winning percentages — particularly in large districts — translate into higher margins of victory. The problem with high margins of victory, however, is that they don’t amount to any additional electoral gains; winning a district by a single vote is just as good as winning it by 100,000 votes, as far as getting elected is concerned.

To illustrate this problem, let’s imagine a tennis game between me and Roger Federer. For the first two sets, I dominate him, winning 6-0, 6-0. In the third set, I’m winning 5-0 and serving for match point when the tide suddenly turns and Roger roars back, eventually winning the set 7-5. The same thing happens in the fourth and fifth sets, and Roger, alas, wins the match.

Who do you think won more games in that match, Roger or QN? As it turns out, I did, winning 27 (6+6+5+5+5) to his 21 (0+0+7+7+7). And yet, I couldn’t win when it counted most.

The numbers in Feghali’s election graph tell a similar story. Let’s take a look at the six opposition-won districts with the highest margins of victory: Baalbek (94,841 votes), Sour (66,470), Nabatieh (56,112), Bint Jbeil (48,687), al-Zahrani (40,662), and Marjeyoun (37,000). All told, the opposition earned 343,782 more votes than its opponents in these districts. (Remember, these figures reflect margins of victory, not total votes. In other words, they are “surplus votes” earned beyond the 50% needed to win the district).

Now let’s look at the six loyalist-won districts with the highest margins of victory: Beirut III (51,619), Akkar (36,000), Shouf (35,453), Tripoli (25,366), Miniyeh/Dinniyeh (21,636), and Aley (13,053). All told, March 14 earned 183,127 more votes than its opponents in these districts.

If we subtract March 14′s surplus votes in its biggest districts from March 8′s surplus votes in its biggest districts, we are left with 160, 655 votes, which is nearly the difference in the popular vote results. In other words, had March 8 won its districts by the same margins of victory that March 14 won its districts, the difference in the popular vote would be practically negligible.

Conclusions: The reason that March 8 won 165,000 votes more than March 14 and yet still lost the election is essentially because Hizbullah and Amal trounced their opponents by an average of 88%, winning tens of thousands of votes more than they needed in their districts.  By comparison, March 14 won its districts by an average of 61.2%, with far more modest margins of victory. The difference in “surplus votes” between the top six districts for each coalition produces a net gain of 160,000 votes for the opposition.

Michel Aoun’s Change & Reform bloc, by contrast, won its districts by an average of around 56.5%, so it is a little bit disingenuous for Aoun and Frangieh to say that they reflect the popular will. The discrepancy in the popular vote was not generated by their own supporters but rather by Hizbullah’s and Amal’s.

As per popular demand, the Qnion posts now have their own tag and introductory page. Click the relevant tab on the page header (at the very top, above the cow graphic), and you’ll be able to view the entire series.

I’ve been on the road for the past several days. As it turns out, hotel rooms in American cities are remarkably well-equipped for Biblical exegesis. The TV channels on offer have very little news but a wide selection of Christian evangelists, and the Gideon’s Bible in the nightstand helps me keep them honest, as far as verse citations are concerned.

It seems that the Prophet Ezekiel has some salient policy proposals for how to deal with Iran, so I highly suggest that all you State Department analysts reading this blog crack open your copies of the Good Book and see what the Man has to say.

For non-divine discussions of the events in Iran, I’d suggest checking out Brian Ulrich, Arabic Media Shack, and of course, Andrew Sullivan. Abu Muqawama’s got a nice roundup on the Twitter hype pieces that are starting to come out in the press.

CAIRO, Egypt – The massive street protests triggered by President Ahmadinejad’s improbable 63% victory over opposition challenger Mir Hussein Moussavi have prompted Middle Eastern despots to re-think vote rigging strategies for their own upcoming elections.

Abdul-Majid Nadwi, a former political advisor to Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, says that real change has come to the Middle East. “It’s not really feasible anymore to rig an election and produce a 98% or 99% victory. People aren’t going to accept it. You have to be a bit more subtle about it,” said Mr. Nadwi, speaking from the offices of his Cairo-based political consultancy, FortyMoreYears©.

A senior adviser to Syrian president Bashar al-Asad echoed Mr. Nadwi’s sentiments. “As we’re seeing from Iran, even 63% is too high a winning percentage. The best margin of victory is probably around 55%, so that’s what we’re going to be aiming for when President al-Asad comes up for reelection in a few years.”

Analysts and observers are attributing the sea change in public attitudes throughout the Middle East to a growing disenchantment with ruthless dictatorships, but also to the patronizing attitude that they show towards their citizens.

“People have simply had enough,” says Hassan Khalil, deputy editor of a Qatari state-owned newspaper. “I mean, it’s just insulting. We can endure the oppression and the human rights abuses, but what we simply will not stand for anymore is having our intelligence insulted,” said Mr. Khalil.

“Ok, so it’s a sham election, I accept that. But why throw it in my face with a landslide victory, know what I’m saying? I mean, 55% is just as good as 99%, isn’t it?”

President Ahmadinejad’s office did not return a call for comment on this matter.

By Qifa Nabki

TEHRAN, Iran – Western observers are touting Twitter’s critical role in helping Iranian opposition protesters organize rallies under the watchful eye of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s security regime, but some young Iranians are complaining about the 140-character limit imposed by the San Francisco-based company, calling it “draconian” and “stifling”.

One opposition supporter who goes by the Twitter username “MousaviRulez” is alleging that the character limit prevented him from communicating a major discovery that could have provided proof for the opposition’s claims that the election was rigged.

“I came upon a huge warehouse in the outskirts of Tehran, and it was full of unopened ballot boxes from different districts all around the country. There must have been a several million votes in there,” MousaviRulez told QNION correspondent Jacob Tafnis. “As soon as I figured out what I’d found, I immediately sent a message to my Twitter followers with the directions to the warehouse. But I ran out of space.”

MousaviRulez says that when he realized he couldn’t fit the entire set of directions into one tweet, he tried to break it up across many smaller ones.

“But by then, it was too late,” he said. “People were re-tweeting my original tweet, then re-tweeting my staggered tweets. It was a huge mess. And then someone in the government who was following my tweets realized what was going on and they shut down the Twitter servers in the country.”

MousaviRulez says that within ten minutes, several officers arrived at the warehouse, cuffed him, and took him to jail. When he was released the following day, he made his way back to the warehouse only to find that it was empty.

“Ten more characters. That’s all I needed to get my message across,” he said sadly, sipping tea in a Tehran cafe.

“If only I’d used Facebook, things might have been so different.”

By QIFA NABKI

I have a drawer in my house that contains a collection of miscellaneous documents: past-due bills, soon-to-expire magazine subscription notices, important tax forms, etc. You know the drawer that I’m talking about; you probably have one yourself. It’s the “later drawer”: the drawer of important tasks postponed.

As it turns out, Lebanon has its own later drawer, also known as the national dialogue talks.

Every thorny political issue eventually seems to exhaust the deliberative avenues available for its resolution within parliament and ends up being penciled onto the agenda of the national dialogue talks, a series of private high-level round-table discussions between the leaders of Lebanon’s different confessional communities.

I’ve often wondered what happens in these dialogue sessions. Who moderates the discussions? What do they actually talk about? What is the mood like?

Well dear readers, the investigative sleuths on staff here at qifanabki.com have managed to lay their hands on a leaked tape of the most recent national dialogue session, held in a secret location immediately after the election. I’ve transcribed some of the most interesting bits below. Among those present were: Saad al-Hariri, Fouad Siniora, Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, Mohammed Raad (representing Hassan Nasrallah), Michel Aoun, Amin Gemayel, Samir Geagea, Suleiman Frangieh, and Michel al-Murr.

**

Siniora: I’d like to call this round table to order. Gentlemen, please… If I could have your attention…

Aoun: (muttering) Let’s get this over with.

Siniora: Excuse me?

Aoun: Nothing.

Siniora: Did you say something?

Aoun: No.

Siniora: I’m sure I heard you say something.

Geagea: Me too.

Frangieh: I didn’t hear him say anything.

Berri: Me neither.

Hariri: Well I did.

Siniora: He definitely said something.

(15 minutes later…)

Berri: He didn’t say anything! Can we please just move it along?

Siniora: Yes let’s. Turning to the first item on the agenda…

Aoun: (muttering) What an incredible waste of time…

Siniora: What?

Aoun: Nothing.

Siniora: There he goes again! Don’t tell me you said nothing! I heard you say something!

(20 minutes later. Everyone is shouting.)

Hariri: Hello! Yo! C’mon call it off. Let’s focus people. (Everybody ignores him.)

Jumblatt: (sitting in the corner, sending SMS’s with a bored expression on his face. He pulls out a gun, shoots a single shot in the air, and everyone quiets down.) That’s better.

Siniora: Ahem… Thank you Walid Bek.

Jumblatt: (without looking up from his phone) Ahlan wa sahlan.

Siniora: Are you sending text messages?

Jumblatt: No. Surfing the internet.

Siniora: Oh. Anything good?

Jumblatt: Have you seen this blog, qifanabki? It’s highly worth reading.

Frangieh: Oh man, I hate that guy.

Aoun: You know, so did I, but after a while he kinda grows on you. But I agree, he’s annoying.

Siniora: (clears his throat) Okay, first thing on the agenda: Hizbullah’s weapons. Can we talk about them?

Aoun, Frangieh, and Berri: No.

Siniora: Alrighty then. Moving right along. The next item on the agenda is…

Raad: Ahh, actually… yes we can. In my capacity as the representative of Hizbullah, I have a proposal to make.

Hariri: Oh?

Raad: Yes. We have drawn up a national defense strategy. If we could just pass these papers around, you will see what it is that we’re talking about. Basically, we’re willing to dismantle the resistance entirely or incorporate it into the Lebanese Army… whatever works for everyone else.

Geagea: Huh?

Raad: We think that this is what makes the most sense for Lebanon, at this stage.

Hariri: Wait, really?

Raad: No! I’m just messing with you! Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha…!!!

Hariri: Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha…!!!

Geagea: Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha…!!!

(10 minutes later)

Everyone: Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha…!!!

Raad: You should… have seen… the look on … your face… Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha ha…!!!

Hariri: (wiping tears of laughter away) Oh my God. You had me there man. Oh damn, that was funny!

Siniora: (serious) Can we turn to the next issue please?

Hariri: Ha ha ha ha… ok ok. (Takes a deep breath). Ok. What’s next?

Siniora: The new electoral law.

Everyone: (groans) Noooooo…!!!

Siniora: I know, I know… But we have to talk about it. I’m under strict orders from the President. Interior Minister Ziad Baroud says that …

(There is a collective eye roll around the room and another round of groaning.)

Hariri: Ziad Baroud says this, Ziad Baroud says that… Who does this guy think he is?

Raad: Seriously. We just passed a new electoral law. Why do we need another one?

Siniora: I don’t know, ok? Something about pre-printed ballots, preventing corruption…

Berri: (snickering) That goody-two-shoes. Someone needs to get him a bag of marbles to play with.

Aoun: Sheikh Saad, can’t you give him a job as president of one of your companies or something? Why does he need to be Interior Minister?

Hariri: I thought of that, but he’s not interested in real estate or investing or… anything, really, other than electoral reform.  The guy’s got a one-track mind. Electoral laws, electoral laws, electoral laws… that’s all he thinks about.

Murr: So create a company for him that produces electoral laws. Ha ha ha ha ha ha ha…!!!

(Everyone cackles gleefully…)

Berri: I move to table this important discussion until the next national dialogue session.

Everyone: Hear hear!

Hariri: While we’re at it, I move to adjourn this entire session, because I’m hungry.

Everyone: Hear hear!

Aoun: I’m starving. I didn’t have dinner.

Raad: Me neither. What’s everyone in the mood for?

(The room is silent as everyone thinks this over)

Everyone: BARBAR!

Hariri: Someone call ahead. And get the police to shut down all of Hamra, Qoreitem, Sanayeh, and Zoqaq al-Blat.

(Everyone starts filing out of the room)

Frangieh: Oh man, I can’t wait for my spicy lahmbajin with extra pickles.

Siniora: (on the phone, dictating to his press secretary) “…the national dialogue talks were very productive. All parties agreed that progress had been made on a wide range of issues, and we have agreed to resume where we left off, a month from now…”

Raad: (holding open the door for Geagea) After you.

Geagea: No, after you…

Raad: No, I insist…

Geagea: No I insist…

Jumblatt: (firing another shot in the air) Just move it. I’m hungry.

That’s right, friends. QN is leaving the old country and returning to the New World where a dissertation and several sections of over-ambitious undergraduates await. I hope to keep the blog up so keep stopping by, won’t ya?

What a difference nine months make. Back when we set up shop, the media was full of news about Syria’s emergence as the go-to power for regional influence-mongering. Today, Saudi Arabia is thumping its chest again. And yet… things don’t seem all that different.

Later this week, I hope to be back to regular posting, but for now I leave you with a conversation between me and the doorman of my building, about my impending departure.

Kamal: We’re going to miss you Mr. Elias.

QN: I’m going to miss you too, Kamal. Are you planning on staying in Lebanon for long?

K: Nope. I’m going to try and smuggle myself into Greece.

QN: Interesting. Sounds dangerous.

K: Yup.

QN: Why take the chance?

K: The economy’s terrible here. I only make $300 a month.

QN: Where’s your family?

K: Deir az-Zor [eastern Syria].

QN: Near the secret nuclear plant that the Israelis bombed?

K: I wouldn’t know anything about that, Mr. Elias.

QN: Why not just go back to Syria?

K: Ha ha ha. You’re joking right? As bad as Lebanon is, it’s 100 times better than Syria.

QN: Really? In what way?

K: Look, our foreign policy is good, but everything else is terrible. The economy is bad, the infrastructure, the jobs, education… everything.

QN: That’s too bad.

K: Plus, the worst thing… the censorship. It’s just awful.

QN: You mean, journalists? Intellectuals?

K: Well sure, that too, but I mean the internet. What are the three most important sites on the internet?

QN: Umm, I don’t know. Google? Ummm…

K: (with a pained expression) No! No, no no no… The three most important sites are: Facebook, YouTube, and Hotmail.

QN: Oh yes, those too.

K: Facebook, YouTube, and Hotmail. Those are the three most important sites on the internet, and they are ALL banned in Syria. (Shooting me an incredulous look). I mean, can you believe that?

QN: Must be rough.

K: I mean seriously. Think about it. If I go back to Syria… how am I supposed to check my email?

We’re hearing more and more about the possibility of a “Doha II” agreement, a negotiated settlement to the anticipated standoff about the composition of Lebanon’s next cabinet. With Michel Aoun demanding a cabinet share proportional to his bloc’s strength in parliament, it’s clear that March 14 will not be able to assemble the cabinet simply by giving Hizbullah guarantees on the inviolability of its resistance. It will also have to deal with Aoun.

The original Doha Agreement produced a 30 member cabinet with 16 ministers for the majority, 11 for the opposition, and 3 ministers loyal to President Suleiman. This arrangement gave the opposition just over one third of the cabinet’s seats, the proportion needed to block legislation on “basic national issues”. The one-third-plus-one share also has a “nuclear option”, whereby the government can be brought down if the entire cabinet minority resigns. Here’s what the Lebanese Constitution says about the functioning of the cabinet (or Council of Ministers):

Article 65.5: “The Council of Ministers meets in a locale specifically set aside for it, and the President chairs its meetings when he attends. The legal quorum for a Council meeting is a majority of two thirds of its members. It makes its decisions by consensus. If that is not possible, it makes its decisions by vote of the majority of attending members. Basic national issues require the approval of two thirds of the members of the Council named in the Decree forming the Cabinet. Basic national issues are considered the following:

The amendment of the constitution, the declaration of a state of emergency and its termination, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the annual government budget, comprehensive and longterm development projects, the appointment of Grade One government employees and their equivalents, the review of the administrative map, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, electoral laws, nationality laws, personal status laws, and the dismissal of Ministers.”

I am personally uncomfortable with the idea of a Doha II Agreement, and not because I’m opposed to the idea of a national unity government. The problem with a Doha II is that it runs the risk of serving as a band-aid remedy, an antidote whose utility lies only in satisfying immediate political demands rather than addressing the larger underlying issues. Let us ask ourselves, honestly: would anyone be talking about cabinet vetoes if it weren’t for the issue of Hizbullah’s weapons? The fact that Hizbullah itself is theoretically willing to drop its demand in exchange for suitable “guarantees” weakens the opposition’s case that the current system violates the consensual logic of Lebanese governance.

What I would prefer to see is a full-fledged debate on the issues that puts everything on the table, eschews closed-door deal-making in favor of constitutional amendments, and works within the existing framework of the Ta’if Accord. Virtually all of Lebanon’s political parties are in agreement on the fact that Ta’if provides the blueprint for a viable political future. Even the Aounists, who complain loudly about the weakening of presidential powers as a result of Ta’if, cleave to its recommendations regarding a non-confessional electoral law and the creation of a senate.  If we’re going to go to the trouble of coming up with a Doha II, why not at least harmonize its features with the prescriptions of the Ta’if Accord?

The obvious answer to this question is that none of the political players are actually that interested in implementing Ta’if, despite what their voluminous electoral platforms indicate. This is where Lebanon’s civil society needs to swing into action. Rather than sitting back and complaining about the horsetrading conducted over the next several weeks, civil society organizations should be engaged in a public campaign to raise expectations for the kind of deal that should eventually be made. After all, we’ve just spent several months listening to political leaders talking about second independences, third republics, and building the state. Now is just as good a time as any to hold them to their word.

PS: Check out Jimmy Carter’s opinion of Jeffrey Feltman. It’s amusing.