Of Maps and Men

810 thoughts on “Of Maps and Men”

1. 

   ISIS is a transitory phenomenon. But, the fertile crescent will be much different after it’s gone.

   By the way, Elias, the author of the Yazidi faith or actually the one who combined the old Babylonian beliefs with Islamic beliefs hails from a place no too far off where you come from.

   He is from today’s Khirbet Qanafar near Qab Elias. His name is Uday ibn Musafer and is a descendent of Marwan ibn al-Hakam. He ran away from the Abbasids to where he is currently burried in Lalesh where the Yazidis worship.

   Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 12:54 am
2. 

   Fault lines are always exacerbated when one group has more power than the other. For the Sykes-Picot borders to endure, the ‘States’ need to share power among sectarian/ethnic lines ala Lebanon or dissolve ethnicity by genuine secularism in the public sphere. Revisiting the Sykes-Picot arrangement in this crucial time is dangerous and can lead to further chaos and violence.

   Posted by Maverick | August 14, 2014, 1:15 am
3. 

   Very interesting question QN, put in another way: are we in a period of nation formation like Europe was almost a hundred years ago? Or are we in a period of nation dismantling like Europe is going through now? this begs a different set of questions: are different regions subject to different trends or are there global phenomena or fashions in ideas which find variations in different regions?

   So according to one sort of thinking, the Levant would be lagging behind Europe and what we see today is the Levant catching up with Europe and dividing into tidy and neatly organised ethnically homogeneous states after the evil or ignorant colonialists drew the map in a rather messy way mixing Shiias with Sunnis, Kurds, Maronites and others producing such a disordered region.

   I am of the school that thinks that history does not move in such an orderly manner and the primary movers are ideas rather than material or concrete elements. The 20th century state as we know it is being dismantled globally and it is not as homogeneous as we might think it is, even in Europe.

   At the end of 2011 I evaluated the year as a turning point where the 20th century was being dismantled and that there was a link between all the riots we saw that year on a global. http://nytweekly.com/columns/intelarchives/01-13-12/

   Lebanon skipped the 20th century and was considered a failed state by its standards, it may now be ahead of the game while the rest of the region dismantles what they successfully achieved and have to get used to the idea of living without it. Lebanon spent most of the 20th century arguing about whether to become a ‘proper state’ or not.

   Posted by Nadim Shehadi | August 14, 2014, 4:08 am
4. 

   Syria, Lebanon and Iraq were ideas or concepts before they became states. This was the reverse of many other state-formations, where ideas (of France, Britain, Egypt, etc.) were molded to fit political faits accomplis. The sudden creation of the post-World War I states meant that these ideas had to be given content and material form on short notice, in a haphazard fashion, and in unfavorable circumstances. The *idea* of Syria or Iraq was more attractive than the reality of the Assad family fiefdom and Saddam Hussein’s rule-by-Tikrit. And so (helped along, again, by unfavorable regional and international circumstances including foreign invasion) they both fall apart.

   Posted by Jim Reilly | August 14, 2014, 6:52 am
5. 

   Josh’s earlier post was thought-provoking, but problematic. Notwithstanding his statement in the comments section that “I didn’t use the word “primordial” and I wouldn’t”, the argument rests on the assumption that the ‘nationalities’ it describes were there, waiting to be disentangled (Winston Churchill’s word for it) and sorted into nation-state boxes.
   It also seems to veer into anachronism when it states that the Germans expelled from eastern Europe “had lived in these countries stretching from Poland in the north to the Ukraine and Romania in the South for hundreds of years”: this seems to assume that Poland, Ukraine, Romania, and the countries in between had actually been ‘countries’—ie, independent states—for hundreds of years. They, and Germany, had all emerged in the period since 1870.

   If we want to understand what happened then, and be in a position to draw meaningful comparisons with what’s happening now, it’s at least as useful to start with the internal development and external clashes of states, and see how that affected populations and the way they understood themselves. Doing that enables us to see just how much effort states had to put, not just into massacring or expelling populations they came to consider as disloyal, foreign, or unwanted, but also into hammering populations they wanted into ‘nations’. This was done by means ranging from the schoolroom to aeriel bombardment: it’s still within, or barely beyond, living memory that teachers would beat Breton schoolchildren for speaking Breton and not French in the classroom, and Turkey’s attempts to persuade Kurds that they’re ‘mountain Turks’ have been extremely brutal into the much more recent past. (For that matter, repressive states have probably done as much as Kurdish nationalists to persuade the religiously diverse speakers of two related languages that they share one ‘Kurdish’ identity—by no means a finished process.)

   Of course, the populations persecuted or expelled by one panicking dynastic empire or emergent nation-state often ended up in a state that wanted them—but this doesn’t mean that that state was simply ‘theirs’ or that they belonged to it, wa khalas. West Germany had to do a lot of work to make expellees from eastern Europe lose their Polish or Czech accents; into the 1970s Anatolian Greeks in Greece were still marrying among themselves, and not with ‘Greek’ Greeks (among whom the term ‘turkospouroi’, ‘Turkish seed’ was often used to describe the transferees), while the work of persuading Greek-speaking Cretans, say, whose ancestors had converted to Islam several centuries earlier that they were and always had been ‘Turks’ and must speak Turkish took the Turkish Republic generations—during which time some of the most emphatic missionaries of the Turkish national project were from families which only a generation or two earlier had been Circassian, Daghestani, or Balkan. More recently, post-unification Germany often used some pretty crude criteria when deciding which Russian-speaking immigrants from Kazakhstan to accept as ‘Germans’. For many modern national groups, it took the shared experience of mass displacement, occurring at one or several points across the period Josh discusses, to accelerate—if not begin—the process of political self-definition as a ‘nation’.

   So Tony Judt’s point that in Europe after the late 1940s “almost everybody now lived in their own country, among their own people”, like some of Josh’s arguments, seems misguided, unless it’s hedged about in the original by qualifications (which it may be, as Judt was usually pretty sharp about these things). It ignores too much history. And I haven’t even dwelt on just how debatable it really is that the post-1945 European nation-states were mononational. In France, durable immigration from colonial possessions had already begun before the war, but the much larger part of France’s immigrant population—which by 1930 was proportionately the largest in Europe, despite France’s status as the locus classicus of the nation-state—was from other European countries: Russians, Italians, Belgians, Poles, Spaniards, Portuguese, and others, all in numbers ranging from many tens of thousands to a million (not counting those who were naturalized as French).

   You might think that further east, especially east of the Iron Curtain, immigration was less a feature of post-1945 nation-states—and perhaps that’s true. But the extremely large numbers of people of each state’s ‘nationality’ living outside the state mean that it’s no truer to say that “almost everybody now lived in their own country, among their own people”. When over half a million Poles moved to Britain after Poland’s accession to the EU a decade ago, it was widely heralded (or condemned) as the largest and fastest wave of immigration in British history—but something like 700,000 Poles, mostly people who’d served in the Allied armies and their families, moved into Britain in the late 1940s rather than going, or being sent, ‘back’ to the new-look, partly relocated Poland. This influx dwarfed the ‘Commonwealth migrations’ that began at around the same time (while Britain, incidentally, continued to be a major exporter of emigrants in this period, to Australia, the USA, South Africa). A lot of Poles lived in Poland—’in their own country, among their own people’—in 1950, some of whom had out of desire or necessity passed for German during the Nazi occupation. But the number of Poles who didn’t live in Poland—the post-1945 Poland whose existence as a modern national state, albeit on a somewhat different tract of land, could only be traced back to 1919 (the same year that Alsace and Lorraine became ‘French’ after fifty years of being ‘German’)—was probably in the millions: certainly over a million between Britain and France, let alone the US, Canada, and so on.

   Apologies for the very long comment: this has obviously been on my mind since I read the original post. The point is that the twentieth-century European experience (or the nineteenth-century Balkan experience) of state formation and population displacement doesn’t offer any neat lessons for what’s happening in the Levan now. The seemingly ‘solid’ post-1945 European nation-states—and, pace Nadim, I’m not convinced that they’re being dismantled right now, though they’re certainly being re-tooled—depended for their stability on American and Soviet dominance, military and diplomatic, and at least in western Europe on superpower financial backing too; more, I’d argue, than on their debatably ‘mononational’ character. The EU has—as it was intended to—provided a supranational framework for them since the cold war ended, as Alan Millward argued, though it’s had its problems recently. In the Levant at the moment there’s no prospect of either a stable, superpower-backed ‘freezing’ of the state system (one reason it’s collapsing) or of a locally-based regional framework emerging. Everything is up for grabs, including control of individual states. The clashes over and between states will be understood by the populations of the region in different ways and will affect them in different ways; different actors will try out different ideologies and practices in order to mobilize support—whether that’s machine-gunning Yazidis in the name of the Caliphate, barrel-bombing cities in the name of Syrian or Arab unity, or, heaven help us, attempting to maintain a national or international dialogue for the sake of peace and democracy.

   In the meantime, QN’s short and poetic article reminds us that mental and cultural geographies don’t depend only on the existence of a state authority, and aren’t formed only by violence.

   Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 14, 2014, 6:55 am
6. 

   Thanks to the very thoughtful responses thus far. If no one objects, I will promote some of them up to the main post so that readers who don’t frequent the comment section may benefit.

   Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 14, 2014, 7:09 am
7. 

   Professor Jim Reilly said:

   The sudden creation of the post-World War I states meant that these ideas had to be given content and material form on short notice, in a haphazard fashion, and in unfavorable circumstances.

   Dr. Reilly,

   Why do we always hear excuses? As if an imaginary border has anything to do with creating a successful state. Sykes-Picot excuses; “foreign invasion” excuses are getting boring.

   Why not call a spade a spade? The Middle East is/was led by authoritarian thugs, democracy can’t be implemented, and intolerant Islamic Fundamentalist is now taking over. No imaginary line can do this sort of damage.

   Posted by Akbar Palace | August 14, 2014, 7:33 am
8. 

   One obvious deficiency of Sykes-Picot is it never took into consideration the wishes of the local population. No matter how many historical references we cite in order to justify the borders drawn by two individuals living in Europe, that fact remains. With the exception of Lebanon, for some unknown reasons, all the other borders seem to have been drawn by laying a ruler on a map.

   No other state in the world, except the states of the US, have such geometrically poetic straight line borders.
   Half my clan is Syrian and the other half is Lebanese. We just happened to move to Beirut during the famous Safar Berlek trek just before Sykes and Picot drew the map and split us into two apparently two different nations without taking our opinions into consideration.

   Jordanians and Syrians have similar problem so are the Iraqis and the Syrians so are the Palestinians in diaspora and Palestinian elsewhere nearby.

   Hundred years of imposed history is nothing to this part of the world and definitely not to an Arab.

   There is also the question of the double British talk to Sherif Hussein and also the question of how the Arabs (intelligensia) were sold the ideas of nationalism as a pretext and what followed hence.

   Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 8:21 am
9. 

   In reply to AP’s query, my starting point was to acknowledge Elias’s point — Britain and France, Sykes and Picot, did not “invent” the concepts of Syria and Iraq out of thin air. These ideas had deep historical pedigrees in indigenous literary and cultural traditions. But the modern states of Syria and Iraq were created almost ex nihilo by the colonial powers. This posed (and poses) particular challenges for indigenous state- and nation-building. If Turkey has been relatively successful (emphasis on the “relatively”), it helps that the Turkish Republic was founded by a more-or-less coherent group who inherited their experiences and assumptions of rule from the upper echelons of the later Ottoman Empire, and who defeated internal and external challenges to what they saw as the territorial integrity and survival of Turkey. (Greeks, Armenians and others paid the price; but Britain and the other post-WWI Allies had to live with the new Turkey because Mustafa Kemal & co. had imposed a fait accompli. Kemal & co. were assisted by an international environment in which Soviet Russia gave them political and material assistance at a critical time, coupled with Allied war-weariness and Greek overreach.) The (mostly) Arab states of Syria and Iraq had no such experience, and they were poorly governed from the get-go. There is a lot more to say (QN commentator Benjamin White has written the book on the emergence of “minorities” in post-1920 Syria, for example), but trying to understand what has happened and why, and to contextualize developments in Syria and Iraq, is what keeps me engaged.

   Posted by Jim Reilly | August 14, 2014, 8:35 am
10. 

    If I hear the word “Colonial” one more time, I just may puke NewZ

    But the modern states of Syria and Iraq were created almost ex nihilo by the colonial powers.

    So was the US.

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 14, 2014, 9:04 am
11. 

    Oh well, so much for trying to carry on a civiil conversation.

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 14, 2014, 9:13 am
12. 

    The White Man’s Burden (and Guilt) NewZ

    Jim,

    My apologies and NOTHING personal, I’m just a (huge) skeptic. The ME has had NUMEROUS opportunities to create successful states, and they, and only they are responsible for their failures.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_White_Man%27s_Burden

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 14, 2014, 9:30 am
13. 

    So was the US.

    AP, this is a false comparison.

    The state structures of Syria and Iraq were created in the 1920s by France and Britain respectively, more or less ex nihilo, as Jim said; in Syria something like 80% of the Ottoman bureaucracy fled with the retreating army in 1918. They were imposed on populations which had remained relatively loyal to the Ottoman empire (if distantly, in the Iraqi case) even into the first world war. The catastrophic social impact of the war, and the Ottoman state’s mixture of inability and unwillingness to offer even minimal care to the civilian populations of the Arab provinces, rapidly eroded that loyalty, which had already been spread pretty thin. Other possibilities for organizing themselves into states quickly came to prominence among those populations, with different degrees of appeal to different parts groups and individuals. But none of those possibilities bore much resemblance to what those populations got: the ‘Syria’ and ‘Iraq’ that lasted the rest of the twentieth century. (Post-1920 Lebanon is something of an exception as it quite closely resembled what Maronite elites, if no-one else, had wanted since the 1860s.)

    The United States as a polity, as you know perfectly well, has its roots in the colonies of settlement established by the British crown along the eastern seaboard of north America from the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Other colonies of settlement were established by the British crown in this period (and of course, it only became ‘British’ partway through the process, when King James VI of Scotland inherited the English crown and became King James I of England in 1603, the two kingdoms remaining separate for another century thereafter) in the Caribbean and on the Moroccan coast at Tangier (inherited by a royal marriage). The one that got most attention, and by far the most funding in the seventeenth century, was Tangier, because of its highly strategic position at the mouth of the Mediterranean—it was a first attempt at ensuring British geostrategic dominance of the ‘middle sea’, early in Britain’s rise to global power. But it wasn’t very successful, unlike the later attempt on the other side of the straits of Gibraltar (British since 1713). The Caribbean colonies lasted far longer, and in this early period generated far more revenue, but British settlement there was tenuous: they turned into slave societies whose local elites relied on permanent backing from Britain to maintain their position. The ‘bridesmaid’ settlements on the North American coast ultimately proved better at attracting British, later other, settlers, and at expanding *as settler societies* at the expense of indigenous inhabitants. As they did so, they—unlike the Caribbean colonies—became less reliant on backing from Britain, and ultimately resentful of the crown’s political dominance. The revolution of 1777–83 was the result. But the new state was a state of settlers (some of whom were slaveholders): it had been made for them, and taken over by them, with a common experience of fighting a war, notwithstanding the strong unionist sentiment that led many to fight for the crown. In the century following the victory, the small settler societies of the eastern seaboard were able to go on expanding, channelling vastly increased flows of migrants and also investment from Europe (with Britain, ironically, being the main provider of both, especially the latter, until the US industrial ‘take-off’ around 1880) into territorial expansion beyond the Appalachians, at the expense of indigenous societies (treated to a combination of expropriation, expulsion, and massacre), not to mention Mexico. Slavery continued to play an important role, indeed several important roles, up to 1863 and in some ways up to the present.

    All of which is to say that the colonial powers did not ‘create’ the US in any sense remotely like that in which the Allies ‘created’ the modern states of Syria and Lebanon. The relationship between the settler populations and the new federal state after 1783 bears no comparison with that between the Iraqi and Syrian states and their populations in 1920.

    Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 14, 2014, 9:48 am
14. 

    QN,

    “Syria and Iraq are not merely a pair of problematic shapes on a map, and the agreements that followed the First World War, in drawing the borders, did not create modern states out of thin air; they created them out of far more substantial things—the tangled thickets of communal memory, landscapes drawn in poetry and prose, and centuries of political culture memorialized in chronicles, oral epics, and biographies. ”

    I would buy this if the illiteracy rate in the region were not so astronomically high when the countries were founded. I would buy this if I didn’t know what the typical Arab falach was like in the early 20th century and how he lived and what he believed. The modern states were created out of thin air.

    In addition, the Palestinian urban elite the ran away from Haifa and Jaffa in 47-48 to Beirut and Sidon could have as easily gone to Aleppo or Baghdad and would not care at all about the borders. During the 400 years of Ottoman rule, the borders between the administrative areas changed arbitrarily all the time. In a mere 20 years after 48 the Palestinians stopped thinking of themselves as Syrians or Jordanians and began seeing themselves as Palestinians. If there were really some “substantial” things involved, these processes would not have happened so quickly.

    To argue that there is some communal memory or a literary foundation that is the basis of the modern Arab states, you would need to provide much more evidence. I would say that you will find the task impossible.

    Posted by AIG | August 14, 2014, 9:51 am
15. 

    The Arabs of the Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent cooperated with the British against the Turks for the objective of creating the United Arab Kingdom which would encompass all the areas mentioned above.

    Sykes-Picot was kept secret until after the end of the war in order not to lose the Arab support in the war. If Sykes-Picot was such an arrangement that can be described as an agreement, there would have been no need for the secrecy.

    Regardless of the literary level of the people involved, such secrecy clearly means colonialism which also means even those who drew the maps knew full well it will not be agreed upon by the people affected by it.

    It is no surprise that we find such charlatans like ISIS sweeping so easily through Iraq and Syria.

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 10:20 am
16. 

    Sykes-Picot was disclosed to one and all by the Bolsheviks in November 1917. *Some* Arabs of the Fertile Crescent and Arabia cooperated with the British. Many more Arabs fought as conscripts in the Ottoman army. They, and millions more, were just trying to stay alive and were not (as far as we can tell from the evidence) dreaming of a United Arab anything. These cross-currents contributed to the confusion and uncertainty of the immediate postwar years.

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 14, 2014, 10:48 am
17. 

    Marvellous piece as ever, Elias. Some useless trivia for you: one of my favourite Ilham al-Madfai songs, which I presume predates his rendition of it, has a line describing a woman as “أطيب من تمر البصرة وتفاح الشام”. Came to mind when you mentioned Syria was known for apples and Iraq for dates.

    Posted by Alex Rowell (@disgraceofgod) | August 14, 2014, 11:09 am
18. 

    By Nov 1917, the war was almost over and it wouldn’t have made a difference if Sykes-Picot remained secret or made public. For all practical purposes, the Ottomans were defeated and what ever was broken between Turk and Arab could not be made unbroken.

    Of course, there were some Arabs fighting in the Ottoman army as conscripts. But there were also, Balkans, Indians, north Africans and many others. After all, the Ottomans were a world power.

    The correspondences between Sheriff Hussein and the British are still available for you if you care to look at. It was based on this premise that the Arabs (both of Arabia and the Crescent) adopted so-called nationalism and sided with the British.

    Further the intrigue that went on between the Military Generals of Britain and France that were on site when the Sheriff’s son was installed as King in Damascus are still available for your review. Needless to say, it was the Arab army commanded by the Sheriff’s son which liberated both Damascus and Aleppo even before the French were barely able to make it to Mount Lebanon. The British at this point in time just made it to Palestine.

    From then on, it was a straight forward invasion of Syria proper by the French, in order to enforce the so-called agreement of Sykes-Picot, which was accompanied by full scale destruction of Damascus also still documented if you care to look at both in prose as well as in poetry (just to satisfy QN’s pursuits of our poetic historical origins).

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 11:10 am
19. 

    With hindsight we can say that the war was over by November 1917, but it didn’t seem that way to participants at the time. After all, Russia had just withdrawn from Allied ranks, and the Ottomans’ allies the Germans signed a favorable treaty with the new Bolshevik authorities. The collapse of Russia encouraged Enver Pasha to send Ottoman troops eastward all the way to the shores of the Caspian Sea. The curtain came down only when the Germans’ last-gasp offensive on the Western Front failed in the summer of 1918. So, Sharif Hussein and his associates knew of Sykes-Picot for almost eleven months before the Ottoman armistice of October 1918. Of course the British were double-dealing. Of course when push came to shove, Britain sided with its Great Power ally France against Britain’s Hashemite Arab clients. Quelle surprise.

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 14, 2014, 11:21 am
20. 

    By Nov 1917, the war was almost over

    This is far from true, and Britain and France certainly weren’t expecting it to be over within a year. The other key member of their alliance had just fallen out of the war, taking most of the pressure of Germany’s eastern front. Their new ‘associate’, the USA (which chose not to become a full member of the Alliance) had only recently entered the war and had barely begun to get substantial forces into the main theatre of conflict. The French army along the western front had been in a state of mutiny for much of 1917, the men refusing to fight what they viewed as pointless offensive actions (but continuing to fight defensive ones). Containing Germany’s 1918 spring offensive was difficult and costly, and it was only once it had successfully been stopped that the tide had definitively turned—though in retrospect we can see that Germany, which was short on raw materials and had been less successful than the Allies in ensuring a basic standard of living for its civilian populations, was in trouble before this. (As I see Jim has just pointed out.)

    Also in November 1917—actually starting in late October—the other Ally, Italy, suffered its most catastrophic defeat of the war (with Austria-Hungary) at Caporetto. This completely broke the Italian army: hundreds of thousands of prisoners taken, and a similar number of deserters. But winning the battle also exhausted the empire’s army, which couldn’t maintain the ground it had taken or advance any further. Here, too, the central powers had reached their limits: but the Allies were close to theirs too.

    Of course, there were some Arabs fighting in the Ottoman army as conscripts. But there were also, Balkans, Indians, north Africans and many others. After all, the Ottomans were a world power.

    ‘Some Arabs’ is understating it drastically. Mustafa Aksakal puts the proportion of soldiers from the Arab provinces in the Ottoman forces at Gallipoli at 40%, for example (which Turkish nationalist histories of the battle rarely mention).

    Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 14, 2014, 11:32 am
21. 

    “With hindsight we can say that the war was over by November 1917, but it didn’t seem that way to participants at the time

    Of course, but you’re overlooking what I already said. What was broken between Turk and Arab could not be made unbroken even after Sykes-Picot was revealed. It was way too late in the game.

    “Of course when push came to shove, Britain sided with its Great Power ally France against Britain’s Hashemite Arab clients. Quelle surprise.”

    Too simplistic. I’m not so naïve to accept the assumption about Britain’s sinister designs against the Arabs. I believe they were genuine and sincere out of their own recognition that British interests lie in honoring their commitments to the Arabs. There was so much at stake for them to risk alienating the Arabs. We see that in Jordan and in Iraq where they tried to cover for their shortcomings elsewhere. I’m talking here about the two Hashemite Kingdoms, of course. They also forced the French out of Lebanon immediately after WW II, and to the British Lebanon owes its independence, not to the other horseshit of Lebanese clowns uniting against French and getting imprisoned in historic fortresses in the process. The Brits did not look at France as their great power ally as you imagine, but as their foe which needs to be defeated in the ‘colonies’. After WW I they were forced to play realpolitiks with them in the Levant for a while.

    The fact is, the French were never able to subdue Syria throughout the so-called mandate. This is also a well documented history which is a good read for you when you have the time.

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 11:43 am
22. 

    British policymakers thought that they could have their cake and eat it, too — and for a long while they did. The weakness of the “Arab national movement” (in contrast to the Turkish) was a major contributing factor to Britain’s relative success. This same weakness lies behind issues raised earlier in the discussion, namely, the unsound foundations of the Syrian and Iraqi states that came out of Sykes-Picot, San Remo, etc.

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 14, 2014, 11:50 am
23. 

    benjaminthomaswhite Said,
    ”

    By Nov 1917, the war was almost over

    This is far from true, and Britain and France certainly weren’t expecting it to be over within a year.

    We’re talking here about the war theatre of the Fertile Crescent which involved the Ottomans. The Arabs sided with the British, publicly as early as 1916. They were secretly corresponding with them for few years before that, and they began attacking Turkish garrisons with the help of the British. A year and half later Sykes-Picot was made public by the Bolesheviks. By that time, the Arab army was already in Aqaba and has driven the Turks out of Arabia. There is no way you can put things back together with Ottomans.

    The revelation of Sykes-Picot in Nov. 1917 was of course a shock to the Arab participants in the revolt. But what was done was done and there were additional assurances from the Brits denying what the Bolsheviks revealed.

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 11:56 am
24. 

    We’re talking here about the war theatre of the Fertile Crescent which involved the Ottomans.

    I’m not a big fan of counterfactual history, but a different outcome to the war in Europe—a number of which could plausibly have been, and were, imagined by the people involved—would have made British advances in Palestine and Mesopotamia much less relevant to the fate of the empire in 1918.

    The Arabs sided with the British, publicly as early as 1916.

    I think you need to define ‘Arabs’ much more carefully here. The Hashemites, in the Hijaz, had sided with the British. This was a symbolically important region but strategically and demographically it was marginal. The ‘Arab revolt’ did not have the popular resonance in the populous, much more fully Ottomanized Arab provinces that the British had hoped: the agreement with Husayn may have been “based on [the] premise that the Arabs (both of Arabia and the Crescent) adopted so-called nationalism and sided with the British”—but that was a flawed premise. The nationalist martyrs heroized in later historiography were the exceptions. I’d argue that what really eroded the empire’s legitimacy among Arab populations—as I said above—was the failure of the state to save them from social catastrophe during the war, not the revolt.

    There is no way you can put things back together with the Ottomans.

    Again, this is highly debatable. For example, I think there were people fighting the French occupation of northern Syria in 1920–21, in close cooperation with fighters in neighbouring areas to the north, who were unpleasantly surprised to discover that the Turkish nationalist movement was not actually fighting to restore the empire, and was willing to end its cooperation with ‘Arabs’ in order to get international recognition for a new Turkish state. (Come to that, there were plenty of people further north who were just as unpleasantly surprised to learn that they’d been fighting for the ‘Turkish nationalist’ movement, not an Ottoman or Islamic one—some of them ended up getting hanged in 1926.)

    This whole discussion, though, is kind of off topic.

    One point I think should be made, though: if you’re claiming that what happened in 1916 and 1917 is why “It is no surprise that we find such charlatans like ISIS sweeping so easily through Iraq and Syria”, I think you’re looking way too far back. Whatever the limited legitimacy of the post-1920 states, they both managed to last through to the end of the twentieth century, despite both witnessing rapid socioeconomic and political change and both being involved in, and not winning, major wars (Syria in 1967 and 1973; Iraq in 1980–88 as well as 1990–91). If we’re looking for historic reasons to explain the speed of ISIS’s recent advance, more satisfactory ones include the erosion of the Iraqi state by the long war with Iran, the shattering defeat of 1991, the decade of sanctions and airstrikes through the 1990s, and the invasion and occupation from 2003 and the complete hash the US made of every non-military aspect of them. Add a couple of years of multi-directional civil war in Syria—a civil war whose outbreak is also much better explained by more recent events than those of 1916–20—and the scene was set.

    Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 14, 2014, 12:39 pm
25. 

    The effects of WW1 and the colonial (Austin) powers are still being felt in Iraq and around the whirled:

    http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2723659/ISIS-militants-seize-key-towns-villages-close-Syrian-border-Turkey.html

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 14, 2014, 12:58 pm
26. 

    Thank you, Mr. White (!), for clarifying that indeed it’s not as much the European Colonialists that are at fault for the rapid rise of the IS in Iraq and Syria today, as much as it was US foreign (oil) policy in the region, that is.

    Posted by Ray | August 14, 2014, 1:27 pm
27. 

    What I’m saying here, benjaminthomaswhite, is in 1920, General Syrian Congress declared the independence of a “United Kingdom of Syria” including the entire Levant, and proclaimed Emir Faysal king. This represented a clear statement of the will of the people regardless of who were those initial so-called martyrs who may have spearheaded the now defunct Arab Nationalism. We know there were lots of grievances between Arab and Turk. And we know Jamal Basha hang so many in Damascus and Beirut. And the result of that could be interpreted as a different kind of nationalism than what was later spearheaded by the Hijazis. But this is academic now in retrospect. Even these so-called northern nationalists were looking for the support they would only gain from that part of the world. And you are wrong about the demographics. Arabia was always looked at as the reservoir which the northerners looked for in times of need. Syria was not liberated from the Ottomans by the Crescent Arabs. It was liberated by the Hijazis. But without the support of the Crescent Arabs, it is doubtful it could have been accomplished.

    We only have opposite to this declaration of the Syrian Congress, a piece of paper signed in secret in far away capitals that has never even consulted the people about the most important question concerning their fate. We’re not talking here about a government that may come and go. It is the most basic issue concerning identity. So-called agreement is a simple colonialist document, no more no less. You cannot invent identities ad hoc and send them over to far away places .

    Sykes-Picot was and still is a symbol of colonialism which was abhorred by mainstream Arab (Fertile Crescent) as well as all the other movements (nationalists) that rose to power later on and now fell. And, yes ISIS is using it successfully.

    We can see now why Lebanon was the exception. But you need to take into consideration that present day Lebanon (Greater Lebanon as it came to be known initially) was invented by the French in order to make it economically feasible. Had they polled the people affected in the areas which they incorporated from the mother land (Syria) into Greater Lebanon, they would have received zero approval.

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 1:27 pm
28. 

    I want to pose a theoretical question as foods for thought.

    Let’s assume that what ever this ISIS is made of is behaving differently and not resorting to the gruesome tactics which are nothing but savage and do not belong in this world. Let’s say they’re doing everything they did taking over cities, lands and even involved in civic activities they’re involved in such as distributing food and other amenities to the local population but not beheading people, displacing them or demanding forced conversions. But in the process they maintain their stated objective: We’re here to stay and to expand.

    In such scenario as above, how long would you think it will take them to erase completely any trace of these borders that we’re arguing about, considering the current state of the dysfunctional states of Syria, Iraq and even Lebanon?

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 1:48 pm
29. 

    I would also like to thank you for clarifying to all of us in the region, how the Eurovision song contest was allowed to be hijacked by that Brit (Simon Cowell) to create the multi-billion regional talent empire he did, after discovering that neither Israel or Russia are actually located in Europe.

    Posted by Ray | August 14, 2014, 2:00 pm
30. 

    He probably had an American mom.

    Posted by Ray | August 14, 2014, 2:11 pm
31. 

    Who? The guy with the head in his hand? Yes, he probably had an american mon and a british father and a copy of the Sykes-Picot treaty in his hand.

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 14, 2014, 2:26 pm
32. 

    Was ist Amerika, exactly?

    That remains the question.

    Posted by Ray | August 14, 2014, 2:33 pm
33. 

    Ray,

    Amerika is a group of evil White people imposing their will on the innocent and disenfranchised. I learned that in college.

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 14, 2014, 3:31 pm
34. 

    Thanks to all for a very interesting discussion, which I’m enjoying following.

    AIG said:

    I would buy this if the illiteracy rate in the region were not so astronomically high when the countries were founded.

    What does illiteracy have to do with Arabic poetry, an oral art form?

    I would buy this if I didn’t know what the typical Arab falach was like in the early 20th century and how he lived and what he believed. The modern states were created out of thin air.

    You know what “the typical Arab falach was like in the early 20th century”? 🙂 Are you the son of one? Wait. Are you one yourself?!

    “During the 400 years of Ottoman rule, the borders between the administrative areas changed arbitrarily all the time.”

    How often is “all the time” and what does “arbitrarily” mean? Because as far as I know, these administrative provinces were rather stable entities.

    This post by Reidar Visser is a useful backgrounder on the issue.

    To argue that there is some communal memory or a literary foundation that is the basis of the modern Arab states, you would need to provide much more evidence.

    No. I’m not interested in arguing that the modern Arab states have a basis in some pre-modern literary or communal legacy, but rather that the idea of a distinct place — whether one imagines it as a regional or cultural or national affiliation — is not something that the British or French invented in a back room. These places — Iraq, Syria, the Hijaz, the Jazira, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, etc. — have been “thought” and used for centuries. They have been referents in literature, historiography, diplomacy, and law for a very long time. They have occasionally meant different things to different people, and they have always co-existed with broader or narrower geographic affiliations, but they have been around for ages and the evidence for this is overwhelming.

    This fact seems to be lost on both the apologists for ISIS and the commentators who take their word for it. I simply wanted to point out the obvious, not to make a grand claim about the primordial roots of modern Arab states.

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 14, 2014, 4:12 pm
35. 

    Alex, that’s great! Thanks for sharing.

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 14, 2014, 4:22 pm
36. 

    The connections between Mosul and Aleppo have a lot more historical and genealogical roots than Reidar Viesser wants to allow.

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 5:29 pm
37. 

    The Hashemites of Jordan are once again looked at as possible saviours for Iraq,

    https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/560234-the-abdullah-solution

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 6:47 pm
38. 

    Some long comments from Nadim, Jim Reilly and others, on a rather interesting historical topic (rather than the petty concerns we seem to be embroiled in from a day to day POV).
    I’ll reply or throw in my 2 cents on the comments after reading those. But suffice it to say that upon first reading the main article by Elias, my thinking was “Great! The rest of the world is moving into the 21st century, where globalization and diversity reign supreme, while the ME is moving wholeheartedly from the medieval times into the 1920s? Nothing to be proud of here…Very sad, in fact.”
    Europe and North America are increasingly diverse and globalized. I don’t see “Americans” (in the traditional WASP sense) when I walk the streets around here. I see Persians and Chinese and Mexicans and so on.
    I suspect the same can be said of London, Paris, Rome, Berlin and many other European cities.
    Economic necessity and a global economy have made it so these nation-boundaries are almost meaningless, and moving towards obsolesence.
    Yet here we are, in the cradle of civilization, Iraq/Syria/etc. moving backwards (IMO). We’re moving into the idea of nation-states, albeit ones based mostly on sectarian divides (rather than national or ethnic ones). And the manner in which we do so appears to be even less civilized than WW1 or WW2 were for the Europeans. The Nazis may have gassed people to death, but at least they didn’t behead them (heh).

    I tend to agree with Nadim that history does not move in an orderly fashion. I don’t think the ME is really transitioning to nation-states (despite my comments in the above paragraph). I think we are a lot more in the general area of the European middle ages with their religious wars (Catholics/Protestants, etc.) with a flavoring of feudal/tribal/ethnic sprinkled on top. There too, we saw populations being displaced and/or massacred and brutally repressed. It was a transition from a feudal society to one where religiously “divine” royalty lorded over bigger swaths of land (then they did in the feudal era) and used religion and its convictions to stamp their authority and wage war.

    I’d be curious to hear if you guys agree/disagree. Is the ME turning into 1920s Europe, with its nation-states and a semblance of secularism? Or is it more along the lines of the 1500s, with the religiously based divides, kingdoms and wars?

    I guess it would have been somewhat of a positive to think the ME was only 100 or so years behind the modern world. The reality is more along the lines of 500 years behind).

    Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 14, 2014, 7:16 pm
39. 

    QN,

    You are indeed making a very trivial claim then. Because ISIS are not denying that the areas called Iraq and Syria exist (why they even put them in their name), they are saying that a border in the sense of one between UN style states does not exit between these two entities. The “border less single expanse” does not mean that ISIS do not recognize that there are regions that are called “Syria” or “Iraq” inside the single expanse. ISIS are rejecting how the British and French carved up the middle east, not that distinct parts of the middle east exist.

    Apropo the falachs, the Zionists that inhabited Palestine lived and worked with them and there are many sources that describe them. I never read that there were frequent poetry recitals or any at all, but then maybe the Zionists were not invited…

    Posted by AIG | August 14, 2014, 7:17 pm
40. 

    AIG

    Trivial as that claim may be, it is worth making, as much of the coverage of ISIS has been quite exercised by the notion that they are dismantling the Middle East that Sykes-Picot made, and giving voice to some truer and more authentic primordial configuration of the region. I don’t believe in a primordial configuration, but if I did, I’d include Iraq and Syria in it, as they are among the oldest and most widely used categories to denote territory and regional affiliation in the Islamic world.

    The Zionist accounts of Palestine have long been recognized by historians to be problematic, portraying the land to be barren, empty, etc. These sources have been superseded in the past few decades by studies based on archival materials: Ottoman court records, personal family papers, etc. Have a look at my colleague Beshara Doumani’s book, Rediscovering Palestine.

    Let me ask you this: was the modern state of Israel created out of thin air?

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 14, 2014, 8:06 pm
41. 

    QN,

    Does Doumani’s book provide any evidence that poetry played any role in the life of illiterate fallachs?

    “was the modern state of Israel created out of thin air?”

    Of course, there was the British Mandate and on May 14, 1948 Ben-Gurion declared that Israel will exist from the next day.

    Posted by AIG | August 14, 2014, 8:11 pm
42. 

    AIG

    When a historian tries to reconstruct the social and cultural world of a group of people, what does s/he have to work with? One has some material evidence, such as the architectural and archaeological record, everyday objects like clothing, household items, etc. But mostly, one uses all kinds of textual traces, such as indigenous chronicles, literary sources, court documents, legal deeds, commercial records, etc.

    If we are going to invalidate the textual legacy on the basis of the fact that the premodern Middle East, like all premodern civilizations, had low literacy rates, then do you propose that we cannot know anything about the premodern world? Or are you saying that literate people had a radically different worldview utterly disconnected from that of illiterate people? There is some truth to that, but there are ways to mitigate those differences.

    What that textual legacy tells us is that affiliations like “Iraqi” and “Greater Syrian” were categories that existed and were used throughout the medieval period, alongside other affiliations such as Nabulsi, Beiruti, Baghdadi, Maqdisi, etc. That doesn’t mean that the modern states of Iraq and Syria are more “authentic” than some other potential configuration that might draw on a different set of affiliations. But it does mean that it is an oversimplification to say that these states were created out of thin air.

    Unless, by “created out of thin air,” you simply mean that on one day there was no such modern state and the next day there was. But that is, in my view, a merely descriptive statement, not a historical argument. In other words, it does not help us understand the historical background of certain political realities. Before Israel was created out of thin air, as you say, there was a movement to create it that was bolstered by a whole battery of ideological, historical, affective, and religious arguments. No?

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 14, 2014, 8:36 pm
43. 

    i>”

    Apropo the falachs, the Zionists that inhabited Palestine lived and worked with them and there are many sources that describe them. I never read that there were frequent poetry recitals or any at all, but then maybe the Zionists were not invited…

    Deluded Zionists have no shame in continuing to propagate the myth they were brainwashed with by parasitic Zionism that a sterile Palestine was awaiting the salvation of the chosen who produced very little of value to since they wandered out of Egypt. Of course, how else can raping a foreign land be justified besides God’s promise when G-D is removed from the picture and still want to claim Jewishness?

    I have chosen for you few names to look at of Palestinians who were all born in the 19th century (prior to the beginning of your delusional trek to parasitic existence as a G-Dless Jew in the Promised Land), with their areas of expertise:

    Izzat Darwaza, historian, politician, arab nationalist
    Wasif Jawhariyyeh, poet, music composer, oud player
    Khaled al-Hassan, political theorist
    Maye Zeyadeh, Literature
    Khalil Beidas, scholar

    Also, you may want to explore this very interesting 18th century figure character of the novel,

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 9:27 pm
44. 

    Once again, because of Sykes-Picot™, WW1, and numerous other grievances including poor customer service at Comcast, another Islamic luminary educates the masses on joos:

    http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/dgreenfield/australian-muslim-leader-also-kill-left-wing-anti-war-jews/

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 14, 2014, 10:46 pm
45. 

    QN,

    The hamula, tribal and sectarian associations always existed. They were correlated with geographic locations that had accepted historical names. It is not an oversimplification to state that these geographic names did not play an important role, or indeed no role at all, in providing a common identity for a nation based on these geographies. Seriously, just look at Lebanon and your theory is proved wrong. Did the Maronites circa 1920 feel they had some patriotic relation with the Shia, Sunni and Druze? And if Lebanon would have been part of Syria, would the Maronites (or the other sects and tribes) felt some connection to the other sects in Syria? And let me remind you that “Lebanon” the name already shows up in the Old Testament. Solomon bought the lumber to build the first temple from you… Sticking that old name to French defined territory, does not make the people in the territory a nation, not even close.

    The Arab states were created out of thin air. The states were artificial and did not reflect any real affiliation or “natural” borders. Israel was created out of thin air on May 15 1948. Ben-Gurion knew he was making a wish, not founding a state because he was in the middle of a war that started November 29 the previous year. He could not define the borders, nor did he know who would even be the citizens of the state! What does it even mean to found a Jewish state when the Arabs, in the midst of whom you live, outnumber you 1000 to 1? Somehow at the end of the war a viable Jewish state appeared, just as at the end of the current wars, viable states will appear. It will just take a very long time.

    Posted by AIG | August 14, 2014, 10:48 pm
46. 

    What a bizarre thread, and what bizzare assertions.

    There is nothing particularly substantive about “Syria” or “Iraq”. You’re reading too much into the historical references.

    And who knew the Brits didn’t create borders out of thin air… I’ve been, it seems, having a diet of Arab propaganda for for the last 30 odd years telling me that the Brits followed a divide and conquer policy…. That they drew a bunch of random lines on the Middle Eastern map, separating peoples and forever creating the conditions for perpetual conflict.

    Lol.

    This is bordering on the ridiculous.

    There were civilisations, and peoples. The borders ebbed and flowed. The Iraqi Arab tongue is different from the Syrian one.

    References to “medieval” entities are random and convenient, and bear no relation to reality. Or present day affiliations.

    Using this as an argument to discredit the ISIS narrative is laughable. No less ridiculous than mocking Syrian Socialists in Lebanon for insisting that Lebanon is part of a Greater Syria.

    At its greatest extent… the Amawi dynasty stretched to include Syria and Iraq. Now if I were ISIS, I’d suggest you move your clock/calendar back from what you consider to be the medieval definitions of Syria and Iraq.

    Posted by Gabriel | August 14, 2014, 11:52 pm
47. 

    As usual Zios are adept at falsifying facts and history as well as misconstruing words to fit the obfuscated narrative.

    FYI,

    The French DID NOT invent Lebanon. The French invented GREATER Lebanon.

    English lesson # 1 tailored specifically to Zio beginners: when you invent greater of something, the something must already be there.

    Lest you think we’re talking just geography void of political life and without diving too deep into history, there was something called Mutasarifiyat Jabal Lubnan (Prinicipality of Mount Lebanon), just before the French showed up, which had its own administration under the Ottomans.

    Posted by Mustap | August 14, 2014, 11:52 pm
48. 

    Mustap, or R2D2

    Bas falsafi bala ta3mi.

    I think you will find that the French were also behind the creation of the autonomous district.

    Posted by Gabriel | August 15, 2014, 12:07 am
49. 

    Gabriel,

    I don’t know who R2D2 is. So stop your childish nonesense.

    But I also suggest you stop your own falsafi because it sucks. The Principality was under Ottoman rule and not French rule.

    You clearly don’t know what you’re talking or why I made that comment. It was not France. It was the six European powers who agreed with the Ottomans to create the entity.

    The Principal is appointed by the Ottomans and answers to the Ottomans and he must be an Ottoman subject.

    Next time if you have nothing of value to say, I’d say it’s best you don’t say anything.

    Posted by Mustap | August 15, 2014, 12:26 am
50. 

    Blurred lines everywhere……

    If not connected by patriotic/sect relations, how about cultural/environmental relations. A Maronite from Aakkar has more in common with his Sunni neighbour than a Maronite from Achrifieh let’s say. The Durzi from Beirut has more in common with an Armenian Beiruti than his co-religionist in West Bekaa. Within Lebanon, the ‘Jabali’ or mountaineer whether Maronite or Druze has a set of cultural norms that set him apart from lets say their Coastal cousins or their relatives in the Plains. These differences are clear. Only when the political atmosphere is tense and hostile do the sectarian fault lines appear and are exacerbated.

    Posted by Maverick | August 15, 2014, 1:12 am
51. 

    Six European powers spearheaded by France.

    You can thank the French for all iterations of “Lebanon”. Greater, Smaller, Major, Minor.

    It’s not relevant why you made the comment. I suppose it was for a chance at putting the word “zio” in a sentance.

    Posted by Gabriel | August 15, 2014, 1:26 am
52. 

    Ok Gabriel, very good say whatever makes you feel good. It doesn’t matter.

    Ignoring you is probably best. Nothing will be lost. Looking at your last three comments, one can hardly make sense of what you’re saying.

    Posted by Mustap | August 15, 2014, 1:46 am
53. 

    Maverick,

    The Jewish narrative is “why take a chance”.

    Why take a chance waiting for the political environment to get tense for people’s sectarian colors to come out.

    This is AIG’s storyline and he and millions of other Jews are sticking with it.

    What’s the counter narrative? That neighbors in Iraq, one Sunni and one Shia have such fickle relations that a little prodding from the house of Saud, or the emir of Qatar, or the Great USA or the “Isra-hellian” entity can rip the social fabric apart?

    Posted by Gabriel | August 15, 2014, 1:48 am
54. 

    Mustap,

    Dude, the Zio on this thread is the only one saying it as it is. Sticking to facts.

    He’s not misconstruing facts or history nor is he obfuscating. You are.

    I hope that’s clear enough.

    Posted by Gabriel | August 15, 2014, 1:56 am
55. 

    What’s the counter narrative? That neighbors in Iraq, one Sunni and one Shia have such fickle relations that a little prodding from the house of Saud, or the emir of Qatar, or the Great USA or the “Isra-hellian” entity can rip the social fabric apart?
    Gabriel,

    It was a little more than ‘prodding’ that got the Extremists peed off. See Iraq post Saddam – chapters: De-Baathification, Nour Al – Maliki, Disastrous US Policies, Impoverishment and isolation.
    You might want to look at Syria as well, with 200,000 reported killed mostly civilians, the torture chambers, the Shabiha massacres etc

    Secondly, what you are implying with the ‘fickle’ relations comment is that all Sunnis and Shias were implicated in ripping the social fabric. We are dealing with a tiny minority, albeit an effective one.

    Posted by Maverick | August 15, 2014, 2:00 am
56. 

    Maverick.

    Effective tiny minority is no different from majority. What’s tiny? 0.1%, 1%, 10%? These groups don’t exist outside a broader supportive context.

    The minorities in Iraq run a serious risk of extinction.

    Brushing off this group as “tiny” doesn’t cut it.

    Posted by Gabriel | August 15, 2014, 2:26 am
57. 

    more blurred lines….

    50 shades of Sunni. Would they have enjoyed broad support had the Sunni population feel represented fairly in Baghdad during Maliki’s purge? Did not Al Qaeda disappear completely from Iraq once General Petraeus’ policy of driving a wedge between the Sunni tribes and AQ was implemented. Would ISIS have conquered the northern parts of Iraq if it hadn’t been for the ‘peed off’ Sunni community from the lack of representation?

    Posted by Maverick | August 15, 2014, 3:03 am
58. 

    AIG

    Very interesting. Let it be recognized that you have stated that the state of Israel was created out of thin air and did not reflect any real affiliation or natural borders. How oddly out of step with the narrative of Zionism…

    “It is not an oversimplification to state that these geographic names did not play an important role, or indeed no role at all, in providing a common identity for a nation based on these geographies. Seriously, just look at Lebanon and your theory is proved wrong. Did the Maronites circa 1920 feel they had some patriotic relation with the Shia, Sunni and Druze?”

    Which Maronites/Druze/Sunnis are you speaking about? The dirt-poor farmers who might have accepted whatever state was imposed on them or the well-educated elites in the cities who read the newspapers, drafted constitutions, and compared their own condition to what was happening in Europe and Turkey? The writings of the period are full of historical justifications — Phoenicianist, Arabist, Islamist, Syrianist — for different kinds of states. You seem to be suggesting that the people of the region (the Zionist settlers included) had no sense of group affiliation whatsoever. That is obviously wrong. People then, like people today, had multiple affiliations. Some were based on micro-region (village, neighborhood); some on macro-region (province); some on religion and legal status; some on familial relations, etc. This mix of ingredients is what I am referring to in the piece.

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 15, 2014, 7:46 am
59. 

    Gabriel,

    Welcome back. I don’t follow your argument, which contains some contradictory observations:

    “There is nothing particularly substantive about “Syria” or “Iraq”. You’re reading too much into the historical references.,,There were civilisations, and peoples. The borders ebbed and flowed. The Iraqi Arab tongue is different from the Syrian one…References to “medieval” entities are random and convenient, and bear no relation to reality. Or present day affiliations.”

    Please elaborate.

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 15, 2014, 7:50 am
60. 

    When common sense meets academia

    Yes, people are killing each other because of imaginary lines created by the evil Sykes-Picot™ agreement. It’s all making sense now.

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 15, 2014, 8:16 am
61. 

    Maverick…

    I sure hope that the Sunnis didn’t decide to decimate Yazidis because Maliki didn’t give them enough political power.

    And by Sunnis, I mean the very tiny but effective minority of trouble makers. Lest the broad brush of generalization offends anyone!

    Posted by Gabriel | August 15, 2014, 8:43 am
62. 

    Elias. Will elaborate a little later as it will require a longer post.

    Posted by Gabriel | August 15, 2014, 8:53 am
63. 

    QN,

    You are misinterpreting the argument. Of course Jews have a group affiliation and wanted a Jewish state. And the Maronites have a natural affiliation etc. But the whole point is that just like in the case of Sykes-Picot, the UN partition of Palestine did not create a natural Jewish state with reasonable borders. The UN partition immediately led to a civil war and the more natural and reasonable borders were only created after a costly war that included large population transfers. Basing a Jewish state on the UN partition is creating a state our of thin air. Of course, such a state does not exist today. The state that exists today was forged by the war that followed and has no resemblance whatsoever to the state created out of thin air by the UN.

    The same goes for Lebanon. Unfortunately, despite a devastating civil war, Lebanon could not define more natural borders and is in fact dysfunctional at this point. And that is the case with the other countries created by Sykes-Picot.

    You are trying to argue that different groups such Jews and Arabs or Maronite and Shia felt some kind of affiliation because they resided in the same historical geographic areas such as “Iraq”, “Syria”, “Lebanon” or “Palestine”. You may find an example here and there, but in the majority of cases that is just not true. Calling an area “Lebanon” or “Israel” or “Iraq” or “Syria” does not create national cohesion between groups in that area. It just leads to civil wars.

    Posted by AIG | August 15, 2014, 8:56 am
64. 

    Calling an area “Lebanon” or “Israel” or “Iraq” or “Syria” does not create national cohesion between groups in that area. It just leads to civil wars.

    National cohesion, from my vantage point, is the responsibility of the elected government using the education and the media. No country is totally homogeneous, and so minorities and cohesion is a responsibility of the government. An imaginary line is not the issue.

    The arab governments have done NOTHING to promote national cohesion. Here is where the problem is. Arab governments do the opposite, they promote sectarianism. Fix this problem, and you’ll have a functioning nation no matter where the imaginary lines exist.

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 15, 2014, 9:22 am
65. 

    AIG

    I think we are starting to get somewhere. Let me reiterate that I am not arguing that the contemporary states are “functional” or “natural” because of the existence of a long attested place-consciousness in the premodern world. If you recall, one of the things in my response to Josh’s argument a few months ago was this:

    Nationalisms do not derive their emotional and political force from subterranean wells of ethnic or historical authenticity. They have far shorter memories, being made and remade sometimes in the space of a single generation. The Sunni students who marched in downtown Beirut after Hariri was assassinated, carrying “Lebanon First” placards and calling for Syrian troops to scurry across the border were the sons and daughters of the formerly reliable allies of Damascus, who felt more Arab than Mediterranean, more Greater Syrian than Greater Lebanese, etc. etc. So what happened? How was that they suddenly re-invented themselves as something other than what their ethnic or sectarian DNA dictated?

    In other words, the events of one’s own lifetime are far more determinative of political realities (at least the visible ones) than whatever the medieval poetic tradition might tell us. That is obvious to me, and I imagine to most readers of this blog. But my piece was not meant for this audience so much as the audience that is being told that the problem with the Middle East today is that the British and French drew the wrong borders on the map 100 years ago, and invented state entities that had no basis in the history and culture of the region. In my view, that’s not it. The upheaval we have seen, as I wrote to Josh, is a story of politics and economics, not an incompatibility between borders and ethnic/sectarian identity.

    “Calling an area “Lebanon” or “Israel” or “Iraq” or “Syria” does not create national cohesion between groups in that area.”

    I agree, but when you couple calling an area “Syria” with writing a Constitution, creating an education system, giving people jobs in a state bureaucracy, starting a conscript army, etc… that actually does begin to produce some national cohesion. Unfortunately, when you fail to secure people’s basic human rights and give them a share in the political process and leverage their human capital to create a sustainable economy, then it doesn’t really matter how much enforced national cohesion you shove down their throats…

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 15, 2014, 9:51 am
66. 

    QN, I’m completely with you on these points.

    then it doesn’t really matter how much enforced national cohesion you shove down their throats…

    This last point reminds me of the reactions I used to get when people in Syria asked me what I did for a living and I explained that I was a historian. A security officer at Damascus airport—he wasn’t frisking me, we were talking while my plane was delayed—shrugged and said ‘History is lies’. (A young man giving me a lift into downtown Amman when I’d just got off a service taxi from Damascus said almost exactly the same thing, looking out at the city around him as evidence.) And a friend of mine, a young woman, didn’t understand why I’d care about history. I asked why not, and she just replied “والله ثقيل…”. Having watched the evening of TV celebrating the anniversary of the French evacuation (الجلاء), I knew what she meant. An official version of history—very ‘heavy’, very questionable (if not outright lies), and very thin—was an important part of enforced national cohesion.

    Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 15, 2014, 10:23 am
67. 

    Why Beirut is immune from is immune from the dreaded ISIS. 🙂

    https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/diasporadiaries/560232-beirut-blitz-halted-by-traffic

    Posted by danny | August 15, 2014, 10:37 am
68. 

    QN,

    “But my piece was not meant for this audience so much as the audience that is being told that the problem with the Middle East today is that the British and French drew the wrong borders on the map 100 years ago, and invented state entities that had no basis in the history and culture of the region. In my view, that’s not it. The upheaval we have seen, as I wrote to Josh, is a story of politics and economics, not an incompatibility between borders and ethnic/sectarian identity.”

    I have to disagree. The reason that the politics and economics failed, is mostly because of the Sykes-Picot borders. Modern societies succeed when they are open and accountable. In order to have such a society you need to have trust and agree to solve problems without violence. Imagine that the UN partition borders were the ones implemented in Palestine. Imagine that somehow the British were able to force the partition on the Arabs and Jews in Palestine. Do you think there would be any democracy? Do you think Israel could have flourished? It would not have been possible at all as we can just see by looking at what happened during the British Mandate. Eventually, a civil war would occur. “Luckily” it happened right away instead of decades later as is happening around us.

    You cannot cut someone’s legs off and then say after 50 years that he is not mobile enough because he didn’t train well in the last 50 years. The Sykes-Picot agreement did not give the Arab countries a chance to build trust based societies.

    This is not to say that with more reasonable borders all countries would be successes. Take a look at Egypt. I would not define it as a success, but because of its natural borders, it has been able stem destructive civil wars such as in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

    The point is that the Sykes-Picot agreement took away a necessary ingredient for success, not a sufficient one.

    Posted by AIG | August 15, 2014, 10:37 am
69. 

    Thanks Benjamim; very interesting.

    AIG: I understand your argument, but I think it oversimplifies things. You and Joshua are on the same side of this issue, which looks at sectarianism as the primary determinant of “natural” nation-building and political identity. One could point to many cases where a relatively homogeneous population (on the sectarian level) did not result in shining success stories (Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, etc.) but you will probably say that all these cases had the necessary ingredient for success but it wasn’t sufficient. You may be right, but I don’t think so.

    If one looks at the history of Mandate Iraq, for example, we find that the “Shiite community” was quite seriously divided amongst people who identified as Arab nationalists, others who promoted a common Iraqi political identity, and still others who looked to the Shi`i religious leaders for their guidance. If the British had created a Shiite Iraq and a Sunni Iraq, who is to say that this experiment would have been more successful in the long term given the political divisions within the same communities, and the very real possibility that the two Iraqs would eventually go to war over natural resources, etc.?

    When you speak with people of my parents’ generation in Lebanon, they often say that they can’t comprehend the sectarian discourse in today’s political culture. Remember that this was a generation that grew up and fought in the civil war. Rose-tinted glasses? Perhaps a little, but there’s no question that the Sunni-Shiite divide that we’re seeing today is a very different dynamic than existed 40 years ago, let alone 100 years ago. The Sunni community itself is deeply divided between people sympathetic to Wahhabism, and others who want nothing do with political Islam.

    To me, the necessary ingredient for success is a viable political system and economic development; issues of borders and minorities and ethnic homogeneity are secondary.

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 15, 2014, 11:53 am
70. 

    QN,

    Take the Iraq example, isn’t it likely that if a Kurdish enclave would have been created by the British, that the Kurds would have suffered much less and perhaps even had succeeded in building a well functioning state? For the Kurds it is quite clear that the issue of borders was and is THE problem.

    “To me, the necessary ingredient for success is a viable political system and economic development; issues of borders and minorities and ethnic homogeneity are secondary.”

    I believe that both ingredients are necessary.What you don’t want to acknowledge is that political and economical development are so much easier with natural borders and homogeneity. In fact, one leads to the other. We don’t have much data to work with but clearly, the more homogeneous a state is in our region the more it is likely to succeed or the more it is likely to avoid civil strife. Arab societies faced huge challenges anyway modernizing. Add to that the artificial borders and you were stacking the odds against them.

    To become a great basketball center you need to be tall but you also need to practice a lot. Both are necessary conditions. Yes, you can argue that you just need to practice and that there were a few smaller centers that made it into the NBA. But you should agree, that your chances of making it, no matter how much you practice are much, much smaller. The Sykes-Picot borders made the Arab states “short” as per this analogy. It made developing an open and trust based society very, very difficult. You are telling them they just didn’t “practice” enough.

    Posted by AIG | August 15, 2014, 1:00 pm
71. 

    Not a single nation in the modern world was created out of thin air. And that statement remains true even if you go back centuries in time.

    But let’s just concentrate at the most recent century or so. I challenge anyone including the Zios to give one example of such nation created ex-nihilo. But please leave Israel aside for now, because such thesis (ex-nihilism) obviously fits the Zio narrative.

    In the case of Israel if you insist that this is the only way to create a nation, and as such gives a Zio the right to do so, then the Zio nation is fake based on universal empirical evidence. In other words your so-called Zio nation will be the odd black sheep in the herd.

    I like pragmatic theories for what they’re worth. 🙂

    Posted by Mustap | August 15, 2014, 1:29 pm
72. 

    AIG said:
    You are trying to argue that different groups such Jews and Arabs or Maronite and Shia felt some kind of affiliation because they resided in the same historical geographic areas such as “Iraq”, “Syria”, “Lebanon” or “Palestine”. You may find an example here and there, but in the majority of cases that is just not true. Calling an area “Lebanon” or “Israel” or “Iraq” or “Syria” does not create national cohesion between groups in that area. It just leads to civil wars.

    I’m gonna have to agree with this. At the end of the day, complex theories and discussions aside, it really does come down to this, doesn’t it.

    Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 15, 2014, 1:30 pm
73. 

    Yes, my asinine, little grasshoppers! There was never anything cultural to work with at all! It was all tenuously created very late in the game out of thin air, under constant and dire threat of civil war! Yes! Yes, indeed! 🙂

    Posted by Samer Nasser | August 15, 2014, 2:06 pm
74. 

    Next challenge and this one is specifically for the Zios, regarding their presumptuous knowledge about intersectarian affiliations in Lebanon:

    You Zios who have no verifiable connections to these lands of ours, what do you know about the statistics of inter-sectarian marriages in Lebanon?

    Maronite-Sunni
    Maronite-Shiite
    Shiite-Sunni
    Sunni-Druze
    Shiite-Druze
    Orthodox-Maronite
    Orthodox Shiite
    Orthodox-Sunni
    Orthodox-Druze
    Armenian-All the above

    We may also extend this challenge to the immediate nearby Arab states.

    Posted by Mustap | August 15, 2014, 3:16 pm
75. 

    AIG said

    “Take the Iraq example, isn’t it likely that if a Kurdish enclave would have been created by the British, that the Kurds would have suffered much less and perhaps even had succeeded in building a well functioning state? For the Kurds it is quite clear that the issue of borders was and is THE problem.”

    I agree, but here we are dealing with apples and oranges. The Kurds speak a different language. To use the nomenclature of the European case, they constitute a different “nation”, a different “ethnic group”, etc. The other Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, and Jews of Iraq spoke the same language. This difference cannot be obviated, as it is one of the defining features of ethno-nationalism.

    “We don’t have much data to work with but clearly, the more homogeneous a state is in our region the more it is likely to succeed or the more it is likely to avoid civil strife.”

    What I’m suggesting to you is that it’s very difficult to measure homogeneity when the element that is being isolated for comparison is changing. For the Iraqi dissidents and revolutionaries agitating for a state before WWI, the important binary was Arab-vs-Turk, not Sunni-vs-Shiite. Different tokens of identity take on political salience at different times. Things that are not politically salient today may be tremendously disruptive in a society 20 years from now.

    To become a great basketball center you need to be tall but you also need to practice a lot. Both are necessary conditions. Yes, you can argue that you just need to practice and that there were a few smaller centers that made it into the NBA. But you should agree, that your chances of making it, no matter how much you practice are much, much smaller. The Sykes-Picot borders made the Arab states “short” as per this analogy. It made developing an open and trust based society very, very difficult. You are telling them they just didn’t “practice” enough.”

    Ethnic/linguistic/religious diversity is the norm among countries in the world, not the exception. The average Arab country — when compared with India, Indonesia, China, Brazil, and countless other countries — has far less linguistic, religious, and ethnic diversity. To understand why many Arab states have failed on many indexes of human development, we have to look at something other than the ethnicity issue.

    Look, to me, having a sustainable political and economic basis is both the “being tall” part of your analogy and the “training hard”. Having a homogenous population, however that is defined, is something else, like maybe having a cautious personality that makes you averse to risk taking. In most cases, that’s a good thing, because it means that you’re not going to get into a motorcycle accident and ruin your career. But sometimes, especially if the game itself begins to change because of external factors (new players, new rules, new economic pressures new markets, etc) being averse to risk-taking might not be such a great thing. Maybe it means that you can’t land a big endorsement deal, you’re viewed as having no personality, you won’t try some radical new training plan that all the other players are experimenting with. You get the idea…

    This is an amusing conversation.

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 15, 2014, 3:38 pm
76. 

    Amusing ? How French of you 🙂

    Posted by Ray | August 15, 2014, 4:34 pm
77. 

    This conversation is super enlightening.

    Two Thumbs Up !

    Posted by Ray | August 15, 2014, 5:12 pm
78. 

    This piece of news is apparently off topic, but careful analysis will reveal it goes to the very heart of the discussion (hint hint Maverick @2:00 AM above)

    It has just been revealed that the arrested owner of the site of so-called “Brigade of A7hrar Ahlu Sunnah – Baalbek” is an HA operative.

    If you’re not aware what this so-called brigade is, it recently made threats to all Christians of the Bekaa that they will be targeted with ISIS-like punishments.

    Posted by Mustap | August 15, 2014, 5:32 pm
79. 

    This is also off topic but relevant,

    If you care about Gaza or Palestine, or about broader peace for that matter, you can contribute by signing this Thank You petition to President Obama for doing what no other President in the US history has ever done: placing arms deliveries to Israel on hold because of recent events,

    http://org.salsalabs.com/o/301/p/dia/action3/common/public/?action_KEY=16310

    These people are looking for at least 18000 signatures

    Posted by Mustap | August 15, 2014, 7:04 pm
80. 

    QN,

    It is hard to argue with you. You bring Iraq as an example and then dismiss the issue of the Kurds which is a clear example that the borders hampered development. Ok, sure, the differences between a Kurd and an Arab are more profound than between a Shia and a Sunni, but so what? The question is whether the borders hampered the development of Iraq or not.

    Of course diversity in many countries is the rule, not the exception. And in many countries, say Sri Lanka or Yugoslavia, there were bloody wars because of it. There is a lot of diversity in Israel, 20% of the population is Arab, but again, why are the communities living in peace if not because of the war of 47-48? Or take Libya, which is only diverse in the tribal sense, it required a strongman to hold the diversity together. We can go on and on. Diversity in many cases leads to civil strife.

    It does not matter to what extent the diversity exists and if the difference between a Shia and a Sunni is negligible. You cannot make generalizations from some objective “difference meter” and argue that since the differences are small they should not cause problems. You have to look at each case on its own and when you look at the Arab countries, you see that the Sykes-Picot borders were a recipe for disaster.

    Isn’t it clear from the Lebanese case? Did some French declaration really create love between Maronites, Druze, Shia and Sunni or was it a recipe for disaster? You can argue till the cows come home that there is no difference between an educated Beiruti Druze, Sunni, Shia or Maronite but so what? You have to deal with facts and the facts are that these communities slaughtered each other with relish and only stopped because of outside intervention. And Lebanon was the most politically and economically developed from all the Arab countries!

    To me the evidence could not be clearer. Sykes-Picot knee capped the Arabs and set them up for failure. It wasn’t pre-destined that they would fail, but the odds were stacked against them.

    Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 10:04 am
81. 

    Sykes-Picot™ NewZ

    …Sykes-Picot knee capped the Arabs and set them up for failure…

    Yeah, sure, the borders prohibited the arabs from creating successful states. Hogwash.

    Roughly, every state in the Levant has had over 60 years to create a viable state, and if Israel could do with with all the F-ing problems she’s had, so could the others.

    Year of independence:

    Iraq – 1958

    Syria – 1946

    Lebanon – 1943

    Israel – 1948

    Jordan – 1946

    Egypt – 1922

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sykes%E2%80%93Picot_Agreement

    Posted by Akbar Palace | August 16, 2014, 10:35 am
82. 

    AP,

    If someone wins the lottery, it does not mean everyone can win it. Israelis worked very hard, but we were also lucky. Our enemies were many times ineffective and stupid (what if the Arabs had accepted the UN partition), the superpower that supported us came out on top and the world changed in our favor (globalization and the importance of technology).

    Of course the Arab states can and should do better and should not use any excuses going forward. But that is not the issue. The facts are that the Sykes-Picot borders were a big hindrance.

    Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 10:46 am
83. 

    Ok now we know.

    Israel is not the odd black sheep of the herd. It just won the lottery.

    The black sheep seems to have won more than just the lottery,

    https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/americas/5558-us-aid-to-israel-totals-234-billion-since-1948-

    Posted by Mustap | August 16, 2014, 11:24 am
84. 

    So, to put the question in a provocative way, could one argue that Turkey and Israel have been relatively successful post-Ottoman states *because of* (not despite of) ethnic cleansing? That post-Ottoman Arab states have been less successful (in terms of internal cohesion, economic development, power projection) because they didn’t engage in commensurate ethnic cleansing projects? (True, large numbers of Jews were forced from Iraq, but this mostly affected Baghdad.) Ugh. If so, let’s get over this nation-state fetish as quickly as we can.

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 16, 2014, 12:04 pm
85. 

    Jim,

    Speaking for Israel, without the population exchanges between Israel and the Arab world, Israel would have been much weaker and in a constant state of civil war in my opinion.

    As for getting over the “nation-state fetish”, what exactly do you want to happen? The Sykes-Picot borders were such a failure because of that kind of wishful thinking. There is nothing to get over. There is only what works and what doesn’t. It is like people who want to get past capitalism. To paraphrase Churchill about democracy, capitalism is the worst system except for all the others. Nothing is perfect, but nation states are the least bad solution in our region. It sure beats civil wars.

    Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 2:25 pm
86. 

    We live in a world that glorifies the nation-state. (Or at least that’s what I see in much of what I read, and in what I hear from my students who are coming up through the education system.) But the modern nation-state has been around for only some 200 years, so it’s not inevitable. The national idea — that a nation defined ethnically or linguistically or religiously should be wedded to political power that represents an ethnic, linguistic, or religious “nation” — is a poor fit for the complex diversities of the world. Often as not it is a cause of problems (and atrocities) rather than their solution. By getting over the nation-state fetish, I mean let’s begin thinking and talking about nation-states in historical rather than in normative terms.

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 16, 2014, 2:35 pm
87. 

    The nation state is not inevitable, but was what came before it better? What use is an historical discourse if clearly history does not provide any template for going forward. And then the historical discourse lapses into a normative one, since you are basically saying that we should find a better alternative without specifying what it is.

    Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 3:15 pm
88. 

    Not all Arabs were for the nation state and not all Turks were for it either prior to, during and after WW i. According to BENJAMINTHOMASWHITE above 40% of the Ottoman army was made of Arabs. There were major efforts by Turks and Arabs aimed at reforming the administrations within the framework of the empire.

    Is it not ironic that less than a century later we are embroiled with the dilemma of the nation state sold to the Arabs (and Turks) by the European colonialists who themselves abandoned it half a century later after we bought it?

    Posted by Mustap | August 16, 2014, 3:41 pm
89. 

    History clearly does not provide a template for going forward?

    What drug are you on over there in Israel ?

    Are you seriously a Jew/Israeli?

    Posted by Ray | August 16, 2014, 3:47 pm
90. 

    I don’t think history offers answers, but it does raise questions.

    By the way, is no one going to challenge my (deliberately provocative) assertion that Turkey and Israel have been relatively successful, at least in part because of historical experiences of ethnic cleansing? If so, what are the implications of that for Arabs going forward?

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 16, 2014, 4:03 pm
91. 

    Jim Reily,

    We need to wait and see how successfull post Yugoslavia states turn out to be. Very doubtful they’ll succeed since none has won any lotteries yet.

    The Arabs will not engage in ethnic cleansing. What’s happening in Syria and Iraq is the result of Iranian meddling who are also happy to use ISIS charlatans to defelect attention from their own designs of stoking the inter-sectarian fires. When and if the Arabs (the Nasrallah types) discover they have been made the fodder fuel for this vendetta, it’ll stop.

    Based on that, we may say Bashar Assad has been involved in ethnic (sectarian) cleansing for almost three years now. Maliki was also involved in a similar but somewhat larger ethnic cleansing campaign since 2006.

    Posted by Mustap | August 16, 2014, 4:24 pm
92. 

    Under cover of war all kinds of terrible things become possible and conceivable. From what I’ve read, versions of sectarian ethnic cleansing have already taken place in both Iraq and Syria in recent years. No one is immune from the virus it seems.

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 16, 2014, 4:50 pm
93. 

    It is a trivial assertion that there are alternatives to the nation state or that population exchanges have helped solve problems in the past. India-Pakistan, Turkey-Greece, Israel-Arab world, Germany-Poland etc. etc. are all examples. There is no need for any deep historical contemplation to help “raise questions”. What we need are solutions. And frankly, these solutions will be created ad hoc on the ground by the people in each geographic location. There is nothing much anyone else can do including the US.

    Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 5:54 pm
94. 

    Jim,

    If I were engaging with your assertion I’d turn it around a bit: Turkey and Israel have been relatively successful as states at MOST in part because of historical experiences of ethnic cleansing.

    Both of these states were set up by highly motivated and relatively coherent nationalist elites with experience of government. Both managed to secure the loyalty of influential social constituencies within their populations. Both have benefitted from an alignment of interest of military and civilian elites which ensured that both were heavily militarized but that civilian elites had their say too (this has been a more problematic relationship in Turkey). And both have historically benefited from strategic rents and a favourable geostrategic context even if their relations with their neighbours have ranged from distant to terrible.

    They benefitted from ethnic cleansing in two ways. First, the obvious: eliminating from the newly ‘national’ territory all or most of the populations that, on ethnic grounds, they didn’t accept and that didn’t accept them, leaving the state with a fairly solid hold on the territory and a population whose loyalties it could trust, or was at least ready to try and secure. In both cases this ‘cleansing’ (massacre, expulsion, and in the Turkish case genocidal deportation) took place in the midst of wars for survival, and it was carried out by state elites and ordinary people acting together: a common effort that was useful in giving the state popular legitimacy long after the event, partly because it was tied in with the military struggle for survival, partly because states and societies had a shared interest in denying it had happened. (We got the [territory to build a nation-state on/house to live in] because they ran away in the war!)

    Second, perhaps less obviously, both states ‘benefitted’ from providing a haven for populations ethnically cleansed from elsewhere—not just at the moment of their establishment, but for a long time thereafter. The Turkish nationalist movement was disproportionately led by Ottoman Muslims of refugee origins, from the Caucasus and the Balkans; the Republic inherited the late Ottoman imperial mission of providing a haven for Muslims expelled by Christian states, taking in Balkan Muslims from Romania in the 1940s and Bulgaria in the 1980s (as well as Turcoman refugees from Iraq more recently still). Israel continues to present itself as the haven that Jews elsewhere in the world will need should the 1930s repeat themselves. So both had access early on to large displaced populations that were willing to be mobilized by the state, for example in the military, and both—though Israel more than Turkey these days—continue to make their existence as a haven a key part of their legitimizing ‘mission’.

    On each of these counts, there are a number of other cases that bear close comparison with Israel and Turkey.

    But both states remain extremely diverse, ethnically as well as socially and politically, and they’ve both put enormous effort into getting the populations that they accept to act like a ‘nation’ (for example, by getting them to speak a national neo-language). Their relative success as punchy independent states with the capacity to stand up to unfriendly neighbours and repress large parts of their own populations—and, in Israel’s case, maintain an occupation over a population equal to more than 50% of its own population—has relied as much on the factors I outlined above, and probably others too, as on any putative demographic unity. And where ethnic cleansing did matter, it’s less because it created a homogenous population than because, practically and symbolically, it created shared interests between the state and its (still diverse) population.

    Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 16, 2014, 6:29 pm
95. 

    Benjamin,

    As a historian, you tend to raise questions as many say here is what history is good for.

    You say the Turks (Ottomans) were equiped with elites experienced in government as well as in the military.

    The Ottomans before the break out of WW I doubtless were aware of the European powers designs to break up the empire. And without any doubt, they would have known that their southern flank (Arabia) is their achhiles heel. Otherwise, they wouldn’t have tried the Gamal Basha tactics of quelling the dissent.

    The question(s) that arise(s) would be:

    1) Was the Ottoman’s entry into WW I a war of choice for them? Were they sucked into it? And, could they have stood on the sidelines as they did in WW II (learning by fire)?

    2) What was the triggering event for the Ottoman’s entry into the war?

    3) In retrospect, how would the ME be different today if the Ottomans chose to stay out of WW I?

    Posted by Mustap | August 16, 2014, 7:02 pm
96. 

    Thanks, Benjamin, for fleshing out and adding nuance to the original proposition. In ME history class it’s always an interesting discussion when we reach 1920: both the Grand National Assembly (Ankara) and the General Syrian Congress (Damascus) adopted similar programs. One led to the foundation of modern Turkey; the other led nowhere. What accounts for the difference? You’ve hit the nail(s) on the head.

    Mustap, my understanding is that the Ottomans were in dire straits after the Balkan Wars, and Germany had committed to rebuilding the newly purged Ottoman army. And Germany, unlike the Allied powers, appeared to have no territorial ambitions in the Middle East. Add to this that Germany seemed stronger and more likely to win, and Enver Pasha thought it was a no-brainer to join the Kaiser’s merry band. A quick war, a peace conference, and who knows? Maybe Cyprus and Kars would be Ottoman again. So after the decision in principle to join Germany it was just a matter of timing, including the issue of the reflagged German warships that evaded the Royal Navy and ended up in Istanbul.

    Could the Ottoman Empire have stayed out of World War I? Only the bitter experience of the First World War convinced Ismet Inonu to stay out of World War II till the closing weeks.

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 16, 2014, 7:21 pm
97. 

    ….. of timing, including the issue of the reflagged German warships that evaded the Royal Navy and ended up in Istanbul.

    What exactly was that, Jim? Please explain if you have more details.

    Posted by Mustap | August 16, 2014, 7:26 pm
98. 

    AIG,

    Instead of arguing about the differences in our theories, which are now clear, why don’t you state how the borders should have been drawn in 1916?

    Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 16, 2014, 7:31 pm
99. 

    Mustap,

    Check out http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pursuit_of_Goeben_and_Breslau

    Posted by Jim Reilly | August 16, 2014, 7:32 pm
100. 

     Israelis worked very hard, but we were also lucky. Our enemies were many times ineffective and stupid (what if the Arabs had accepted the UN partition), the superpower that supported us came out on top and the world changed in our favor (globalization and the importance of technology).

     AIG,

     I am somewhat surprised you’re buying into the Sykes-Picot™ excuse, which basically says the arbitrary borders making up several ME states made it nearly impossible for these states to become successful nations.

     Being “ineffective and stupid”, as you said, is really the nut we’re looking for.

     If these unelected despots preferred to back terrorist organizations and resistance strongmen, instead of turning to the West and building their economies and tolerant national infrastructure, that is their fault. Certainly not the fault of a border.

     The facts are that the Sykes-Picot borders were a big hindrance.

     No one has made a case showing this.

     What makes a nation? A common language? Common heritage? Yes, if the Partition Plan was accepted there would have been a civil war and so nothing would have been different. The arabs, led by their strongmen, didn’t believe the jewish state would get off the ground.

     And few nations are homogeneous. Minorities have to be safe and given equal rights. How has Israel given their large arab minority equal rights despite the numerous wars, yet the Sykes-Picot™ States have not? Why has Israel created a robust economy and the Sykes-Picot™ States have not?

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 16, 2014, 8:00 pm
101. 

     QN,

     Why is that even an interesting question? The question is WHO should have drawn the borders and the answer is the people involved. Yes, it would have been messy and bloody but at the end, there would have been more natural states. I don’t know what the result would be, but it would have had much less of a long term debilitating effect.

     Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 8:03 pm
102. 

     AP,

     How do you think Israel would look like if the Arabs accepted the UN partition and Israel would have started in 1948 50% Jewish and 50% Arab. Do you think Israel could have been democratic and Jewish for more than a few years? I don’t think so.

     Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 8:06 pm
103. 

     As I wait for AIG to draw a new Sykes-Picot, I’ll just say this:

     The question of what relationship exists between ethnic fractionalization and conflict is wide open among political scientists and sociologists. Some argue that increased diversity leads to a higher likelihood of civil conflict and lower chances of economic cooperation and development. Others argue the opposite: that diverse populations are less likely to experience civil wars and generally do better with economic development. Still others say that the evidence is inconclusive either way, and that it all depends on the context.

     Which brings us back to the Middle East in the 20th century. Let’s assume that you are right and that ethnic fractionalization is more likely than not to be a source of political and social friction in a country. It can be overcome with good leadership and economic growth, but on balance, one would rather have less of it than more.

     If one accepts this position, it still does not follow that the Sykes-Picot borders “knee-capped the Arab states and set them up for failure.” That is simply too strong a conclusion.

     In order for what you say about the Sykes-Picot borders to be true, then we would have to begin with the premise that ethnic homogeneity is the sine qua non of a functioning society, not something one would rather have more of than less. Obviously, as we look around the world, we see that is not the case.

     The borders did not knee-cap the Arab states. Maybe they gave them a bad haircut, crooked teeth, and a lazy eye. Not ideal, but the cancer, diabetes, and heart disease that they developed later in life was the result of life’s circumstances, not genetics.

     End of metaphor…

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 16, 2014, 8:12 pm
104. 

     QN,

     Even Ghandi could not keep India together. The population transfer and death when Pakistan and India were created dwarfs anything in our region. Your assertion that good leadership can overcome ethnic strife does not hold water.

     “In order for what you say about the Sykes-Picot borders to be true, then we would have to begin with the premise that ethnic homogeneity is the sine qua non of a functioning society, not something one would rather have more of than less.”

     Of course not. What I say about Sykes-Picot is held up by the ACTUAL relations between the different groups in the Ottoman Empire at the time. It is an argument about Maronites and Shia, Jews and Arabs etc., not a universal argument.

     Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 8:36 pm
105. 

     How do you think Israel would look like if the Arabs accepted the UN partition and Israel would have started in 1948 50% Jewish and 50% Arab. Do you think Israel could have been democratic and Jewish for more than a few years? I don’t think so.

     AIG,

     Your hypothetical case doesn’t take into account actions by Israel’s neighbors. If Israel was surrounded by liberal societies like Sweden or Holland, perhaps Israel would be at peace with half the population arab. BTW, the Partition Plan, if my memory serves me, was gerrymandered to have a clear jewish majority.

     And as the ME evolves, and acceptance of Israel grows, a 50/50 jewish/arab split doesn’t seem so bad.

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 16, 2014, 8:36 pm
106. 

     Jim,

     That was very interesing and illuminating. Thanks.

     So, the Turks (Ottomans) with all their so-called tremendous experience in administering empire(s) fell so easily to the German trap, while the Italians refused even to allow fueling of the German battlecruisers, and maintained their neutrality despite being part of the Central Axis.

     That wipes out Benjamin’s assertions that the Turks were so equiped with elites who had the experience in the military and in the governance.

     Even, Sheriff Hussein at the time (1914) argued with the Sultan about the legality of the war with the allies and refused on several occasions requests to declare holy war, which could only be declared by him, against the allies and he was not yet committed to side with Britain.

     Posted by Mustap | August 16, 2014, 8:48 pm
107. 

     AP,

     The scenario is the following: The Arabs instead of being stupid understand their demographic advantage, accept the UN partition telling the Palestinians that they will take over Palestine politically and not using war. The Jewish state then has only a slim Jewish majority (about 4% more Jews than Arabs, that is it) and cannot accept or accommodate the Jews from Arab countries. In a few short years the Arabs are a majority in the “Jewish” state and then do whatever they want using their political power.

     What does it matter who the neighbors are? If the Arabs were not stupid, Israel as we know it would not exist. There would be no Jewish state.

     Posted by AIG | August 16, 2014, 8:48 pm
108. 

     Elias,

     Given that I agree with much of what AIG is saying here, and the fact that he’s touched on most of my views on the subject I won’t rehash the argument. Only to say.

     FIrst, my sense of the New Yorker article is that you appear to be challenging the ISIS narrative through recourse to historical/literary references to entities like “Syria”, and “Iraq”. My point is that while such entities may have existed, as regions, or boundaries, and even if they carried any significance to the populace in terms of giving them some sort of “National Identity”, that alone is not enough. There are counter narratives that existed alongside it. And ISIS could just as easily retort that the rise of Islam “broke” down previous national/ethnic boundaries, that the early Muslims stretched an empire from Iraq to the Andalus, and that a Damascene prince was just as welcome in the Andalusian courts as he was in Baghdad.

     Second, your comment that the Kurdish question in Iraq is altogether different because “they have their own language”, doesn’t hold much either. The Ashuris of Iraq also have their own language. Many strongly differentiate themselves from Arabs, many speak Arabic. And conversely, there are many Kurds that feel staunchly Iraqi, and don’t support Kurdish exceptionalism.

     Re: your last comment on sociologists… I don’t think that diversification necessarily leads to conflict. But it requires a social contract that is equitable. The ability of the Arab/broader Islamic world to draft a functioning social contract for its citizens has been a complete failure.

     Posted by Gabriel | August 16, 2014, 9:14 pm
109. 

     The scenario is the following: The Arabs instead of being stupid understand their demographic advantage, accept the UN partition telling the Palestinians that they will take over Palestine politically and not using war. The Jewish state then has only a slim Jewish majority (about 4% more Jews than Arabs, that is it) and cannot accept or accommodate the Jews from Arab countries. In a few short years the Arabs are a majority in the “Jewish” state and then do whatever they want using their political power.

     AIG,

     Oh pul-eeeze! Ok so now your hypothetical is the arabs are “smart”, and so smart, that joos are treated nicely in Arab countries so hundreds of thousands of mizrachi jews stay in their utopian Sykes-Picot™ states. Look, Jews don’t live in a vacuum, either the arabs decided to live with a Jewish state and Israel responds accordingly, or the arabs do what their known for and massacres like Hebron and the ’48 civil war occurs one way or another, which we agreed was the more likely scenario.

     NONE of this has anything to do with an imaginary line, because if governments were “smart”, they’d learn to live together peacefully instead of fomenting violence and hate habibi. Make up ur mind.

     What does it matter who the neighbors are? If the Arabs were not stupid, Israel as we know it would not exist. There would be no Jewish state.

     Ok, arabs are “smart”, Jews somehow lose their 57.5% majority to the peaceful palestinians. So what?

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 16, 2014, 10:01 pm
110. 

     ISIS executes 700 people who DIDN’T fire any missiles indiscriminately into Iraqi population centers.

     The BDS crowd has responded by doing, uh…. nothing.

     http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4559259,00.html

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 16, 2014, 10:46 pm
111. 

     Hamas,

     Meet our demands or we will continue with the war. Sounds like a difficult decision for Israel, especially now that Sykes and Picot are dead.

     http://news.yahoo.com/hamas-says-israel-must-accept-palestinian-demands-face-163905700.html

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 16, 2014, 11:22 pm
112. 

     This one is again for Zios so that they would understand few things that they don’t understand, and which keep them in a state of abject and pathetic denial. But first, the things they need to understand are:

     1) Partitioning Palestine was immoral and specifically based upon Jewish Law first and foremost.

     2) Partitioning Palestine makes your so-called nation fake because of 1 above.

     3) QN’s post about history’s role in defining your identity is the most fundamental of all ingredients. For one thing it doesn’t need the lottery. And by history, it is not meant the one recorded in books and researched by historians. But, exactly the type of history which QN brilliantly highlighted and appropriately called poetic. It is the type of history kept alive in collective memory and handed down from generation to generation in lore, tales and legends.

     4) Because you Zios lack all of the above, you are doomed despite winning the lottery.

     So why was partitioning Palestine in 1948 immoral? If you Zios, as you claim, have been deprived of the so-called promised land for two millenia, and were so eager to go back to it, as Golda Meir pleaded with King Abdullah in 1948, then Palestine should be to you as dear as a baby is to his/her mother. But, since you guys have no history, then you clearly do not understand the wisdom of King Solomon when he judged between the two mothers who claimed the same baby.

     You see how idiotic you Zios are? How can you build the Temple that is void of wisdom? It’s not gonna work. Are you still looking underground for the remains? Believe me, you’ll find none if you don’t find it up in your heads.

     Posted by Mustap | August 16, 2014, 11:39 pm
113. 

     What are the borders between Syria and Lebanon good for, particularly for these residents of this Lebanese border town?

     http://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/172469/الجيش-السوري-يعلن-بلدة-الطفيل-اللبنانية-منطقة-عسكر

     Or even more profoundly: What is the use of the Lebanese State or the so-called national army?

     Posted by Mustap | August 17, 2014, 1:12 am
114. 

     As for getting over the “nation-state fetish” . . . There is nothing to get over.

     i.e., the Jewish state.

     Posted by Badr | August 17, 2014, 2:51 am
115. 

     if the Middle Eastern Nation States embraced better social contracts, we wouldn’t be discussing this subject. Imagine Lebanon as a total secular state, would that have, or can it work?
     My optimism leads me to believe once the ME survives flying through this f**kstorm, the ME’erners will have tried all types of government except the one they could benefit from the most.. A true Democaracy.

     Posted by Maverick | August 17, 2014, 4:13 am
116. 

     Gabriel and AIG

     Believe it or not, I think we are actually getting somewhere in this discussion. I’ll explain tonight. Going out on a day trip now.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 17, 2014, 7:21 am
117. 

     Akbar Palace:

     If these unelected despots preferred to back terrorist organizations and resistance strongmen, instead of turning to the West and building their economies and tolerant national infrastructure, that is their fault. Certainly not the fault of a border.

     This is too historically shallow to be any use. You’re ignoring the internal development (sociological as much as political or economic) of the Arab states over the period since independence, and the changing geostrategic situation—as if ‘turning to the west’ was a no-brainer. The unelected despots did, actually, turn to the west, monarchs from the outset and republican presidents later (Egypt from Sadat, Iraq—temporarily—in the 1980s, with Syria as a partial exception). Whether this helped them ‘build their economies’, and whether western powers had any interest in Middle Eastern clients building their economies or for that matter a ‘tolerant national infrastructure’, is questionable.

     Incidentally, please define what a ‘tolerant national infrastructure’ is: I find it hard to imagine what it could mean.

     Regarding the borders—and this speaks to QN’s point as well as AP’s—I too object strongly to ‘Sykes-Picot determinism’, for a number of reasons. But the post-1920 borders of the Mashriq certainly play into the political instability of the states they demarcated. For example, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, plus the later addition Israel, all lack defensible frontiers. (The idea of ‘natural borders’ is spurious; the idea of militarily defensible ones isn’t.) In all of these states, and especially Syria, Iraq, and Israel, the state’s deep sense of its own strategic vulnerability has contributed to a militarization of the state and of society, at the cost of hindering the development of non-military sectors of the economy, and civilian politics. This problem is far from unique to the Middle East

     In the Arab states of the region, and into the peninsula and Egypt, the close links between populations spread across the new borders also increased the likelihood of both states and non-state political movements engaging in politics across the borders. At times this has harmed the stability of individual states. This problem is also not unique to the Middle East, though it’s perhaps unusually intense in the Arab world between Egypt and the Gulf.

     Finally, the borders have been economically harmful, disrupting long-standing economic connections within the region and between it and the rest of the world. You don’t have to be a nineteenth-century free trade imperialist to see that this caused trouble for twentieth-century state-led economic development, though it was by no means the only factor making the latter difficult for the Arab states. Again, this is not unique to the Middle East: for Aleppo, cut off from most of its economic hinterland, you could read Trieste, which boomed as the chief port for the Austrian half of the rapidly-industrializing Habsburg monarchy in the later nineteenth century, and found itself transformed into an isolated backwater once it was incorporated into Italy after the war (while the postwar mini-Austria found itself entirely landlocked—and, incidentally, strategically vulnerable too).

     Mustap:

     So, the Turks (Ottomans) with all their so-called tremendous experience in administering empire(s) fell so easily to the German trap, while the Italians refused even to allow fueling of the German battlecruisers, and maintained their neutrality despite being part of the Central Axis.

     That wipes out Benjamin’s assertions that the Turks were so equiped with elites who had the experience in the military and in the governance.

     This doesn’t follow. As Jim explained, the Ottoman government had a choice, but not much of a choice, over whether to participate in the war, and on which side. It chose one side, which offered at least marginally better prospects for the empire’s survival. This was not falling into ‘the German trap’: it was making the kind of strategic choice that governments are forced to make all the time, in circumstances that even for strong states are not of their own making. And either way, it doesn’t invalidate my point that the Turkish nationalist movement after 1919 was made up of men (almost all men) who had experience of government and of military leadership, and benefitted from that.

     Also, what do you mean by saying that ‘the Italians… maintained their neutrality despite being part of the Central Axis’? There’s no such thing as a ‘Central Axis’: ‘the central powers’ describes one camp in the first world war; ‘Axis’ describes a (much more loosely-affiliated camp) that existed in the second. In 1914, the Italian government made its own choices about which side to join once the war began. It probably had a better chance of staying out of the war, had it wanted to, than the Ottoman empire, which was a key strategic target for Russia and an important one for France and especially Britain. In the end it chose to abandon its commitment to the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy) because—pushed by a very noisy pro-war camp not just in parliament but in the population at large, of which the poet and demagogue Gabriele d’Annunzio was one of the most vocal members—it decided that it had most to gain from attacking Austria-Hungary, and joined the Allies. So Italy did not maintain its neutrality, but made a choice to enter the war. This choice had lasting negative consequences for Italy, and for Europe more widely. What the consequences might have been of staying out of the war, or of joining the other side, is impossible to say.

     Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 17, 2014, 8:11 am
118. 

     Very interesting comment from Benjamin. I’m curious about what historians of this period think of the King-Crane Commission’s report. I know that Faisal and the Syrian National Congress papered the countryside with talking points, to some extent, in advance of the commission’s arrival. But it must surely be considered valuable as an index of sorts… if only of elite Arab opinion.

     Here’s an excerpt from that report that addresses some of AIG and Gabriel’s points:

     Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission On Syria and Palestine
     (August 28, 1919)

     […]

     2. We recommend, in the second place that the unity of Syria be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria.

     (1) The territory concerned is too limited, the population too small, and the economic, geographic, racial and language unity too manifest, to make the setting up of independent states within its boundaries desirable, if such division can possibly be avoided. The country is very largely Arab in language, culture, traditions, and customs.

     (2) This recommendation is in line with important “general considerations” already urged, and with the principles of the League of Nations, as well as in answer to the desires of the majority of the population concerned.

     (3) The precise boundaries of Syria should be determined by a special commission on boundaries, after the Syrian territory has been in general allotted.

     The Commissioners believe, however, that the claim of the Damascus Conference to include Cilicia in Syria is not justified, either historically or by commercial or language relations. The line between the Arabic-speaking and the Turkish speaking populations would quite certainly class Cilicia with Asia Minor, rather than with Syria. Syria, too, has no such need of further sea coast as the large interior sections of Asia Minor.

     (4) In standing thus for the recognition of the unity of Syria, the natural desires of regions like the Lebanon, which have already had a measure of independence, should not be forgotten. It will make for real unity, undoubtedly, to give a large measure of local autonomy, and especially in the case of strongly unified groups. Even the “Damascus Program” which presses so earnestly the unity of Syria, itself urges a government “on broad decentralization principles.”

     Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy within the Turkish Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate aspirations less possible within a Syrian national State. On the contrary, it may be confidently expected that both her economic and political relations with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the State, rather than entirely independent of it.

     As a predominantly Christian country, too, Lebanon naturally fears Moslem domination in a unified Syria. But against such domination she would have a four-fold safeguard: her own large autonomy; the presence of a strong Mandatory for the considerable period in which the constitution and practice of the new State would be forming; the oversight of the League of Nations, with its insistence upon religious liberty and the rights of minorities; and the certainty that the Arab Government would feel the necessity of such a state, if it were to commend itself to the League of Nations. Moreover, there would be less danger of a reactionary Moslem attitude, if Christians were present in the state in considerable numbers, rather than largely segregated outside the state, as experience of the relations of different religious faiths in India suggests.

     As a predominantly Christian country, it is also to be noted that Lebanon would be in a position to exert a stronger and more helpful influence if she were within the Syrian State, feeling its problems and needs, and sharing all its life, instead of outside it, absorbed simply in her own narrow concerns. For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria, then, the unity of Syria is to be urged. It is certain that many of the more thoughtful Lebanese themselves hold this view. A similar statement might be made for Palestine; though, as “the holy Land” for Jews and Christians and Moslems alike, its situation is unique, and might more readily justify unique treatment, if such treatment were justified anywhere. This will be discussed more particularly in connection with the recommendation concerning Zionism.

     3. We recommend, in the third place, that Syria be. placed under on[e] Mandatory Power, as the natural way to secure real and efficient unity.

     (1) To divide the administration of the provinces of Syria among several mandatories, even if existing national unity were recognized; or to attempt a joint mandatory of the whole on the commission plan:—neither of these courses would be naturally suggested as the best way to secure and promote the unity of the new State, or even the general unity of the whole people. It is conceivable that circumstances might drive the Peace Conference to some such form of divided mandate; but it is not a solution to be voluntarily chosen, from the point of view of the larger interests of the people, as considerations already urged indicate.

     (2) It is not to be forgotten, either, that, however they are handled politically, the people of Syria are there, forced to get on together in some fashion. They are obliged to live with one another-the Arabs of the East and the people of the Coast, the Moslems and the Christians. Will they be helped or hindered, in establishing tolerable and finally cordial relations, by a single mandatory? No doubt the quick mechanical solution of the problem of difficult relations is to split the people up into little independent fragments. And sometimes, undoubtedly, as in the case of the Turks and Armenians, the relations are so intolerable as to make some division imperative and inevitable. But in general, to attempt complete separation only accentuates the differences and increases the antagonism. The whole lesson of the modern social consciousness points to the necessity of understanding “the other half,” as it can be understood only by close and living relations. Granting reasonable local autonomy to reduce friction among groups, a single mandatory ought to form a constant and increasingly effective help to unity of feeling throughout the state, and ought to steadily improve group relations.

     The people of Syria, in our hearings, have themselves often insisted that, so far as unpleasant relations have hitherto prevailed among various groups, it has been very largely due to the direct instigation of the Turkish Government. When justice is done impartially to all; when it becomes plain that the aim of the common government is the service of all classes alike, not their exploitation, decent human relations are pretty certain to prevail, and a permanent foundation for such relations to be secured–a foundation which could not be obtained by dividing men off from one another in antagonistic groups.

     The Commissioners urge, therefore, for the largest future good of all groups and regions alike, the placing of the whole of Syria under a single mandate.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 17, 2014, 8:54 am
119. 

     This is too historically shallow to be any use. You’re ignoring the internal development (sociological as much as political or economic) of the Arab states over the period since independence, and the changing geostrategic situation—as if ‘turning to the west’ was a no-brainer.

     BTW,

     The point is debunking the myth that the failed states in the region were caused by the Sykes-Picot™ borders.

     Syria, Iraq and Lebanon all had spurts of relative success despite being led by strongmen (or in Lebanon case “handcuffed” by HA).

     During these times of stability and steady economic growth, the strongmen failed to break from the dead end resistance camp, make peace with the West, and make peace with their own people by offering openness, freedom, and democracy.

     These 3 states fell apart because they were led over a cliff.

     The unelected despots did, actually, turn to the west, monarchs from the outset and republican presidents.

     Yes some did. And they’re still in business. Now they have to translate into working democracies.

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 17, 2014, 9:16 am
120. 

     Thanks Benjamin.

     But I’m still not convinced that the Ottomans had no other choice but to join the war, even after the defeats they suffered in the Balkans couple years earlier (1912).

     The proper course for the Ottomans after that defeat would have been that of consolidation and not rushing into new adventures. If the Turks were equiped with elites as you say, then the wrong group of elites were making the decisions.

     The Turks had another choice. It was the Young Turks movement, which succeeded briefly in 1908 and then was hijacked by the less effectual wing which led to the Balkan wars in the first place, and to WWW I and the resulting massacres afterwards.

     In 1912, after the defeat, the hijackers of the Young Turks should have learned the lesson and should have begun the process of reconciliation and to going back to the original program of the Young Turks.

     What these guys did was posponing the inevitable at a much higher cost not only to Turkey itself but to much of the world.

     Posted by Mustap | August 17, 2014, 12:51 pm
121. 

     Mustap,

     Far be it from me to defend the post-1913 Committee of Union and Progress. But their rise to power was fueled by a sense among pro-centralizing Ottoman Turkish elites that the Ottoman Empire faced an existential crisis. In rapid succession the OE had lost Bosnia (officially and finally), Albania, Macedonia, and Libya. They had barely hung on to Edirne. The Liberals’ recipe — decentralization — seemed likely to accelerate the process of disintegration. In 1913-1914 the CUP co-opted some of the activists of the previous years’ Arabist movements (most notably Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi), but when the OE entered the war Jamal Pasha determined that many of the Arabists had been “plotting against the integrity of the state” because of the Arabists’ intensive contacts in previous months and years with French and British diplomats, as part of the Arabists’ anti-CUP maneuverings. Sherif Hussein’s subsequent “treachery” only underscored that point.

     Incidentally, historian Kamal Salibi once told me that when he was growing up in Mandate-era Lebanon, his parents discouraged him from attending the “Martyrs’ Day” ceremonies that were held to honor those whom Jamal Pasha had executed. The so-called martyrs were “traitors who had betrayed the country,” he was told.

     Had the CUP and OE survived the war as nominal victors, I’m sure they would have faced much more turmoil in the remaining Arab provinces. But the nationalists’ account of a “united Arab population rising up against the Turks” in World War I just isn’t borne out by the contemporary evidence.

     Posted by Jim Reilly | August 17, 2014, 1:32 pm
122. 

     QN,

     Clearly the King-Crane report represented post-Ottoman elite opinion. To the extent that these elites were able to mobilize support among the population, King-Crane was the best snapshot of public opinion in that period that we’re likely to find. King-Crane echoed the agenda of the General Syrian Congress, which in some ways saw itself as the legitimate Syrian successor of the prewar Ottoman parliament. (Ditto the rump Palestine Arab Executive a few months later.) So if something like King-Crane had been adopted, the transition from Ottoman to post-Ottoman rule would have been much less traumatic at the outset. (Of course, if the sky were pink then we would be living on Mars — there was no way that France and Britain were going to let King-Crane emerge as the Paris Peace Conference blueprint for Syria.)

     Posted by Jim Reilly | August 17, 2014, 1:39 pm
123. 

     Thanks Jim.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 17, 2014, 1:43 pm
124. 

     “The Liberals’ recipe — decentralization — seemed likely to accelerate the process of disintegration. In 1913-1914 the CUP co-opted some of the activists of the previous years’ Arabist movements (most notably Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi), but when the OE entered the war Jamal Pasha determined that many of the Arabists had been “plotting against the integrity of the state” because of the Arabists’ intensive contacts in previous months and years with French and British diplomats, as part of the Arabists’ anti-CUP maneuverings”

     Jim,

     This is exactly what my father told me, who was also told by his father living in Beirut at the time, Jamal Pasha told the notables of Beirut at the time (mostly religeous figures and heads of Beiruti families) when they met with him to voice their objections to his methods. He told them verbatim: ” you guys are fools and have no clue what these guys are up to.”

     Regardless, what happened after WW I was going back to the original Young Turks program albeit at a much smaller scale, limited in this case to Asia Minor. So it was learning by fire and they were not so elite after all. The cost was huge and particularly for us. We’re still paying.

     Posted by Mustap | August 17, 2014, 2:23 pm
125. 

     Of interest to this crowd, surely:

     http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/06/16/syrias-neighbors-want-assad-to-step-down-but-no-appetite-for-aid-to-rebels/#opposition-to-aiding-syrian-rebels

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 17, 2014, 2:27 pm
126. 

     Jim,
     You are, obviously, right that France and Britain were not going to support the King-Crane recommendations. But that doesn’t mean they were right and that they did not commit a grave error from our point of view the people who were affected. There is no way we can look at France and somewhat to a lesser extent, Britain, that they were acting anything but as full fledged colonialists. That picture will remain in memory of the people of the area for a long time.

     If you ask me why I’m more symathetic to the Brits than the French, my answer is if there was no other option but to impose the fig leaf of a mandate, then I would have preferred Britain as the party entrusted to it. All the countries that were under The British Crown turned out to be more successful than the chaos created by the French who, in my opinion, knew very little in terms of running empires or colonies and are very obnoxious, to be honest. And as Lebanese, we should be thankful to the Brits who secured our independence when they were finally able to say to their tag-along-more-burden than an ally, France, it’s time to pack up and leave.

     Posted by Mustap | August 17, 2014, 5:27 pm
127. 

     Mustap,

     I think you’re being too quick to judge these historical actors and find them wanting for the choices they made, without understanding the context in which they made them.

     The Ottoman empire was led into the war by a small group within the government, who actually started the war without declaring it (attacking Russian ships in the Black Sea, if I remember rightly—don’t have Mustafa Aksakal’s book to hand); if there’d been an open debate the government might have decided against it. But it’s not clear that the empire would have been able to stay out of the war had it wanted to, or that it chose the ‘wrong’ side. By 1914 the Ottoman government had ample reason to be suspicious of the states of the Triple Entente, which became the Allies.

     If we only go back as far as 1911, the Italian invasion of Tripolitania had raised little controversy in Europe. All previous European encroachments onto the empire’s territory for the previous hundred years, up to and including the Austrian annexation of Bosnia in 1908, had generated a significant hoo-hah, with other states getting involved to ensure that the empire survived, or at least that the encroaching European power didn’t make excessively great gains by itself. This was the whole ‘eastern question’, and it depended on the ‘sick man of Europe’ staying alive. 1911 answered the question, by demonstrating that no-one, any longer, had a stake in the survival of the Ottoman state—apart from the Ottoman state and those parts of its population which viewed it as their only protection against rapacious encroaching powers. The leaders of Balkan states understood that lesson, hence their combined attack the following year, before the war in Tripolitania had even come to an end. (You attribute this to the hardliners in the Ottoman government: on what grounds?) The empire barely survived the first Balkan war, and only clawed back part of its losses in the second, the following year, because the Balkan alliance fell apart when Bulgaria’s allies turned on it and stripped it of the enormous gains it had made (by doing a lot of the fighting) in 1912. The events in the Balkans, meanwhile, were part of a longer history, since the 1870s and earlier, of increased Russian involvement there (direct or through proxies)—chiefly at the expense of the Ottoman empire, but viewed as a sufficiently great threat by Austria-Hungary to trigger the first world war.

     Did the Ottomans in 1913 have time to ‘consolidate’? I don’t think so, whether we’re looking at it from the perspective of 2014 or 1913. They were trying to: for example, they invested a lot of money in buying modern battleships from Britain. When the war broke out in summer 1914, when the ships were complete (or nearly), Britain seized them: hardly the act of a friendly power. Germany offered ships to Constantinople—the ones Jim mentioned—to emphasise the contrast between it and Britain: you can’t trust them, but we put our money (and ships, and men) where our mouth is. The ‘nice’ Young Turks you would prefer to have seen in power after 1912—and so would I—were liberals who looked to Britain and France, but they ranked extremely low in British and French priorities. If they’d been in power, could they have trusted Britain and France to support the empire? It’s doubtful. By 1914 Britain and France were allied with Russia, and Russia’s designs on the Straits and Constantinople had been clear for years. Britain showed where its priorities lay in summer 1914; France saw the Russian alliance as strategically crucial, and at the same time saw less and less need for the Ottoman state itself to survive to protect French investments in the empire (which were substantial).

     I’m not saying all this to defend the Committee of Union and Progress. But even if you stick at this level of analysis, which is a fairly ‘thin’ diplomatic history, and even if you only look at the two or three years before 1914, it’s easier to see why they chose to take the empire to war, and on the German side. Put it in a longer perspective, and layer the analysis to include more of the texture of late Ottoman history (stuff I’m personally much more interested in: the rapid social and economic transformations the empire was witnessing, the tumultuous internal politics they gave rise to, the way all this linked to the rest of the world; the massive and transformative influx of Muslim refugees from the Caucasus and the Balkans and the well-founded fears they brought with them), and we can see why they felt their choices were so limited.

     Right: that’s all from me for a little while. I’ll check in again in a few days.

     Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 17, 2014, 6:50 pm
128. 

     Oh, hey, this whole debate moved on while I was composing that last comment. Good.

     Posted by benjaminthomaswhite | August 17, 2014, 6:52 pm
129. 

     Elias

     I am not sure what I’m supposed to read into the King-Crane report.

     That the Arabs haven’t changed much in 100 years?

     That the Bogey-Man of communal discord used to be the Ottomans, and then it became the French/British, then it became the despots (who overthrew the kingdoms) but were still Western stooges? Then it became the Western/Qatari/Saudi/Israeli backed Syrian-rebels-come-ISIS.

     I don’t know if Jim is right, and the report represents “elite” opinion. Or “general public” opinion. Even if it represented Majority opinion, what’s that saying? There was still a complex mosaic of peoples in the area. Minorities perhaps, but very much there anyways.

     Posted by Gabriel | August 17, 2014, 9:40 pm
130. 

     QN,

     It all boils down to if you want to have an evidence based discussion or not.

     You claim that with good leadership the Sykes-Picot countries would have turned out differently. But you cannot point at ONE such country that turned out ok. Should we really believe that the Arabs could not turn up even ONE good leader in over 80 years? That is playing into the most racist themes possible. And based on the caliber of local Arab leadership in Israel I find that notion impossible.

     Not to mention that Ghandi, the one and only, could not stop the breakup of India and Pakistan with the cost of human life and population transfer that dwarfs anything in our region. If Ghandi could not do it, who could?

     Sectarian animosity is a scourge that surpasses the ability of good leadership to handle. That has been shown over and over again in human history. If the Czechs and the Slovaks split up, if the Scots want their own country, if almost 50% of the people of Quebec want their own country, if the Flemish and the French speakers in Belgium want to split up, why do you still cling to your notion that all that is lacking is good leadership and economic development???

     Posted by AIG | August 18, 2014, 9:54 am
131. 

     Sindh (part of today’s Pakistan) and Hind (India) were two distinct nations since prehistoric times – perhaps as far back as when Solomon was still judging peoples’ affairs in the Temple.. But black-sheep nation(s)who have no histories cannot fathom the difference in the case of Hind/Sindh. Until you become a non-black sheep nation, then you become qualified to discuss cases of full fledged nations with real histories and identities behind them.

     Posted by Mustap | August 18, 2014, 10:24 am
132. 

     Sykes-Picot™ strikes Again!

     Looks like not only the Iraqi military was AWOL, but so is the PA…

     http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4560000,00.html

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 18, 2014, 12:41 pm
133. 

     AIG:

     Your thinking is now becoming a little bit muddled. First you say that my observation that Arab governments have generally failed at delivering the goods to be racist. Then you say: “if Gandhi could not do it, who could?” I can’t follow you.

     There have been some instances of wise leadership and smart economic decisions here and there, but on the whole the trend has been negative and “unlucky,” as you say. It’s not about individuals so much as a failure to build lasting institutions that can cultivate prosperous political cultures.

     “Sectarian animosity is a scourge that surpasses the ability of good leadership to handle. That has been shown over and over again in human history. If the Czechs and the Slovaks split up, if the Scots want their own country, if almost 50% of the people of Quebec want their own country, if the Flemish and the French speakers in Belgium want to split up, why do you still cling to your notion that all that is lacking is good leadership and economic development???”

     Hold on. How are these examples of sectarian animosity? There you go again, painting with the broadest brush possible. Why not include the Alaskan Independence Party too? Surely that’s an example of another “sectarian” struggle…

     If you want to have an evidence-based discussion, then please engage with the several points I have already made:

     1. No conclusive link has been established by political scientists who have devoted their careers to studying this question between ethnic fractionalization and civil conflict. One has to examine instances on a case-by-case basis. If you think you know better than people who have spent their entire careers demonstrating the opposite, then who am I to end your delusions of omniscience?

     2. In the case of the post-Ottoman Arab states, I have already given you evidence of the political demands being made by “the people themselves” as you requested. The Damascus congress wanted independence for one country called Syria, not 10 different little sectarian enclaves (which is what I assume you think would have been better.) Syria and Iraq had been coherent places — politically-administratively, geographically, culturally — for centuries. Marounistan, Shi’istan, and Sunnistan were not. Kurdistan, I will grant, would have made sense, precisely because of the reasons that make sense in the cases you brought above.

     3. The Sykes-Picot borders, as has been argued cogently many times:

     “merely put on the map patterns of special administrative arrangements that had been in the making under the Ottomans for decades, if not longer. Thus, special Ottoman arrangements for Palestine and Lebanon date back to the nineteenth century: the special administrative district of Lebanon dating to 1861 and the special district of Jerusalem established in the 1870s. As for Iraq, it had been separated entirely from Syria in administrative terms almost since the beginning of Islam – and had for long periods been ruled from Baghdad as a single charge. Again, the only real exception pertains to the Raqqa-Ana borderlands which in brief intervals had gravitated towards Baghdad rather than Damascus. All the talk that these boundaries are a mere hundred years old and that everything was designed by a couple of European colonial strategists is utter unscientific nonsense that collapses immediately upon confrontation with contemporary primary documents, where terms like “Syria” and “Iraq” were in widespread use long before Sykes and Picot even knew where these areas were located.”

     So, to sum up, the borders largely carried over administrative/political realities that had existed prior to WWI and these realities were acknowledged by Arab elites in making their demands for independence.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 18, 2014, 12:51 pm
134. 

     Gabriel, see my last comment to AIG regarding what one might read into the King-Crane commission’s report.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 18, 2014, 1:02 pm
135. 

     ““Sectarian animosity is a scourge that surpasses the ability of good leadership to handle.”

     Congratulations! AIG. It’s takes a lot of chutzpah for a zionist to admit to this basic truth.

     Posted by lally | August 18, 2014, 1:07 pm
136. 

     QN,

     Please do not misstate my argument.

     ” It’s not about individuals so much as a failure to build lasting institutions that can cultivate prosperous political cultures.”

     So who failed in building those institutions if not political leaders, as individuals are as a group? And why did they fail in ALL Sykes-Picot countries? In other places in the world there were successes and failures. Why is the track record ALL failure in the Sykes-Picot countries. And not just a failure in the Czechoslovakia case in which there was an amicable divorce, but in ALL these countries there were or are bloody civil wars. What is your alternative theory except “shit happens”?

     Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Scotland and Quebec are examples in which there are both advanced democratic political institutions AND economic development. Yet, the sects or groups do not want to live together. So your theory that if only there were the appropriate institutions and economic development things would be hunky dory is just plain false. Lebanon was much more advanced economically and politically than other countries yet had one of the worst civil wars.

     And to your points directly:
     1) Yes, looking case by case is the right way to go. So again I ask, what makes the Sykes-Picot countries so special that they are batting 0? Of course there is no conclusive evidence in questions like these. But you have to put two theories one against the other. What is your alternative theory to the total failure of the Sykes-Picot countries? I think it is something to do with bad leadership, but that is not a theory. Why did these countries create such bad leaders? Of course, they didn’t. They created the same kind of leaders as in other places in the world but they could not overcome how the odds were stacked against them just like Ghandi could not stop the India-Pakistan fiasco.

     2+3) The Ottoman empire was a corrupt bureaucracy. On the ground things were very different from some sanjaks painted on maps. The early Zionists bribed the Ottomans right and left to get what they wanted and I am sure it was the same all over the empire. How the Turks arbitrarily divided their empire, does not make an argument for nation state borders.
     And how does the evidence of the Damascus Congress and its demand carry any water? I find this strange coming from you especially. How many times did we hear Lebanese and Syrian politicians talk about Pan-Arab Nationalsm and the Great Arab Nation? All talk, no substance. The Damascus Congress was just another detached body that did not reflect the facts on the ground. Look how quick the Palestinians changed from being Syrians to being Palestinians. And how many of the Christians in Lebanon view themselves as part of the Arab world? But the strongest evidence against you assertion is the fact that Syria actually failed miserably. Again, if the borders were not the problem, why all the civil wars that are sectarian in nature?

     Posted by AIG | August 18, 2014, 1:37 pm
137. 

     AIG

     I’d love to keep going round and round but I need to bow out now. Let’s pick it up in the near future. Too much work and the topic is too interesting to treat cursorily.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 18, 2014, 2:03 pm
138. 

     ““Sectarian animosity is a scourge that surpasses the ability of good leadership to handle.” NewZ

     Good. Now we have an excuse to kill everybody and get away with it.*

     *except Israel of course…

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 18, 2014, 2:05 pm
139. 

     …the topic is too interesting to treat cursorily…

     QN,

     Take it from me and my one sentence responses: you’re not trying hard enough;)

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 18, 2014, 2:07 pm
140. 

     Let’s see who succeeded in the ME and who failed and determine the reasons for success or failure:

     1) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a success. Reasons: no Sykes-Picot, no colonialism and wise leadership. And there was no need for democracy either as an ingredient for success.

     2) The Gulf States. Reasons: Wise leadership and there was no need for democracy either. There was colonialism but failure was mitigated because of the Brits.

     3) Morocco is a success. Reasons: no Sykes-Picot, no colonialism and wise leadership. And there was no need for democracy either.

     4) Jordan is relatively successful. Reasons: Sykes-Picot but the Brits mitigated its potential failure. Wise leadership and there was no need for democracy either.

     I do not consider Israel to be a success because for all practical purposes it has been in a state of civil war since 1948. Winning the lottery does not make you successful. It may make well off. Reasons for failure: Sykes-Picot and even though the Brits were there but they had to abandon ship too early because of Zio terrorism at the time

     Lebanon, Syria and Iraq are failures specifically because of Sykes-Picot, no wise leaderships. Lebanon’s democracy didn’t help either.

     So pick and choose which ingredients are necessary or not necessary for success/failure.

     Posted by Mustap | August 18, 2014, 2:34 pm
141. 

     Mustap.

     Interesting insights.

     You’ll need to elaborate why the monarchies in Iraq and Iran failed.

     Posted by Ray | August 18, 2014, 5:03 pm
142. 

     AIG

     Bear with me here.

     The question we are debating is: to what extent have the Sykes-Picot borders accounted for civil conflicts in the post-Ottoman states during the 20th and 21st centuries? You believe that these borders “set the Arab states up for failure” because they grouped people into states that didn’t belong together and were more likely to fight than get along. I believe that the borders had a far less meaningful impact than you say.

     In order to get somewhere, I think we need to look at this issue at two different levels: macro and micro.

     At the macro level, as we have already established, the evidence is inconclusive that ethnic fractionalization leads to civil conflict. For every example you give me of a state splitting up because of its diverse population, I can give you an example of a state staying together despite the diversity. India and Pakistan split up, but today India is home to over a billion people speaking hundreds of different languages and practicing different religions. Many Scots are pushing for independence, but the Welsh aren’t. The mere fact of fractionalization does not automatically translate into civil conflict or desires for secession. I think we can agree on that. So let’s set aside the arguments from the macro level for now.

     At the micro level, I have no problem accepting that in given cases, borders lead to civil conflicts. Let’s take a hypothetical scenario of a country called Aigland, the borders of which were drawn by colonial powers to satisfy their own mineral extraction interests. Aigland’s population is made up of two ethnic groups that speak different languages, have radically different customs, worship different religions, and have fought with each other for centuries. Neither group wants to share a country with the other; 20-30 years of civil conflict later, they break up.

     Was Aigland a good idea? Probably not. Would a lot of suffering have been spared if the borders were drawn differently? Probably so.

     I think we can both agree that none of the Sykes-Picot Arab states is as extreme an example of fractionalization as Aigland. The question is: so what? One surely doesn’t need Aigland-levels of fractionalization to produce civil conflict. I agree. So let’s take an actual example, Lebanon.

     There were no major civil conflicts in Lebanon for the first 30-odd years after independence. 1958 marked a moment of conflict that was subdued by foreign intervention, but it was followed by a decade of economic growth, infrastructural development, social welfare programs, etc. This was Lebanon’s so-called golden age, even though it was largely a golden age for Beirut. The rest of the country lagged behind and the rising tide did not lift all boats, but the assimilationist ambitions of the Chehabist programs proceeded apace. My father’s generation did not think they were growing up in a country on the brink of civil war.

     So what happened? The Arab-Israeli conflict moved to Lebanon. Hundreds of thousands of refugees were expelled from Palestinian villages and came to Lebanon along with the PLO and various militia groups. Israel invaded Lebanon twice and bit off a chunk of its southern flank as a security zone. Syria invaded and stayed for thirty years. The Lebanese Civil War was not a war fought purely between Lebanese communities. It began as a war between the Lebanese Christian militias and the Palestinians, and then became a war between the Christian militias themselves, left-wing and right-wing militias, the Syrian army, the US and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, Saddam Husayn and Hafiz al-Assad, etc.

     No small state, no matter how ethnically “homogenous” it was, could have avoided the consequences of such extreme proximity to the Arab-Israel conflict. The reason I asked you to redraw the borders was not a rhetorical challenge. Would a Maronite Lebanon have avoided a conflict with Israel after 1967 if the PLO had moved its base of operations there? Would a Sunni Syria have decided not to invade Maronite Lebanon in response, seeking to reincorporate it into its own territory? Different borders would not have made these countries less immune to the fallout of 1948, just as they would not have been immune to a cataclysmic earthquake.

     Ok, now I’m really going to take a break from this discussion… I leave the last word to you.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 18, 2014, 5:34 pm
143. 

     In the Iranian case, the monarch was an idiot.

     In the Iraqi case, the people were idiots.

     Posted by Mustap | August 18, 2014, 5:35 pm
144. 

     Here’s an interesting proposal for the Maronites of Lebanon.

     Tracy Chamoun for President.

     Posted by Ray | August 18, 2014, 5:38 pm
145. 

     And in Egypt, Ya Mustap?

     Posted by Ray | August 18, 2014, 6:00 pm
146. 

     What’s wrong with Egypt? Nasser screwed up. Sadat fixed things. Mubarak was good for 30 years. It’s not clear why they went crazy on him in 2011. Now, they want back. People sometimes do crazy things. Mass hypnotism, social media hypes etc…

     But overall, Egypt is OK.

     Posted by Mustap | August 18, 2014, 6:18 pm
147. 

     and who’s to say that even if the Middle East became an archipelago of smaller countries based on sects, there wouldn’t be cross border conflicts based on ethnic cleansing and usurpation.

     Very interesting debate nonetheless with both QN and AIG going to the 12th round, as QN was gaining points with lethal jabs, AIG opted for broad swings looking for a quick knockout. Well played QN, well played.

     Posted by Maverick | August 18, 2014, 6:44 pm
148. 

     QN,

     First let’s get the historical facts straight. The 1948 Palestinians were not a serious problem for Lebanon. The conflict that screwed Lebanon was the Palestinian-Hashemite one, not the Israeli Palestinian one. Israel played no role whatsoever in the PLO attempted coup against King Hussein that led to Black September. Not did Israel play any role in the Cairo agreement which really was the most idiotic agreement a country would agree to. It stands out as the stupidest agreement ever signed in our region by far. Lebanon was signing up both for civil war and to a hot border with Israel. No Cairo agreement, no problems with Israel whatsoever. In 1967 it would have been a cake walk for Israel to take parts of Lebanon.. Yet is didn’t do it, because we had no issue with Lebanon until Lebanon allowed the PLO to attack Israel from within its borders. Would a Maronite or Druze state have signed the Cairo agreement? Yeah, right.

     Why could Hussein defeat the PLO but Lebanon succumbed to it? Exactly because Lebanon was not cohesive and could not build a strong army. The sects tried to play the Palestinians against each other and shot themselves in the foot.

     If there would have been a Maronite or Druze state they would have had a strong army and it could have had an under the table agreement with Israel and the US to protect it from the Palestinians and Sunnis. In fact, Bashir Gemayel signed a short lived agreement with Israel and the Israeli Druze are an integral part of the country. There is no reason similar arrangements could not be made with the Christians and Druze of Lebanon. But there was no chance of Lebanon as a whole making such an agreement. So again, history shows that the border screwed everybody and led to a civil war. Better borders could potentially have saved large parts of Lebanon from conflict.

     And yes, just like Syria forces stopped attacking Jordan because of Israeli threats, Israel and the US could have protected a Maronite or Druze state.
     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_September_in_Jordan#Syrian_intervention_attempt

     The borders of Lebanon were not fatal at the beginning. They were more like a virus that harms the immune system but that does not kill. When the Nasser (brokered the Cairo agreement) and PLO infections happened , the impaired immune system did not allow Lebanon to deal with this external threat.

     Posted by AIG | August 18, 2014, 6:56 pm
149. 

     QN,

     One more thing. You write:
     “No small state, no matter how ethnically “homogenous” it was, could have avoided the consequences of such extreme proximity to the Arab-Israel conflict. ”

     Seriously? Lebanon was about the same size of Israel with the same population size but with much better geography. If Israel could survive the conflict, why couldn’t Lebanon survive? Why was Lebanon the only country that could not kick the PLO’s butt?

     Posted by AIG | August 18, 2014, 7:03 pm
150. 

     …

     :p

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 18, 2014, 7:48 pm
151. 

     I see too many “if’s”, too many assumptions and too many distortions of facts in the arguments above just like a drowning person hanging to straws.

     But, another reply from QN would be very welcome, I’m sure, by all.

     So, please come back QN for one more last time.

     Posted by Mustap | August 18, 2014, 7:53 pm
152. 

     No, I’m cashed out. AIG overwhelmed me with that last one… No meaningful response possible.

     New post coming soon: an interview with an expert on the Lebanese Armed Forces. Should be interesting.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 18, 2014, 7:59 pm
153. 

     In the meantime, turn your thoughts to this odd photograph.

     http://elaph.mobi/news/932750/

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 18, 2014, 8:01 pm
154. 

     QN,

     Do you deny the fact that Israel and Lebanon are similar in size and population?
     What kind of excuse is size?

     Posted by AIG | August 18, 2014, 8:11 pm
155. 

     I deny nothing and confirm nothing. I am going to watch football.

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 18, 2014, 8:29 pm
156. 

     AIG,

     Not to throw a spanner in the works, but I don’t think minorities creating their own Nation-States would be feasible. Not only are they too tiny to administer such a grand task, they also have their long lasting beliefs that dictate a ‘taqqiya’ or assimilation within the larger nation. Groups such as the Alawites, Ismaelis, Druze, Yazidis and other sufi-esque minorities would prefer to have an autonomous community within the larger multi-ethnic community. For starters, they can practise their spirituality without having to deal with governance, administration and the burdens of a Nation-State deflecting their responsibilities in the spiritual realm. Also, politically, they set themselves up for antagonism and hostility as they are now isolated in one entity. You also have the ancient Christian minorities who might have similar tendencies.

     Posted by Maverick | August 18, 2014, 8:36 pm
157. 

     QN,

     RGIII isn’t going to last in the NFL if he continues running with the ball.

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 18, 2014, 9:06 pm
158. 

     Maverik,

     Just nonsense:
     http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jabal_Druze_State

     If you don’t think some of the Christians in Lebanon believe there could be either a completely independent Christian country or at the very least a Christian state that is part of a federation, you haven’t been talking to any LF’er lately. The other Christians would jump at the option of a Christian state if they thought it were viable. It would be near impossible to breakup Lebanon now.

     All what you said, was said about the Jews for years by the way. Boy were many people surprised to see Jews with a state.

     Posted by AIG | August 18, 2014, 10:57 pm
159. 

     Maverick,

     Minorities and non-Muslims can practice their ‘spiritualities’ in any Arab country without resorting to ‘taqqiya’, which to my knowledge means concealement and not assimilation.

     You would object to my blanket statement above by citing Saudi Arabia. OK, you can do that. But, there are reasons for it. Saudi Arabia is a tribal society and 100% Muslim since the early days. You may say, there are millions of migrant workers who are non-Muslims. True, but they are in the Kingdom under a contract which they understand very clearly before they leave their home countries. They know they can never become citizens, they cannot upset the prevailing customs, and they have to go back to their countries of origin when their sevices are no longer required. In return, they are usually compensated with very lucrative salaries and benefits.

     There is a similar practice in almost all the huge multinational conglomerates operating throughout the world, companies that employ hundreds of thousands of workers. In addition to their regular staff (which you may think of as citizens of the company because they usually retire from the company. They’re there for life), these companies rely on a huge pool of contractors who provide essential services to the company. These contractors also get the lucrative contracts with huge immediate compensations, but they don’t get the long term benefits of the regular staff (the citizens). The regular staff usually make far less than the contractors in terms of immediate compensations. It’s not exactly the same when it comes to spirituality, but there are millions others throughout the world who would be more than eager to sign the contract with the Saudis and live with the inconvenience of taqqiya.

     Posted by Mustap | August 18, 2014, 11:10 pm
160. 

     AIG,

     You can hardly call that a Nation-State, it was a more a statelet, territory, canton. I think it was also a reaction to the French authorities. A snippet in Wikipedia is hardly a good starting point.

     See article below;

     http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/20452

     Mustap,

     ‘Taqqiya’ I believe is concealment through assimilation (on the surface anyway) and try asking the Yazidis if they can practice their ‘spiritualities’ in any Arab country even before the advent of ISIS.

     Posted by Maverick | August 19, 2014, 12:30 am
161. 

     Maverick,

     To be honest with you, I never heard of Yazidis before the recent events. In Iraq, at least before ISIS, they had their own pilgrimage town and places of worship. So they were practicing in the open.

     Due to their very limited numbers, they may get looked upon awkwardly in a place other than Iraq. But, in this case they may have to resort to Taqiyya. And yes agree, on the surface it is assimilation. But assimilation as it was enforced in previous centuries in some parts of the world meant total melt down. Taqiyya is endemic to Muslim majority countries. And it is not confined to matters of faith only.

     I also wouldn’t expect any of the so-called satan worshipers would be free to practice even through Taqiyya, in case they get discovered, I’m sure they’ll be dealt with harshly. I heard of one getting arrested recently in some Gulf country.

     I don’t think there’s a problem with the rest of the other recognized non-Islamic faiths.

     Posted by Mustap | August 19, 2014, 12:55 am
162. 

     Lally.

     Lol.

     Brilliant. Just brilliant.

     Posted by Gabriel | August 19, 2014, 4:32 am
163. 

     Gaby. 🙂

     How else to deal with one for whom facts are fungible?

     I’m beginning to think of AIG as Rabbi AIG:

     “The Bible: This is what the Midrash and the Talmud are, Rabbis arguing. In the Torah, Jews argue with God. Abraham frickin’ haggles with God over the amount of righteous men needed to save Sodom and Gomorrah. Just to clarify: The Talmud is a record of rabbis arguing, often over other arguments which are over the Midrash’s arguments with itself. Traditional Talmud study is basically nonstop arguing. So really people are arguing about arguments about arguments about arguments. Then they start comparing ‘those” arguments…”

     http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/JewsLoveToArgue

     Way way way above my pay grade…

     Posted by lally | August 19, 2014, 4:18 pm
164. 

     You guys are overcomplicating this with the whole Sykes-Picot theories.

     You have to widen your prism a little bit. 30 years of “peace” (post-independence, in Lebanon) is actually a small timeframe when taking in history as a whole. So are the Skyes-Picot borders for that matter.

     The peoples of the Middle East (Arabs, mostly, but I don’t want to pin this on race) have been entrenched in tribalism for centuries (a tribalism that extends, to a certain degree to sectarianism, ie Shia-Sunni divide, but also Mulsim/Christian/Jew/Turk/Kurd, etc.)
     The culture has been one of constant war, usurpation, subjugation and so on, going back to the days of, pretty much, the Roman Empire’s fall and the rise of the muslim caliphate (the original one, not the current one, heh).

     I blame the culture, one rooted in tribalism, ideas of tribal honor, etc. for the violence that has been pretty much the de facto modus operandi for the region for about 1000 years or more.
     Sykes-Picot didn’t help, when seen at a micro-time level (meaning, we zoom in to the last 100 years), but the endemic problems of the region predate Sykes-Picot and cannot be blamed solely (or even in large part) on that fateful agreement.

     The peoples of the region have been, by default, in a state of constant war and violence. The periods of enforced peace seem to be the exception, rather than the rule. And I say “enforced” because it seems to be very much a factor of a power gaining dominance and enforcing a semblance of peace by subjugating the warring tribes, for a period of time:
     – The original caliphate, which fell into internecine war soon after its inception.
     – The Abbasid caliphate, which also imposed peace for a time, then weakened and gave way to internecine conflict.
     – The Ottoman empire…See above.
     – The Sykes-Picot colonial powers. Which gave way to a period of instability after the colonials pulled out.
     – The current era, where again, we’ve seen some enforced peace (courtesy of various strongmen), followed by the order of things starting to collapse. (And I’ll throw into this bucket the Iran-Iraq war, the Lebanese civil war, the Israeli-Arab conflict and now all the current revolts/wars/rebellions/etc).

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 19, 2014, 4:45 pm
165. 

     My special dedication to my friend.

     Posted by Ray | August 19, 2014, 7:13 pm
166. 

     From a comment by AIG in 2009:

     “There will be wars in the middle-east in the next few years. But they will be CIVIL wars inside the Arab countries. Both Egypt and Syria are unsustainable entities, perhaps also Jordan. The combination of oil prices, the depression, lack of water and the crazy population growth will lead to a big explosion in the middle-east. This is really not in our own hands. We should wait patiently and see what emerges afterwards. This process may take 20 years to play out but it is NOT in our hands to influence. We are neither smart enough or strong enough and also we do not care enough. We have to mind our own very narrow interests and let the chips fall where they may.”

     Yikes…

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 19, 2014, 8:40 pm
167. 

     The Secrets of Beirut with Bahi Ghubril

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 19, 2014, 8:52 pm
168. 

     Watching the video of the gruesome and barbaric beheading of James Wright Foley was frightening, but what was also chilling is the impeccable English the ISIS thug spoke. Disgusting, we can’t bomb them in Iraq and allow them to flourish in Syria. It is time we bomb their strong holds in Raqqa and throughout Syria.

     Posted by tamer k | August 19, 2014, 8:53 pm
169. 

     Looks like AIG had it pegged back in 2009. Can Brown offer him an honorary degree in ME Prophecy?

     t is time we bomb their strong holds in Raqqa and throughout Syria.

     Tamer K,

     Sure, you have my permission, but just make sure it’s done “proportionally” and that you don’t employ “collective punishment”.

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 19, 2014, 10:14 pm
170. 

     And to keep the “good” news coming:
     1) As much as the current situation in Egypt is beneficial for Israel, it ain’t over yet there. There will be serious unrest in the next few years for all the same underlying reasons.
     2) Lebanon is in grave danger from the Syrian refugees. In 10 years give or take, the current children and teenagers will have grown up much of their life in Lebanon and will make demands on the Lebanese state. This will lead to a civil war. I don’t know what the solution is, but Lebanon has to somehow deal with the issue if it wants to survive in its current form.
     3) Jordan is still very shaky but given the example of the catastrophe next door in Syria, there will be a strong reluctance by the population to risk instability.

     But there is some actual good news. It looks like the people of the middle east are finding out rather quickly that political Islam is not a good alternative so the transition from political Islam to other options will take much less time than I thought. It was hard to imagine that the Islamists would be so ineffectual or brutal. The Egyptians got fed up with the Muslim Brotherhood in a very short time. The downside is that the only alternative so far is authoritarian regimes or deadlock that cannot deal with the underlying problems such as population growth in Egypt or political reform in Lebanon.

     Posted by AIG | August 20, 2014, 12:33 am
171. 

     No one wants to comment on my response above?

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 20, 2014, 2:44 am
172. 

     BV,

     If you’re looking back a thousand years, which region didn’t experience constant warfare? You make it sound like the ME’erner is doomed to perpetual conflict because it is etched in his DNA.

     The constant struggles were never about borders but ideologies. It’s too bad that so often wars fought on ideological premises end up being sectarian in nature.

     Posted by Maverick | August 20, 2014, 5:50 am
173. 

     ICYMI: a column by Rami Khoury that speaks of the “thin nature of citizen allegiance to the contemporary centralized Arab state,” and attributes this to bad governance:
     http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Columnist/2014/Aug-20/267750-arabs-face-a-deep-crisis-of-statehood.ashx#axzz3AvOa083T

     Posted by Jim Reilly | August 20, 2014, 6:02 am
174. 

     No one wants to comment on my response above?

     Makes sense to me BV…

     But I think the discussion should be “Where do we go from here?”. Trying to explain how we got here is fairly interesting, but there are so many factors, no one can be “proven” correct or incorrect.

     I think AIG has a good feel for what to expect and it seems rather bloody and violent to me. Either ME moderates work together to fix things or it’s every man for himself.

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 20, 2014, 8:09 am
175. 

     QN’s Anti-Israel NewZ Hotline

     AIG,

     Bad news dude. You aren’t allowed to visit Bradford, England. They’re boycotting you.

     http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/aug/19/george-galloway-interviewed-police-bradford-israel-free-zone

     In other news, it looks like the Hamas “Death Wish” Government is getting what they’ve been praying for. Even our leftist MK, Tzippi Livni is excited…

     http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/08/20/israel-targets-hamas-commander-as-gaza-descends-into-violence/

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 20, 2014, 8:29 am
176. 

     BV was saying, if I understood correctly, that the norm in history is war. Peaceful intervals in history are just the interludes for the next war.

     Someone, I can’t remember who, said something like that.

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 8:53 am
177. 

     The US’ reply to Egyptian Ambassador’s statement voicing concerns about what’s happening in Ferguson, Mi, echoing the UN chief, shows how self righteous and hypocrite the US is.

     What does the US mean by saying that the US has more transparency when dealing with public riots and race issues than any other country in the world? That’s nothing but a cheap piece of crap hypocrisy and self righteousness. Instead of charging the officer with the crime, the state of Mi opted for a jury of some 20+ jurors to look into the case for a whole months while the streets are simmering with violence and anger. The prosecutor could have simply decided to lay or not lay charges based on evidence already in his possession and has the authority to do so. Referring the case to jurors to determine the circumstances of the crime and deciding whether to lay or not lay charges a month later is nothing but a whitewash.

     The US is the biggest hypocrite on earth.

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 10:47 am
178. 

     I know that history as a whole is full of war and violence between various peoples.
     That was not my point exactly. I think my comment was more geared towards the Middle East being in large part entrenched in a culture of tribalism, which has been the root cause for ongoing violence (and not, as some would have it, Sykes-Picot).
     Sure, Europe, the Americas, etc have had their shares of wars over the centuries, but those wars have often had a very different cachet to them, be it personal ambitions of various royal dynasties in the middle ages and renaissance, to nationalism of one form or another in the more recent times.
     But, in my opinion, one has to go back to the days of the fall of the Roman Empire to see in Europe the degree of tribalism we see today in the ME. Europe, as a whole, has not exactly been “tribal” since then and their wars have been fought over other reasons.
     Ditto for the Americas.
     I see tribalism in full force in Africa as well. No different than the ME. If you look at almost all conflicts in Africa and the ME, in the past century, you’ll see it has very little to do with colonial-drawn borders. Such are often used as pretexts, as are various ideologies (left vs. right, etc.) when in reality, when one scratches a bit under the surface, one finds most if not all of these conflicts being the continuation of long-prexisting tribal hatreds (Tutsis/Hutus in Rwanda/DRCongo/Burundi, etc), Arabs/Berbers/Othertribes in Libya/Algeria/Chad/Western Sahara, and so on.
     And again, looking at the ME, one will find that our wars have been tribal in nature, and ongoing for much longer than Sykes-Picot or the colonial era.

     The point of my comment is to say this: I am tired of people blaming Sykes-Picot, the west, and the creation of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli conflict for all our ills.
     I cannot tell you how many times I have heard friends, family, online commenters, bloggers, and the like, claiming that “if the colonials had never created these artificial lines, we’d have been fine.” or “If they hadn’t created this artificial Israel, we wouldn’t have had any of these problems” or “It’s all because of the Arab-Israeli conflict” or “It’s all because of Sykes-Picot and what the western powers did to divide the Arab nation, etc.”
     You know what? There has NEVER been an Arab nation. It’s always been pretty much a loose grouping of clans fighting and raiding each other, going back all the way to the days of the Quraysh and the Prophet.
     The only difference is that these clans and tribes now disguise their wars under various more modern sounding banners like “Socialism” or “Arabism” or “Islamic” or whathaveyou. This clan mentality can be seen anywhere from the Jumblatts grip on the druze of Lebanon to the Tikiritis of Iraq or the Ibn Sauds of Arabia, to the various monarchies, Hashemites or gulf, etc…Tribes, tribes and more tribes.

     The biggest difference between the ME and the Americas or Europe, is that these tribes have still not coalesced into “nations” of any kind (And again, this has nothing to do with Sykes-Picot). We’ not 200 or 500 years behind. We’re about 2000 years behind (I’m thinking Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and other rival Germanic tribes)…

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 20, 2014, 12:42 pm
179. 

     I am tired of people blaming Sykes-Picot, the west, and the creation of Israel and the ensuing Arab-Israeli conflict for all our ills.

     BV,

     I see your are turning into a Zionist. Once we have Lilly making comments like you, then we will know we succeeded.;)

     Anyway, there are certainly arab nations. Many of them. They just need to learn how to settle their differences peacefully instead of using violence.

     Anyway, if there’s someone to blame, I blame ME Professors.

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 20, 2014, 1:03 pm
180. 

     BV,

     All the nations in the world evolved from tribes. Tribalism is not limited to the ME and Africa. It’s all over Asia. It is also everywhere in Russia, the Balkans. It still exists in South and central America. Europe and America still have some of their own tribal pasts in what they call nations – But I wouldn’t call America a nation yet.

     You cannot deny that Muhammad didn’t create a nation. It wasn’t called Arab even though it was spearheaded by Arabs. It lasted for well over a millennium and is still alive in may people’s memories if not also lives.

     You cannot deny that Saladin, who some claim as Kurd and some as Arab, did not rally a nation and was able to unite ALL of Arabia, including Yemen PLUS north Africa. It would be a an unparalleled feat for a Kurd, if true and the conflicting claims are settled one way or another, to accomplish what he accomplished on a scale like the Prophet himself.

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 1:06 pm
181. 

     Mustap,

     Re-read what I wrote carefully. Europe has evolved past clans fighting over their honor. At least for the most part.
     Muhammad created a Muslim nation that lasted, in that form, for a very short period of time (enforced peace) followed by internecine and tribal violence (Starting with the Muawya/Ali war and ongoing on and off for the millenium that ensued).

     If you think that the Muslim nation was united and peaceful from India to North Africa for the past 800 or so years, you may want to go read-up on history. The majority of those centuries was spent with the various tribes and clans continuing their age-old rivalries, peppered with a few periods of enforced tranquility.

     I don’t know how folks cannot see the difference between Europe/North America and the ME/Africa.
     It’s not that they don’t BOTH have conflicts. Of course they do.
     It’s the nature of the conflicts (and how they are addressed, via violence or via a different process).
     For the most part, Europe and NA have reached a point where conflicts are economic in nature (not based on antiquated notions of tribal honor and family ties) and are resolved peacefully (or close to it, with some exceptions).
     Then you look at the ME and Africa where it’s all about pride/honor of the tribe, sect, family.
     The groups dictated ME/Africa violence are NOT defined based on any kind of national or economical entities. They are entirely sectarian and tribal. As I said in my previous comment, it’s Druze or Maronites or Alawites or Tikritis or Kurds or Jews or Hutus or Tutsis or Berbers. Look at the conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRCongo, Rwanda, Chad, etc…They almost invariably are framed in very very tribal/clan terms. One clan is a minority and lords over another clan who rebels. Or something along those lines. And then you look back at the history, and you find that these same tribes and clans have been rivals for centuries (long predating the colonial era) and have been alternating being victor and vanquished.
     That is NOT at all similar to European history and how it evolved.

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 20, 2014, 1:42 pm
182. 

     BV,

     You’re in a state of biased denial. As for history, we know it very well. And we know exactly what the nature of those conflicts were. Enforcing the peace was and still is the paramount responsibility of the reigning authority, and that’s no different than the responsibility of present day governments.

     When you brush aside something like what Saladin did, the it’s obvious you’re not being objective. Even by your account, “The majority of those centuries was spent with the various tribes and clans continuing their age-old rivalries”, one can hardly explain how a possible Kurd could have united these conflicting tribes and clans if there was no underlying national force, not to mention well established civilizations like Egypt and the fertile crescent.

     What about the Ottomans who ruled for some 500 years? And if we have bad memories of them but that wasn’t always the case. In fact, the people of the Balkans have fond memories of the early Ottomans who came to rule over them at the time.

     The fact is, the Muslim Nation was a reality for over a millennium despite the different dynasties that ruled over it. These dynasties could only rule if and only if they had such legitimacy. Once they lose it, their dynasty and rule is gone. It can’t be saved,

     There is no reason on earth that different cultures should evolve similarly, like what you’re proposing with regards to EU and America. The possibilities are endless. But the conflicts always remain the same. You may argue that the conflicts in the ME are purely ideological. This is false, is too simplistic and there is always economical factors behind each and every conflict. Just as a reminder, early tribal societies engaged on wars more about sources of water or farming lands for themselves and their cattle than about all the other ideological factors that you enumerate. And they still do the same nowadays, but there are more resources to fight over these days.

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 2:05 pm
183. 

     The Ottomans ruled in name only for a majority of their time. Their Empire was fairly de-centralized and within their realm, tribes in the ME continued their wars and conflicts throughout.

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 20, 2014, 2:20 pm
184. 

     ‘…Their Empire was fairly de-centralized and within their realm, tribes in the ME continued their wars and conflicts throughout.”

     May be in the last 100 years or so but not before that.

     It took all the diplomatic skills of the British, the misrule of governors like Jamal Pasha, and the full support of a noble Arab to turn only SOME of the Arabs against the Ottomans.

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 2:31 pm
185. 

     Hussain Abdul-Hussain seems to agree with me. A piece dating back a few months:

     https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/555706-the-mistaken-tragedy-of-the-arabs

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 20, 2014, 2:31 pm
186. 

     Read the link I just posted.. 🙂

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 20, 2014, 2:32 pm
187. 

     C’mon BV, Hussein Abdul-Hussain is arguing only the last century. That’s a drop in the bucket. These things always happen towards the end of a dynasty.

     And what do you expect the British to say other than what they said according to Hussein? O’ yeah sorry, we were at fault! They are COLONIALISTS after all, and of course they want to look good and say we were not so bad after all. 🙂

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 3:10 pm
188. 

     You and I must be reading the article differently. I did not think he was talking about just the last century.
     He made a point of saying it wasn’t about Sykes-Picot or the colonials, rather, the tribes of the ME have been at each others’ throats by tradition, for centuries.

     I’ll quote:

     ” In the tribal code of that time, when a tribe was defeated, it joined the victor and conceded its land. ”

     “The overlap in maps between Ibn Saud and the colonials created two regions: one based on kinship and loyalty in the old tradition of Arab tribalism and the other based on Sykes-Picot and the interests of the colonials and their Arab urbanite protégés.” (old tradition of Arab tribalism…as in…not just 100 years old).

     “Eventually, a connection was established and, instead of urbanization, the tribes flocked to the cities, first forming belts of poverty and then replacing the cosmopolitan leadership and lifestyle with tribal code and tradition, including endless bloody feuds. ”

     Last but not least:

     “The Arabs are not in a wretched state – they are in a tribal state, and they are doing what they have been doing since time immemorial: conquering each other, demanding allegiance, and living in a state of perpetual war. The only difference now is that the Arabs are feuding in cities, and on TV and social media instead of in the desert.”

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 20, 2014, 5:22 pm
189. 

     BV,

     Here’s the truth that never changes and it’s from the same quote which you’re referring to:

     “In the tribal code of that time, when a tribe was defeated, it joined the victor and conceded its land.”

     This never changes with or without Sykes-Picot and it is valid today as it was millennia ago.

     FYI,
     Major Arab tribes which straddle the borders of Sykes-Picot affected countries (Jordan, Iraq and Syria) and KSA do not recognize the borders. They move in and out of one to the other at will. You may want to check one such tribe like قبيلة عنزة. They have presence in all four countries mentioned above

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 6:34 pm
190. 

     Then you and I are agreeing. My original point was that Sykes-Picot has had very little to do with the violence that has been affecting our region. Isn’t that what we’re both saying?
     I think that was the original gist of the discussion, with AIG arguing the same, and QN somewhat disagreeing.

     Posted by Bad Vilbel | August 20, 2014, 6:55 pm
191. 

     BV,

     In addition Hussein Abdul-Hussein needs to learn few things before making such blanket statements as the last two you quoted. The Arabs of Arabia were not all living in the desert at the time of Muhammad or couple centuries before him. The Meccan and Medinan societies were veryurbanite with oligarchs and aristocrats that are very well recognized. There was also Taif, Nejran not to mention the ancient Yemen. There were also urban centers on the east coast. many historians connect our Lebanon’s Byblos to an ancient Jubail on that coast. These were all urban centers and even the Arabs themselves made the distinction between city Arabs and the desert Arabs. The terms are distinct, pronounced and written differently and understood when used in conversation. Go back to the Quran. You’ll find them there.

     Muhammad and his people were not desert people. They did belong to tribes. But they were city dwellers.

     There are lots of analysts nowadays who are trying to make sense of what’s going on in the Arab world and especially in the Mashreq. It’s not as black and white as desert Arabs and city Arabs as Hussein is trying to portray it.

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 7:00 pm
192. 

     No I don’t agree with you, BV. I just read your last comment after posting

     Sykes-Picot has the most impact on what’s going on today in particularly in Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq.

     I may elaborate later. But, it’s been discussed above in most of the comments before you and I got engaged.

     Now I have to do something else.

     Posted by Mustap | August 20, 2014, 7:03 pm
193. 

     To all the BB conspiracy theorists: looks like BB was right, Hamas admits to killing the 3 Israeli teens….

     http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4561387,00.html

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 20, 2014, 8:40 pm
194. 

     Jeezus Effing Christ

     We have داعش in our midst.

     Posted by Gabriel | August 20, 2014, 9:24 pm
195. 

     Gabriel?

     Dash or Dash friendly? Not an accusation to make lightly.

     Posted by lally | August 21, 2014, 1:14 am
196. 

     Lally,

     Well with the minor exception of having clear evidence on where the individual stands on throat slitting, it’s quite clear every other dash-supporting attribute has a check mark beside it.

     I don’t throw j’accuses around lightly 🙂

     Posted by Gabriel | August 21, 2014, 3:52 am
197. 

     …The real da3sh is dying to spring out of the friendly Lally!

     Posted by danny | August 21, 2014, 7:18 am
198. 

     BDS Alert

     I wonder if George Galloway will prevent head-chopping Brits and Baathists from entering his little Bradford hamlet.

     http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/aug/19/george-galloway-interviewed-police-bradford-israel-free-zone

     Posted by Akbar Palace | August 21, 2014, 7:20 am
199. 

     BV

     I was the one arguing that S-P borders are not as relevant as other factors; AIG thinks they are of first-order importance.

     Just for the record…

     Posted by Qifa Nabki | August 21, 2014, 7:39 am
200. 

     “I was the one arguing that S-P borders are not as relevant as other factors; AIG thinks they are of first-order importance.”

     True, except AIG wanted to see quite few more borders on the map in order to feel more at ease.

     You would have been happy with less borders.

     Posted by Mustap | August 21, 2014, 8:05 am