Lebanon’s Prime Minister Najib Mikati was expected to make a major address today concerning the stalemate over the funding of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), which was threatening to bring down his government.

Mikati did speak to the media, but it was only to say that he had transferred Lebanon’s share of the funding (around $33 million) earlier this morning. The STL confirmed receipt of the funds, so it seems that Lebanon has dodged another bullet.

As of this moment, here’s what we don’t know:

  1. We don’t know what kind of deal Mr. Mikati cut with his cabinet partners in order to prevent their resignation;
  2. We don’t know if funding the STL in exchange for valuable concessions was the hidden agenda of the Aounist bloc and Hizbullah all along, or if they decided on this path as a result of more recent developments (like Jumblatt’s defection, the situation in Syria, etc.);
  3. We don’t know if a vote will be required in the cabinet or in parliament to “approve” the funding. Apparently, Mikati transferred the money from the premiership’s own budget, so maybe there will be no need for a vote. This strikes me as a very dicey precedent.

A few minutes of Internet research turned up the 2011-2012 budget for the Prime Minister’s office, which is around a billion US dollars per year (click here to see the spreadsheet, to which I’ve added an extra column converting the figures from [thousands of] liras to dollars).

I have no idea how accurate these figures are, or which pot Mr. Mikati pulled the STL funding from. There are line items in there that are extremely vague (see for example #32, which is devoted to “foreign funding” to the tune of one third of a billion dollars). One would have to assume that there are more detailed figures elsewhere.

At any rate, I’m no expert on government budgets, but it seems odd to me that a Prime Minister of a country like Lebanon should have discretionary spending powers on over one billion dollars. The President’s budget, by contrast, is around $11 million, and the budget for the entire Parliament is $45 million. If anyone has more information on this issue, please feel free to leave it in the comment section. In the meantime, I will try to get an answer from Mr. Mikati’s advisors about where the money for the STL is coming from.

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Today has been a very silly day in Lebanese politics. A cabinet session scheduled to address various issues unrelated to the funding of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) had to be canceled because ministers belonging to General  Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement decided not to turn up.

The reason? According to various sources, it was to send a signal that the FPM is prepared to resign and “turn the tables on the opposition”, with respect to the STL funding issue, which must be brought to a vote at next Wednesday’s cabinet meeting. Minister of Energy Gebran Bassil told the AFP that the signal had to do with the FPM’s unhappiness with the government’s performance, not necessarily on the issue of the STL.

Come again?

Let’s remind ourselves that the FPM is the majority partner in the Mikati government. In other words, they are the government. There is no meaningful opposition to their policies. So how can they be disappointed in the government’s performance?

Even by the cynical standards we’ve grown accustomed to, this latest move by the FPM takes the cake. Between 2005 and 2009, they complained because they weren’t given the Presidency. Between 2009 and 2011, they complained because they didn’t have enough seats in government. And now that they are the single largest bloc in the cabinet, they are threatening to bring down their own government because of its poor performance?

In an Arab world where tyrants are struggling to hold on to their seats, Lebanon’s leaders are trying to find ways to get out of theirs as quickly as possible.

No one is fooled that this move doesn’t have everything to do with Najib Mikati’s own vow to resign if the STL’s funding is not approved at next week’s meeting. But the FPM’s counter-threat to resign first is an escalation typical of the blustering and irrational theatrics of Michel Aoun. “You think you can scare us with your resignation, Najib? Well then, we’ll resign first! Ha!

Amateur psychological analysis aside, what does this puzzling strategy tell us about what the STL funding issue means to the March 8 coalition? Obviously, there’s no way that Hizbullah can support the STL since they are being targeted by it. Nor can one expect AMAL to break with Hizbullah on any issue. But the FPM surely could have elected to play some kind of conciliatory or mediating role rather than walking such a hard line. Why be more Catholic than the Pope?

My own conversations with a few FPM insiders over the past couple days suggest that there is considerable befuddlement and frustration with the position that the party finds itself in.

And let’s not forget that resigning and bringing down the current government would only make matters worse — for Aoun, for Hizbullah, and ultimately for Syria. By pushing the magic button and sending Lebanon into its familiar tailspin, Aoun can dodge the STL funding bullet. But this measure will certainly not bring the STL’s activities to a halt. All it will do is create chaos in the near term and possible sanctions in the long term.

Maybe Aoun and Hizbullah would prefer that kind of combative atmosphere to the current situation, where they look worse and worse each day as the Arabs, the Turks, the Europeans, and the Americans keep heaping more pressure on Damascus. Or maybe Aoun is just bluffing. We’ll know sooner rather than later.

At the end of the day, March 8 needs to wake up and face the fact that they’re not going to get away from the Tribunal issue by changing prime ministers every few months.
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Ever since Najib Mikati took over as Prime Minister of Lebanon earlier this year, things have gone relatively smoothly. With no opposition in the cabinet, there have been few opportunities for conflict (with the exception of the odd squabble between Michel Aoun and his disgruntled allies).

All that could change next week. The cabinet must finally take up the ticking time bomb that they’ve been avoiding for months (and which was the downfall of Saad Hariri’s government), namely the issue of funding the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL).

For obvious reasons, Hizbullah is opposed to funding the court, as is AMAL. And Michel Aoun, per his usual custom, has played the role of the intransigent rejectionist to the hilt, going so far as to declare: “Even if Hizbullah approves the funding, we’ll vote against it.”

The problem is that it’s not in Hizbullah’s interests, at this stage, to create an international incident over the STL, and this is what may well happen if Lebanon reneges on its obligation to the court. The Americans and Europeans have made it abundantly clear over the past several weeks that there would be dire consequences if Lebanon severs its ties to the STL.

What this means is still  unclear. However, when one combines Lebanon’s recent stance at the Arab League on the Syrian uprising with the prospect of ending its cooperation with the Tribunal, it seems straightforward to assume that Hizbullah’s opponents (in Lebanon and abroad) will seize the opportunity to argue that the Mikati government is nothing more than an extension of the Syrian regime, and should be treated as such by the international community.

Hizbullah would prefer to avoid such a scenario, as they understand that their position on Syria has not done them many favors in Lebanon or the rest of the region. The problem is, even if they wanted to find a solution that would keep the hounds at bay while allowing them to save face by voting against the funding, it’s not clear how they would do so.

As far as I have been able to ascertain from my conversations in Beirut this week, approving the funding requires a simple majority vote in the thirty-member cabinet. At present, Hizbullah and its allies hold eighteen seats, while the remaining twelve are divided between ministers loyal to Mikati, President Sleiman, and Walid Jumblatt. In other words, there is no way to compose the necessary majority to approve the funding without using ministers from the shares of Hizbullah, Amal, or the FPM.

So we’re faced with a situation whereby either one of those three parties has to reverse its policy on the funding, or they all hold a firm line and Lebanon drops the STL like a bad habit. Neither scenario is  ideal, from the current majority’s perspective.

One possible solution that has been floated is that the cabinet passes the hot potato to the Parliament, where  a majority in favor of the funding can be assembled by having Walid Jumblatt vote with his old allies. I’m not sure this is a constitutionally legitimate move, but I’ve been told that it could be the basis for a typically Lebanese fudge.

Whatever happens, we’re sure to see Saad Hariri make a serious push next week at the Tripoli gathering to put as much pressure as possible on Najib Mikati to resign. My sense is that Hizbullah would prefer to keep this government afloat and out of the Syrian cross-fire, but not at the expense of voting for the tribunal themselves. If the parliamentary solution doesn’t work and the cabinet can’t muster the votes, Mikati will probably walk and Hizbullah will let him do so.

In that scenario, we’ll be back to treading water with no government, and things will be… interesting, yet again.

[An earlier version of this post stated that a two-thirds super-majority was required to approve the funding. I'm now being told that a simple majority will do, as there are no new international treaties being signed.]
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Greetings to all from Beirut, where I’ve been meeting with MPs, civil society folks, and good friends about the Lebanese senate project I’m working on. Will have more to say on this score when I’m back in Cambridge, but for now, I thought I’d direct you to a  new International Herald Tribune / NY Times Global opinion blog called Latitude, which has just launched. I have a piece there today on the STL and its discontents.
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On October 11th, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar published a story by Omar Nashabe entitled “STL’s Cassese: Resignation Likely Sign of Infighting, Not Ill Health.”  In the piece, Nashabe (who is the paper’s judicial affairs editor) claimed that the previous day’s resignation of Antonio Cassese from the presidency of the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was “likely prompted by a power struggle between prosecutor Daniel Bellemare and STL judges,” and not by health issues, as Cassese had originally said.

As we all know by now, Mr. Cassese passed away last night, after a long battle with cancer.

But I’m sure that Nashabe was right, and that Cassese’s resignation had nothing to do with failing health.

I’m sure that Nashabe’s single source, an unnamed “New York based UN official” was absolutely correct about the reasons motivating Cassese to step down and Ban Ki-Moon’s decision to cover up the mess with a false excuse. Sounds like iron-clad reporting to me.

I’ve generally found Omar Nashabe’s commentary on the STL to be smart and well-argued, but this piece exposes one of the primary weaknesses of the Lebanese press, namely its questionable reporting standards. Al-Akhbar should be much better than this, and usually is. Take a look at my friend Marwan Taher’s excellent story on the prosecution’s reliance on telecommunications evidence. He lays out a very convincing argument against the credibility of this evidence, but is still intellectually honest enough to point out that Hizbullah’s counter-narrative (that they were framed by Israel) is just not convincing, as far as the actual mechanics are concerned.

I’m not disputing the possibility that Cassese clashed with Bellemare, or that the long string of resignations at the STL does not betoken a climate of mistrust or acrimony among its central players.

But when a guy says he’s quitting for health reasons, you need more than one anonymous source to prove he’s lying.

Otherwise, if he dies on you twelve days later, you look very silly and your credibility is shot to hell.

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Greetings from Beirut, and apologies for the brief blogging hiatus: I’ve been busy, and I anticipate that next week will be even busier than this one. Here are some thoughts on the week’s big news items.

Blanfordgate

I don’t quite understand what all the fuss is about TIME Magazine’s interview with someone claiming to be an STL indictee. Hezbollah denounced the interview and said that it was fabricated. The Angry Arab concurred. March 14 supporters insisted it was the real thing. Nick Blanford distanced himself from it. The Miqati government has rushed to deny that the interview could ever have taken place. Several days later, people are still arguing about whether the transcript was for real, or whether it was co-written by Condoleezza Rice and Detlev Mehlis on Saad al-Hariri’s yacht off the coast of Sardinia.

What no one has explained to me is why the “damaging” statement made by the alleged interviewee (i.e., “The Lebanese authorities know where I live, and if they wanted to arrest me they would have done it a long time ago…”) is such a big deal in the first place. Didn’t Hassan Nasrallah make the same point himself? None of Hezbollah’s leaders have claimed that these four men are missing or hiding or otherwise unlocateable by the Lebanese police. Nasrallah has described them as upstanding citizens, not renegades, and he has also said that no Lebanese government — not one led by Najib Miqati, nor one led by Saad Hariri — would dare arrest them. So why are people so up in arms about an interview that basically repeated what Nasrallah said?

Kahrabagate

For a party that is supposedly so dedicated to transparency and accountability, one would think that the FPM would have deployed its media wing to publicize Gebran Bassil’s proposal to revamp Lebanon’s electicity sector. Al-Diyar cannot compete with OTV; so why is this deal being negotiated in back rooms and Riyadh?

I also recall a great deal of rhetoric a few years ago from the FPM about the need to solve Lebanon’s energy problems with renewable sources. What percentage of the $1.2 billion will be devoted to wind farms, solar cells, hydroelectric dams, etc? After the party’s ideological compromises on electoral reform, deconfessionalism, and the situation in Syria, I have very little faith that they will do the right thing when it comes to energy and the environment.

KisIkhtHalConnectionGate

It’s true: we’re finally getting faster internet speeds in Lebanon. I hope this spurs more innovation and independence in Lebanon’s media sector, and that a new generation of video bloggers and cyber-activists emerge who will speak the truth to power, at least while they’re not streaming porn, downloading pirated movies, and playing network games.
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The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has unsealed its indictment of Mustafa Badreddine, Salim Ayyash, Hussein Oneissi, and Assad Sabra for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. You can download a copy of the indictment here (PDF, 12.9 megabytes).

I’ve read the document once through and there’s a great deal to mull over, but here are some preliminary thoughts.

The Evidence

The case against the four men accused of plotting and carrying out the Hariri murder rests almost entirely on telecommunications analysis. As was leaked by a Lebanese security official as early as 2006, the investigation discovered the cell phone networks allegedly used to surveil Hariri and coordinate his assassination.

The central methodological tool of the investigation is “co-location”, which determines on the basis of cell-tower data when and where certain cell phones were used to call each other and other off-network phones. Here’s a basic illustration of the principle:

  1. Phones A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H are activated together on the same day, several weeks before the crime. They only ever make calls to each other, and those calls are made from locations in the vicinity of Hariri’s convoy or along his various routes. In the two hours before the assassination, 33 calls were made between these phones with the last one coming just five minutes before the bomb went off. This is the red network, carried by the hit squad.
  2. When the hit squad members need to communicate with people who are not part of the immediate assassination team, they use other phones.  Cell-tower data shows that these phones are always active in the same locations and at the same times as the red network phones, and they were used to do things like purchasing the vehicle used to carry the bomb.
  3. The hit squad also have their own personal mobile phones (PMP’s) which they use to contact family members and friends, and are ultimately used by the investigation team to determine the identities of their owners.  (Note to self: beware of co-locating with PMPs. Always a bad idea.)

Using this method, the investigation team was able to put together a very detailed chronology for the operation build-up and execution, as well as its aftermath (when the Abu Adass claim of responsibility was made).

Question Marks

The first question that comes to mind is: is this it? After nearly six years of investigation, does the case truly rest solely on telecommunications data? What about witness testimony? Forensics? DNA analysis? Magnifying glasses and trench coats?

Secondly, if signals intelligence does comprise the bulk of it, then what did the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) do between 2006 and 2010? The first Mehlis report had already identified the hit squad’s cell phone network in late 2005,  and the 2006 article by Georges Malbrunot in Le Figaro revealed that the investigation had used cell phone data to discover new evidence “leading to Hezbollah”. I understand that piecing all of this together must have been a complicated task, but surely it would not have taken five years to do so.

(Let me reiterate that I don’t buy Neil Macdonald’s claim that the UNIIIC only began analyzing telecoms data in late 2007, which was when they supposedly discovered the hit team. As I’ve previously shown, that simply does not add up.)

The last big question is whether the STL has other indictments up its sleeve. Did Badreddine or Ayyash ever communicate with off-network phones tied to political figures? The CBC report claimed to produce documents from the investigation showing networks connected to Hezbollah political figures, but the indictment makes no mention of these.

As I said, there will be much more to comment on the next few days as Lebanon’s professional and amateur pundits pore over the indictment. In the meantime, the floor is open for thoughts and critiques.

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The Special Tribunal for Lebanon has unsealed its indictment of four individuals for the murder of Rafik Hariri. The indictment was available on the STL website until it crashed due to high demand. It’s now available on Scribd but takes forever to download, so I thought I’d make it available here. The document is a PDF (12.9MB): click to download.

Watch this space for commentary on the indictment, within the next hour or two.
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As I was perusing some of the latest Wikileaks cables, I came across this little nugget about Asif Shawkat, the former head of Syrian Military Intelligence and brother-in-law of President Bashar al-Assad:

05PARIS6580 (September 26, 2005)President Jacques Chirac’s Technical Advisor on Middle East/Americas Dominique Boche “reiterated that the content of the final Mehlis report would be decisive. If the report established direct [Syrian government] responsibility for Hariri’s assassination, Boche speculated that Bashar may give up second-tier officials up to the level of Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan and former [Syrian Military Intelligence] Chief in Lebanon Rustom Ghazaleh, without touching brother-in law Asif Shawkat, in-laws the Makhlufs, or his brother Mahir. Boche added that he could not exclude any possibilities for regime stability after the Mehlis report; there could be a “palace coup,” with other powerful Alawis taking over; the Alawites could lose control to the Sunnis, who lack leaders; or Bashar could seize the moment to consolidate his authority and marginalize others, as he has started to do since the last Ba’th party congress. [French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary-equivalent for Egypt/Levant] Besancenot was more cautious than Boche in reiterating to us that the [Government of France (GoF)] did not want a “total destabilization” in Syria, nor did the GoF want isolation of Syria to lead to it increasing its “nuisance capacity” in the region…”

“Boche confirmed that [Syrian Military Intelligence] Chief Asif Shawkat had visited Paris and met with [French intelligence agency DST] head Bosquet and no other GoF officials, before departing France. Boche described Shawkat’s visit as part of long-standing liaison relationship between French and Syrian security services, and noted Shawkat usually visited France twice a year. Boche described timing for the visit as “unfortunate,” and claimed that there was a lack of coordination within the GoF, with the Elysee learning of the visit only after Shawkat had arrived. He added that Shawkat has a sick child, which could have been another reason for the visit. Boche offered no details on the contents of Shawkat’s discussions with the DST.”

Comment

As is clear from the cable, the French were very uneasy about seeing Syria destabilized as a result of the Mehlis Report. If they were that anxious about the political fallout of a humble UN investigation report, I can only imagine what kinds of conversations are taking place today between French and American diplomats about the situation in Syria. For anyone still puzzled about the double standard of the Obama administration on Libya vs. Syria, these cables offer a sobering reminder of the fact that for all the bluster about the Axis of Evil, Hizbullah, Iran, yada yada yada, the prospect of an Assad-less Syria is even more problematic to the West than the “nuisance capacity” of the current regime.

Also, why hasn’t anyone else commented on the fact that Asif Shawkat was visiting France twice a year “as part of a long-standing liaison relationship between French and Syrian security services“? This is Asif Shawkat we’re talking about: the man with no face, the hidden hand of the Syrian mukhabarocracy, etc. Try to find a picture of the guy online and you might luck out with a couple grainy shots here and there. Meanwhile, the French were hosting him on a biannual basis to talk intelligence.

It is well-known that Shawkat (who made Foreign Policy’s list of the Middle East’s Most Powerful Spooks in 2009) also worked with the Americans after the 9/11 attacks to set up intelligence sharing and cooperation, but that this relationship broke down after Syria declined to join the Iraq war in 2003. I guess what I’m saying is that, like Jamil al-Sayyid (whom Feltman outed as an American intelligence asset in another Wikileaks cable), Shawkat is a perfect example of a Middle Eastern strongman whom the West likes to vilify as a public enemy, but who is, in reality, very much a private ally.
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Click to enlarge.

The Pre-Trial Judge of the the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) has approved the lifting of confidentiality on “the full names and aliases, biographical information, photographs and charges against the individuals named in the indictment, confirmed on 28 June.”

As previously reported in the press, the four individuals’ names are below (click the links for more information).

  1. Salim Jamil Ayyash
  2. Mustafa Amine Badreddine
  3. Hussein Hasan Oneissi
  4. Assad Hassan Sabra

Well gee, now that we know where they all live, maybe Mr. Miqati can send a nice policeman over and invite the fellas downtown to answer a few questions.
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